DOMESTIC COSTS TO THE SOVIET REGIME OF INVOLVEMENT IN AFGHANISTAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R001401010001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 17
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: October 25, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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Central Intclligerxe AgFnry
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
25 October 1984
Domestic Costs to the Soviet Re ime
o nvo vement n g anistan
Summary
In addition to the economic burden, the internal costs to the Soviets
of their nearly five-year Mar in Afghanistan include the aggravation of an
array of pre-existing societal problems. The Mar has worsened morale among
Soviet conscripts, led Blare citizens to avoid the draft, and introduced
Soviet youths to new forms of drug abuse. It has fed ethnic tensions,
increased working class resentment of intelligentsia privileges, and
strained regime credibility among a population increasingly cynical about
Soviet propaganda claims. In addition, it has been a source of frustration
and friction within the alilitary, the K66 and the party, enhancing the
potential for serious ooli~l conflict Mithin the Soviet elite that could
damage regime cohesion. u
These internal costs are tempered by a number of factors. The regime
possesses powerful coercive instruments to keep the population in line, the
population still has ingrained habits of political passivity, and many
citizens and officials take pride in the USSR's expanded global role. At
the same time, the USSR stands to reap positive benefits if it is able to
consolidate control in Afghanistan--such as enhanced leverage vis-a-vis
Pakistan and Iran. Regime concern about the internal repercussions of
involvement in Afghanistan will continue to exert some influence on Soviet
policy, but strategic considerations are likely to remain paramount. n
s t escript was written b with the help of contributions by
nd other members o e ecurity Issues Branch, Policy Analysis
v s on, fice of Soviet Analvsis. Comments may be directed to Chief,
Policy Analysis Division,
SOV M 84 10180CX
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Economic Costs
The the Soviet economic investment in Afghanistan has been
considerable, but manageable:
-- Direct Soviet military expenditures in Afghanistan,
while up by about 20 percent since 1980, still account
for only about one percent of total Soviet military
spending. (We estimate that from 1980 through 1983
the Soviets spent a total of about $12 billion in
direct support of Soviet military forces in
Afghanistan, or an average of about $3 billion
annually.)
-- We estimate cumulative economic aid to the Babrak
regime through 1983 at roughly $1 billion and military
aid at under $2 billion in current prices--more than
to any other clients except Cuba and Vietnam. In
addition, the Soviets this fall agreed to provide $100
million in new aid over the next five years.
-- The economic impact has been more pronounced for
particular regions and sectors of the economy than the
overall figures would suggest. Military priorities,
for example, have caused disruptions in transportation
and construction in Soviet republics just north of
Afghanistan. Shortages of railroad rolling stocks
have been especially evident during the harvest
season. The drain on Soviet manpower of maintaining
110,000 troops in Afghanistan has been limited,)
Social Costs
Little overt rotest. The regime has taken pains to limit
the popu at on s cnow a ge of developments in Afghanistan,
conditioning Soviet citizens to accept the Soviet role there and
acting quickly to stifle public criticism:
-- At the outset of the war Soviet media never mentioned
Soviet casualties or engagement in combat. Growing
public awareness of developments in Afghanistan forced
some modification of this approach in late 1981, but
the media are still portraying the "limited
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contingent" of Soviet forces as being drawn into
combat only when attacked by "bandits" and refrain
from mentioning participation in planned offensive
operations. Moreover, the Soviets have publicly
acknowledged only about 50 of the over 20,000
estimated casulties they have suffered. Increasingly,
however, media coverage of the war has come to
acknowledge the extent of opposition the Soviets have
encountered in a seeming attempt to prepare the
population for a long ordeal in Afghanistan.
-- When dissident Andrey Sakharov in 1980 condemned the
Soviet invasion, the regime moved rapidly to silence
him. The KGB summoned him for questioning in short
order, and he was susequently exiled to Gorky.
-- Regime attention to preventive measures is further
indicated by the reported dispatching of plainclothed
KGB personnel to attend funerals of war dead
presumably to guard against demonstrations.
Partly as a consequence of these efforts of police and
propaganda instruments, active opposition to the war has been
limited. Even human rights activists in the Soviet dissident
community have not made Afghanistan a central concern, although
dissident literature contains numerous critical references to
regime actions in Afghanistan. The war has had a demoralizing
effect on most elements of the population and has intensified a
wide range of social ills, but the attitude of society so far
remains one of resignation rather than rebellion. ~
Troop morale. Soviet conscripts have a 1Qw level of
commitment to prosecution of the war in Afghanistan:
-- This may be largely attributable to the hazards of
combat, the rigors of daily life in the ranks, and
poor relations between officers and troops.
-- But disillusionment with Soviet propaganda also plays
a role. The newly arrived conscript--who has been
told by Soviet media that he will be fighting US,
Chinese, and Pakistan mercenaries and will be received
by a grateful Afghan population--soon discovers that
official propaganda bears little relation to the
realities of the situation.
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Dru abuse. Substantial numbers of young Soviets are being
intro ud ced to new forms of drug abuse--involving hashish and to
a lesser extent heroin--and these are threatening to spread into
a Soviet society already beset by a serious alcohol problem:
have attac e e ega ransport of narcotics
across the "southern border" into the USSR, and the
Soviets have undertaken a number of operations to
reduce the extent of dru trafficking i n
Afghanistan.
Corruption. Large numbers of Soviets are involved in the
movement of contraband goods from the USSR to Afghanistan's
thriving black market, and in a reverse flow of Western consumer
goods from Kabul back to the USSR by illegal channels, as well
as in the illegal trading of rubles to gain foreign currency in
Afghanistan. Both officers and conscripts reportedly have
participated in illegal sales of military equipment and the
taking of bribes to release prisoners. It is probable that
opportunities to practice "capitalism" in Afghanistan are
reinforcing practices and attitudes that contribute to the
further growth of corruption and erosion of discipline among
officials in the USSR itself.
Soviet press articles
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Ethnic tensions. The Afghan conflict appears to have
heightene ongstan ing Soviet apprehensions about nationality
friction in the military and about the political reliability of
non-Slavs:
-- Although Central Asian troops played a major role in
the initial Soviet invasion, the regime subsequently
has used Central Asian soldiers largely in the non-
combat support jobs that they have traditionally
filled. This appears to have been largely because
most of the Central Asians in the invading force were
reservists activated only on a temporary basis and
then released in accordance with normal Soviet
practice.
-- There are numerous media reports (but little hard
evidence) of efforts by Afghan insurgents to engage in
small-scale cross-border raids in areas of Central
Asia where the populations are thought to be
sympathetic. -
-- Concern to prevent cross-border raids and smuggling
from Afghanistan soul d have been behind the reg~-m-P'
move to stiffen the Soviet border law in 1982.
Although unrest in Soviet Central Asia diminished following
the early period of Soviet intervention, some incidents have
occurred since that time. A Soviet intellectual with reasonably
high-level connections told US Embassy officers in October 1984
that angry relatives of soldiers killed in Afghanistan had
recently burned down the city militar command building in Kazan
and created a disturbance in Baku.
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Evasion of Mi 1 i tar Service. Not surprisingly, the Afghan
confl ct as ncrease the a orts of Soviet citizens to dodge
the draft. Even more than previously, Soviet youth aided by
their parents reso t to various strategems--legal and illegal--to
evade induction.
High-1 evel mi 1 itary spokesmen, including t e e ense
Minister and the Chief of the General Staff, have in recent years
decried with unusual fervor the growth of pacifist tendencies
among young peo le, suggesting increased regime sensitivity on
the subject.
Class tensions. Since it is easier for middle-class Soviets
to avo m tary service through bribery or enrollment in
universities, the Afghan conflict has exacerbated working class
resentment of the privileges enjoyed by the intelligentsia.
Soviet media recently have criticized children of the elite for
trying to get around fulfilling their military obligations,
thereby leaving less advantaged citizens to bear the brunt of the
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fighting in Afghanistan. In apparent recognition of
disgruntlement among workers, the regime acted in 1980 to limit
colle a deferments through revision of the military service
Consumer attitudes. Soviet citizens have long tended to
exaggerate t e costs of aid to the Third World and to blame
Soviet foreign involvement as one cause for consumer shortages at
homE. Emigre reporting indicates Afghanistan has apparently
increased public resentment of the diversion of ~n~tic
resources to support foreign policy objectives. u
Regime credibility and legitimacy. The Afghan conflict may
have rein orced the growt o social malaise among the Soviet
population:
-- Since World War II a key source of domestic strength
for the regime has been its success in giving the
population what it most wants--peace. The fighting in
Afghanistan may have weakened this prop to the system
to some extent.
-- Growing realization among the population that the
Soviet media are not telling the whole story about the
Afghan conflict may have enhanced public cynicism about
official propaganda on other subjects as well.
-- Most important, the lack of Soviet success in the war
and the pervasive sense among the population that it
may drag on indefinitely may have contributed to an
increase in pessimism about the Soviet future.
-- The war has had its most direct effect on the attitudes
of Soviet youth, the element of the population about
whose behavior the regime is most concerned.
Friction Within the Elite
There are indications that the stalemate in Afghanistan has
been a source of tension and frustration within Soviet elites.
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This evidence does not permit any tidy identification of
institutional groupings within the elite associated with
particular points of view on the course of the war. Nor does it
indicate clearly whether there are different attitudes about the
war within the top leadership. Overall, however, the reporting
indicates that the political leadership has been dissatisfied
with the erformance of the military in Afghanistan, while within
the profess ona mi itary dissatisfaction over the regime'
op lic'y toward Afghanistan has been especially pronounced.
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This conclusion increases in importance when viewed in light
of signs over the last several years of more generalized
discontent r bout the ualit of the olitical
leadership.
Conclusion
These internal costs of Soviet involvement in Afghanistan
are tempered by a number of factors:
-- The Soviets are only devoting something in the range of
two percent of their mi 1 i to ry manpower to the war. The
limited scope of the Soviet effort limits the impact on
Soviet society.
-- The regime possesses enormous powers of coercion and
control that make it less vulnerable to pressures from
below than are governments in most other states. It
has taken both recautionar measures to prevent
societal problem~esca ating and reactive measures
to deal with existing levels of dissatisf-ac on.
-- Habits of political passivity and obedience to
authority still are deeply ingrained among the Soviet
population.
-- The discouragement of Soviet officials and citizens
about slow progress in Afghanistan is offset in many
cases by national pride in the USSR's world role, and
in some cases by a belief that Soviet enduran~ll
ultimately prevail--as it has in other wars.
Leadership concern about the domestic repercussions of
Soviet involvement in Afghanistan will continue to have some
effect on regime policy. But it is by no means certain in what
direction this concern will influence Soviet actions:
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-- A rotracted conflict would perhaps have the most
negat ve omest c consequences. Already the Soviets
have fought in Afghanistan longer than they did in
World War II, and Soviet leaders are doubtless worried
that the continued rotation of young Soviet soldiers
through Afghanistan and their exposure to conditions
there could have an increasingly corrosive effect on
Soviet society. A protracted conflict could also
enhance alienation within the Soviet military officer
corps.
-- A major escalation intended to shorten the war by
achieving qui c c m i to ry woul d require sending more
troops and would raise the toll of Soviet casualties.
Soviet leaders consequently might believe that an
escalation would run the risks of touching off civil
disturbances in the USSR.
-- A political accommodation in which Moscow accepted less
than total domination of Afghanistan would damage the
regime's prestige internally. Soviet leaders might
fear that a loss of face in Afghanistan would serve as
an object lesson to non-Russian minorities and make the
USSR's rapidly growing Muslim population more
politically assertive.
Leadership concern about domestic costs is not the most
important factor shaping policy in Afghanistan. The Soviets fear
the consequences for Soviet security interests and international
authority of any move to withdraw. Moreover, the regime stands
to reap positive benefits (not elaborated in this paper) if it is
able to consolidate control--such as enhanced fieverage vis-a-vis
Pakistan and Iran. Afghanistan also provides the USSR a useful
testing ground for military equipment and personnel. We believe
these and other strategic considerations continue to override
domestic costs in determining the course Moscow takes in
Afghanistan.
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