AFGHANISTAN SITUATION REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000700910001-6
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 16
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 30, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: April 11, 1983
• Content Type: REPORT

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Directorate of
Intelligence N
fill. C/ C-
Afghanistan Situation Report
11 April 1983
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The Afghan secret police have increased harassment of the
Embassy's foreign national employees, and the Embassy no lon er
excludes the possibility of being shut down at some point.
Satellite photography shows the destruction of pylons on the
Kabul-to-Sorubi powerline.F--] 25X1
Although the food situation in Afghanistan probably will remain
generally adequate in most areas in 1983, spot shortages and
disruptions will pose hardships among the civilian population in
some key locations.
This document is prepared weekly by the Office of Near East/South Asia
and the Office of Soviet Analysis. Questions or comments on the issues
raised in the publication should be directed
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The US Embassy in Kabul reports the arrest of its seventh
Afghan employee. In addition, for the first time, one of the
Embassy's non-Afghan foreign employees, a Pakistani, has
disappeared and has probably been arrested. Similarly, for the
first time, KHAD has told several Embassy guards in writing to
quit their jobs because they had not cooperated with the secret
police. The Embassy thinks that KHAD's primary goal is to reduce
contacts with Afghans in hope of restricting the scope of the
Embassy's weekly sitrep, which is used to brief the press, and it
no longer excludes the possibility of eing closed down perhaps
in late April, on the anniversary of t e 1978 coup.
Comment: KHAD does appear to be engaged in a systematic
attempt to reduce the Embassy to a skeleton staff, and some KHAD
personnel probably would like to expel all US personnel as well.
At the end of 1981, the Embassy had 20 white-collar foreign
employees; at the end of 1982, it had 15; and now it has only 11.
In addition to reducing the scope of the weekly sitrep, KHAD may
also want to staff the Embassy with its own informants. The main
reason for not shutting down the Embassy completely, however, is
the possibility that other Western embassies might then close
voluntarily. Both the Soviets and Babrak probably prefer to
maintain the Western presence because it confers a certain
legitimacy and facilitates commercial contacts.
Further information concerning insurgent attacks on electric
transmission lines in the Kabul area has recently become
available.
three electric power pylons were damaged or destroyed about 38
kilometers east of Kabul along the Kabul-to-Sorubi powerline.
press reports indicate that insurgents
attacked pylons along the powerline on one or more occasions
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US Embassy reporting indicates that residents of Kabul
generally blame the Afghan authorities and the Soviets--not the
insurgents--for the resulting power outages.
Comment: The attack was carried out in remote mountainous
terrain, probably to provide cover for the insurgents and to
complicate repairs for the authorities. We judge that the
reported countermeasures planned by the Soviets would impede but
not prevent the insurgents from attacking other pylons,
particularly in remote areas.
This article was prepared principally by the Office of Imagery
Analysis.
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Although the food situation in Afghanistan probably will remain
generally adequate in most areas in 1983, spot shortages and disruptions
will pose hardships among the civilian population in some key locations.
Satellite photography indicates that, even in the major zones of
conflict, crops were usually sown and harvested roughly on time in 1982.
Many sources indicate, however, that the disruption of the
transportation systems, the government's inability to collect grain and
other agricultural products in insurgent-controlled areas, and the
reluctance of some farmers to sell to the government have created
serious shortages in Soviet-controlled areas. This increases dependence
on food imports from the USSR. Military operations have also disrupted
agriculture in some locations bordering Pakistan and areas adjacent to
Kabul, including the Panjsher Valley. Continuing food shortages in
these areas would put an extra burden on insurgent groups in trying to
feed both themselves and their civilian supporters.
Agricultural Production
Most Afghan farms were not seriously affected either by the Soviet
occupation or by insurgent activity during the 1983 crop season.
Satellite photography of the grain-producing areas of the country
indicates that fair to good crop conditions prevailed through the
growing season in most regions and that harvesting was initiated on or
nearly on schedule. Most of rural Afghanistan, which is largely
controlled by the insurgents, appears to be self-sufficient in food.
Although meterological data for Afghanistan in 1982 are incomplete,
the weather was generally good throughout
the year. During the winter of 1981-1982, areas north of Kabul received
slightly above-average precipitation, and ground water supplies were
adequate, as imagery reveals. Canals in the irrigation networks were
generally filled throughout the growing season.
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Afghanistan: Kabul Area
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Nonetheless, the war in Afghanistan has disrupted the country's
agricultural economy. The Babrak regime has little influence over
agricultural production and distribution and requires substantial Soviet
assistance to feed government-controlled urban areas. Military
operations in some key insurgent-controlled areas have caused shortages
and hardships there. Prices for agricultural products are generally
rising because of shortages.
Problems for the Government
The Afghan Government faces a number of obstacles to maintaining or
increasing production. the
government is having little success in gaining farmers loyalty, and
farmers remain reluctant to expand production under the threat of
collectivization. Fearing even sharper cuts in production than those
that have already occurred, Kabul has made no inroads in socializing
Afghanistan's farms, although some agricultural production is under
collective or state auspices. The revised land reform program is
largely a failure because of the government's corruption and
incompetence and its inability to guarantee sufficient food, shelter,
tools, and seeds to begin production. Despite official claims of
improved irrigation facilities, fertilizer use, and mechanization, we
have found no evidence of large-scale farm improvements.
Various Western sources, including the US Department of Agriculture,
estimate total foodgrain production in 1982 at 3.4 million tons, with
wheat accounting for 2.2 million tons. This compares with an average
foodgrain production of 4.7 million tons for the five years preceding
the Soviet invasion in 1979. In contrast, the Minister of Agriculture
and Land Reform in January 1983 announced highly satisfactory results
for agriculture for 1982 and for grain production in particular,
estimating total foodgrain output in 1982 at 4.5 million tons. 0
We believe the Western estimates are more accurate than the Babrak
government's figure, because the insurgency has sharply limited the
regime's access to rural areas. Because the insurgents have control
over most of the countryside, government officials cannot move freely
about to gather agricultural data. Moreover, since the Soviet invasion,
Kabul's efforts to conceal economic deterioration have made the
collection of reliable data even more difficult than previously.
Various international reporting and contradictory statements by the
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Afghan Government suggest that Kabul is trying to counter Western
criticism of the Soviet presence in Af hanistan by overestimating crop
production and land under cultivation.
Despite its claims to the contrary, the Afghan Government publicly
announced in October 1982 that the country was facing "a shortage of
food and malnutrition" and that "each year, 150,000 to 200,000 tons of
wheat" are imported, along with large quantities of rice, cooking oil,
sugar, and dairy products. Our assessment shows that food shortages,
particularly in the cities, would be serious were it not for large-scale
imports of up to 350,000 tons annually. In contrast, Kabul imported an
average of only 85,000 tons annually for the five years preceding the
Soviet occupation. All of the country's imported foodgrains are
supplied by the Soviet Union, either directly or through purchases on
world markets.
Of the total land
area of 65 million hectares (ha) in Afghanistan, only 8 million is
arable, and half of that amount is cultivated yearly. Historically, the
total area under wheat has averaged about 2.4 million ha, of which 1.3
million ha is irrigated and about 1.1 million ha is rainfed. Some
arable land is left fallow each year because of insufficient irrigation
water and the need to rejuvenate the fields. Owing to the lack of
cropland imagery prior to the Soviet invasion, we cannot judge
accurately the direction of trends in the amount of land left fallow
under Soviet occupation.
Commercial crops, which normally account for 10 percent of total
arable land, appear to have had a mixed record. Official estimates even
show increases of some products. We are skeptical of the government
figures, however, given the decline of available labor and draft animals
in cash crop areas, as reported by Western observers.
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Various reports indicate mixed results in livestock production.
Historically, livestock production accounts for approximately 10 percent
of the country's gross domestic product and provides 30 percent of total
export earnings. Official data indicate increases in the production of
horses, donkeys, and camels, which are used principally for
transportation. Sheep provide the principal meat in the Afghan diet,
but excessive slaughtering over the past two years has limited their
increases. Meat shortages cannot readily be resolved by imports,
because most Afghans refuse to eat meat from animals not killed in
Afghanistan.
Shortages in Key Areas
Although there appears to be enough food in the countryside to feed
the local population and the insurgents, imagery and human source
reports have identified food shortages in four geographic areas
important to the insurgency.
there are severe food shortages
in the strategic Panjsher Valley, 60 miles northeast of Kabul.
Declining civilian morale--because of Soviet military pressure,
increased casualties, and lack of food and shelter--was probably a
factor in the interest of the local insurgent leader Masood in cease-
fire negotiations with the Soviets. Imagery confirms that a few fields
have been burned in the area, and farming was reportedly disrupted by
military operations in the spring and fall. Earlier imagery from June
and July, however, suggests a fair yield of winter grains in most parts
of the valley.
In the lower Konar Valley, near the Pakistan border northeast of
Jalalabad, yields in 1982 ranged only from poor to fair, according to
imagery analysis. The relatively poorer crop here does not appear to be
a result of deliberate crop destruction by hostile military action, but
rather the consequence of a locally severe labor shortage, which, in
turn, precipitated the abandonment of some tracts of previously
cultivated land. Furthermore, the Konar Valley grain crop was harvested
in mid-May, and may have been cut before it was fully ripe. This would
naturally result in lower yields.
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The grain crop also looked poor on imagery for a few locations of
Paktia Province, southeast of Kabul, where insurgency at times has been
intense. As a result of military activity near the town of Khost, some
agricultural land and crops were destroyed, and military equipment has
been observed in grain fields at the edge of town. Even here, however,
winter grains sown in fields adjacent to the battle zones were
harvested. The proximity of this area to Kurram Province in Pakistan
permits Afghans living in Pakistan-based refugee camps to work their
fields in Afghanistan without much difficulty.
A number of Western journalists and Afghan refugees in Pakistan have
filed accounts of the bombing of villages and the destruction of crops
by Soviet forces in Lowgar Province, south of Kabul. One report,
written in September, states that harvested grain in that area had been
burned and that irrigation systems in several villages alon the Kabul-
Gardez road had been destroyed. Soviet
and Afghan troops have attempted to create a "sanitary zone" along the
road by burning the vegetation. Unfortunately, imagery is not available
Soviet military operations have caused
scattered destruction of fields and livestock. Satellite photography
indicates there was no systematic burning of fields in 1982, and crop
damage from military operations appears to be limited.
Prices
The war and resulting spot shortages have increased the prices of
agricultural products. The Afghan Government claims that consumer
prices increased 12 to 15 percent over the last two years, held down by
controls and subsidies and the large volume of goods passing through
government-owned and cooperative shops. However, unofficial sources
claim that inflation is running about 100 percent or more. Data
collected from a variety of sources since 1980 show a number of
significant price increases. Price increases for cooking oil, mutton,
bread, and rice suggest shortfalls as well as distribution difficulties.
On the other hand, the prices of flour, beef, camel meat, and chicken
increased only moderately during the reporting period, reflecting less
severe shortages of these items. The prices of fruits, nuts, and
vegetables show little or no increase over the reporting period,
reflecting their abundance. Many of these food items grow wild in
Afghanistan and have shown great resistance to war activities.
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Out look
We do not expect any major change in Afghanistan's food situation in
1983, although the fighting will probably continue to cause shortages in
some areas. Shortages will continue to plague major Afghan urban
centers, given the disruption of the distribution system, the
susceptibility of Soviet convoys to insurgent attacks, and the
dependence of the occupied urban areas on Soviet imports. In insurgent-
controlled areas, the Soviets will probably attempt to use scorched-
earth tactics selectively to punish insurgent supporters or to force
them into Afghanistan's cities where they are more easily controlled.
Because of the exodus of some 3 million refugees and the thousands of
Afghan casualties, the available work force has declined. We believe
the work force decline is already beginning to result in lowered
agricultural output in selected areas despite the periodic return of
some refugees to both farm and fight. Given the trends, Afghan
agriculture would worsen only gradually, over the longer term. If the
Soviets increase the intensity and scope of their military activities,
more severe consequences for the food supply will probably result.
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