THE SECRECY OFFENSIVE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP91-00561R000100100090-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 7, 2012
• Sequence Number: 90
• Publication Date: May 21, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

WASHINGTON TIMES
21 May 1936
ships with other groups or state
sponsors. Much of this is just hard
research, compiling a large data
base and attempting to fill in the
gaps. It is not very glamorous, and
those who do it do not capture the
headlines. But it is the foundation
upon which the U.S. counter-
terrorism effort rests.
Continuing collection and
analysis enable us to improve our
ability to detect trends in terrorism
operations, upgrade security in
ean.
7 tabauntc
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a11AgE
c WIIILIAM CASEY
o prevent terrorists'
plans or to disrupt
their activities, we
need information
about them. But
the very nature of
terrorist groups
and their activities
makes the task of gathering such in-
formation extremely complicated.
Terrorist groups are very small,
making penetration a very difficult
task for police or intelligence
agents. Moreover, the operating life
of any single group of terrorists is
often no more than a few years. Like-
wise, typical terrorist leaders have a
relatively short business life.
So how do we go about it? First, we
are acquiring as much information
as we can about terrorist groups, in-
cluding modus operandi, organ-
izational structure, personnel sup-
port, financial and communications
arrangements, and their relation-
areas most likely at risk, and deter-
mine vulnerabilities of terrorist
groups. We have put in place a sys-
tem of rapid communications to
gather assessments, have reports
tested by experts throughout our
government, and pass conclusions
and warnings quickly to the point of
the threat.
Action based on our intelligence,
along with that of other friendly
countries, including moderate Arab
governments, has been taken to pre-
vent about 100 planned terrorist
attacks around the world. The rate
of effective warning is increasing,
rising to 26 during April.
Sometimes we fall just heart-
breakingly short of success, as was
the case with the West Berlin
nightclub bombing last month. You
have heard the president's statement
outlining the evidence for the Libyan
complicity in the Berlin bombing.
We also have compelling evidence of
Libyan involvement in attempts to
attack other U.S. targets, several of
which were designed to cause maxi-
mum casualties similar to the Berlin
bombing:
? France expelled two members
of the Libyan People's Bureau in
Paris for their involvement in a
planned attack on visa applicants
waiting in line at the U.S. Embassy;
? France subsequently expelled
two disgruntled Fatah Force 17
members recruited by Libya to con-
duct another operation against the
United States in Paris;
? In early April, a Libyan-inspired
plot to attack the U.S. Embassy in
Beirut was aborted when the 107mm
rocket exploded on launch;
? Turkish police in late March ar-
rested two Tunisians in Istanbul who
claimed they were planning on be-
half of the Libyans to use explosives
e .~'' 3trrtii ~~
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 Declassified and Approved For
against a U.S. target in Turkey. The
operation was planned to inflict
heavy casualties.
All in all, nearly 50 Libyan diplo-
mats have been expelled recently
from Spain, Italy, France, and West
Germany. In fact, so far this year we
have reports of well over 35 Libyan-
associated threats, including sur-
veillance of planned attacks against
U.S. personnel and facilities in Eu-
rope, Africa, and Asia.
Together with the intelligence and
security services of friendly coun-
tries, we have developed a
worldwide counterterrorist network
that functions through intelligence
exchanges, training and technical
support, and joint operations.
We have become increasingly ef-
fective and our capabilities are
improving. I take this occasion to
further a necessary dialogue on how
we can overcome what I consider the
greatest single impediment to pro-
tecting our interests and our citizens
from the scourge of international
terrorism.
In recent years, publication of
classified information by the media
has destroyed or seriously damaged
intelligence sources of the highest
value. Every method we have of ac-
quiring intelligence - our agents,
our relationships with other secu-
rity services, our photographic and
electronic capabilities, the informa-
tion we get from communications -
has been damaged by the publica-
tion of unauthorized disclosures.
In recent weeks and months, a
flood of information and misinfor-
mation has appeared in print and on
the airwaves. Before the president
spoke to our people and told them
about the conclusive evidence that
we had about Libyan direction of the
attack on allied soldiers in the Berlin
nightclub, major newspapers and
news magazines published that Lib-
yan communications were being
read. The Libyans stopped using
those communications and this is
bound to put other peaceful citizens
in jeopardy. This is a severe problem
we must address if our fight against
terrorism is to succeed.
I respect the diligence and inge-
nuity of the working press in gather-
ing and publishing news and applaud
its exposure of waste, inefficiency,
corruption, and other misconduct.
In short, I speak from 30 years of
experience as a friend, participant,
and supporter of the media.
I have two points that I feel I must
make at this time in order to dis-
charge the obligation specifically
placed on me by the law of our land
to protect intelligence sources and
methods.
Put very simply, they are, first,
the media, like everyone else, must
adhere to the law. Second, all of us
have responsibilities to balance in
carrying out a mission. In the face of
the new dangerous threats we face
from international terrorism, now is
the time to address those responsi-
bilities mutually in a serious and
measured way.
Congress, shortly after it estab-
lished the National Security Agency
to gather signals intelligence, en-
acted a law which prohibits the pub-
lication of information about com-
munications intelligence. There has
been widespread violation of that
law over recent weeks and months.
Much damage has been done.
Kay Graham, the publisher of The
Washington Post, in a recent, very
thoughtful, and constructive speech,
cited the kind of damage we have
sustained. She told how a television
network and a columnist had ob-
tained information that we were
reading the messages of people ar-
ranging the bombing of the U.S. Em-
bassy in Beirut. Shortly after this
public disclosure, that traffic
stopped. This undermined our ef-
forts to capture the terrorist leaders
and eliminated a source of informa-
tion about future attacks.
Where there already has been
public disclosure about communica-
tions intelligence, the law has been
violated, but the milk has been
spilled. I would not, therefore, at this
time favor action for these past off-
enses. But I strongly believe that if
we are to protect our security as a
nation and the safety of our citizens
in this age of international terrorism
and intercontinental missiles, the
law now on the books to protect a
very narrow segment of informa-
tion, that dealing with communica-
tions intelligence, must now be en-
forced.
There are other large areas of
information about our intelligence,
our national security, and our rela-
tionships with other nations which
can and frequently should be pub-
lished without violating any law. But
there are situations in which many
of us believe there is a responsibility,
before rushing into print or onto the
airwaves, to weigh and consider the
danger to life and limb of our citi-
zens and others and to the interna-
tional relationships and the reputa-
tion for reliability of our nation.
The temptation to go beyond the
facts and piece together and stretch
fragments of information in order to
make a publishable story, and some-
times in order to sensationalize, is a
dangerous thing. It can, and has, cost
lives. It can wrongly impair reputa-
2.
tions and disrupt relationships
critical to our national interest.
We all must do better. This is a
dangerous and unpredictable world
in which all of us must move with
caution and responsibility.
We have been gratified by the
readiness of many reporters and edi-
tors carefully to consider sometimes
withholding publication of informa-
tion which could jeopardize national
interests or to treat or present it
story in a manner which meets the
public need, yet minimizes potential
damage to intelligence sources. The
trick is to recognize the potential for
damage and to consult on how it
might be minimized. We are always
ready and available on short notice
to help on that.
I hasten to add, however, that the
first line of defense and the most
effective way of preventing these
types of leaks is to increase disci-
pline within the government itself.
The inability to control sensitive in-
formation is destructive of the mo-
rale of people who do keep secrets,
as well as damaging to our security.
During the last several years, the
president has emphasized the spe-
cial obligation federal workers have
to protect the classified information
with which they are entrusted. We
have increased, and must intensify,
our efforts to uncover those who vio-
late this trust. We are studying pro-
cedures and possibly new laws
needed to deal with federal employ-
ees who decide on their own to dis-
close classified information.
William Casey is director of the
Central Intelligence Agency. This ar-
ticle is condensed from a speech de-
livered May 15 before the annual
meeting of the American Jewish
Committee.
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