DAILY LOG OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY DIRECTOR

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01676R001300090024-5
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 14, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 26, 2002
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: November 28, 1962
• Content Type: NOTES

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Office of the Deputy Director
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1. Scientific Intelligence Digest, Special Supplement of 27 November 1962.
Feature article is on the Cuban air defense system as of 23 November
and states that it is now operational for all of Cuba. One facility
reported nine tracks simultaneously vi thout difficulty which evidences
a good capability.
2. Hilsman reports:
a. "The Soviet Economic Stake in India"
The Soviet bloc has extended nearly $1 billion in credits for
economic and technical aid to India, nearly 90 percent from
the USSR. The USSR also has extended about $21 million in
military aid, in the form of auxiliary noncombat aircraft. A
number of indicators suggest that Moscow does not intend,
at least for the moment, to renege on any of its present
economic and military aid commitments to India. " (ER 8606)
b. 'Regional Integration of Industry in Less Developed Countries"
The current drive for industrial growth by less developed
countries is hampered by the smallness of national markets which
cannot support efficient sized industries. (ER 8605)
c. "Moscow Wary of Break with Communist China"
A Pravda article by Central Committee Secretary Ponomarev,
while strongly countering strident criticisms of Soviet policies,
avoids threats and reflects Moscow's unwillingness at the
present time to meet Peiping's challenge head-on. (ER 8598)
d. "Balance Sheet on Brazil's October 1962 General Elections"
The results, while mixed, confirmed the control of congress
and a large majority of the states by moderate forces. Cer-
tainly the elections slowed down the trend toward the left and went
far toward giving Brazil a four-year respite in which to work
out solutions to its complex social and economic problems.
(ER 8693)
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Date 28 November 1962
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e. "Soviet Reaction to US Military Aid to India"
The Soviets have treated US aid to India more with sorrow
than with anger. They attempted to steer a middle course
between the contestants, losing ground with both as they
proceeded. Stepped-up US assistance to India would
probably still find the Soviets trying to occupy a median
position, even if as a result India should succeed in
recapturing the territory it claims. (ER 8692)
f. "Soviet Domestic Propaganda on the Cuban Crisis October 23-31, 1962"
From the first, Soviet domestic propaganda presented the crisis
as a US-Cuban,rather than as a US-Soviet, confrontation. The
Soviet people were shielded from a realization of the full gravity
of the crisis. When the decision to remove the missiles from
Cuba was announced, this could be presented as a peaceful
gesture in return for the US assurance not to invade Cuba. It
was said this denouement was a victory for the Soviet Govern-
ment. (ER 8691)
g. "Soviet Bloc Support for Chinese Cease-Fire Proposal"
The first clearcut expression of support for the Chinese
cease-fire proposal from a Soviet Bloc country has now been
given by Hungarian Party chief Kadar. (ER 8701)
h. ",Short-Term Chinese Communist Course if India Stalls"
The Chinese Communists could at any time charge the Indians
with non-compliance and return to the offensive, but so long
as they believe that the Indian position is not determined and
that a US-supported offensive is not in prospect, they are more
likely to seek to maintain the cease-fire and to effect at least
some withdrawal in NEFA.
i. "Cautious Soviet Reaction to the Chinese Cease-Fire"
Moscow's public reaction to the Chinese proposal on the Indian
border dispute has been extremely cautious, with no clear
indication of Soviet approval. While we are still inclined to think
that the Soviets will urge the Indians to take the Chinese proposal
at least as a basis for negotiations, Moscow is probably awaiting
clearer indications of the Indian attitude.
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3. JCS Southeast Asia Sit Rep dtd 21 November 1962:
4. IRONBARK~
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