MOZAMBIQUE: SHORT-TERM PROSPECTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87T00573R000801070001-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 7
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 5, 2011
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 1, 1986
• Content Type: SNIE

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Mozambique: Short-Term
Prospects
Special National Intelligence Estimate
Key Judgments
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SNIE 72.3-85/S
MOZAMBIQUE: SHORT-TERM
PROSPECTS
KEY JUDGMENTS
Information available as of 12 June 1986 was used in the
preparation of this Estimate.
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KEY JUDGMENTS
The Mozambique National Resistance (RENAMO) insurgents will
probably intensify their activities throughout the country during the
next 12 months, but will not win a military victory or force President
Machel's government (FRELIMO) to share power. This means that
RENAMO:
- Will probably consolidate and expand its position in central
Mozambique, improving its ability to reinforce guerrilla opera-
tions in government-held areas to the north and south.
- Will not make major inroads into the government-controlled
major cities, or into much of the southern countryside where the
Machel government has substantial support.
- Might capture a major garrison or temporarily hold a city,
dramatic events that could stimulate isolated mutinies and an
increased rate of desertion in Machel's demoralized armed
forces.
- May generate sufficient pressure to force Machel to reduce-
but not abandon-his opening to the West in an effort to
acquire increased Soviet military aid.
In our judgment, Machel will probably remain in power over the
next 12 months despite growing pressures on his regime:
- Machel is a skilled political survivor who retains the loyalty of
his FRELIMO colleagues, and they have not yet lost their
resolve, despite RENAMO's pressure.
- A successful coup by war-weary Army officers is unlikely for
now, but the threat will grow in direct proportion to the
deterioration of security, particularly after heavy rains resume
in November.
- A successful Soviet-inspired coup is even less likely because
Moscow probably will continue to view Machel as a more viable
leader than any of his less talented colleagues.
- Clandestine contacts between the government and rebel offi-
cials may lead to formal talks and possibly a temporary cease-
fire, but a breakthrough toward a power-sharing agreement is
unlikely as long as neither side is prepared to drop conditions
currently unacceptable to the other.
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- Insurgent attacks will continue to block economic recovery,
contribute to food shortages, enlarge refugee populations, and
render Maputo unable to make principal and interest payments
on its foreign debt.
South Africa will probably not renounce its nonaggression pact
with Mozambique, but will continue small amounts of covert aid to
RENAMO to maintain influence with the insurgents. Despite the
Nkomati agreement, Pretoria will be likely to resume attacks on African
National Congress (ANC) targets in Mozambique. Any major escalation
of Soviet or Cuban military presence in Mozambique almost certainly
would provoke a hostile South African response.
Zimbabwean forces will probably continue to guard transportation
routes in central Mozambique that serve Harare and to carry out
limited attacks on insurgent targets nearby. We think it unlikely but
possible that Prime Minister Mugabe, in his desire to support the
Machel regime, could disregard his military advisers and order new,
large counterguerrilla operations and thereby delay RENAMO's expan-
sion, as they did last fall. Harare is concerned about mounting costs and
probably realizes that such operations would slow but not reverse rebel
advances.
Neither Machel nor Moscow yet views RENAMO as able to
threaten the survival of the FRELIMO regime, and Machel remains
reluctant to call for Cuban combat ground forces. In the unlikely event
that the situation should suddenly deteriorate to the point that the
regime were seriously threatened, we believe that Moscow probably
would disengage rather than mount a large military intervention-
which would have questionable prospects for success, entail high cost,
and invite direct confrontation with South Africa.
In our judgment, the Soviet Union will continue to provide
assistance to the Machel government at, or modestly above, present
levels over the next year. We believe'that the Soviets are pursuing a cau-
tious and incremental approach with Machel that seeks to barter future
Soviet military aid for Mozambican concessions. Moscow delivered
about $175 million in arms in 1985, the lowest amount in three years,
and only $55 million in economic assistance.
US and Western influence in Mozambique will be likely to decline
gradually over the next 12 months as Machel turns increasingly to his
Soviet allies for military aid to shore up his regime. While Machel was
euphoric following his visit to Washington last September, Maputo now
considers it overestimated US ability to compel South Africa to fulfill its
promises under the Nkomati Accord, and recent US support
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for the Angolan insurgents has increased Mozambican anxiety that the
United States will aid RENAMO as well. Moreover, Western economic
aid has not met Mozambique's unrealistically high expectations or been
enough to cure the country's intractable problems, and the West has
furnished only minor military assistance. Some constraints on Mozambi-
que's moving too close to the USSR will nonetheless
the need for US
possible South African reprisals, and, to a
and Western economic aid, in a situation of security and economic
deterioration.
Implications for the West of scenarios we consider less likely-a
military victory by RENAMO or the government, or a successful coup
against President Machel-would appear to be highly contingent upon
the following circumstances:
- Whether the fighting ceased, or remnants of the losing side
coalesced into a viable insurgency.
- Whether the government in Maputo adopted conciliatory poli-
cies, or it sacrificed greater stability and valuable talents by
excluding former adversaries.
- Whether South Africa supported the regime, or Pretoria sought
to undermine it.
- Whether other neighboring states accepted the Mozambican
Government, or they adopted a hostile attitude
Of these possible scenarios, the only one clearly unfavorable to
Western interests would be a successful leftist coup that ushered in
closer Mozambican-Soviet relations and reduced chances for a
FRELIMO-RENAMO settlement. National reconciliation-the out-
come most favorable to Western interests should it prove lasting-is, in
our judgment, unlikely over the time period of this Estimate given the
intransigence of both the Machel government and RENAMO. Longer
term prospects for serious talks between both parties may grow if
neither side gains a critical advantage or seems much closer to victory.
A coup by more moderate military elements or a RENAMO military
victory would appear to have both pluses and minuses for the West, and
the implications would be largely dependent on the composition and
acceptability of the new regime. Least likely, a government military
victory would have mixed results. On the one hand, it would appear to
validate Soviet military support; on the other hand, peace, if lasting,
could bring economic development again to the fore and enhance
Western leverage.
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