IRANIAN ACTIVITIES IN CENTRAL AMERICA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87M00539R001702610026-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 18
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 18, 2010
• Sequence Number: 26
• Publication Date: February 1, 1985
• Content Type: REPORT

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TOP SECR
(Security Classification)
COPY OF
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MEMORANDUM FOR: 'I I
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TRANSMITTAL SLIP ? I I"ebruary 1985
TO:
Executive Registry
ROOM NO. BUILDING
7E12 HQS
REMARKS:
25X1
FROM: D/DDI/NESA
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I? ,e (0 (W4 I ~I al~r ~~ uI Icy L
Directorate of Intelligence
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Office of Near Eastern and South Asian Analysis
D/NESA 85-035
1 February 1985
The attached is in response to your
request which reached us in the followin
manner: your office 25X1
to the NIO/LA; the NIO/LA to ALA/DI;
and from ALA/DI back to the NI0/LA to us.
Given this route, I hope the attached is.
in fact what you wanted.
Director
DDI/NESA
Attachment:
As stated
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? I I
1 February 1985
.Iran has given strong rhetorical support for anti-US regimes and groups
in Central America since the Iranian revolution in 1979. Iran began expanding
ties with Nicaragua in 1983.
-- Tehran and Managua are discussing a barter deal worth about $13 million.
We know of only limited contacts between Iran and Salvadoran or other
Latin American guerrillas.
Iran recently has tried to draw closer to Cuba.
? -- Given Iraq's ties with the Soviet Union, Cuba is unlikely to supply arms
unless Moscow gives its approval.
This paper is classified
ExEG
REG
or.1 25X1
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PLO Activities in Central America
1 February 1985
The Palestine Liberation Organization has maintained contact
with various revolutionary groups, mainly leftist in political
orientation, for many years. Among other objectives, the PLO has
sought thereby to reinforce its own revolutionary credentials, to
strike at Western governments sympathetic to Israel, and to
guarantee continued political and military support from radical
states such as the USSR and Cuba by occasionally acting as their
proxy.
Assistance in recent years, however, apparently has been
limited, probably the result of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon
in 1982 and the subsequent internal PLO crisis.
I WARNING NOTICE I
INTELLIGENCE SOURCES SECRET
OR METHODS INVOLVED
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Libyan Activities in Cental America
1 February 1985
Nicaragua is the main focus of Libyan efforts to undermine
US interests in Latin America.
- Libyan has been providing military aid to the Sandinistas
since the early 1980s. I
-- Tripoli has sent Managua four SF-260 light strike
aircraft, two to four MI-2 helicopters, a Boeing 720 VIP
aircraft, anti-aircraft guns, SA-7 surface-to-air
missiles, multiple rocket lauchers, and miscellaneous
small arms.
Libyan military aid has been supplemented by rapidly
expanding economic assistance.
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25X1
Libyan support for Nicaragua and Salvadoran insurgents
serves Cuban interests, but Qadhafi and Castro have never
developed close.personal ties because of equally inflated egos
and competing revolutionary philosophies.
In Panama, competition for influence between Cuban and
Libyan-backed groups has badly divided the leftist
community, according to
Elsewhere in Latin America, Libyan efforts to promote
increased militancy among Caribbean leftists conflict
with Cuban councils of moderation, which are intended
help strengthen their popular support.
Political tensions between the two leaders have not affected
economic ties.
Trade between Tripoli and Havana is limited to
$30 million annually. Libya has supplied. sporadic cargos
of crude oil--which is incompatable with Cuban
refineries--and small commercial loans. Cuba supplies
Libya with sugar, several hundred workers as well as some
technological expertise. 25X1
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Top Secret
Special Analysis
IRAN- Warming Ties
LATIN AMERICA:
Iran is stepping up its economic support for Nicaragua, both to
improve Tehran's standing in the Third World and to strengthen a
prominent anti-US regime. Iran also has begun cultivating Cuba
as a possible conduit to Moscow. Over the long run, Iran's major
interests in Latin America probably lie with Brazil and Argentina,
which have the potential to become major trading partners. Iran
has been unsuccessful so far in trying to acquire arms in Latin
America.
Iranian Prime Minister Musavi's visit this month to Nicaragua as part
of a trip that included a stopover in Cuba was intended to
demonstrate that Iran is not politically isolated. The Iranians gave
prominence to the stop in Nicaragua to publicize their support for a
leading anti-US, Third World regime
Ties to Nicaragua and Cuba
Iran has given the Sandinistas strong rhetorical support since they
took power in 1979 but began expanding economic ties to Managua
only in 1983.
Musavi's decision to meet with Fidel Castro in Cuba probably was
intended to reinforce recent Cuban-Iranian talks on increasing
diplomatic and economic ties. Iran also may be seeking Cuban
assistance for its unsuccessful approaches to Moscow for better
relations
continued
Top Secret
12 31 January 1985
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Top Secret
There is no direct evidence that Iran is cooperating with Nicaragua in
sponsoring subversion in Latin America.
Courting Brazil and Argentina
Iran's major Latin American trading partners are Argentina and Brazil.
Argentina, Iran's major food supplier in the Third World, provided
nearly 3 million metric tons of grain last year. Brazil sells Iran
manufactured goods.
Brazil is negotiating with Tehran to increase its purchases of oil to
take advantage of Iranian discounts
At current levels Iran will become the third-ranking exporter
of oil to Brazil, behind Iraq and Saudi Arabia.
Iranian efforts to acquire arms from Argentina and Brazil have had
little success. Argentina has sold Iran some artillery ammunition but
dropped an attempt to sell two destroyers to Tehran last year as a
result of US pressure. Although Iran has tried to conclude a major
arms purchase from Brazil, the Brazilians are afraid to jeopardize the
strong trade in arms and oil with Iraq.
Iranian support for Nicaragua is a relatively cheap way for Tehran to
enhance its standing in the developing countries, garner support in
the UN, and cause trouble for the US. Over the coming year, Iran is
likely to supply additional small arms, ammunition, and financial aid
that will strengthen Nicaragua's counterinsurgency effort
Iran probably is willing to give stronger rhetorical support to the
Cuban position in Central America and may agree to limited
economic cooperation and trade arrangements
Over the long term Brazil and Argentina are much more important for
Iran because of their status as major Third World, nonaligned regimes
and because of their potential for expanded trade. Tehran probably
hopes their economic problems will lead Brazil and Argentina to
increase arms sales to Iran or at least to turn a blind eye to such sales
by their weapons manufacturers.
Top Secret
25X1
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13 31 January 1985
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iop becret ^GV^
CUBA=1"P1 Increased Contacts .
r
President Castro's desire to Improve ties to Tehran.
Havana's high-level reception of Iranian Prime Minister Musavi
during his brief stopover In Cuba Wednesday underscores Cuban
mediating the war.
Comment: Castro's decision to greet Musavi personally probably was
intended to reinforce recent talks between the two countries on
increasing diplomatic and economic ties. Castro may believe that
recent improvements in US-Iraqi relations provide an opportunity to
court Iran, and he may hope to renew his efforts to secure a role in
unsuccessful thus far, and Iran may be hoping to enlist Cuban
assistance in approaching Moscow. Some Iranian officials also may
Tehran's direct overtures for improved Iranian-Soviet ties have been
be testing Cuban and Soviet willingness to provide weapons.
Although Cuba probably can supply only small arms, ammunition, and
spare parts, Castro would welcome the role of intermediary with
Moscow. This would underscore his value to the Soviets in the Third
World, helping to justify Soviet economic and military support.
economic cooperation and trade arrangements.
to the Cuban position in Central America and may agree to limited
The Iranians probably also. believe that stronger ties to Cuba will
demonstrate Tehran's solidarity with anti-US Third World
governments and will help reduce its international isolation. Toward
that end, Tehran probably is willing to give stronger rhetorical support
probably will stop in Cuba again after his visit Jo Nicaragua
Increased contacts between the two countries are likely, and Musavi
Top Secret
1 25 January 1985
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Secret
Libyan-Nicaraguan
Trade Expands
standards provokes demonstrations.
economy toward export-oriented industries, Rabat hopes to clear the way for
new foreign financing. Over $2.5 billion in annual debt relief and concessional
financing will be required over the next three years. With no planned growth
in living standards, the program risks serious political unrest. The local media
has played up the meeting, as evidence that Morocco's foreign donors support
the adjustment program. The government is hoping that it can shift the blame
for austerity to creditor demands in case lack of improvement in living
pressure
Libya and Nicaragua have signed a $15 million trade agreement, according to
the US Embassy in Managua. The agreement provides for a barter exchange
of Nicaraguan coffee, cotton, sesame, and bananas for Libyan crude. oil.
Tripoli delivered a shipment of crude last November as prepayment on the
contract. This agreement highlights the sharp increase in Nicaraguan trade
with Libya, Algeria, and Iran since 1982. The accord could help Managua
offset declining prices for its primary exports, especially bananas. Qadhafi
probably believes the deal also will help lessen Nicaragua's vulnerability to US
Secret
25 January 1985
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? i - Top Secret
Special Analysis
LIBYA-CENTRAL Anti-US Initiatives
AMERICA-
CARIBBEAN:
Nicaragua is the main focus of Libyan efforts to undermine US
influence in Central America. Libya probably has as many as
50 military instructors and technicians there. Since 1982, it has
shipped to Managua light strike aircraft, helicopters, antiaircraft guns,
SA-7 surface-to-air missiles, rocket launchers, and small arms.
Tripoli has supplemented this aid with probably over $350 million in
economic assistance. Such aid is likely to continue despite Qadhafi's
threat to curtail it because of Managua's misuse of funds.
Libya has also provided arms, training assistance, and financial aid to
Guatemalan and Salvadoran insurgents. 25X1
Involvement in the Caribbean
in Barbados suspects that the Libyans
recently have been in contact with militant dissidents from
Guadeloupe and Martinique.
Rivalry With Cuba
Libyan activities in the region almost certainly are being monitored by
President Fidel Castro. Although limited economic cooperation
continues between the two countries, Qadhafi and Castro have never
developed close personal ties because of their competing egos and
conflicting revolutionary philosophies.
Top Secret
6 7 January 1985
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Top Secret
Qadhafi blames Cuban meddling for underminin Gren a prior to
the US intervention. that 25X1
competition for influence between Cuban- and Libyan-backed groups
in Panama has divided the leftist community there. 25X1
Tripoli's generally heavyhanded efforts to spread Qadhafi's radical
ideology probably will undercut his effort to forge ties with regional
radicals. Libya also will be hampered by distance, lack of cultural
familiarity, and lack of intelligence assets. Militant Libyan policies are
likely to conflict with Cuba's current counsel of moderation among
Caribbean leftists, which is intended to help strengthen their popular
These constraints still leave Tripoli opportunities to promote anti-US
activities in the region. Qadhafi probably will push ahead with delivery
of additional weaponry to Nicaragua in order to reduce Managua's
vulnerability to US pressure. He also will increase military and
financial aid to Central American insurgents, although such
assistance is unlikely to affect the balance between insurgents and
Qadhafi presumably will try to persuade Caribbean leftists to increase
their militancy. Most Caribbean leftist organizations are unlikely to go
beyond demonstrations and propaganda, however, because of their
concern that violent actions would damage their political standing
Libya will become more aggressive in the region if Qadhafi believes
Libya is coming under greater US military or economic pressure. He
asserted in a policy speech several months ago that Libyan
involvement in Latin America is in retaliation for US naval operations
in the central Mediterranean that threaten Libya. The threat of
Libyan-backed terrorism against US interests in Central America and
the Caribbean will grow if Qadhafi continues to develop his relations
1 7 January 1985
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