COLBY BACKS US IN EL SALVADOR, PRESSES FREEZE OF NUCLEAR ARMS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00806R000100130041-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 27, 2010
• Sequence Number: 41
• Publication Date: January 18, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/27: CIA-RDP90-00806R000100130041-1
ART I CI L?>/ba;.it )
BOSTON GLOBE
18 JANUARY 1983
Cof,b y backs to in
Salvador,,
presses freeze of
nuclear arms
By Paul Aaron
Special to The Globe
WASHINGTON - He is a devout Ro-
man Catholic who believes the
church's "just war" doctrine should
help guide a nation's military conduct.
Yet during the 1960s. his name became
synonymous with Operation Phoenix,
an attempt to destroy the Viet Cong in-
frastructure that critics charged led to
a vast. indiscriminate campaign of po-
litical murder.
While CIA director. he delivered up
the agency's secrets to the Senate's
Church committee and struggled to es-
tablish a framework for permanent
congressional oversight of the intelli-
gence community. He was dismissed by
President Gerald Ford and reviled as an
apostate by those CIA professionals
who still swore allegiance to the cult of
the clandestine.
Today a successful Washington law-
yer with the firm of Reid and Priest, he
is a staunch supporter of the nuclear
freeze. and his testimony has grown in-
creasingly prominent as debate intensi-
fies over the strategic balance and the
nuclear arms race. At the same time, he
defends US involvement in El Salvador,
where the hearts and minds of peas-
ants can be won through applying
techniques that. he says. produced
positive results in Vietnam.
William Colby is the man who em-
bodies these contradictions. At the end
of an interview. during which he held
forth on intelligence. arms control and
assassination. what seem jagged edges
of sensibility and experience fit togeth-
er into a smooth, even placid. charac-
ter.
Collective common sense
The nuclear freeze. Colby argues, re-
presents collective common sense mobi-
lized against the hocus-pocus of an un-
accountable elite: "My thesis is that the
subject of nuclear war has been so awe-
some. so frightening. so complex that
ordinary citizens have left It to the
priesthood to handle. But the priest-
hood has failed, and people looking at
outlandish Ideas like the -racetrack in
the desert [the original-MX basing
model, or now, dense pack. ask, 'My
goodness. are the experts who designed
this for real?' "
Intelligence, which began as an ad-
et weapons in any case. With a treaty. to engage in an arms race.
_ L _ae- ^r t,e.~ ['nlhc'c view muliar to
steppes producing what we suspect is a
new whiz bomb, and we ask the Soviets
to let us take a look at It. they'll tell us
to mind our own business. Under a
freeze. if we think a factory is produc-
ing a new nuclear weapon, we can go to
them, and say. 'You've got to reassure
us you're under compliance.' "
No ironclad guarantees
. Colby admits, however, that iron-
clad guarantees against subterfuge
cannot be made. "But would it be possi-
ble for the Soviets to violate a freeze to a
strategically significant degree?" he
asks. "I don't think so. We have a var-
junct to military operations. has led array of capabilities to protect
moved. Colby maintains, from a "mere against major violations."
contest with the enemy to helping us Colby asserts any attempt by the So-
make decisions about the world we live viets to mount a decisive evasion of a
in." Colby contrasts the deadlock over freeze agreement would not only run
the 1946 Baruch Plan, the initial ex- risk of detection by US surveillance,
periment to curb atomic weapons that but might also be jeopardized by disclo-
failed because the United States could sures from the Russian people them-
not persuade Stalin to authorize inspec- selves. A small cabal of conspirators
tion teams, with the SALT I agreement. would be inadequate Jo carry off a ploy
which both sides were able to sign and so substantial as to Up the strategic
monitor thanks to satellites and other balance. he said. Instead. widespread
sophisticated data-retrieval systems. coordination would be required. there-
Or look at the electronic sensors in by increasing the chance that a partici-
the Sinai in 1973 that buttressed a pant. appalled by his government's du-
truce so that neither the Egyptians or plicity, would bring the secret to the
the Israelis had to stand at their bor- West. "The Kremlin has to remember,"
ders with their fingers on the trigger. Colby said. "that [Oleg) Penkovsky [a
Each side could have confidence that Soviet army colonel who. during the
ample warning would be available early 1960s, handed over more than
should assembling of forces occur. 1x000 highly classified documents on
That's the crucial role for intelligence: Soviet missiles to the CIAI acted out of a
to keep the peace, not just aid in war." wish to put a brake on what he felt was
Colby denies that a freeze would lead reckless political leadership."
to Soviet deception or cheating. "We're
going to maintain surveillance on Sovi- Irresponsibility and the inclination
i
t
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n
are no
,
the Soviet
side. and I