INSURGENCIES: TWO OF A KIND

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000807210001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 10, 2012
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: March 23, 1987
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/10: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807210001-6
ARTICLE APPEARM
ON PAGE,._..
Insurgencies:
Two ol a Kind
The U.S.-backed rebels in Afghanistan are having
almost as much trouble as the woebegone contras
For the guerrillas, the war is an uphill
struggle. Despite the support they receive
from the United States, the anticommunist
insurgents can never hope to defeat their
better-equipped adversaries. The rebels are
hounded relentlessly, their camps and sup-
ply lines in constant danger of attack. As
guerrilla leaders squabble among them-
selves. discussions are underway fora polit-
ical settlement of the war. But any foresee-
able agreement is likely to leave a pro-Soviet
government firmly in charge of the country.
Meantime. word is beginning to get out in
Washington that millions of dollars worth
of aid intended for the freedom fighters
cannot be accounted for.
What sounds like an indictment
of the Nicaraguan contras ac-
tually applies to the mujahe-
IV din, the anticommunist rebels
in Afghanistan. In Washing-
ton the conventional wisdom has it that the
Afghan guerrillas are a splendid success,
despite the 118,000 Soviet troops arrayed
against them. Moscow seems to want out of
Afghanistan, and proponents of the Rea-
gan Doctrine-the program of support for
anticommunist insurgencies around the
world-only wish that the contras could
fight half as effectively as the mujahedin.
But there is growing evidence that the con-
ventional wisdom is wrong, that the muja-
hedin are having almost as much trouble as
the contras.
Even though the rebels, inflamed by
religious zeal, have a broad base of popu-
lar support, the Soviets and their proteges
in the Afghan government are slowly
grinding the insurgency down. During the
past seven years nearly 1 million Afghans
have been killed in this war of attrition,
and perhaps another 7 million-nearly
half the entire population-have been
driven from their homes, many to refugee
camps in Pakistan. Countless villages are
deserted, and three-quarters of the culti-
vated land has been abandoned. Peace
talks sponsored by the United Nations
have made some progress, but there is no
reason to believe that the Soviet Union is
ready to withdraw from Afghanistan
without first guaranteeing the survival of
a government acceptable to the Kremlin.
So far, the stalemate in Afghanistan has
soaked up $1.35 billion in covert U.S. aid
since 1980. Now it seems that much of the
money has been wasted. Congressional
sources charge that 30 percent or more of
the aid has been skimmed off, apparently
by middlemen in Pakistan.
With the Iran-contra scandal simmering
NEWSWEEK
23 March 1987
along, Washington isn't eager to acknowl- ery of the Stingers, the Pakistanis gave the
edge that its surrogate war in Afghanistan missiles to the other three guerrilla groups.
may not be going much better than the one "The message the Pakistanis have sent to
in Nicaragua. The State Department de- the mujahedin is clear: 'Don't try to go over
nies that the mujahedin are losing ground our heads'," says a U.S. official.
or that large amounts of money are miss- Because the Pakistanis control most of
ing. But a reappraisal of U.S. support for the supply operation, the CIA has never
the rebels is getting under way. Frank Car- been able to conduct a proper au it of the
lucci, President Reagan's new national- arms an ammunition reaching the muja-
security adviser, has ordered a review of hedin, according to a former administra-
the administration's Afghan program. tion official. But sources say that some of
And last week an investigator from the the money seems to have been diverted in
General Accounting Office, the auditing -TYaR-1sta`n`.`Tt_Fo_oEs as if -the CIA is willing to
arm of Congress, began to look into the accept a leakage of erha s 30 erce s
allegations that aid meant for the mujahe- t e price of doing business there," says one
din had been diverted on a scale that could we -in orme congressman. Staffers on
make Ollie North look like a piker. the Sena a Foreign Relations Committee,
Unlike the contras, the mujahedin are a who also have access to classified informa-
genuinely indigenous movement. Their tion on the leakage, put the diversion at
fundamentalist Islamic faith has made a perhaps 50 percent. As a result, Congress
holy war out of the resistance to Soviet maydecide to makecuts in the $670 million
invasion. Despite the overwhelming odds aid package for Pakistan requested by the
against them, they have managed to avoid administration for fiscal 1988. The GAO
defeat, an accomplishment in itself. In investigation also will try to find out
some respects they have even made head- whether any U.S. money was diverted from
way. Last fall the Central Intelligence the mujahedin to the contras. The CIA has
A env began to supply the rebels with admitted that, early last year some of the
shoul ?r-fired finger antiaircra t mis- profits from the arms sales to Iran were
iles and in recent months the mu ahedm lodged in a Swiss bank account that han-
died CIA funds for Afghanistan. It says the
sdown Soviet aircraft at
have been shooting
an average rate o more than one a ay. mingling of funds was a mistake and was
quickly rectified.
plain that the Afghan resistance fighters
haven't been as successful as their press
clippings suggest. Republican Sen. Orrin
Hatch of Utah, who visited the refugee
camps in Pakistan in 1985 and 1986, ac-
cuses the rebels of "strategic ineffective-
ness," including a failure to attack major
Soviet military bases and headquarters.
"They are courageous fighters," he says of
the mujahedin, "but they will have to raise
the cost to Moscow a lot before the Soviets
will withdraw and give them back their
country."
The government of Pakistan, which pro-
vides the rebels with sanctuary, exercises
more control over them than their Ameri-
can benefactors do. Pakistani President
Mohammad Zia ul-Haq will not allow U.S.
government personnel to operate in the
mujahedin camps along the Afghan bor-
der. Pakistan manages to keep the mujahe-
din on a tight leash. A large portion of the
arms purchased for the rebels with Ameri-
can money are actually ordered by a com-
mittee of Pakistani generals, according to
Andrew Eiva, a private Washington ana-
lyst. Pakistani officials acknowledge that
they do not allow the guerrillas enough
firepower to significantly harm the Sovi-
ets, for fear that Moscow will carry the war
into Pakistan. "Certainly we control the
tap, and we turn it on and off," admits one
Pakistani diplomat.
Most of the rebels' weapons come from
China, but last year the leaders of four of
the seven main Afghan resistance groups
went to Washington to plead for additional
arms. When Washington authorized deliv-
Closing a gap: The prospect of a negotiated
settlement may make it even easier for
Congress to cut U.S. aid. Last week the
U.N.-sponsored talks between Pakistan
and the pro-Soviet Afghan regime ad-
journed after both sides offered concessions
on a key issue: how long Soviet troops
would remain in the country after a peace
agreement. The Soviets, who earlier pro-
posed to stay on for three years, cut the
period to 22 months and then allowed their
Afghan allies to reduce it to 18 months. The
Pakistanis extended their proposed dead-
line from four months to seven, giving rise
to fears among conservatives in Washing-
ton that Pakistan might sell out the
mujahedin.
There was no agreement yet, however,
on exactly what sort of government would
exist once the Soviets leave. That subject
will be discussed directly between the Unit-
ed States and the Soviet Union when Un-
der Secretary of State Michael Armacost
visits Moscow this week. The Soviets have
softened their rhetoric; they say they want
a government of "national reconciliation,"
and they do not insist that Afghanistan is
part of the "socialist camp." But there is no
assurance yet that Moscow is prepared to
allow the mujahedin a significant role in
the government-or a chance to overthrow
Najib, the Kremlin's man in Kabul. The
Soviets will have to bleed a lot more before
they allow the rebels to win at the negotiat-
ing table a victory that is far beyond their
reach on the battlefield.
RUSSELL WATSON with -JOHN BARRY" In-
Washington and bureau reports
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/10: CIA-RDP90-00965R000807210001-6