THE POLICE: 'DAY OF THE JACKAL'

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100050004-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 9, 2012
• Sequence Number: 4
• Publication Date: December 13, 1981
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100050004-2
STAT
Aq T ICL7,i, APPE pMD
ol-I PACT;
THE WASHINGTON POST
13 December 1981
Joseph W. Smith
e M alive: " av=-ol the' Jackal
For the.second time the United States is that could overwhelm protective forces--
asked tQ.cope with government-sponsored especially since the protective forces must
terrorism in?this case a kind.of 1a ga. scale.:. guard a num berof possible targets..The as-
Day-of the Jackal" -> 4=.: ; sa;sination of Anwar Sadat is no comfort
.Without any inside . information" on the The net effect is the further isolation of the -
intelligence. or -sources involved in this-la-;i,%: president and his senior people:. --,_
test IAbyaa affair a number. of issues come But taking .the threat seriously and;
to mind that cause real concert trying to protect against it do not really jus?
If one assumes ?that.the-intelligence rn--. --tify the intense--even excessive"-publicity?-
our'?hands- fs:reasonably, credible with re- . ' that has accompanied this affair: While it`'
gard - to-source ' and content, aside from may have been the decision that going pub-'
.political:'conaiderations `what is the-} lic would - have the. effect of dissuading -
U.S. response to a threat of this sort? Bear'' Muammar Qaddafi from believing he could
in mind that the, source of the threat is. &.-% disassociate himself from the operation,
government known for its support of and there is a real question of the negative ira-
connections with disparate terrorist groups,:: pact of all this publicity on U.S. and world
..around ,the -world, from the-IRA, to- the--..." opinion and on current and future sources
Japanese Red Army. of-critical information...'
It is easy to denigrate the overreaction In. the light of what has happened; have of the security forces, but in fact, given the,.. .we adequately protected the source(s) land
source of. the threat, a worst-case seenario --- have we reassured others who may some-
must~be:thebasis:ofanyplanni,~g."Inthis..- day provide similar. intelligence? A more
case, wheje:thereis the indication of assns- : controlled handling,.would :have allowed
sination teams.witli a paramilitary capabil- : better source -protection and widened the
ity, possibly including heavy weapons, the political -options available to, the adminis- -:I
more orthodox' protective measures would ' tration. It would certainly have reduced the -1
hardly-"be: suffcient_Without"recourse:to- -_: credibility gap here and abroad:
paranoiac you cai stilLtake seriously--or at-
=least~reuse: to dismiss--the possibility of a T to ,: a . for mer CIA officer, is =",
= Iarge:scale coordinated ` attack ? by well- director of a: firm dealing in intern-
tionaI uri:.'
ty preblernx.
trained'oommandod is one or more 'teams sec
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/09: CIA-RDP91-00561 R000100050004-2