STATE DEPARTMENT STRIVES TO RECAPTURE CONTRA POLICY 'HIJACKED' BY THE CIA

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Collection: 
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000403340004-7
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
1
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
February 27, 2012
Sequence Number: 
4
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
February 9, 1987
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000403340004-7.pdf101.46 KB
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Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000403340004-7 WALL STREET JOURNAL ARTICLE APPEaREO ON PA6~ a~ - 9 February 1987 State Department Strives to Recapture Contra Policy `Hijacked' by the CAA WASHINGTON INSIGF~T By F~tCK Kguve .lfaff (tCQ01 '.~c)URNAL WASHINGTON-The State Department is maneuvering to regain lost influence over U.S. Central American policy, an area that one U.S. diplomat says the Cen- tral Intelligence Agency "hijacked" early in the Reagan administration. In an effort to capitalize on the recent departure of ailing CIA chief William A Case and growing criticism ~e ncy s mishandling of the Contra pro- gram, State Department officials are de- votingmore time and resources to combat- ting the Sandinistas. State Department officials believe they will win the bureaucratic battle, and if they do, U.S. policies toward the Contras, the U.S.-backed guerrillas struggling to de- pose the Marxist Sandinista government, are likely to change. State Department and even Pentagon insurgency specialists have long com- plained that the CIA has concentrated on clandestine military operations, while slighting the need to build a strong, demo- cratically based insurgency movement that can appeal for legitimacy inside Nica- ragua and on the world stage. Foggy Bot- tom is currently pressing for action, per- haps as early as this week, to make Contra leadership broader based and more demo- cratic. The State Department's calls for more Contra democracy have failed before, but ~~fficials believe they now have more clout to get what they want. The absence of Mr. i'asey. a presidential confidant since he rnanaged Mr. Reagan's 1980 campaign, will give Mr. Shultz a greater opportunity to act on a September presidential decision making State the lead agency in setting Nicaraguan policy. A Change for Abrams Another reason for the chance for a change in policy is that the hard-line assis- tant secretary of state for Inter-American iffairs, Elliott Abrams, also seems to be modifying his earlier tendency to walk in lock step with the CIA's lead. He now seems more willing to question the agency's strong backing of the most con? servative of the Contra groups, the Nicara- guan Democratic Front, known as FDN, of Adolfo Calero. "William Casey was secretary of state for Central America," complains one ad- ministration official, who says that is cer? tatn to change under the "faceless bureau- crat" who is his successor, Robert Gates. Others are less certain the agency's dominance over a highly secretive insur- gent war can be easily challenged. The State Department is frustrated by its ina- bility, even in Mr. Casey's absence, to get a grip on what the CIA is up to in the re- gion and fulfill its congressional mandate of oversight and policy guidance in the dis tribution of 5100 mUlion in Contra aid. I "The CIA figures what we don't know can't hurt them," the same administration official complains.) Mr. Shultz will nevertheless gain from measures designed to increase his influ- ence for another reason: It will silence his critics who charge ht purposefully has dis- engaged himself from foreign-policy exe- cution when he disagreed with administra? lion decisions such as selling arms to Iran. Late last month, Mr. ShWtz created a new group to keep tabs on the E100 million. The Nicaraguan Coordinating Office is be- ing formed by Moms BuS6y, the former second-in-command at the U.S. embassy in Mexico City. Mr. Busby will have a staff of about half dozen people, perhaps includ- ing new diplomatic positions in the Hondu- ras and Costa Rican embassies. Removing Blinders "The Busby team might not be enough, but it will certainly be better than noth- ing," says one Slate Department official. "The idea is to make sure the State De- partment isn't totally blind any longer and totally dependent on the CIA for its knowl- edge about the Contras and the war." A handful of diplomats won't quickly ease the Contras' major problems. The guerrillas are still too closely tied in Nica- raguan minds to Anastasio Somoza, the dictator ousted by the Sandinistas, and the Contras haven't provided an alternative political vision of Nicaragua's future. This is what the State Department hopes to change, and its aims are bringing it into conflict with the CIA. Their first test of wills could come as soon as this week over the shape of the Contra leadership. State is arguing that several leaders from Mr. Colero's FDN, the most influential group, must go because they have gone out of their way to block the influence of more moderate factions, particularly that of Ar- turo Cruz. Mr. Cruz, who has tended to emphasize the importance of social change and eco- nomic improvement within Nicaragua over military action, has said he plans to with- draw from the United Nicaraguan Opposi- tion, or UNO, the umbrella organization created to forge Contra unity, because he hadn't any influence. If the State Department has its way in coming days, it wants to save UNO by re- vamping its political structure and bring- ing in several new leaders. It hopes Mr. Cruz, instead of resigning from UNO, will emerge with greater impact. State argues that such changes would make the Contras more palatable to Nica- raguans, reduce the likelihood that Con? gress will cut off funding and make it easier for U.S. diplomats to convince America's allies in Europe stop aiding the Sandinistas. Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/28 :CIA-RDP90-009658000403340004-7 STAT