DESPITE FEARS OF U.S., SOVIET AID TO NICARAGUA APPEARS TO BE LIMITED

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403560011-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 21, 2012
• Sequence Number: 11
• Publication Date: April 3, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403560011-5
WALL STREET JOURNAL
ART .Mr APPEARED 3 April 1985
Latin Focus
Despite Fears of U.S.,
Soviet Aid to Nicaragua
Appears to Be Limited
White House Still Will Push
To Aid Contras to Lessen
Risk of Region Revolution
Managua Shuns Puppet Role
/\
D) \,L.Ar - auv.vw
I J(? And ROBERT S. GREExsERCEK
Staff Reporters of THE WALL STREET JOURNAL
MANAGUA, Nicaragua - The Soviet
bloc is much in evidence here, but the Rea-
gan administration's talk of a descending
Iron Curtain seems overdrawn.
Sandinista soldiers wielding Soviet-
made AK-47 rifles travel in East German
trucks and are coached by Cuban advisers.
Postage stamps honor the Soviet space
program, and supermarkets sell cans of
Bulgarian rabbit and Polish pate. The re-
cent death of Soviet leader Konstantin
Chernenko was observed with a period of
official mourning.
Despite the clear Soviet presence, most
signs indicate Moscow is moving cau-
tiously in Nicaragua. The Soviets are al-
ready bogged down with a military stand-
off in Afghanistan, unrest in Poland and
economic problems at home. The last thing
they want, many analysts believe, is to see
Nicaragua become another distant burden
like Cuba. And while nearly everyone
agrees the ruling Sandinistas are commit-
ted Marxists, they don't seem to be "eager
puppets" of Moscow or a serious military
threat to neighboring countries, as Presi-
dent Reagan claims.
Old Hardware
According to U.S. estimates, the Soviet
bloc supplied some $250 million in military
aid to Nicaragua last year. That is double
the figure for 1983 but only a small fraction
of the estimated $4 billion in annual Soviet
subsidies received by Cuba. The Soviet
bloc also provides Nicaragua with a
smaller amount of economic aid, but that
figure has declined in recent years.
i Most of the Sandinistas' military hard-
ware is relatively old, and Moscow has re-
peatedly turned down their requests for ad-
vanced jet fighters. Also, Sergio Ramirez,
Nicaragua's vice president, says that the
Soviets haven't obligated themselves to de-
fend Nicaragua in the event of a U.S. inva-
sion. "There is no treaty of mutual de-
fense," he says.
In revolutionary circles. Moscow
wants to be seen to have done everything
to ensure (the Nicaraguan regime's) abil-
ity to survive and defend itself, but the bot-
tom line, that the regime must ultimately
defend itself, is explicit," writes C. G. Ja-
cobsen, the University of Miami's director
of Soviet studies, in a June 1984 report
commissioned by the State Department.
If the Soviets don't feel unduly commit-
ted to the Sandinistas, the reverse also ap-
pears to be true. Although Soviet aid has
been a boon to the Nicaraguan regime,
which is struggling with a collapsing econ-
omy and a guerrilla war, it hasn't been
enough to make Managua a slave to Mos-
cow, according to many independent ob-
servers in Nicaragua.
No Mortgage
"Nobody is running this thing except
the Sandinistas," says a senior Western
diplomat in Managua. The Sandinistas, he
states, aren't letting their Cuban advisers
control the ministries, and "they aren't
mortgaging the revolution."
The Reagan administration, of course,
Soviet military involvement in Nicara-
gua began in August 1979 when four Soviet
generals secretly visited Managua only
weeks after the revolution that brought the
Sandinistas to power. Shipments of East
German military trucks and Soviet small
arms began around that time. Most of the
equipment has been Warsaw Pact hand-
me-downs that are technologically obso-
lete, but last fall the Soviets are said to
have delivered between five and 12 NII-24
Hind helicopter gunships. The helicopters
are sophisticated anti-insurgency aircraft
that the Soviets have been using against
guerrillas in Afghanistan.'
The Soviet bloc, principally Cuba, has
also sent advisers. U.S. estimates put the
number of Cuban advisers as high as 10,-
000, of whom as many as 3,000 are believed
to be working with the Nicaraguan army.
The others are believed to be civilians such
as physicians and teachers and engi-
neers.
The Sandinista regime claims there are
only about 1,500 Cuban advisers in Nicara-
gua, but most independent observers agree
that Cubans are a significant presence in
both the military and the Interior Ministry,
the government's police arm. Hugo Torres,
the Sandinista army's top political officer,
doesn't apologize for the presence of So-
viet-bloc advisers. "We had to begin from
zero," he says. "Somebody has to train us
to use a tank. That doesn't fall from the
sky."
Since 1979, military aid to the Sandin-
istas from the Soviet bloc has totaled over
$500 million. And some analysts are wor-
ried that the burgeoning Communist pres-
ence could eventually pose problems for
the United States. (U.S. aid to the contras
totaled about $80 million w hen Con ess
stopped further assistance last June a ter
disclosures that the Central Intel ige?ce_
Agency had been involved in the mining of
Nicaraguan harbors.)
Should the Soviets ever supply the San-
dinistas with modern jet fighters, for in-
stance, they could be used to intimidate
neighboring Honduras and Costa Rica and
support insurgencies. One of the more dis-
turbing developments in Nicaragua is the
construction of several airstrips that could
handle any warplane in the Soviet inven-
tory. (The Sandinistas say they need the
airstrips for economic reasons.)
Nicaragua's neighbors are clearly con-
cerned. Isidro Tapia, Honduras's ambassa-
dor to Nicaragua, says the Cuban and So-
viet involvement there "undoubtedly
means a threat to all Central American na-
tions, especially in military terms."
The Reagan administration agrees.
During recent congressional testimony,
Secretary of State George Shultz, referring
thinks the Sandinistas are doing just that
and more. The specter of Nicaraguan ag-
gression in Central America-financed by
the Soviet Union-has become the keystone
of the administration's uphill campaign to
persuade Congress to resume aid to the
"contra" guerrillas who are trying to over-
throw the Sandinista regime.
The effort to persuade Congress to give
the contras $14 million in aid is expected to
receive major attention from the White
House in the weeks ahead. President Rea-
gan, in his weekly radio broadcast last Sat-
urday. said that failure to approve the aid
would send the signal that the U.S. was
"incapable of stopping Communist aggres-
sion in our own backyard."
Most people agree the Sandinistas
would welcome regional revolution. They
have, for instance, given aid to leftist guer-
rillas in El Salvador although the amount
is a matter of debate. Still, many experts
maintain the Nicaraguan arms buildup is
primarily a defensive move-a reaction,
among other things, to increased activity
by the contras.
Secret Visit
A classified U.S. intelligence report pre-
con-
are late last year reaches
clusion. The re Dort. a co of which wa
reviewed v t is newspaper states that
"the overall buildup is primarily defense-
oriented. and much of the recent effort has
been devoted to improving counter insur-
gency capabilities."
Contbared
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403560011-5
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403560011-5
to Nicaragua, said, "We see a government
that is being armed by the Soviet Union,
developing an army-including reserves-
that far exceeds anything remotely needed
for defense in Central America." Adminis-
tration officials also dispute the Sandin-
istas' independence from the Soviet bloc.
The Cuban advisers "have the final word
on most things" in Managua, says a U.S.
official who is a chief architect of the pres-
ident's Central American policy.
Such rhetoric, however, seems designed
mainly to inflame the public debate and in-
fluence Congress. The classified U.S. intel-
ligence report prepare late last year con-
tradicts Secretary Shultz. And figures in
the re at sum est the increase in Soviet
aid to Nicaragua may have been prompted
by the escalation of the CIA-backed contra
,,var.
oviet military aid to the Sandinistas
began as a $5 million trickle in 1979 and
rose slightly to $7 million in 1980, accord-
ing to the report . In 1981, when Congress
authorized covert su rt of the contras,
so-tet- oc at soared to s4b minion. The
amount of Soviet aid and the intensity of
the contra war increased sharply in suc-
ceeding years.
Guerrilla Tactics
Nicaragua currently has about 60,000
soldiers on active duty. That's far more
than its neighbors, but those soldiers have
to deal with an estimated 15,000 contras
whose guerrilla tactics have successfully
compensated for their smaller numbers.
(Nicaragua also has another 60,000 militia-
men and reservists, but they are consider.
ably less well-equipped.)
Nicaragua's air force, accordine to the
U.S. intelligence report, is "one of the
smallest and least capable in the region."
Lacking air support, the Nicaraguan army
would probably find it difficult to launch
an attack against Honduras or Costa Rica.
Several U.S. military experts note, for in-
stance, that if Nicaragua's T-54 and T-55
tanks began a push north on the one usable
road to Honduras, they would be easily
picked off by the vastly superior Honduran
air force.
Based on a visit to Nicaragua in Febru-
ary, Lt. Col. Edward King,.a retired U.S.
army officer and critic of Reagan adminis-
tration Central American policy, dismisses
the Sandinista threat. "With its well-worn
Warsaw Pact castoffs, (Nicaragua) isn't
capable of launching an offensive any-
where in Central America," Lt. Col. King
says.
Economic Aid
On the nonmilitary front, Soviet aid to
Managua has actually been declining even
though the country is in dire need of such
help. Shortages have led to food rationing,
and the country's currency has virtually
collapsed. Damage to export crops like cof-
fee and cotton caused by the contra war
has severely reduced the supply of foreign
exchange to pay for needed imports.
Economic aid from the Soviet bloc
peaked in 1982 at about $253 million, ac-
cording to the Sandinista government. It
totaled about $146 million in each of the
last two years. Sandinista figures are gen-
erally considered accurate by the Univer-
sity of Miami's Prof. Jacobsen. The Soviet
bloc is playing a bigger role in Nicaraguan
trade, but the U.S. is still Managua's big-
gest trading partner. Last year, U.S. goods
accounted for about 20% of Nicaragua's
imports, and Americans purchased a sim-
ilar percentage of the country's exports.
(The U.S. share is falling rapidly, how-
ever.)
The Soviet bloc has also sent civilian
advisers to help some sectors of the Nica-
raguan economy. The Soviets are advising
the fishing industry, for instance. Bul-
garian agronomists are sharing informa-
tion on raising tobacco and hope to eventu-
ally blend their varieties with Nicaraguan
strains.
Friendship Hospital
Soviet economic aid is winning friends
and influence in Nicaragua. In the foyer of
the Soviet Friendship-Hospital in Chinan-
dega, a display of World War II battlefield
scenes depicts "The 40th Anniversary of
the Soviet Union's Defeat of Fascism."
Down the hall, Carlos Ramirez, a 24-year-
old corn farmer, is recovering from a
slipped disk. "I used to work for Ameri-
cans and didn't know anything about the
Soviet Union," he says. "Now I know So-
viets are calm people who treat people
well and equally."
Sandinistas still complain that the So-
viet economic aid is insufficient. Cesar
Arostegui, Nicaragua's vice minister of ex-
ternal cooperation, says Nicaragua needs
another $500 million in annual aid to pay
the interest on its foreign debt and to meet
domestic needs. "It's very difficult for the
Soviet Union or any other country of the
Socialist community to give us $100 million
at one shot," he says.
Some Soviet experts in the U.S. put the
problem differently. Moscow doesn't want
to take on another burden like Cuba, and
it isn't in a position to force the Nicara-
guans to do its bidding, says Cole Blasier,
a University of Pittsburgh political scien-
tist who specializes in the Soviet role in
Latin America. "So there are real limits,"
he says, to what the Soviets "will do eco-
nomically or militarily" for the Sandin-
istas.
c.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/21 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403560011-5