MEETING ON PROPOSED STEPS TO IMPLEMENT NSDD 75

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP97M00248R000401070002-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 14
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: July 7, 2011
• Sequence Number: 2
• Publication Date: June 13, 1983
• Content Type: MEMO

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PRIOR PAPERS ON THIS SUBJECT: NO /YES
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ROUTING AND TRANSMITTAL SLIP
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FROM: (Name, org. sy,mbbol, Agency/P,)st)
Executive Secretary-
ROOM No.--Bldg.
OPTIONAL FORM 41 (Rev. 7-76)
Prescribed by
GSA.
FPNR (41 CFR! 10i-11.205
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Interdeparmental Group No. 30
TO: OVP
NSC
ACDA
USDA
CIA
Defense
FBI
JCS
Treasury -
UNA
USIA
United States Department of State
Washington, D. C. 20520
June 13, 1983
Mr. Donald P. Gregg
Mr. Michael 0. Wheeler
Mr. John Tierney
Mr. Raymond Lett
Mrs. Helen Robbins
COL John Stanford
Mr.
Edward
O'Malley
LTC
Dennis
Stanley
Mr.
David
Pickford
Amb.
Harvey Feldman
Ms.
Teresa Collins
SUBJECT: Meeting on Proposed Steps to Implement NSDD 75
In response to an NSC directive, Interdepartmental Group
No. 30 will meet on June 16 at 11:00 am to consider steps to
implement provisions of NSDD 75 on US-Soviet Rela ions. The
meeting will be chaired by Assistant Secretary Burt and will be
held in room 6226, Department of State. The attached paper
will be the principal subject of discussion at the meeting.
Charles
ii 1
Executive Secretary/
Paper on steps to implement NSDD 75
SITIVE
IeR
DECL. OADR
V
~) / c DO o~
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Implementation of NSDD 75
Proposals in US-Soviet Bilateral Relations
The basic approach of the Reagan Administration to
U.S.-Soviet relations is set forth in NSDD 75 signed by the
President on January 17, 1983. The NSDD estaplish.ed three
fundamental long-term objectives of U.S. policy toward the USSR:
-- To contain and over time reverse Soviet expansionism by
competing effectively on a sustained basis with the
Soviet Union in all international arenas.
To promote, within the narrow limits available to us,
the process of change in the Soviet Union toward a more
pluralistic political and economic system in which the
power of the privileged ruling elite is gradually
reduced.
To engage the Soviet Union in negotiations to attempt
to reach agreements which protect and enhance U.S.
interests and which are consistent with the principle
of strict reciprocity and mutual interest.
The NSDD underscores the need to convey clearly to the
Soviet Union that unacceptable behavior will incur costs that
would outweigh any gains. At the same time, the NSDD notes the
importance, particularly in a Soviet succession period, of
making clear to the Soviet Union that positive changes in its
behavior would create the possibility of an improvement in
East-West relations. Recognizing that this approach is not
likely to lead to a dramatic near-term improvement in US-Soviet
relations, NSDD 75 underscored the importance of cultivating
public understanding'and support of the Administration's
long-term policy approach. -
In order to implement this broad strategy, the Administra-
tion has publicly and privately stressed realistic assessment of
Soviet objectives and behavior. We have also underscored the
need to rebuild U.S. and Western military and'economic strength,
so that there can be no doubt of our capacity and resolve to
compete effectively with the Soviet Union in each of the
critical arenas identified in NSDD 75. As mandated by NSDD 75,
we have also conducted an intensive and comprehensive diplomatic
dialogue with the Soviet Union to determine whether
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possibilities may exist for cooperation to mutual advantage.
This process is essential not only to probe the limits of Soviet
flexibility on issues of concern to us, but also to make clear
that it is the Soviet Union, not the U.S., which is responsible
for the persistence of the current level of East-West tension.
In its discussion of priority near-term objectives for U.S.
policy, NSDD 75 calls for "building and sustaining a major
ideological/political offensive which, together with other
efforts, will be designed to bring about evolutionary change of
the Soviet system." Two steps which have been proposed to
implement this directive are:
To negotiate a new cultural agreement which would
facilitate our efforts to penetrate the USSR with our
ideology, while giving us a framework to control Soviet
cultural, academic, and media activities in the United
States.
To move forward with the opening of U.S. and Soviet
consulates in Kiev and New York and possibly additional
cities in the two countries. This would enable us to
establish the first permanent Western presence in the
capital of the Ukraine, while increasing the Soviet
presence in New York only marginally.'`~-
The attached papers address in detail the pros and cons of
both proposals. The IG believes that both proposed initiatives
are entirely consistent with the broad strategy approved by the
President in NSDD 75 and would constitute prudent and effective
steps to implement it. In both cases, concrete U.S. interests
would be served by steps that would also convey our willingness
to explore with the Soviets moves we could make to mutual
advantage. Thus, while contributing to effective management of
U.S.-Soviet relations, these steps would also be helpful in
sustaining public, Congressional, and Allied support for our
new, tougher approach to the USSR.
It is recognized that these steps would represent changes in
the sanctions regime adopted by the previous Administration in
response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Given the
continuing Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, it is essential
that changes in the sanctions regime be carefully considered and
represent a clear net benefit for U.S. interests. As with the
Administration's decisions on grain sales and the Long-Term
Grains Agreement, the IG believes that the proposals under
consideration meet these criteria. Neither would signal a shift
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in our policy on Afghanistan. or a return to "business-as-usual"
in our bilateral relations with the Soviet Union. To make this
clear, however, our public and private statements must continue
to stress:
--That our overall policy of opposition to the Soviet
occupation of Afghanistan has not changed and that other aspects
of the post-Afghanistan sanctions regime remain in place;
--That we are merely reversing steps taken by the previous
Administration which impede a dialogue which is essential in
times of tension.
--That both initiatives are clearly in the U.S. interest and
will put us in a position to manage our bilateral relations with
the Soviet Union more effectively;
--That there will be no tempering of our public criticism of
unacceptable Soviet behavior; and
--That the rebuilding of U.S. and Western strength will
continue so that there will be no doubt of our capacity and
resolve to maintain the East-West military balance and resist
Soviet expansionism.
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NEGOTIATION OF A NEW CULTURAL AGREEMENT
NSDD 75 sets as a basic task of U.S. policy the promotion of
change in the USSR. It notes that, along with radio broad-
casting, our most important means for ideological penetration
and promotion of democratic values in the USSR are exchanges
activities and the exhibits program. The NSDD states that we
should reverse a pattern of dismantling those programs, and
should instead expand those which can serve our objective of
promoting change in the Soviet Union. It calls for an official
framework for handling exchanges and obtaining reciprocity to
prevent the Soviets from gaining unilateral advantage from their
activities in the U.S. and their control of our access to the
Soviet people.
We have not had such an official framework since the last
cultural exchanges agreement was allowed to expire in December
1979 in the wake of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. In
consequence, the great fields of ideologically effective
operations that the agreements opened to us in.tcl~e USSR, such as
exhibits (in which we had a clear advantage overWthe Soviets),
are now closed. This leaves the Soviets in a position to work
around us with private institutions and individuals to exploit
the imbalance created by their closed system, given the openness
of our society. We are left with no ready means to achieve a
significant measure of reciprocity in cultural relations.
Soviet propagandists have ready access to our media, and the
Soviets are showing signs of changing their policy against
sending performing artists here -- all without reciprocity being
enforceable.
Diplomatically, the issue of a cultural agreement was
included in the general review of bilateral relations conducted
by the Secretary of State and Ambassador Dobrynin this year, and
the Soviets have expressed willingness to renew negotiations.
At lower level, they have hinted that they will no longer insist
on USG guarantees against defection of Soviet performers, the
issue which brought renegotiation of the previous agreement to a
standstill even before December 1979.
The Department of State is at present seeking modification
of the current visa law to improve our ability to enforce
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reciprocity through the visa process. Visa refusals are,
however, a clumsy tool, poorly suited to dealing with highly
visible cultural visits. A more positive and flexible instrument
is needed to maximize our ability to use cultural exchanges to
penetrate Soviet society. Ambassador Hartman, who has been
filling the reciprocity gap somewhat through privately-funded
cultural events at Spaso House, strongly supports negotiation of
a new cultural agreement both to increase American Cultural
penetration and to enforce reciprocity.
Options:
We see two basic options:
1) Negotiate a new exchanges agreement that ensures
reciprocity, replacing the one that expired in 1979. It would
provide a framework that focussed on the following areas:
-- Thematic exhibits -- in the past such exhibits in the
USSR, manned by russian-speaking American guides, had an
overwhelming ideological impact, which Soviet exhibits
here could in no way match.
Radio and TV -- we would seek to obtain greatly improved
access to Soviet nationwide electronics media, to offset
the access Soviet propagandists have to ours.
-- Publications -- an agreement would restore an official
basis for the continued distribution of America
illustrated in the USSR and Soviet life; we would'seek a
higher level of distribution in the USSR.
Educational and academic exchanges -- these both provide
access to Soviet elites and support the base of U.S.
expertise on the USSR.
Performing arts -- restoration of exchanges in. this area
can expose Soviet audiences to the possibilities of free
cultural development, in contrast to the stifling
restrictions of their system, and reciprocal provisions
would give us the means to prevent splashy Soviet media
events here.
-- Films -- we would require reciprocity for the Soviet
film weeks now being held here regularly on a commercial
basis.
Access to Soviet elites -- we would have a basis to
require reciprocity for the almost unlimited access
Soviet officials, propagandists and academics have to
our institutions.
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-- A new agreement on this basis would be responsive to
NSDD 75.
A properly drafted agreement would define the areas in
which reciprocity must be provided, and the means of
enforcing it.
By putting continued access to U.S. audiences on a
reciprocal basis it should improve our access to
influential Soviet circles, present and future.
Exhibits, access to Soviet media and all other
legitimate means of penetrating Soviet society would be
included in an agreement.
Most of the Allies and a substantial element in Congress
would support an agreement.
This would involve negotiating a highly visible
agreement to replace the one we permitted"to expire
following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, without
significant improvement of the situation there.
We would need to explain how it conforms to our
sanctions policy and demonstrate that we are not
returning to business-as-usual, by putting this step in
the framework of our testing strategy while maintaining
pressure on the Soviets concerning Afghanistan.
2) Continue current practice.
This involves no change, and is easy to administer; no
negotiations with the Soviets would be required, and we
would not have to explain apparent departures from our
sanctions program.
We would forgo an opportunity to be responsive to NSDD
75; we would do nothing to ensure reciprocity or improve
access to Soviet society through exchanges; the Soviets
would continue to have easy access to American Society;
and it would be harder to implement a strategy of
testing the Andropov leadership's willingness to explore
small steps of benefit to us as well as the Soviets.
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NEGOTIATIONS ON-ESTABLISHING CONSULATES
IN KIEV NEW YORK AND POSSIBLY ELSEWHERE
INTRODUCTION
NSDD 75 provides that a central objective of U.S. policy
toward the Soviet Union will be promoting internal pressure
inside the USSR to weaken the sources of Soviet imperialism, and
specifically that we should seek to penetrate the Soviet Union
with our ideology and exploit weaknesses and vulnerabilities
within the Soviet empire. Our task, mandated by the decision
document, is to work for change in the USSR toward a more
pluralistic political and economic system in which the power of
the privileged ruling elite is gradually reduced. We now need
to translate that mandate into specific moves geared to that
general objective.
The issue of whether or not to renew negotiations with the
Soviets to establish additional consulates in the USSR and the
U.S. has been proposed for decision in precisely this context.
Briefly, the diplomatic history of the issue is as follows:
In the 1974 Summit Communique the two countries agreed
to "open additional Consulates General in two or three
cities of each country," and, as a first step, to the
simultaneous establishment of posts in Kiev and New York
City. The Soviets had resisted for more than two years
the location of a consulate in Kiev, offering a less
advantageous site (Odessa), but finally yielded to the
U.S. insistence on Kiev during the 1974 summit,
apparently as a necessary concession to demonstrate an
expanding relationship.
-- By the time the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. in December
1979, advance parties were in place in the two cities
and formal openings were anticipated within six months.
The Carter Administration decided to put the process on
hold, withdrew our advance party and ordered the Soviets
to withdraw theirs as part of our sanctions program.
Many believe that, like the grains embargo, this
decision was a mistake from the beginning because it
hurt us more than the Soviets. Since then, the
propertywhich had been acquired or prepared in the two
countries has been maintained empty, at modest cost to
both governments. The Soviets have periodically
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inquired as to our intentions, claiming they are "under
pressure"from the Kiev City authorities to hand back the
office building prepared for us. In April 1982 we
responded officially that we would appreciate their
holding the building question in abeyance, although we
were not prepared for further discussion of the overall
issue. Subsequently, the issue has been raised in the
course of the general review of bilateral relations
conducted by the Secretary of State and Ambassador
Dobrynin, and the Soviets have indicated willingness to
move forward on it.
Meanwhile, NSDD 75 was signed by the President in January as
the basic document for U.S. Soviet policy; discussions in the
nationalities working group have suggested that opening U.S.
Consulates in Kiev and Tashkent should be considered as feasible
means of increasing our contact with the USSR's largest
non-russian nationalities; and some Jewish and Ukrainian
community organizations and members of congress, including
Senator Specter, have urged the opening of a Consulate in Kiev
to provide improved official U.S. consular protection for
American visitors to the Ukraine, and to demonstrate our
concerns about the Soviet human rights situation in practical
fashion. Ambassador Hartman supports moving forward on this
issue for these reasons, and as part of our testing strategy.
The specific issues are:
1) Whether proposing negotiations leading to an increase
in the U.S. official presence in the Soviet Union
through opening new Consulates is an appropriate way to
increase our penetration of Soviet society and to
implement our strategy of testing the Andropov
leadership at this time, given the drawbacks; and
2) If so, whether we should propose negotiations on
opening two new sets of Consulates, i.e. at Tashkent and
second American City in addition to Kiev and New York,
in line with the 1974 agreement.
Options
They are essentially as follows:
1) Inform the Soviets that the U.S. is ready to renew the
process of establishing Consulates General in Kiev and New York
City and possibly to begin negotiations to establish in two
other cities, depending on how options 3 and 4 below are
decided); propose a public announcement and the resumption of
technical discussions toward this end.
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-- A U.S. official presence in the Ukraine (and Central
Asia) would be closely controlled by the Soviets, and
would operate with difficulty, but it would contribute
to building internal pressure to weaken the sources of
Soviet imperialism and promoting change within the
Soviet Union, in accordance with NSDD 75, by its
activities in a sensitive region (or regions) of the
USSR. It would provide a new base or bases for contacts
with nationality, religious and dissident groups in a
period when nationalism is arguably the strongest
internal pressure on the Soviet regime, as well as for
developing USG expertise in these areas.
-- Establishment of new consulates in these areas would
demonstrate our concerns over human rights and
nationalities in the Soviet Union in tangible form. A
consulate in Kiev would be welcomed by American Jewish
and Ukrainian groups for the improved official
protection it could provide to visitors under the
U.S.-USSR consular convention, and for the simple
encouragement of its presence.
This proposal would be difficult for the Soviets to
resist, given their stress on policy continuity under
the Andropov leadership, since it refers to an agreement
signed at Summit level.
If successful, negotiations for establishment would
remove the Soviet threat to turn over the office
building they have prepared for us in Kiev to the local
authorities, and thus the need to acquire a more
expensive new building if we decide to establish there
later.
-- The proposal is an appropriate vehicle for testing the
Soviets on a small issue where benefit would be mutual
or, on balance, in our favor.
-- Moving forward in this area involves lifting an
Afghanistan sanction at a time when Soviet behavior in
Afghanistan has not improved. Although the sanction
cost us more than it did the Soviets, some groups would
have trouble understanding that moving forward and
getting something for it does not mean the U.S. is
returning to business-as-usual.
-- Although the Soviets would add only marginally to their
already substantial presence in New York while we would
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gain a new city in the USSR, the Soviet opening in New
York would increase their intelligence presence there..
This would somewhat increase the burden on our
counter-intelligence capabilities. At the same time the
Bureau's resources are being increased, and we are,
taking a number of steps to limit the Soviet threat.
-- Depending on how fast we wish to establish in Kiev and
how big an operation we wish to put in place there, the
cost over a period of years could run from 500,,000 to
upwards of 2.5 million dollars in scarce funds.
-- We should, concentrate on really serious issues like the
Soviet arms buildup or international expansionism.
2) Continue current practice.
.In general, the pros and cons are the inverse of those for
option 1:
Pros:
-- We would not have to explain that lifting a sanction at
this time does not signal return to bus'irress-as-usual.;
the burden on our counter-intelligence capabilities
would not rise; we would not need additional funds; and
we would not need to expend energy on a minor issue in
U.S.-Soviet relations.
We would have forgone a major base to increase our
penetration of Soviet society; we would be unable to
provide the protection and encouragement some American
Community spokesmen say visitors would appreciate, and
to give this tangible demonstration of our concerns over
Soviet human rights; and it would be more difficult.. to
implement a testing strategy in conditions where we
stand to benefit and can control.
If we decide to go ahead to propose negotiations on
consulate openings to the Soviets, there are two further options:
3) Propose to the Soviets that in addition to moving
forward on Kiev and New York, we negotiate to open Consulates in
Tashkent and another American city as well.,
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Over the next years and decades, nationalities tensions
are likely to be even more severe in Soviet Central Asia
than in the Ukraine, and a Consulate in Tashkent would
be even more useful to us as
source of American influence than a mission in
If the Soviet occupation~of Afghanistan continues,
having people in Tashkent would put us "behind the
lines" of a major theater of Soviet expansionism.
Making this proposal would be a tougher test of Soviet
willingness to move forward in bilateral relations
because when Kiev and New York closed down nothing
further had been done to implement the general
commitment in the 1974 communique to open "in two or
three cities."
Opening in Tashkent would cost more scarce money.
A Soviet opening in a fourth American city (after
Washington, San Francisco and New York) would make our
counter-intelligence task even harder.
This proposal would be easier for the Soviets to turn
down precisely because there was no practical follow-up
to the 1974 "two-to-three cities" commitment.
4) Not to propose negotiations for Tashkent and an
additional American city.
In general, the pros and cons are the inverse of those for
option 3:
-- We would not spend more money; we would not increase the
counter-intelligence burden; we would not face a Soviet
turndown.
We would have lost a possible opportunity to establish a
presence beyond the USSR's Afghanistan lines in Central
Asia; we would have given up a potential vehicle for
testing Soviet intentions in bilateral relations.
CF rPPT /QPMQTMTX7
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