MOSCOW'S RESPONSE TO RECENT CENTRAL AMERICAN DEVELOPMENTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000900150001-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: August 29, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
29 August 1983
MOSCOii' S RBSPOHSB TO RBCB~IT CBlITRAL AMBRICA9 DBVBLOPMBIiTS
Sussary
Moscor's response to the escalation of OS pressure
in Central l-serica has been consistent rith its
calculated exploitation of the situation there over the
past fer years. The Soviets are trying to protect
Cossunist positions in Cnba and licaraqua, to preserve
the possibility of future Marxist advances elsewhere in
the region while avoiding a confrontation rith the
In order to preclude the possibility of even
stronger OS coves and a further deterioration in OS-
Soviet relations, Moscor has sought to avoid the
ispression that its interests are being directly
challenged. It has takes ao action indicating it rill
provide 111caraqua--or even Cnba--anything sore than
qualified support in the event of OS silitary actions.
1-lthough !loscor clearly does not want to put its
prestige on the line in a possible confrontation rith
the OS in an area so distant Eros Soviet =ilitary
porer, its public release of its 11 August protest over
OS surveillance of Soviet shipping suggests that it say
resonstrate sore strongly over any future OS
Copy,-o f 3 3
Thin sesorandus vas prepared by (China-Third
1lorld Branch, Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions and consents
should be addre o the Chief, China-Third Norld Branch, SOYA,
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Ia oar judqnent, Moscow probably thinks that the
current situation--although carrying sore risks--
benefits the OSSR by distracting the IIS, helping cause
controversy in the IIS that impacts ^ore broadly on
foreign policy, diverting OS military resources fro^
areas closer to vital Soviet interests, and creating
opportunities for Soviet ezploitation with IIS friends
in Latin l~lserica and liestern Europe. The DSSR probably
thinks that its best coarse is to avoid nay escalation
of involveaent that could lead to a sho~-do~-n Frith the
OS or preclude soveaent oa other issues of i^portance
to the OSSR such as aras control. The OSSR is
apparently hoping that the current phase of acute
tension Hill ease, leaving it free to pursue its
longer-tern objectives in the region.
Soviet Goals and Strategy
Moscow's long-term goal in Central America is to expand its
influence there and weaken that of the US by working to increase
the number of pro-Soviet and Marxist countries. The Soviets also
want to distract and divert US strength from areas of greater
Soviet security concern. The USSR has approached the recent
intensification of US pressure on Nicaragua with an intention of
protecting long-term prospects for spreading Marxism and Moscow's
influence. At the same time, while probably pleased with growing
US embroilment in the area, it wants to avoid a confrontation
with Washington over it.
Continued Military Support
Despite the increase in US pressure over the past several
weeks, Moscow has not appeared so far to reduce its direct
provision of military support equipment to Managua, nor its
indirect provision of weaponry through surrogates.
In reply to US statements that military supplies are being
delivered to Nicaragua on Soviet vessels--including MI-8
helicopters on its freighter Aleksandr U1'yanov--Moscow has
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insisted that the ships carry only normal commercial freight.
Although Managua has in most statements taken the same position,
Foreign Minister D'Escoto was quoted by a Sandinista newspaper on
30 July to have said, "The ,Soviet shins are carrving wheat an
The Nicaraguan Defense Ministry said on 29 July that foreign
journalists had been invited to look at the U1'yanov's cargo, and
Moscow Radio repeated several times, beginning 2 August, a false
statement that such inspections had occurred. But when the ship
began unloading on 4 August journalists were refused permits by
officials who said the Nicaraguan government saw no need to prove
the nature of the cargo. This reversal may have reflected a
sudden decision to preclude discovery of the MI-8s, but it also
could have been the result of a Soviet desire to avoid creating a
precedent of having all Soviet cargoes to Nicaragua checked.
The Soviets have also publicly laid out a justification for
continuing military-related shipments. On 10 August Pravda
reported the statement of Sandinista leader Daniel Ortega that
the "Nicaraguan people are fully entitled to strengthen their
defense and acquire weapons wherever they deem it necessary."
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Soviet public and private statements have also been
carefully orchestrated to avoid the impression that the USSR has
been challenged or that Soviet interests are deeply engaged in
the situation. The Soviet media, for example, have ignored
President Reagan's 18 July statement that the arrival of Soviet
military supplies in Nicaragua "cannot be allowed to continue."
And Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko has sought to soothe
Washington. He told the US Ambassador a few days after the
President's speech that Moscow has no intention of threatening US
security from Latin America and denied that the USSR has military
bases in Cuba or Nicaragua.
In a similar vein, Moscow initially sought to play down US
surveillance of Soviet ships carrying military-related cargoes to
Nicaragua. The USSR briefly mentioned in foreign broadcasts--but
not in domestic media--the radio querying and subsequent
shadowing of the Ulyanov by a US warship off Nicaragua on 30
July. The Soviet Foreign Ministry told the US Embassy that the
query was "unacceptable and impermissible" but did not formally
protest. This complaint seemed intended to put Moscow on record
as rejecting the precedent of harassment but without making a
major issue of the incident in a manner that could force Moscow
to choose between confrontation or a humiliating retreat.
Moscow, however, reacted more strongly to subsequent US
surveillance after the ship left Corinto, Nicaragua, on 7
August. On 11 August it publicized a formal protest of the US
actions, calling them "lawless" and saying that the US would be
responsible for the consequences of additional similar actions.
Although this protest was delivered at a relatively low level by
the Foreign Ministry in Moscow, its publication and hint of a
stronger Soviet response suggests that the USSR would react to
further US actions with intensified diplomatic and propaganda
efforts.
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Soviet Exploitation
Soviet media, which have long sought to picture the US as
following imperialistic policies in Central America, have seized
upon recent developments there to intensify efforts to discredit
this country. Main themes of recent Soviet commentaries have
included attacks on US policy as "violating the international
norms of interstate relations" by use of covert action,
practicing "gunboat diplomacy," "feverishly preparing for
intervention" in the region, deploying forces "for the purpose of
committing aggression," and using the Kissinger commission as a
smoke-screen for aggression. These themes seem intended by
Moscow both to show support for Nicaragua and Cuba and to damage
support for the US in the rest of Latin America and Western
Europe.
No Expanded Commitment to Managua or Havana
Moscow has avoided any action over the past month that might
link Soviet prestige more closely to Nicaragua and Cuba or to
commit the USSR to greater backing for them. For example,
published messages to the two countries on their revolutionary
anniversaries last month were notably cool and non-committal.
The Soviet leadership said on 19 July that "the Nicaraguans are
courageously defending their revolutionary gains" against US
"threats and crude pressure," and the "Soviet people are
satisfied" with their relationship. This strongly implied that,
despite escalating US pressure, Managua should not expect any
additional Soviet help.
The Soviet wariness of any public suggestion of military
support was also shown by Foreign Ministry Secretary General
Fokin's answer to reporters' questions after his consultations in
Managua on 3 August. Asked if the USSR would provide military
aid in case of a Central American war, he replied, "we will
support Nicaragua politically in all forms."
Similarly on 26 July the USSR told Cuba that, when US
"aggressive circles" were continuing provocations, "the Soviet
people again express their invariable solidarity with heroic
Cuba" and will strengthen their friendship. In his anniversary
speech, President Castro seemed to acknowledge this implicit lack
of a firm Soviet commitment. He expressed only vague thanks to
Moscow for "solidarity" and "constant support" without relating
this directly to the perceived danger from the US. Castro's
comments on the occasion reflect his continued inability to get
from Moscow the explicit private or public pledge of Soviet
defense for Cuba that he has been seeking for years.
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Moscow's refusal to be drawn into responsibility for Cuba or
Nicaragua is a reflection of its unwillingness to get into a
confrontation in an area so distant from Soviet military bases
and so close to US power. Despite changes in the strategic
balance and substantial improvement in Soviet ability to project
military power abroad since the Cuban missile crisis 21 years
ago, Soviet leaders remain cautious about commitments that might
test their strength in non-critical areas.
Moscow's comments may also be designed to discourage Cuba
from overextending itself in Central America and increasing
chances of a confrontation with the US.
mse as een to ng ore gn officials that Moscow has been
signaling him that it will not support Cuba in any confrontation
with the US.
Changing View of Contadora
In apparent response to the intensification of the
situation, official Soviet statements and media commentary have
begun showing more support for efforts of the Contadora group--
Colombia, Mexico, Panama and Venezuela.
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The USSR quickly voiced support for the six-point plan
proposed by Sandinista Junta Coordinator Ortega on 19 July for
multilateral negotiations under Contadora auspices.
Nevertheless, the Soviets did not link this to support for the
Contadora group's own proposals. But, after both Cuba and
Nicaragua had publicly endorsed the Contadora effort, the USSR
began cautiously to warm toward it.
Pravda on 3 August said
the group advocated "a just settlement of the conflict in the
region." The same day Managua Radio quoted visiting Soviet
official Fokin as supporting the group's efforts.
Moscow's initial coolness toward Contadora settlement
efforts probably reflected its view that the turmoil in Central
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America, if left to fester, would lead to greater Marxist control
and Soviet influence. The Soviets probably also thought it was in
their interests to keep the US politically preoccupied or even
militarily embroiled. Furthermore, the Contadora negotiations
would exclude the USSR and might force Managua to make
concessions that would set back the long-term Soviet objective of
the creation of anti-US, preferably Marxist regimes. This is
suggested by recent comments to US Embassy officers by a Soviet
diplomat in Moscow, who said he saw problems with the Contadora
group's call for democratic processes and elections. He said
these had been "imposed" on the group--an allusion to US
initiatives.
As the situation heated up in recent weeks, however, the
Soviets have seemed to become more concerned to avoid being out
of step with Latin America. They may think that support for
Contadora may win some credit with West Europeans who are uneasy
with US policy. In the changing situation, Moscow may also think
that the Contadora efforts could hamper US moves by creating
pressure for diplomatic rather than military actions, thus
furthering Soviet interests.
Soviet Calculations
This overall pattern of Soviet conduct suggests careful
calculation by Moscow about its interests in the current Central
American situation. In our judgment, the Soviets are probably
uncertain about what course the US may eventually adopt.
Although they recognize that there are serious international and
domestic constraints against the US using force or resorting to a
blockade in the region, we doubt that the Soviets discount these
possibilities. This argues for Moscow's giving priority to
avoiding any new action that would provoke or justify such
actions or that would commit Soviet prestige to support Managua
or Havana in the event they occur--while continuing military
deliveries and other activities to strengthen the two regimes.
Moscow's deliberate efforts to downplay its commitments to
Managua and Cuba as well as its cautious support for the
Contadora efforts suggest the Soviets may even be thinking that
some back-peddling now by Managua and Havana--such as engagement
in negotiations--will help keep the situation from getting out of
hand. We believe the Soviets may think this will ensure the
survival of the Sandinistas, preserve long-term options of the
Salvadorean insurgents, and protect US-Soviet relations from
further deterioration.
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At the same time, Moscow apparently sees advantages in
continued US embroilment in the region, which could intensify US
domestic discord and exacerbate Washington's problems with
regional friends and NATO allies. The diversion of the
battleship New Jersey and US carrier groups from Asian and
Mediterranean waters of more intense security concern to the USSR
is also viewed by Soviet leaders as a benefit. Moscow also sees
US preoccupation with Central America as constraining the US
elsewhere. Aleksandr Bovin, a prominent Soviet commentator and
reputed Andropov consultant, for example, wrote recently that
President Reagan had to pull back from his initial assertive
posture on Chad because, in view of Central America, he would
find it difficult to justify another "military adventure" at
Prospects
Despite the escalation of US pressure, over the next few
months the USSR seems likely to continue efforts to strengthen
the regimes in Cuba and Nicaragua. It probably will try to do
this, however, in ways that avoid a showdown that might test
distant Soviet power against nearby American strength. This
could involve more military aid to Cuba, a possible naval visit
to the Caribbean--although Moscow might see this as too
provocative--an intensified effort to back regional talks,
cautionary advice for Managua and Havana, and increased economic
support to Nicaragua.
If Moscow feels that the risk of firmer US military action
is reaching dangerous proportions it may temporarily slow down or
alter Soviet shipments of military goods and urge its surrogates
to do the same. The Soviets, for example, could dramatically
reduce the number of military related shipments in Soviet vessels
simply by consolidating the small deliveries they have been
making on regularly scheduled cargo runs into fewer bigger
shipments. Indeed, if the Soviets adopted this practice we could
see an increase in total tonnage of military related shipments
but fewer individual seaborne deliveries. Moscow could also
begin using client countries' ships for all military-associated
deliveries to Nicaragua, instead of continuing its past practice
of sending major weapons through surrogates and delivering only
small arms and military transport and support equipment itself.
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If the US again harasses Soviet shipping, the USSR will
probably protest more vigorously and seek to marshal world
opinion against it. Moscow might see continued US naval
shadowing of its shipping as playing into Soviet efforts to stir
West European concern about US policy in the region, but it
probably will remain reluctant to deliberately stir up incidents
in a region where it is at a significant military disadvantage.
Over the longer term, we doubt that the present level of
tensions will deter Moscow from the calculated exploitation of
the Central American situation that has characterized its policy
over the past several years. Indeed, the current situation may
well reinforce Moscow's perception that Central America is good
ground for harassing and distracting the US without substantial
investment of Soviet resources.
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DDI/BONA/CS/C: (22 Aug 83)
Distribution:
Copy 1 - DCI
2 - DDCI
3 - DDI Action Staff
4 - SA/DCI,
5 - ED/DCI,
6 - Senior Review Panel
7-11 - OCPAS/IMD/CB
12 - D/BONA
13 - DD/BONA
14 - NBC, Al Sapia-Bosch
15 - NBC, Jack Matlock
16 - Asst Sec of State, Motley
17 - Asst Sec of State, Burt
18 - Office of Soviet Affairs, Tom Simons
19 - D/INR, Huqh Montgomery
20 - INR/Latin America, William Knepper
21 - INR/USSR, Robert Baraz
22 - Asst Sec DOD/ISA
23 - Asst Sec DOD/ISP, Richard Perl
24 - Deputy Assistant Secretary, (Inter-American Affairs)
Nestor Sanchez
25 - D/DIA
26 - D/NBA
27 - NIO/USSR
28 - NIO/LA
29 - NIC/AG, Beth Blumfield
30 - NIC/AG, Kay Oliver
31 - D/ALA
32 - C/ALA/MAC/CA
33 - C/ALA/MAC CC
34 - DDO/LA
35 - D/OGI
36 - OGI/Shipping Branch
37 - OGI/Communist Activity
38 - C/PAD/BONA
39 - DC/PAD/BONA
40 - C/PA/F/BONA
41 - C/TFD/BONA
42 - C/BED/BONA
43 - C/SFD/BONA
44 - C/EAD/BONA
45 - C/DID/BONA
46 - C/CSD/BONA
47 - SA/CS
48 - CSD/Chrono
49 - C/CS/C
50 - C/CS/E
51 - C/CS/S
52 - CS/Chrono
53 - CS
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