NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY FRIDAY 29 AUGUST 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82T00466R000400020123-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 123
• Publication Date: August 29, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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r~ r '~l Central
InteWgence
Naton~.l Int~~ligence I3aily;
CO NID 8Q-204JX
29 August 1980
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Situation Reports
Top Secret
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Boundary representation is
not neceaaarily authoritative.
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~ Top Secret
Negotiations between the government and strikers in Gdansk are 25X1
deadlocked on the key issue of free trade unions, and posturing by
the two sides appears to be taking them back toward confrontation.
Each side has tried to pressure the other into giving
ground by setting deadlines. Strike leader Lech Walesa
yesterday urged his fellow countrymen not to go on strike
for "three or four days" for the good of the country and
to allow the regime time to meet the strikers' demands.
His statement--which apparently was not carried on state
radio or television as had been rumored--seems a veiled
threat that the strike leaders are prepared to call for
a nationwide general strike if their demands are not met
soon.
Some strike leaders may be ready to follow through
on this threat. Although Walesa has previously said that
a general strike would not aid the cause of the Gdansk
strikers, he may not have the deciding voice.
In Warsaw, regime spokesman Miroslaw Wojciechowski
made one of the government's sharpest attacks yet on the
strike leaders, specifically labeling them "anti-
socialist and extremist." He also said that the present
situation is "very serious" and "cannot go on much longer."
Church Backing Off
The Church, meanwhile, appears to be backing away
slightly from earlier statements by Cardinal Wyszynski
in which he seemed to side with the regime's call for a
quick return to work. A statement issued by an extraor-
dinary meeting of the Episcopate's Main Council, broadcast
To Se
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yesterday on Vatican Radio, said that the dialogue between
the strikers and government should find solutions accept-
able to both sides.
Church accusations that the regime had"broadcast
only an "incomplete and unauthorized" version of
Wyszynski's sermon on Tuesday soured the atmosphere of
yesterday's negotiations in Gdansk. These actions by
the Church appear to reflect its concern over popular
criticism that the Church was too closely identifying
itself with the regime and against the strikers.
Pressure on Gierek
The flurry of rumors in Warsaw that party first
secretary Gierek would soon be ousted--rumors denied by
the Polish News Service--suggests that there has been
considerable pressure on Gierek to step down.
Gierek may, in fact, have come close to being forced
out. A Polish Foreign Ministry official Wednesday evening
flatly asserted to a US diplomat that Gierek had been re-
placed by Stefan Olszowski at a central committee plenum
earlier in the day. Although the evening news failed to
announce the change, the Polish official stuck to his
story.
The failure of the change to materialize could mean
that the Polish party leadership concluded that Gierek's
resignation without accompanying policy changes would not
break the impasse in Gdansk. The removal of Gierek, more-
over, would reduce the number of options available to the
Polish regime. The Soviets also may have resisted Gierek's
dismissal at this time.
If those pressuring for a clean sweep prevail, how-
ever, the most likely candidate to succeed Gierek appears
to be Olszowski. He is reputed to be a good admin-
istrator who favors far-reaching reforms of Poland's inef-
ficient economy and who apparently has some good connec-
tions in Moscow. Gierek himself indirectly boosted
Olszowski's claim to be party leader during his speech
on Sunday.
Olszowski is not, however, a new face in the Polish
leadership and, as party secretary for the economy from
1976 to 1980, must carry some of the blame for Poland's
--continued
Top Secret
29 August 1980
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Top Secret
current economic problems. The Polish leadership might
decide that a totally new face--possibly one of the
provincial party leaders--is needed if the party is to
project successfully a new image. Pursuing this option
would cause Moscow the most concern because the Soviet
leaders presumably would not be as familiar with such an
individual as they would like.
Comments of Soviet Officials
The highest ranking Soviet official to discuss
Poland's problems with Westerners described the situation
as "bad" but claimed that Moscow is not anxious. Speaking
to the US Ambassador in East Berlin, Soviet Ambassador
Pyotr Abrasimov, Ambassador to Poland in the late 1950s,
conveyed an impression of business as usual in Moscow.
He asserted that the Soviet leaders viewed the events
in Poland "calmly," pointing to President Brezhnev's
current visit to the southwestern part of the Soviet
Union as supporting evidence.
In contrast to Abrasimov's low-key demeanor, a rank-
ing Soviet trade union official recently told a West
German diplomat that the Polish strikers' demand for a
"second trade union system" would be "totally unacceptable"
in a socialist society. His remarks undoubtedly represent
the prevailing, though still unpublicized, view in Moscow.
The Romanian leadership yesterday betrayed its
anxiety over the Polish crisis in an editorial in the
party daily Scinteia that forcefully defended Poland's
"inalienablE right" to deal with its "internal problems"
without "outside interference," but also asserted that
"strikes" are not the way to solve economic difficulties.
The statement appears to reflect Bucharest's concern that
Moscow may eventually decide to intervene in Poland and
lays the groundwork for Romania's refusal to participate
in such an action. The editorial also seems an argument
to Romanian workers, who are clearly unYiappy about rising
prices and shortages of food and other consumer goods, not
to use strikes to press their grievances.
Top Secret
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The mcz~jor Communist parties in Western Europe have reacted
forthrightly to the unrest in Poland, while West European goyern-
ments have studiousZz~ avoided provocative statements.
The Italian, French, and Spanish parties have voiced
very different attitudes toward the Gierek regime, re-
flecting their differences in domestic and international
political orientation. At the same time, however, each
is trying to deflect domestic criticism of Communism.
Moreover, they all have an underlying fear that the
Polish disturbances may end in violence, a development
that would divide their parties and seriously reduce
their domestic support.
The Italian Communist Party has been the most out-
spoken in identifying political problems in Poland. An
editorial in the Communist newspaper L'Unita called the
Polish political system "monstrous" and "suffocating"
and noted the need for a truly democratic socialism. As
a solution to the crisis, the Italian Communists have
proposed the "Eurocommunist option"--a more open, crea-
tive, and participatory system.
Spanish Communist Party Secretary General Carrillo
also emphasized the need for a serious reform of the
Polish economic and political systems. In accordance with
the party's customary emphasis on "indigenous" socialism,
he noted that Poland required a socialist system more
closely tied to the nature of the Polish people.
Commentators for the French Communist Party, which
is aligned more closely with the USSR, have compared the
"democratic" and "tolerant" responses of the Polish
authorities with the refusal of President Giscard to
satisfy the demands of striking French fishermen. On the
other hand, an article in L'Humanite noted that the French
party had opposed the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia
in 1968--an implication that its position would be the
same on Poland. The use of force in Poland would be
particularly traumatic for the party because of its ties
to Moscow and strong support of the Gierek regime.
29 August 1980
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Syria
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Tension in Lebanon remains at a high Zeve2, fed bz~ fears that
the rightzoing Phalange still intends to attack former President
Fran~jiz~ah's Christian group in the north and, together with Israel,
move against the Palestinians in the south.
The Syrians are making a major effort to build up
Franjiyah to counter the Phalange. High-level Syrian
officials have made well-publicized visits to Franiiyah's
The Syrian attack on Israeli reconnaissance planes
over southern Lebanon last weekend, although unsuccessful,
also may be a warning to the Phalange and to Israel that
Syria remains determined to protect its interests in
Lebanon despite unrest at home.
a resu t o e Israe i po icy o con uc ing preemptive
strikes against PLO bases, however, the Phalange could
be tempted to robe Palestinian defenses near the areas
it controls.
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for the third quarter.
Although Iran nova has an estimated $11 billion in liquid
foreign assets, its balance-of-payments surplus declined in the
second quarter of this year and is expected to become a deficit
its exchange reserves.
The Iranians have the technical ability to increase
oil exports from 850,000 barrels per day currently to
over 2 million barrels per day, which would stem the
drain on assets. To sell the extra amount on the cur-
rently soft oil market, Iran would have to reduce its
prices well below the $35 per barrel that it is now
asking, at least until demand picks up or other OPEC
countries trim production. If oil exports should again
fall because of sabotage, reduced demand, or for
political reasons, Iran would have to draw heavily on
community to take a tougher stance against Tehran.
If, for example, Japan and the Western countries
were to stop their purchases from Iran, thereby reducing
oil exports to just 540,000 barrels per day, oil revenues
would be cut by $600-700 million a month within two
months. Iran's liquid assets could last a year even
under these extreme conditions, but the consumption of
liquid reserves might cause the international banking
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29 August 1980
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CHILE: Opposition to Plebiscite
Opposition in GYh2Ze to a plebiscite on a new constitution is
increasing, Zndieat2ng that the vote mag be a focal point for rising
Tens of thousands of Chileans--moderates and
Marxists--staged a rally on Wednesday to protest the
proposed constitution and the procedures for the plebi-
scite scheduled for 11 September. It was the largest
opposition gathering in the military regime's seven-year
history.
The crowd strongly backed former President Frei'_s
demands for a transition government leading to civilian
rule. The proposed constitution calls for continued
direct military rule until 1989.
When President Pinochet announced the plebiscite
two weeks ago, he probably expected that the long-dormant
opposition would be unable to organize itself in time to
marshal significant support for a "no" vote. He had
hoped that the plebiscite, by publicly reaffirming his
rule, would give the government greater legitimacy both
at home and abroad. This was the case in 1978, when
Chileans rejected UN criticism of the government by a
three-to-one margin.
The opposition, however, has coalesced more rapidly
than Pinochet had anticipated. Politicians who were
reluctant to side with foreign critics in 1978 now are
more willing to campaign against a constitution that
would have a negative effect on domestic politics for
years to come.
Pinochet probably will attempt to play on Chilean
fears that rejecting the constitution would lead to a
return to the chaos of the Allende years. He is unlikely
to cancel the plebiscite because his personal prestige
is committed to it. If its opponents appear to be gain-
ing momentum, however, the government may clamp down on
Top Secret
their public meetings and access to the media.
29 August 1980
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Top Secret
ETHIOPIA-SOMALIA: Status of Military Activity
The situation along Somalia's northern border with
Ethiopia was quiet yesterday, and
fighting had tapered off late Wednesday night. The
extent of the action is still unclear, but it now appears
to have been largely a probing attack by an Ethiopian-
based Somali guerrilla group that has engaged in a number
of cross-border operations during the past year. The
Somalis claimed yesterday to have repulsed the attacks,
and the French Ambassador in Djibouti told the US Char e
there that the area is calm.
West Bank.
Prime Minister Badran, who will head the new
Jordanian Government announced yesterday, is likely
to devote most of his time to domestic affairs. He
previously served as Prime Minister from 1976 to late
1979. Badran's cabinet consists largely of holdovers,
but the return of Palestinian activist Adnan Abu Awdah--
a key adviser on Palestinian affairs to King Hussein
in past cabinets--as Minister of Information and the
creation of a Ministry of Occupied Lands Affairs could
indicate that Amman plans a more active role in the
9 Top Secret
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INDIA: Proposed Constitutional Amendment
Prime Minister Gandhi's government reportedly has
decided to seek a constitutional amendment that would
permit the dispatch of federal troops to "disturbed
areas" and the establishment of special courts in the
states to expedite trials of people charged with dis-
rupting law and order. The proposed amendment probably
is offered in response to mounting criticism that the
government has failed to deal effectively with recent
civil unrest. With the parliament out of session,
formal consideration of the measure cannot bectin until
the two houses reconvene later this year.
Top Secret
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