THE LESSONS OF THE CUBAN MISSILE CRISIS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000403990003-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 21, 2010
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: September 27, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000403990003-5
TIME
27 SEPTEMBER 1982
The Lessons of the Cuban Missile Crisis
For 13 chilling days in October 1962, it seemed that John F
Kennedy and Alikita S. Khrushchev might be playing out the open-
ing scenes of World War III. The Cuban missile crisis was a
uniquely compact moment of history. For the first time in the nu-
clear age, the two superpowers found themselves in a sort of moral
road test of their apocalyptic powers.
The crisis blew up suddenly. The U.S. discovered that the Sovi-
et Union, despite repeated and solemn denials, was installing nu-
clear missiles in Cuba. An American U-2 spy plane came back
with photographs of the bases and their support facilities under
construction: clear, irrefutable evidence. Kennedy assembled a
task force of advisers. Some oft/tern wanted to invade Cuba. In the
end, Kennedy chose a course of artful restraint; he laid down a na-
val quarantine. der six days, Khrushchev announced that the So-
viet missiles would be dismantled.
The crisis served some purposes. The U.S. and the Soviet
Union have had no comparable collision
since then. On the other hand, the humilia-
tion that Khrushchev suffered may have
hastened his fall. The experience may be
partly responsible for both the Soviet mili-
tary buildup in the past two decades and
whatever enthusiasm the Soviets have dis-
played for nuclear disarmament.
Now, on the 20th anniversary of the cri-
sis, six of Kennedy's men have collaborated
on a remarkable joint statement on the les-
sons of that October. It contains some new in-
formation, particularly in Point Eight, and
at least one of their conclusions is startling
and controversial: their thought that, con-
trary to the widespread assumption of the
past two decades, the American nuclear su-
periority over the Soviets in 1962 had no cru-
cial influence with Washington or Moscow
at the time-ard that in general, nuclear su-
periority is insignificant.
ognition of the need for thorough overflight, not without its haz-
ards, that produced the decisive photographs. The usefulness
and scope of inspection from above, also employed in monitoring
the Soviet missile withdrawal, should never be underestimated.
When the importance of accurate information for a crucial policy
decision is high enough, risks not otherwise acceptable in collecting
intelligence can become profoundly prudent.
THIRD: The President wisely took his time in choosing a
course of action. A quick decision would certainly have been less
carefully designed and could well have produced a much higher
risk of catastrophe. The fact that the crisis did not become public
in its first week obviously made it easier for President Kennedy
to consider his options with a maximum of care and a minimum
of outside pressure. Not every future crisis will be so quiet in its
first phase, but Americans should always respect the need fora pe-
in dealing with a major international crisis.
FOURTH: The decisive military element
in the resolution of the crisis was our clearly
available and applicable superiority in con-
ventional weapons within the area of the
crisis. U.S. naval forces, quickly deployable
for the blockade of offensive weapons that
was sensibly termed a quarantine, and the
availability of U.S. ground and air forces
sufficient to execute an invasion if neces-
sary, made the difference. American nucle-
ar superiority was not in our view a critical
factor, for the fundamental and controlling
reason that nuclear war, already in 1962,
would have been an unexampled catastro-
phe for both sides; the balance of terror so
eloquently described by Winston Churchill
seven years earlier was in full operation. No
The authors are Dean Rusk. then Secretary of State; Robert
McNamara, Secretary of Defense; George W. Ball, Under Secre-
tary of State; Roswell L. Gilpatric, Deputy Secretary of Defense;
Theodore Sorensen, special counsel to the President; and
McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to the President for national
security affairs. Their analysis:
In the years since the Cuban missile crisis. many commenta-
tors have examined the affair and offered a wide variety of con-
clusions. It seems fitting now that some of us who worked partic-
ularly closely with President Kennedy during that crisis should
offer a few comments, with the advantages both of participation
and of hindsight.
FIRST: The crisis could and should have been avoided. If we
had done an earlier, stronger and clearer job of explaining our
position on Soviet nuclear weapons in the Western Hemisphere,
or if the Soviet government had more carefully assessed the evi-
dence that did exist on this point, it is likely that the missiles
would never have been sent to Cuba. The importance of accurate
mutual assessment of interests between the two superpowers is evi-
dent and continuous.
SECOND: Reliable intelligence permitting an effective
choice of response was obtained only just in time. It was primari-
ly a mistake by policymakers, not by professionals, that made
such intelligence unavailable sooner. But it was also a timely rec-
one of us ever reviewed the nuclear balance for comfort in those
hard weeks. The Cuban missile crisis illustrates not the signifi-
cance but the insignificance of nuclear superiority in the face of
survivable thermonuclear retaliatory forces. It also shows the cru-
cial role of rapidly available conventional strength.
FIFTH: The political and military pressure created by the
quarantine was matched by a diplomatic effort that ignored no
relevant means of communication with both our friends and our
adversary. Communication to and from our allies in Europe was
intense, and their support sturdy. The Organization of American
States gave the moral and legal authority of its regional hacking
to the quarantine, making it plain that Soviet nuclear weapons
were profoundly unwelcome in the Americas. In the U.N., Am-
bassador Adlai Stevenson drove home with angry eloquence and
unanswerable photographic evidence the facts of the Soviet de-
ployment and deception.
Still more important, communication was established and
maintained, once our basic course was set, with the government
of the Soviet Union. If the crisis itself showed the cost of mutual
incomprehension. its resolution showed the value of serious and
sustained communication, and in particular of direct exchanges
between the two heads of government.
When great states come anywhere near the brink in the nu-
clear age, there is no room for games of blindman's buff. Nor can
friends be led by silence. They must know what we are doing and
why. Effective communication is never more important than when
there is a militar confi?ontation.
C T 7\ STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/07/21 : CIA-RDP90-00552R000403990003-5