IRAN WAS SEEKING A WAY TO REACH OUT TO THE WEST

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807620002-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 28, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R0008077620002-0
A"CLEAPPMRED B10 ALTIMORE S UN^ FILL UNIT
1's
OW PAGE -
Iran was seeking
a way to reach out
to the West
By Robin Wright
I n the past week, there has been considerable
discussion of whether the United States began
arms sales to Iran as a way of freeing hostages or
as a way of improving relations with "moderates"
in the Tehran government.
The New York Times said that CIA Director William
Casey had reportedly written a memo describing the
initiative as primarily an arms-for-hostages swap. Once
the arms and hostages were introduced - whether that
was the initial motivation or not - the effort to establish
relations with Iran was clearly doomed. Offering such an
exchange. contrary to the policy the United States urged
on its allies, jeopardized other Interests. It also estab-
lished a precedent that made negotiations with anything
less than arms more difficult.
But an effort to establish relations was not occuring
In a vacuum. Indeed. the United States joined the virtual
scramble for influence in the most valuable geostrategic
property in the Gulf comparatively late in the day.
A brief reconstruction indicates that the United
States was not "duped" by the wily Persians. as cynics
charge. The background actually demonstrates that the
goal of rapprochement was quite realistic. And recent
statements from leading mullahs in Tehran indicate that
the rapprochement option may not be totally dead.
A significant change in Iran's vitriolic attitude be-
came visible in mid-1984, a full year before the National
Security Council's began formulating what amounted to
a fundamental policy shift. The turning point was sym-
bolized by Foreign Minister Ali Akbar Velayati's stun-
ning pronouncement to the Iranian Parliament. "The
world is determined on the diplomatic stage," he said. if
we are not present, it will be determined without us."
After six years of self-enforced isolation, epitomized
by the theocracy's rhetorical catch-all "Neither East nor
West." the statement sparked wide interest both in and
outside the region.
The speech coincided with a visit by West German
Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher, the first im-
portant Western diplomat to visit Tehran since the 1979
revolution. After he left Tehran, Mr. Genscher confirmed
diplomatic speculation that Iran had a "clear wish" to
open up to the West again.
By the end of the year. President Ali Khamenei was
publicly talking of a new "open-door foreign policy." And
in a speech during Friday prayers at Tehran University,
he even mentioned the "Great Satan" - "We are not
enemies of the U.S. nation. We bear no hostility towards
that geographic region and that land. We are hostile
towards domineering policies."
This marked a major departure from earlier and an-
grier denunciations. His words were interpreted by ana-
lysts in the region as a signal in the subtle, occasionally
even obtuse, tradition of Persian politicking. The Iranian
president's representatives were reportedly among those
who subsequently talked with the McFarlane team.
The change was a reflection of two developments.
First, the revolution had begun to settle down. By this
stage. the mullahs felt more secure after consolidating
power by eliminating leftists and monarchists challeng-
ing their right to rule.
Second. and more crucial to Western interests, were
the economic and military exigencies that had caught up
with the inexperienced theocrats who had toppled the
shah. Oil prices were plummeting while the costs of
buying Western armaments for the Gulf war through
costly middlemen were Increasingly draining a crippled
economy.
Thus, different personalities In the Tehran regime
began to shift position - for different reasons. For
some. pragmatic political convictions led them to want to
end isolation. although not on terms that would make
them surrogates of any nation. For others, deteriorating
circumstances forced their hands.
In fact, despite the long record of the Iran regime's
funding and aiding Islamic militants elsewhere in the
region - notably those responsible for attacks on the
U.S. facilities and -citizens in Lebanon - there had
previously been signs of pragmatism and "moderation."
Such signs included failing to close the Strait of Hor-
muz, the global chokepotnt for Western oil supplies. The
mullahs showed restraint in responding to Iraq's air
strikes on tankers ferrying oil from Iran. And the Irani-
ans did not retaliate when the Saudis, aided by U.S.
AWACS, shot down one of their war planes.
By early 1985, the shift in Tehran was being explored
or exploited by such disparate former rivals of Iran as
Saudi Arabia and the Soviet Union. as well as several
others in the Middle East, Europe and Asia. Both Riyadh
and ? !oscow exchanged high-level diplomatic visits.
The Soviet Union was in many ways a more illogical
partner in rapprochement than the United States, since
Communism is atheistic, whereas the West Is rich In
religious traditions respected, at least In theory, by the
Koran.
The Russians' invasion and seven-year occupation of
Afghanistan, a Muslim nation that borders Iran, has
also been a sodree of anxiety in Tehran. Moscow's sale
of massive amounts of war material to Iraq has been
another source of suspicion.
The 26 Soviet divisions deployed along the 1.200-mile
Soviet-Iranian border have not lessened concern, espe-
cially in light of the Russians' prolonged stay in northern
Iran after World War II. The first major crisis debated by
the then-new U.N. Security Council in 1946 was Mos-
cow's refusal to leave. Preventing Soviet expansionism
has been as much a priority of the theocracy as it was of
Iran's monarchy.
Still, there were enough common economic interests.
such as shipping Iranian gas to Europe through the
Soviet Union, to form a basis for talks between Tehran
and Moscow. Those types of talks might have served as
a useful model later for the NSC.
The final indication of Iran's new course was the
voluntary intervention of Speaker of Parliament All Ak-
bar Hashemi Rafsanjani in the TWA Flight 847 hostage
ordeal. During a coincidental visit to Syria at the height
of the crisis, he summoned Lebanon's Islamic militants
to a meeting in Damascus.
Iran was sympathetic to their demand by the hos-
tage-takers for the release of 766 Shiite and Palestinian
prisoners taken from Lebanon, in violation of the Gene-
va convention on prisoners of war, to Israeli jails. But he
made It clear that the Islamic republic did not favor
another prolonged crisis over new American hostages.
Again, Iran's motives came from a mixture of conviction
and circumstances.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807620002-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807620002-0
The Rafsanjani meeting set the scene for the eventual z
release on July 1, 1985, after 17 days in captivity, of the
final 39 Americans. Iran's role was acknowledged. with
a noticeable lack of enthusiasm, by the Reagan adminis-
tration.
All of these events took place before the NSC scheme
was developed. And each proved that at least some quar-
ters in Tehran were indeed ready for further overtures
from the West. including the United States.
The flaw in Washington's plan was to introduce arms
and hostages. This anxious and short-sighted thinking
did not lay a proper foundation for what should have
been recognized as a long-term effort.
In light of the decades of anti-American sentiment
among the mullahs who have ensured Iran will remain
an Islamic republic even after the Ayatollah Ruhollah
Khomeini dies, rapprochement was clearly not going to
happen overnight.
But the recent history of pragmatism should under-
line the necessity not to abandon the goal of gradually
renewing relations with Iran, a goal that has been lost
sight of during the acrimonious investigations in Wash-
ington.
The Reagan administration can revive the detente
effort by making clear its goals to all interested parties
and developing a multifaceted strategy that takes into
account allies as well as broader U.S. interests.
If helping to end the Gulf war is a priority, then the
United States can regain credibility by eliminating as-
sistance that would contribute to its continuation or
escalation. That applies equally to arms for Iran and
military intelligence from satellites for Iraq.
If stability in the Gulf is a priority. then the United
States can repair some of the damage done in the eyes of
Arab allies such as Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, by bring-
ing them into the process. They have more at stake than
the United States in the nature of relations with.the
Islamic republic.
In dealing specifically with Tehran, the United States
needs to develop alternative incentives, such as an eco-
nomic package to aid reconstruction of the war-ravaged
western provinces, to help rehabilitate the tens of thou-
sands of wounded, and to rebuild damaged oil facilities
This would have major appeal in light of Tehran's
crippled economy. And noli t Ily it would on e way of
demonstrating that the United States does not intend tc
overthrow the
CIA's involvement in reinstalling the shah in 1953.
many Iranians still genuinely fear
Most Iranian theocrats will now recognize that addi-
tional arms sales are improbable. Yet their policy still
appears to be oriented toward reassuming a place in the
world community - a process in which the United
States has major clout.
The second time around, the United States will have
to deal more slowly. The 1979 revolution was in large
part a reaction to the Westernization of Iran under the
shah. Washington should take special care not to give
the impression of trying again to direct Iran's policies or
politicians. But remarks as recently as this past week by
Speaker Rafsanjani Indicate Iran is still Interested in
talking. The terms. involving arms, would be unaccept-
able to the United States now, but the fact remains that
a channel appears to be open.
Full rapprochement, much less diplomatic relations.
would probably not reach fruition during President
Reagan's remaining two years. But diffusing the tension
with the Islamic republic is, in the end, the only realistic
way of ending this unconventional conflict.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/01/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807620002-0