COUNTERSPY: NEW YORK TIMES COVERS AND AIDS 1983 C.I.A. COUP IN IRAN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150002-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 6
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: June 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: October 1, 1980
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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The Magazine For People Who Need To Know
SPECIAL ISSUE SEPT /OCT. 1980 50C
New Revelations:
New York Times
Covers and Aids
1953 C.I.A. Coup
in Iran
Iranians of different socio-eco-
nomic strata and backgrounds vary
in their grievances against the
U.S. government but agree on the
event of greatest disdain: the CIA-
masterminded coup of August 1953.
The coup replaced the constitution-
al government of Mohammed Mossadegh
with that of a pro-Nazi named
Zahedi and marked the onset of 25
years of Shah-led dictatorial rule.
An event of such historic impor-
tance was bound to generate contro-
versies and consequences even three
decades later. Indeed, Iranians'
fears that the October 1979 admis-
sion of the Shah to the U.S. for
"medical reasons" signalled another
CIA-masterminded coup served as a
catalyst for the embassy seizure.
Following the embassy takeover,
several U.S. government statements
on the coup grabbed media headlines..
President Carter, scoffing at the
idea of apologizing to the Iranians,
dismissed the 1953 coup as "ancient
history". State Department spokes-
person, Hodding Carter, repeatedly
refused comment. The CIA officer
who ran the 1953 coup, Kermit
Roosevelt, disclosed his version of
events in his book, Counter-coup:
The Struggle for Control of Iran
issued by McGraw-Hill in October
1979 and withdrawn in November 1979
(three days after the embassy take-
over) following strenuous objec-
ti,ons by the British Petroleum Com-
pany.
After all the official versions,
a number of questions remain unan-
(cont. on pg.2)
New C.I.A. Bill:
Death to the
First Amendment
CounterSpy magazine is issuing
the following special report be-
cause it poignantly illustrates
the devastating damage resulting
from collaboration between the
press and the CIA, and because it
addresses the present threat to
freedom of the press and the U.S.
Constitution posed by RR5615 and
S2216 pending in Congress. These
two bills make it a crime to name
undercover CIA and FBI officers,
agents, and informers or to pub-
lish information that could lead
to the disclosure of a CIA or FBI
name, even if all the information
is obtained from public sources.
This report is about Kennett
Love whose personal role in the
CIA's 1953 coup in Iran was de-
scribed as follows by. Paul Nitze,
a former Secretary of the Navy
and an active member of the Com-
mittee on the Present Danger.
"There was a tank battle, and
it wasn't going well, and the
four pro-Shah tacks - were in the
main square, stalled, and Love
went to the tank commander,
knocked on the tank and asked
him why he didn't attack
Mossadegh's place. Love, who
was only a reportehad just
come out of there,,and he had
noticed it was undefended. So
the tanks went rumbling towards
Mossadegh's and lossadegh went,-
over the back wall with some-
thing like six people, one of
whom was a prominent professor-
at Teheran University."
Love's tide-turning involvement
in the tank battle and other as-
(cont. on pg.6)
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the cost of the operation was in
the thousands of dollars; former
CIA officer, Andrew Tully claims
the cost was more than $10 million
In addition to the cost, the CIA
personalities involved, with the
exception of Roosevelt and Allen
Dulles, remain shrouded in mystery
and very little is known of the
precise strategy and tactics em-
ployed.
New evidence, however, has
emerged from the Allen W. Dulles
papers, recently opened to a care
fully screened audience at Prince
ton University, which answers some
of the questions. Dulles was CIA
Director at the time of the August
1953 coup. A 1966 file in the sec
tion of his papers containing cor
respondence includes-a letter to
Dulles from Kennett Love, a New
York Times correspondent in Iran
in 1953 and one of only two Ameri
can reporters in Teheran during
the coup. Along with the letter,
Love sent Dulles a 41-page paper
entitled: "The American Role in
the Pahlevi Restoration: On 19-Au
gust 1953" which he wrote in 1960
while attending Princeton as a
Carnegie Press Fellow of the Coun
cil on Foreign Relations. Appro-
priately enough, he wrote the pa-
per for T. Cuyler Young, a Prince
ton professor covertly consulting
for the CIA.
The partially secret committee
which oversees the Dulles papers
forbids publication of any mate-
rial from the collection without
its prior approval. The committee
is chaired by Dulles' long-time
colleague and friend, Lawrence
Houston, who served as CIA Gener-
al Counsel from 1947 to 1973. We
have not received permission to
publish our report based on the
Love materials, but we are pro-
ceeding with disclosure on the
principle that the American public
has a right and a need to know the
details of their government's for-
eign policy operations. The U.S.
Declaration of Independence re-
quires that the government operate
with the "consent of the governed".
Consent is meaningless without
knowledge. In consenting or dis-
approving of present and future
U.S. policies towards Iran, Ameri-
cans need to understand the moti-
vations behind Iranian feelings
and actions. As essential compo-
nent of this understanding is
knowledge of the 1953 coup since
it continues to motivate in part
the actions of millions of Irani-
ans. As Love himself stated: "The
relevance of information on the
American rescue of the Iranian
throne to an understanding of
American-Iranian relations would
appear to be unarguable." Thus,
we are presenting the following
information and analysis which we
also feel is in the interest of
world peace since an adequately
informed American people cannot
be misled into war.
We also feel justified in pub-
lishing parts of Love's account
as it was written for an universi-
ty course at an institution which
claims that the free and open ex-
change of ideas and research
should govern academic scholar-
ship. So, let us begin.
First of all, according to Love,
the U.S. government initially be-
came involved in Iran for economic
self-interests which, in turn,
stimulated an unconstitutional,
violent coup and subsequent CIA
repression.
"It was the dispute between Iran
and the AngZo-Iranian Oil Com-
pany which drew the United
States toward its major involve-
ment in the Iranian scene... The
experience prodded the United
States toward its cloak-and-dag-
ger Persian adventure....Iranian
leaders were aware that the
United States was doing more for
their economy thari. Washington
would admit... It an be con-
cluded that Washington wanted
to joggle the Iranian premier
with a blunt assertion that he
would have to settle his econom-
ic difficulties himself if he
remained intransient in the oil
dispute... It (Mossadegh's con-
stitutional government). had
eliminated qZZ, constitutional or
peaceable methods of removing
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him from office. . . "
"It is probable that the Ameri-
can role was decisive, that the
Iranians who participated in the
royalist coup could not have
succeeded without American help.
It is doubtful that the coup
would have been attempted with-
out American cooperation ... it
was a consciously planned accom-
plishment creditable to American
Federal employees... Washington
reacted, not by helping Mossa-
degh, but by kicking him out. "
"At the same time, the CIA
agents who blue-printed the coup
against Dr. Mossadegh continued
to furnish technical assistance
in quelling dissident movements
that threatened the stability of
the new regime. A year after the
coup, American cryptographic and
police experts and a CIA agent
played an important part in root-
ing out an extensive conspiracy
of Army officers that was close-
ly linked to the Communist Tudeh
party."
In short, the U.S. government,
using methods that were not "con-
stitutional or peaceable", con-
sciously intervened to install an
undemocratic, royalist regime. The
raw cynicism and callous indiffer-
ence of this operation is seen in
the CIA's reason for choosing
Major General Fazlollah Zahedi to
lead the coup and the new govern-
ment.
"General Zahedi had all the re-
quisites. He had been Minister
of Interior in Dr. Mossadegh's
first cabinet in 1951. He had
been interned by the British in
Palestine during World War II
because of pro-Nazi activities
under Reza Shah. He had been
twice accused of plotting
against the Mossadegh regime,
the first time in October 1952,
when he escaped his arrest be-
cause of his parliamentary im-
munity as a senator, and the sec-
'ond time in April 1953 in con-
nection with the murder of Gen-
eral Afshartoos by a group of re-
tired officers.....Thus, he pos-
sessed adequate credentials as a
nationalist, useful contacts
Approved
with army officers including
many who faced forced retirement,
and a reputation for decisive ac-
tion without too many scruples."
(This is the same Zahedi whom
Allen Dulles would call "dis-
tinguished".)
The CIA's brutality was
seen in its assignment of
Carroll, hot on the heels
also
George
of plot-
ting violence in South Korea. Love
related the following.
"The organization of gangs,
armed with clubs, knives and
stones, and occasionally a pis-
tol or rifle... was candidly
claimed by a CIA agent named
George Carroll, a six-foot-four-
inch 200 pounder who had arrived
in Teheran from Korea, where, he
said, the CIA had been standing
by while the United States was
organizing a popular uprising to
oust Syngman Rhee."
Love also said that a colleague
of his described Carroll as "too
unrestrained" but as the type the
CIA uses "where they really don't
give a damn...". Love's colleague
also told him of the following
post-coup involvement of Carroll.
"In the days immediately follow-
ing the overthrow of Mossadegh,
Ardeshir Zahedi came to see
Carroll daily..."
"Carroll was also a buddy of
Gen. Farhat Dadsetan, Zahedi's
first military governor of Tehe-
ran. I believe Carroll worked
with Dadsetan on preparations
for the very efficient smother-
ing of a potential dissident
movement emanating from the'ba-
zaar area
first two
1953."
and the Tudeh in the
weeks of November,
As Love summarized:,,"There can
be no dispute over tTie fact that
Mr. Carroll made an important con-
tribution to the royalist success
before, during and after the
coup." We should mention here the
following statement by Love, viz.,
"It was the prospect of Soviet-
controlled communism becoming dom-
inant in Iran that prompted the
United States-to*intervene." How-
ever, the credibility of this as-
sertion was undermined by these
observations of Love himself.
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"The communist threat was defi-
ni to ly s econdary... "
"He (Mossadegh) had been an anti-
communist throughout his career."
"In the July 1952 crisis... the
I;ationalists (Mossadegh's group)
rebuffed the Tudeh and balked
Red plans in the streets, dis-
playing a degree of organization
and tactical ability."
"The Mossadeghists, then firmly
allied with Ayatollah Abol-
ghassan Kashani's religious fac-
tions of the National Front,
such as Dr. Mozaffar Baghai's
Toilers Party, occasionally or-
dered attacks on communists at
public gatherings. Groups far
to the right such as the Pan-
Iranists and the fascist Sumka,
followed a policy of constant
attacks on the Tudeh. This pol-
icy met with only occasional
government (Mossadegh's) inter-
ference."
"There was no real abatement of
Dr. Mossadegh's anti-communism
until after his appeal to Pres-
ident Eisenhower." (Only 2,
months before the coup.)
"It is conceivable that the
Tudeh could have turned the
fortunes of the day against the
royalists. But for some reason
they remained aloof from the
conflict."
"My own conjecture is that the
Tudeh were restrained by the
Soviet Embassy because the
Kremlin, in the first post-
Stalin year, was not willing to
take on such consequences as
might have resulted from the
establishment of a communist-
controlled regime in Teheran."
Given these observations, it is
all but impossible to accept that
the coup was motivated by genuine
fears of a Soviet-controlled com-
munist takeover. Not surprisingly,
the Shah did hold up the spectre
of communism. But, even--Love, who
recounted that "My life was saved
by the driver, a card-carrying
Tudeh member...", claimed that
the Shah's threat was used as
"bait" to solicit U.S. support.
One final point here was Love's
in Teheran believed that there
were only 15,000 to 20,000 Tudeh
members in Iran in 1953. In a
country of 25 million, this was
hardly a serious threat.
Love's doublethink, if you will,
which shadowed his public report-
ing at the time, stemmed from his
personal participation with the
CIA in the coup. Love admitted
his participation as a propagan-
dist and as a militarist in the
following passages.
"My first observation of the as-
sociation of the United States
with the royalist cause began
with a telephone call to me at
the Park Hotel from Joe Goodwin,
a CIA man attached to the em-
bassy as a political officer.
Mr. Goodwin called shortly af-
ter the 7 A. M. news broadcast
and asked if I wanted to meet
General Zahedi to get the real
version of what happened."
Love was taken in tow by
Goodwin to see Zahedi on August
17, two days before the coup. At
the rendezvous, Love met instead
of General Zahedi, his son,
Ardeshir,who knew Goodwin.
Ardeshir told Love that the Shah
had issued two decrees. One ap-
pointed Zahedi as prime minister,
and one dismissed Mossadegh.
After witnessing the photocopy-
ing of the decrees, Love took a
"handful" of the one declaring
Zahedi prime minister and distib-
uted them at the Park Hotel in
Teheran. In distriburing these
decrees, Love, a New York Times
reporter, consciously served as a
propagandist for an on-going, un-
democratic CIA coup. We say un-
democratic because the Shah by
royal fiat was appointing Zahedi
and dismissing Mossadegh.
Love's dual role as a propa-
gandist was as unacceptable in
1953 as it is today. The incom-,?
patibility of the two roles was
highlighted by the fact that Love
was the main source of informa-
tion to the American people at
the time. How- could the'American
people get independent news cov-
erage from 'a reporter acting at
reporting that the U.S. Embassy the direction of the CIA ? Indeed,
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a reading of Love's articles of
August 1953 presents the "real
version" a la Zahedi and the CIA.
Love never mentioned any CIA in-
volvement; glossed over Zahedi's
undemocratic appointment and
not mention his unscrupulous,
Nazi nature; and portrayed
did
pro
Mossadegh as increasingly suscep
tible to a Soviet takeover.
Love himself was apparently
aware of his compromising as he
lied about his involvement 25
years later. According to the New
York Times: "... Mr. Love said
that shortly after the over-throw
of Premier Mohammed Mossadegh in
Iran in 1953, he helped the CIA
distribute copies of a declaration
declaring Ardeshir Zahedi as Mr.
Mossadegh's successor." But
Kennett Love said he had not known
at the time that the man who had
asked him for help, "had been a
CIA man and that he had never know-
ingly done anything else for the
CIA."
As we saw, Love referred to "Joe
Goodwin, a CIA man". It seems
highly unlikely that Love did not
know at the time that Goodwin was
a CIA officer. This is particular-
ly so since the CIA made Love
privy to intimate details of the
coup including the identification
of "dirty tricksters", George
Carroll and Howard Stone. Love was
even told that Ayatollah Behbehani
one of the most influential reli-
gious leaders, "was the key figure
in enlisting and organizing the
bands of 'chaqu kashan' or 'knife
drawers' who carried out Carroll's
dirty work.
Love's denial is further under-
mined because he did do something
else for the CIA in addition to
his propagandizing.
"Incidentially, I, myself, was
responsible, in an impromptu
sort of way, for speeding the
final victory of the royalists...
I told the tank commanders (one
of whom Love said was named
Ehteshamee or Ekhteshamee) that
a lot of people were being get-
ting killed trying to storm Dr.
lossadegh's house and that they,
the tank cc Approved For Release 2010/06/16 :
down there where they would be
of some use instead of sitting
idle at the radio station. They
declared my suggestion to be a
splendid idea. They took their
machines in a body to Kokh Ave-
nue and put the three tanks at
Dr. Mossadegh's house out of ac-
tion after a lively duel with
armor-piercing 75 millimeter
shells. "
Thus, it was through Kennett
Love (and Associated Press corre-
spondent, Don Schwind who worked
with Love and Goodwin) that the
American people were kept in the
dark about a CIA operation - car-
ried out in their name and through
their taxes - which resulted in
what Love himself called a "police
state". Little surprise then "that
Iranians are well aware of the
American role although the Ameri-
can public is not", as Love later
cynically observed.
The message is that the people
in the U.S. should demand that the
media sever its ties with the U.S.
government, particularly the CIA
in order that America will have
the knowledge to function as a de-
mocracy, i.e. with the "consent of
Israel's
Pentagon Papers . . .
Israel's Sacred Terrorism
"a valuable service ... to those who are
interested in discovering the real world
that lies behind 'official history.' "
-From Noam Chomsky's Introduction
Moshe Sharett, Israel's first foreign minister and prime minister
from 1953 to 1955, kept a personal diary-a day-to-dav candid
record of how key Israeli policy decisions were made. Long kept
unpublished, the diary reveals how?srael's "security establish-
ment." men like David Ben-Gurion, Arik Sharon and Moshe
Dayan, sought to destabilize neighboring Arab countries
through covert military operations and terrorist activity, and
plotted the takeover of South Lebanon. the West Bank and Gaza.
Italian journalist Livia Rokach's thoughtful analysis of the
Shareit diary and other key cfocufurnts shatters longstanding
myths about Israel and its security needs. Israel's Sacred
Terrorism lays bare thepolitical trend in Israel that, in the words
of a troubled Moshe Sharett, raises terrorism and "revenge" to a
"moral ... and even sacred principle."
Order (gone
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 Approved For Release 2010/06/16: CIA-RDP90-00845R000100150002-9
the governed". This is especially
needed at the present time with
President Carter reportedly plan-
ning other military action against
Iran in the near future. This time
if the American people are kept in
the dark while covert operations
and military actions are carried
out by presidential fiat and in
their name, there just may be a
World War III.
(cont. from pg.1)
pects of the 1953 CIA coup are'
detailed in CounterSpy's special
report. At the same time that
Love was participating in the CIA-
directed coup, his articles were
receiving front-page coverage in
the New York Times and most major
U.S. newspapers. Not one of the
stories mentioned,the- CIA's in-
volvement in the coup. Indeed,
before Mossadegh was overthrown,
Love reported that Mossadegh had
been toppled and his story was
transmitted through the U.S. Em-
bassy and was broadcast over Ra-
dio Teheran.
If Kennett Love had exposed the
1953 CIA operation; or if he had,
at least, not fed CIA propaganda
about an imminent Soviet takeover
of !ran to.the U.S. public, the
coup and the subsequent Shah-led
"police state" (as even Love
called it) might have been pre-
vented. Likewise, the present CIA
precipitated tensions between the
U.S. government and Iran may also
have been averted.
CounterSpy is publishing the
Kennett Love story at the present
time because Congrees is prepar-
ing to enact what Representative
Robert Drinan has called on offi-
cial Secrets Act. If this CIA
written law (HR5615 and S2216)
were in effect now, it would be a
crime punishable by three years
in prison to write or talk about
Kennett Love and his role as an
agent for the CIA. This is the fu-
ture for press coverage of CIA
operations if HR5615 ancFS2216 are
made into law.
The Kennett Love story shows
that the pending Official Secrets
Act is against the national inter-
ests and a threat to national se-
curity. This is because it will
not allow the exposure of present
and past CIA operations, such as
the 1953 coup in Iran, which, in
the-long run, did not enhance U.S.
security as exemplified in the
present tensions between the U.S.
and Iran.
CounterSpy is thus- issuing this
special report in order to alert
the American people to organize
actions to prevent the passage of
HR5615 and S2216. We are also is-
suing the report at this time, be-
cause in our opinion, it will be
next to impossible to publish
CounterSpy under the pending law
even though all the information in
CounterSpy has been obtained from
public sources; and CounterSpy's
stories have been in the interest
of national security and world
peace.
In conclusion, we urge our read-
ers to disseminate this report to
activate people into stopping the
CIA's rape of the U.S. Constitu-
tion. The CIA must not be allowed
again to carry out its actions
against peoples of other coun-
tries without any scrutiny from
the U.S. media at all.
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