NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE DAILY 11 AUGUST 1980

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82T00466R000400020043-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 13
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 31, 2012
• Sequence Number: 43
• Publication Date: August 11, 1980
• Content Type: REPORT

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~J Intewgence
National Intelligence Daily
Monday
11 August 1980
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11 August 1980
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I Top Secret
CHILE: Pinochet Announces Referendum
Chilean President Augusto Pinochet announced last
night that a constitutional referendum will be held on
11 September. The constitution, which is likely to be
approved, will extend Pinochet's one-man rule for eight
more years. It will preclude free elections for the
presidency until 1997. The timing of the announcement
reflects Pinochet's need to reassert his authority at
a time of increasing terrorist violence from both right
and left. The terms of the proposed constitution were
immediately denounced as farcical by civilian opposition
political parties.
Top Secret
11 August 1980
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Contents
Situation Reports
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Iran
Briefs and Comments
2
Romania: New Middle East Pe
Argentina: Support of Boliv
ace Initiative
ian Junta.
3
4
Zimbabwe: Status of Militar
USSR: Disarmament Issues Di
y Amalgamation
scussed
7
8
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11 August 1980
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Top Secret
Ayatollah Khomeini strongly criticized the USSR
again Saturday in a speech to representatives of 35
"liberation movements" currently meeting in Tehran.
Khomeini labeled the Soviets a "big satanic power" for
seeking to "suffocate Afghanistan" and for selling arms
to Iraq for use against Iran. His comments could set
the stage for reducing Iran's relations with Moscow to
the charge level--a threat raised by Iranian Ambassador
to the USSR Mokri the day before.
Tehran radio, in both domestic and Arabic-language
broadcasts yesterday, asserted that Shia communities in
eastern Saudi Arabia had demonstrated Friday in support
of Ayatollah Khomeini's "Jerusalem Day" remarks. It
claimed that many of those "freedom-loving" people were
attacked and jailed in "the prisons of the Saudi family."
Iranian. media claim that similar demonstrations also
occurred in Bahrain on Friday.
Education Minister Rajai will likely become Iran's
prime minister today, as the Islamic Assembly is scheduled
to vote on his nomination as forwarded by President Bani-
Sadr. Once confirmed, his first task will be to assemble
a new cabinet.
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11 August 1980
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ROMANIA: New Middle East Peace Initiative
Romanian President Ceausescu mazy be carrying a ne~a peace ini-
tiative when he travels to the Middle East next week, but he prob-
ably will not garner much support from the region's major protago-
nists.
Diplomatic sources in Bucharest report that Ceausescu--
who visits Jordan from 17 to 19 August and may also stop
in Syria and Iraq--has been trying to line up support for
a general Middle East peace conference to convene under
Romanian sponsorship next year. Ceausescu has long advo-
cated such a conference, attended by all interested par-
ties including the Palestine Liberation Organization, the
USSR. and the US. to discuss a "comprehensive settlement."
President Sadat probably has not et formulated
Egypt's stand toward the initiative.
The major obstacles to the Romanian initiative would
appear to come from Israel--which has already rebuffed
similar Romanian proposals--and from hardline states like
Libya and Iraq, which oppose any negotiations with Israel.
Ceausescu probably is motivated less by an expectation of
success than by the benefits he anticipates will accrue
to Romania just from making the effort. He may hope that
Romania's stature in the Arab world will rise, thus as-
suring greater access to Middle East oil, and reinforcing
his independent foreign policy line.
Top Secret
11 August 1980
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ARGENTINA: Support of Bolivian Junta
Argentine leaders appear determined to prop up the miZitarzU
regime in Bolivia, even at the risk o_f .jeopardizing recent improve-
ments in relations with the US.
President Videla has for the first time publicly
expressed sympathy for the new ruling group led by General
Garcia b2eza and implied that Argentina would provide food
aid and financial credits. These are the latest in a
series of supportive actions taken by the Argentines,
Argentina's recognition of the new regime on 28 July
was followed by the postponement of a visit to Buenos
Aires by a high-ranking US official--a visit eagerly
sought by the military government as a continuation of
high-level bilateral meetings begun last January to pro-
mote better understanding and cooperation.
Although President Videla may send a personal emis-
sary to Washington to discuss the Bolivian problem, there
is little reason to expect the Argentines to show flexi-
bility. Though there may be minor differences of opinion
in the Argentine government hierarchy, those officers who
count believe strongly that in Bolivia at present there
is no civilian alternative to a rightwing military junta.
11 August 1980
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ZIMBABWE: Status of Military Amalgamation
The process of combining elements of Zimbabwe's two guerrilla
forces and the former Rhodesian Army appears to be stalled.
Current plans call for a four-brigade Army. Some
battalions evidently will be little more than renamed
Rhodesian units, while others will comprise former insur-
gents of the Zimbabwe African National Union and the
Zimbabwe African People's Union. Only a sinale inte-
grated battalion has been formed to date
The new force may include only 9,500 of the more
than 43,000 guerrillas under arms at the time of inde-
pendence. Former insurgents who are unfit or unwilling
to serve are being demobilized. As of early July,
only about 7,400 guerrillas had returned to civilian
life, leaving more than 22,000 ZANU and some 13,000
ZAPU personnel still at assembly points.
The resignation of Army Commander-in-Chief Walls
is only the latest obstacle to amalgamation. Important
decisions on the size and composition of the force, and
naming of a commander continue to be hampered by sus-
picions and rivalries. Even such minor matters as de-
vising common rules and regulations are complicated by
distrust.
The cooperation, support, and leadership of white
military personnel are essential, particularly in the
near term. By late May, however, one-third of the white
military officers and one-half of the senior white non-
commissioned officers had already submitted retirement
papers. Many of those still in uniform are not optimistic
about the prospects for the new Army.
11 August 1980
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A tour d'horizon of Moscow's arms control proposals signed
by Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko and appearing in the mid-July
issue of the theoretical ~journaZ of the CPSU, Kommunist, crit-
icizes the West in general and the US in particular for alleged
procrastination with regard to arms control and disarmament.
In excerpts of the text broadcast by Moscow radio
for three consecutive days beginning on 7 August, Gromyko 25X1
charges that "the leaders of NATO and the US above all"
are attempting to change the strategic balance to their
advantage in order "to return the world to the days of
power politics." According to Gromyko, the West's appre-
hens~on regarding Soviet military spending and the pres-
ence of "a limited Soviet military force" in Afghanistan
is mere pretense serving as a convenient rationale for
an accelerated Western arms buildup.
In recounting the experience gained in disarmament
talks, Gromyko points out gloomily that "basically,
nothing at all has been done to eliminate the material 25X1
means of war." Nevertheless, he continuues, "current
agreements and treaties cut off some channels for the
arms race, ban or limit individual weapons," and hinder
"an unrestrained arms race."
Gromyko urges the implementation of SALT II and
chides the US for its postponement and the resulting de- 25X1
lay of SALT III talks. He cites US failure to ratify
SALT II, the US-Soviet treaty on Underground Nuclear
Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, and the US-Soviet treaty
on limiting underground nuclear tests as "facts" which
"erode the credibility of the US as a reliable partner."
In closing, Gromyko promises that the Soviet Union 25X1
will continue to champion disarmament in the UN, but
notes that because UN resolutions "are only in the nature
of recommendations" Moscow favors "a forum that could
adopt really effective decisions which could be really
binding on all nations" and suggests that "such a forum
could be a world disarmament conference."
11 August 1980
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