IRAN-AFGHANISTAN: HELMAND RIVER DISPUTE STILL SENSITIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP08C01297R000100130002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 6, 2012
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: December 16, 1981
• Content Type: REPORT

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16 December 1981
Iran-Afghanistan: Helmand River Dispute Still Sensitive
a provision for purchase rights to additional flow.
The Helmand River Treaty assures Iran, the downstream
riparian state, a basic annual average flow rate of 26 cubic
meters per second in a normal year, enough water to irrigate
50,000-100,000 hectares of agricultural land or 200,000 hectares
of pasture land in the Iranian portion of the Helmand delta. The
treaty focuses on the low-water, dry-season flow of the river.
The post-treaty phase of the dispute centers on the disposition
of the excess flood flow of the Helmand. During the treaty
negotiations the Iranians had tried with little success to insert
regimes.
The river-sharing treaty, signed in 1973 but not ratified
until June 1977, was intended to end decades of bickering between
the two states over flow allottment. The delay in ratification
was due to opposition among influential groups in the Afghan
Government, who resented "giving away" what they regarded as
precious Afghan water. Because of its political sensitivity,
ratification was not publicized in Afghanistan, nor has the
treaty been officially recognized by post-1978 revolutionary
two countries.
The subject of water rights to the Helmand River is a
sensitive issue between Afghanistan and Iran and could aggravate
relations further despite larger domestic political concerns in
both countries. During the last several months, Iranian
officials have become apprehensive over indications that the
regime in Afghanistan--at the behest of Soviet authorities--plans
to abrogate the Helmand Waters Treaty between Iran and
Afghanistan and to thereby create border differences between the
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The Hydrological Background
The Helmand River originates in the Hindu Kush range in
Afghanistan, flows across the southern Afghan desert region, and
empties into the land-locked Sistan basin in a series of brackish
lakes (hamuns) and salt marshes. The river is the primary source
of water in a vast arid region of southwestern Afghanistan and
eastern Iran, and supports the agricultural economy of the
relatively fertile and populous delta region. Only the western
part of the delta is in Iranian territory.
The flow of the Helmand is perennial, although the level
fluctuates seasonally. The period of low flow occurs during the
months of August through November, when the flow rate averages
52-53 cubic meters per second in a normal year. In unusually dry
years, the flow has fallen to less than 1 cubic meter per
second. The flood flow of the river from snow melt in the Hindu
Kush is in March through May. Flooding in the lower Helmand
valley has two major effects: damage to canals and dikes as well
as channel relocation caused by alternating scouring and
sedimentation; and local inundation from ponding of the overfow
in the hamuns.
These shallow seasonal lakes and extensive areas of salt
marshes, most of which are located to the north and west of the
delta in Iran, are a significant element in the ecology and
environment of the Sistan basin. They attract large numbers of
migratory birds, and are a moderating influence on the local
climate. Although other rivers--the Hirut, Farah, Khash, and
Dor--flow into the the basin, only the Khash contributes a
significant part (about 12 percent) of the hamuns' volume.
Almost none of the water that flows into the hamuns comes from
the Iranian side of the border. An additional long-range factor
is that, climatically, the region is drying up. Recent
archeological excavations in Sistan indicate that the water table
has fallen about 20 meters in the last 5,000 years.
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River-Control Efforts
Both the Afghans and the Iranians have built structures to
regulate and to use the Helmand flow. The Iranians have
constructed control weirs and canals in their portion of the
delta, but these structures are channeling devices and they lack
a storage capacity. In Afghanistan, a large irrigation project
in the upper Helmand River valley centered near Lashgar Gah has
been financed by the U.S. AID. As part of that project the
Kajaki storage dam was built in 1954. The dam improved the low
water flow but did little to control the ravages of the flood
flow of the river. The Afghans became convinced that the best
location for a structure to control flooding in the lower Helmand
valley was at the head of the delta at Bandar-i-Kamal Khan.
Seeking funding and expertise, they approached the Americans--to
no avail. Reportedly, the Soviets subsequently did a preliminary
feasibility study in the early 1960's and proposed to help
finance construction of a dam, but the Afghans declined the
offer.
The Chakhansur Project
The Chakhansur Project is a flood-control and irrigation
scheme for development of the Afghan portion of the Helmand
delta. The plan was developed in 1972 by the International
Engineering Co. (IECO) and funded by the Asian Development
Bank. A dam at Bandar-i-Kamal Khan, 70 kms. upstream from the
Iran-Afghanistan border, is designed to be the linchpin of the
project. (Map) The plan for the Kamal Khan site calls for the
construction of two earth-filled dams with concrete control
structures at the head of the Helmand delta to divert the excess
flood waters of the Helmand into a former distributary, the Rud-
e-Biaban, thence southward into the Rudi-e-Khvoshrud and into the
Gowd-e-Zereh. Now a salt flat, the Gowd-e-Zereh will become a
seasonal lake. A control weir will connect the Qala Afzal Dam,
which blocks the Rud-e-Biaban channel with the Kamal Khan Dam
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across the Helmand. The present Helmand channel below Kamal Khan
will become, in effect, a feeder canal. Two additional barrages
in the delta area will enable the Afghans to irrigate 51,000
hectares of potentially fertile land. When finished, the
combined structures will control and store water for downstream
irrigation projects in the Chakhansur region of Afghanistan as
well as provide Iran with its treaty-allotted 26 cubic meters per
second of the Helmand flow.
Construction of the Kamal Khan Dam began after the
ratification of the Helmand River treaty in June 1977
Completion of the Chakhansur Project would effect major
environmental changes in the delta region. The immediate result-
-if the flood flow were diverted--would be the drying up of the
present overflow ponds, the hamuns north and west of the delta,
most of which are in Iran.
Iranian Objections
Bitterly opposed by the Iranians since the conception of the
plan, construction of the Chakhansur Project could seriously
restrict economic development in the Iranian portion of the
delta. Although assured by treaty of 26 cubic meters per second
of the Helmand flow, the Iranians actually use much more of the
free flow of the river. The Iranian portion of the basin,
regionally called Sistan, supports a ppulation of about 175,000,
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including 30,000 in the town of Zabol. In addition to the
diversion dams in the Iranian portion of the delta, approximately
80 pumps are in operation along the Iranian bank of the Helmand
distributary where it forms the border, lifting water to Iranian
fields. Prospective changes in the surface water supply
following completion of the Kamal Khan Dam complex are also
likely to affect the rate of recharge to the ground water supply
in the area of the hamuns, and reduce the amount of water that
can be drawn from local wells. In contrast, the Afghan portion
of the basin, the Chakhansur, is neither as densely populated nor
as developed as Sistan. The Chakhansur region has a population
estimated at 40,000.
The Iranians even offered to fund the Kamal Khan Dam in
return for guaranteed water purchase rights. They also sought
moderation of the project design to avert the hamuns in Iran from
becoming salt flats. The Iranians pointed out (with some
justification) that the flood flow could be diverted into the old
main distributary of the Helmand, the Rudi-e-Biaban, with the
overflow reaching the Iranian hamuns from the south, to maintain
the present hydrography of the region. They charge that
diverting the overflow to the Gowd-e-Zereh serves no purpose as
the area is desolate and unpopulated and the water would be
wasted through evaporation. At one point in 1976 the controversy
became so heated that the Shah ordered a halt to the funding of
all Iranian aid projects in Afghanistan as an economic lever to
force Afghan compliance on the Kamal Khan issue.
The need for additional water in the Iranian portion of the
delta hinges on land use plans for the area. The present
allotment is sufficient for maintaining Iranian land as pasturage
but inadequate for developing the entire area as cropland. The
Sistan basin has a long history as a wheat producing region.
Yields, however, are not high, and during the last decade the
region contributed only about 5 percent to Iran's total wheat
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production. The spurt in economic development in other areas of
Iran during the mid-1970s attracted local youth away from the
Sistan region. With depleted manpower and a declining population
in the region, the Shah's planners envisioned a gradual
transition-to a less labor-intensive economy. Under those
circumstances, the additional water was needed only for an
anticipated transition period of up to a decade.
Outmigration from Sistan undoubtedly slowed or ceased
following the advent of the Revolution in Iran, reversing the
planners' projection. The economy of the region is likely to
continue to be agriculturally based, and totally dependent for
survival on more than the treaty-allotted share of the Helmand
water.
Comments
The recent concern expressed by Iranian authorities that the
Afghans plan to cancel the Helmand Treaty was apparently based on
publicity in Kabul attending Afghan participation in an arid
lands conference held in Tashkent in October under the auspices
of the United Nations.* Conference participants were asked to
present a project for possible funding and action. An Indian
tehnical adviser to the Afghan Government, who had worked at the
Kamal Khan site, convinced Ministry of State Planning officials
to use the Chakhansur Project. There is no indication that the
commitment of the Ministry was more than the need to meet a
conference requirement.
There is also no indication that Soviet officials at the
conference seriously entertained the prospect of reviving the
Chakhansur Project. It seems unlikely that either the Afghans or
Soviets would seriously consider proceeding with construction on
the Kamal Khan Dam at this time, given the level of dissident
activity in the area and other higher priority development
* The UNEP/USSR Project to Combat Desertification through
Integrated Development (CDID). 25X1
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V V
in the Kandahar area.**
projects in less remote regions of the country. Moreover, the
officials in the Afghan Government who had been the most avid
promoters of the Kamal Khan Dam are now active resistance leaders
issues.
The recent apprehension expressed by the Iranians, however,
reveals their sensitivity and vulnerability to the Helmand water
Alikozai Pushtuns from the Kandahar area.
** Former Minister of Agriculture Azizullah Wasefi and his
brother, Abdul Farid Rashid, Director General for Economic
Affairs in the Foreign Ministry under Mohammad Daoud. Both are
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