U.S. STEPS UP CUBA SURVEILLANCE
Document Type:
Collection:
Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST):
CIA-RDP91-00561R000100060053-7
Release Decision:
RIPPUB
Original Classification:
K
Document Page Count:
1
Document Creation Date:
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date:
February 23, 2012
Sequence Number:
53
Case Number:
Publication Date:
March 18, 1980
Content Type:
OPEN SOURCE
File:
Attachment | Size |
---|---|
CIA-RDP91-00561R000100060053-7.pdf | 98.62 KB |
Body:
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100060053-7
M TICL1I A'fWt D
o:i FA..A_J.__
The uproar over the Soviet "combat
brigade" in Cuba last fall has been sup-
planted in the headlines by Iran and
Afghanistan, but the short-lived Cuban
crisis brought a dramatic reordering of
priorities in the U.S. intelligence com-
munity-Cuba has now replaced China as the
target of our second most intensive in-
telligence efforts-second only to the
Soviet Union. From the status of "low
priority attention," the Marxist ruled Lis-
land 90 miles off the Florida coast has'
risen in the intelligence community's'
estimation as an area worthy of con-
centrated and massive surveillance.
"If a rabbit moves on that place, we
know about it." So a Central. Intelli
gence Agency source described the
new emphasis on Cuba to my associate
Dale Van Atta. While this sounds like
hyperbole, it's not all that farfetched:
The satellites that have been commit-
ted to spying on Cuba since the Soviet
brigade fiasco can take clear pictures
of a one-foot object from 100 miles up
in the stratosphere. - , ? -
The- administration is clearly, not
going to be caught napping on Cuban
developments again. Briefings by the
CIA .are made on an almost everyday
basis. As a CIA source put it, "Cuba gets
an intelligence enema. every three
days."
A series of "Top Secret Umbra" re-
ports from the summer of 1979 to Feb-
ruary 1980 shows the detail with which
U.S. intelligence agencies have been
alerting the administration to the dan-
gers from Russia's Caribbean colony.
Much of the information focuses on
Cienfuegos,, on the southern coast' of
Cuba, -where ::Fidel- Castro has been
THE WASHINGTON POST
18 March 1980
modernizing a key naval and air base:
? A 1979 Defense Intelligence Agency
report predicts that the Russians may
send a detachment of Backfire nuclear
bombers into Cuba in 1A. Runways at
the Cienfuegos airfield are being len g-
thened to 9,000 feet -the distance re-
quired for the Backf ire- and there are
already two airfields in Cuba, that
could handle the Soviet plane.
From gases in Cuba, Soviet Backfi-
res could hit virtually any target in
the United States. What alarms our
military experts is that present defen-
ses against bomber raids are aimed to-
ward the north (against Soviet missi-
les coming over the North Pole) and
on each seacoast (against submarine
launched missiles), leaving the na-
tion's southeastern defenses rela-
tively naked.
s Spy satellites have spotted a suspi-
cious-looking building at Punta
Movida, near Cienfuegos. It closely
resembles the kind of structure used
in Eastern Europe for storage and
maintenance of nuclear missiles.
Punta Movida is also being connected
by a railroad, which raises the possi-
bility that nuclear submarines could
be serviced at the huge shed.
Some intelligence analysts, - how-
ever, have cautioned that everything
turned up by the spies-in-the-sky is
consistent with a nuclear power plant
the Cubans are building with Soviet
help in the Cienfuegos area. And
these experts note that there have
been "no indications that Havana has
plans for nuclear weapons." - -
On the other.. hand, some intelli-
gence reports express-concern that
the. CIA may:be . ignoring. evidence
that Castro plans to use the Soviet-
sponsored nuclear technology for mil-
itary purposes.
? The secret intelligence repor
show that the Russians have been up-
grading their communications equip-
ment in Cuba in recent years.. One
communications satellite facility, ac-
cording to a "Top Secret Umbra" Na-
tional Security Agency report, per-
mits nearly simultaneous two-way ex-
changes between Havana and the
Soviet defense ministry's main intelli-
gence office. According to the report:
"Havana serves as a communications
relay center for the [Kremiinl to sup-
port its intelligence operations -
throughout the Western 'Hemi-
sphere."
The intelligence reports indicate
that the Soviets may not have yet
breached the secret agreements they
signed with the United States follow-
ing the Cuban military crisis in 1952
- but they're coming dangerously
close. ,
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100060053-7