GORBACHEV'S POLITICAL SETBACK

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001401080002-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 10
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 29, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: November 1, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

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Central Intdll nce Agncy
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CURRENT INTELLIGENCE MEMORANDUM
SUBJECT: Gorbachev's Political Setback
1 November 1984
Events in recent weeks suggest the Soviet leadership
succession picture is less clear than it has seemed for most of
Chernenko's tenure. In particular, Mikhail Gorbachev's status as
heir apparent appears to be under challenge. This paper lays out
the relevant data and discusses in speculative fashion three
possible explanations for this development. The celebration on
7 November of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution and the
Central Committee meeting slated for late November will provide
further clues to Gorbachev's political standing and prospects. [
Gorbachev, the Kremlin's agricultural overseer, failed to
address the 23 October Central Committee plenum that dealt with
agricultural issues. This was the clearest of a series of
indications that the 53-year-old leader's position has come into
question:
o On 18 October at a Kremlin ceremony honoring Foreign
Minister Andrey Gromyko, Secretary Gorbachev ranked below
rival Secretary Grigoriy Romanov, according to a Pravda
photograph.
o The television coverage of that ceremony focused on a
quartet consisting of Chernenko, Gromyko, Romanov, and
Premier Nikolay Tikhonov, while Gorbachev was shown in the
company of lower-ranking leaders.
This memorandum was prepared by of the Office of Soviet
Analysis. Comments or questions may De d to Chief, Policy Analysis
Division
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- o Pravda reported that on the same day Chernenko addressed the
Politburo on personnel issues, an area in which Gorbachev
reportedly has played a leading role.
o On 27 September, Defense Minister Dmitriy Ustinov, not
Gorbachev, presented Chernenko with an Order of Lenin, a
duty that under Brezhnev and Andropov had fallen to the
party's number two man.
More recently, on 26 October Gorbachev failed to appear at a
Kremlin dinner for the visiting Mongolian party leader while his
chief rival Romanov attended the dinner and participated in the
discussions.
Voluntary Retreat?
A possible explanation of Gorbachev's downgrading is that it
has resulted from a collective leadership campaign to bolster
Chernenko in which Gorbachev has played a willing part. Since
early September, when Chernenko resumed public appearances after a
health-related absence of several weeks, some Politburo members
have gone to unusual lengths to emphasize Chernenko's individual
authority. Ustinov, for example, publicly described Chernenko as
"Supreme Commander-in-Chief"--the first time since Stalin that the
General Secretary has been so identified by another Politburo
member. Soviet leaders may have felt it necessary to insist at the
same time on a lower profile for Gorbachev, who had been described
in the Western press earlier this year as "second General
Secretary." The younger leader himself may have been willing to
adopt a less prominent role in the interest of party unity and to
convince Western governments and the Soviet public that Chernenko
was firmly in charge. Gorbachev may have anticipated that, in
light of Chernenko's chronic ill health, hi n retreat from
public prominence would only be temporary.
Self-effacement of this sort, however, would entail risk for
Gorbachev. Although few Soviet observers deny his abilities, some
have questioned whether he has the necessary drive and ruthlessness
to get to the top. Such doubts would almost certainly be
strengthened were Gorbachev voluntarily to withdraw from the
limelight and demonstrate a distaste for the infighting of Kremlin
politics. It is unlikely, moreover, that Gorbachev would acquiesce
in any perso etreat that made it appear he was being upstaged
by Romanov.
Blamed for Agricultural Performance?
It is more likely that Gorbachev's setback was related to
agricultural issues. Some have suggested Gorbachev may have come
out on the losing side in a dispute over agricultural policy. In
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his public statements, he has been cool to reliance on land
reclamation, the focus of Chernenko's spelech to the Central
Committee plenum on 23 October, and instead emphasized more "cost-
effective" solutions. In a speech on 26 March, Gorbachev
criticized the approach of the Land Reclamation Ministry and urged
that more resources be assigned to modernizing existing systems
than to buildin new ones
The agricultural program unveiled at the plenum, however, does
not appear to be inconsistent with Gorbachev's policy views.
Although Chernenko's remarks emphasized increased investments,
Tikhonov's speech--like Gorbachev's earlier statements--criticized
the performance of land reclamation workers and the limited return
achieved from earlier investments. It also highlighted the
collective contract system for teaas of agricultural and
construction workers, an initiatiV*.Gorbachev has pushed. In fact,
Tikhonov's speech could even have been drafted by Gorbachev's staff
for Gorbachev to deliver. Thus a dispute over agricultural policy
probably was not responsible for Gorbachev's setback.
The agricultural issue more likely to have been involved is
agriculture's poor performance. Although Gorbachev's career has
advanced despite a series of below-average grain harvests, this
year's crop--the sixth poor-to-mediocre one in a row--could be a
different story. Gorbachev no longer enjoys the protection of past
powerful patrons Brezhnev and Andropov, and Chernenko as well as
"others may have used agriculture's problems against him. In
particular, Gorbachev may have fallen victim to a decision taken
earlier this year to withhold military transport support from the
Punishment for Running Out Front?
Poor agricultural performance alone, however, seems inadequate
to explain Gorbachev's setback. Instead, it seems more likely that
Gorbachev encountered the perennial problem of succession
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contenders who move ahead too fast. His frontrunner status
probably made him particularly vulnerable to attack by his
political rivals and may have caused problems in his relations with
Chernenko and the older generation. In such a context, Gorbachev's
elders and rivals could have made use of agricultural performance
to hurt his political standing. They could also have played upon
fears engendered in provincial party officials by the revival this
summer of the discipline and anti-corruption drive. Gorbachev may
have alienated some important local officials by acting as
Andropov's agent in this area last year,
Gorbachev also may have been hurt by indiscreet comments by
some of his backers. Pravda editor Afanasyev, talking to Japanese
newspapermen in Moscow in m Td-October, said that Gorbachev could be
described as "the second General Secretary," and other high-level
Soviet officials have called him the party's de facto second
secretary. Such an identification, which would not have gone over
well with Chernenko, could have resulted in a Politburo decision to
bring Gorbachev down a notch.
Moreover, since the 23 October plenum, Soviet diplomats
nave n shying away from suggesting that Gorbachev has a lock on
Chernenko's job. One even denied that a post of "second secretary"
exists.
It is even possible that Gorbachev became incautious and
actively sought to undermine Chernenko. This is unlikely, if only
because Chernenko's poor health has probably persuaded Gorbachev
that time is on his side. Still, Gorbachev may have become
overconfident when filling in for Chernenko and overstepped the
bounds in pushing himself to the fore. In late September, for
example, his signature on the obituary of a retired senior military
officer, which Chernenko failed to sign, may have made it appear
that Gorbachev was usurping a function Chernenko would normally
perform. The ceremonies at the opening of Moscow's version of the
Olympic games also gave unusual prominence to Gorbachev, making him
I
'
s leader.
appear--in Chernenko's absence--the Politburo
Prospects
If, as seems likely, Gorbachev's setback is the result of
political factors, his chances for recovery will greatly depend on
the strength and cohesiveness of those forces recently aligned
against him. His downgrading so far has been a plus both for
Chernenko and for other would-be succession contenders, especially
Romanov. It would be premature, however, to speak of a Chernenko-
Romanov alliance. Chernenko is unlikely to find it to his own
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advantage t
prospects.
h to strengthen Romanov's succession
Romanov himself, although undoubtedly benefitting from
Gorbachev's setback, may also be wary of allying himself too
closely with the aged and sick Chernenko or with other Politburo
elders who may quickly leave the political scene. His reluctance
may be all the greater if he perceives that Chernenko, Tikhonov,
and other Politburo elders are determined to resist any real
sharing of power with younger leaders. In recent weeks there have
been indications that Chernenko's comeback has been assisted not
only by his traditional allies, but also by Ustinov and Gromyko,
former Andropov supporters whose antipathy toward Chernenko may
have been overcome by generational loyalties and by their current
enjoyment of unprecedented personal power. It was Ustinov who
described Chernenko as Supreme Commander-in-Chief, and Gromyko
embraced the General Secretary when Chernenko awarded him the Order
of Lenin.
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Gorbachev's setback, therefore, may be only temporary.
According to the French media, Politburo candidate Ponomarev
confidentially told participants at a French Embassy reception on 25X1
26 October that Gorbachev had chaired the plenum, a role consistent
with that of "second secretary." Chernenko may still find it in
his interest to cooperate with him, and the younger leader may be
able to profit from divisions among rivals and critics. The early
November celebration of the anniversary of the Bolshevik Revolution
and the Central Committee meeting slated for late November will
provide additional evidence about his political position. a 25X1
Beyond these immediate considerations, Chernenko's resurgence
suggests that the succession process is likely to be a long drawn-
out affair. Chernenko's age, health, and dependence on his
colleagues will likely prevent him from ever really consolidating 25X1
his power. If his health holds, however, he and his elderly
colleagues--Ustinov, Tikhonov, Gromyko--apparently intend to stay
in power as long as possible. This could put off the transfer to a
new leader until after the next party congress, which normally 25X1
would be held early in 1986. Thus the overall succession process--
the selection of a new leader followed by a period of power
consolidation--probably will last for most of this decade. F 25x1
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