THE SOCIALIST INTERNATIONAL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90B01370R001501900014-1
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 8
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 19, 2010
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: September 28, 1984
• Content Type: REPORT

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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Office of Legislative Liaison
Washington, D. C. 20505
Telephone: [phone] Sept 84
TO: Peter Sul 1 i van
Select Committee on Intelligence
U.S. Senate
Attached is additional information on the
Socialist International. If you have further
questions the analysts will be able to discuss
any more recent developments with you directly.
Liaison Division
FORM 1 533 OBSOLETE
$?79 PREVIOUS
EDITIONS.
CNRC
STAT
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The Socialist International
The Socialist International continues to take an interest in
Central American developments despite some waning of enthusiasm
for active involvement over the past year. SI leaders have
adopted a more cautious --approach -because of the 'negative -reaction
of many Latin American governments to the Franco-Mexican
initiative of 1981 (which the SI supported) and to SI offers to
mediate, and because of the divisive effect of Central American
issues within the SI itself. Moreover, partly due to
argumentation provided by the United States, the SI as.a whole
has developed a more realistic understanding of the barriers to a
settlement in Central America. During the past year, the
organization has even reduced the number of "fact-finding" groups
sent to the region. Nevertheless, the SI's declarations still
show strong disapproval of U.S policy and a resistance to the idea
of breaking completely with leftist forces. .This is the case
despite a growing concern among West European members about the
radical tendencies of some of their Latin American colleagues
within the SI, and a more critical attitude among some of the
Latin American members toward the Sandinistas. the Salvadoran
insurgents, and Grenada's New Jewel Movement.
Key Players on -Latin American Issues
Since their admission to the SI during the late 1970s, Latin
American parties such as the Venezuelan Democratic Action, the
Dominican Revolutionary Party, and the Jamaican People's National
Party have played a key role in shaping SI positions on regional
issues. In addition to those parties holding membership,
Nicaragua) attend SI gatherings as observers. in practice tnere
is little difference between the rights of observers and of
members, since both are allowed to participate in meetings.*
The typical SI declaration on Latin America is a collage of
contributions supplied by the regional parties, each of which
concentrates on its own narrow interests. There are some
leaders, however, whose interests and influence transcend their
own co.untr..i-es, These include Jose Francisco Pena Gomez of the
-Dominican Republic (chairmanrof~theeSI'seCommittee iLJ_aon
Daniel Oduber of nsta Ric _Michae of amais1, and
i Lon, the Sandin~s as and
e mo u e of i In
Luillermn lingo's National Revolutionary Movement (MNR)-continue
to influence directly the SI's views or US policy.
Among West European leaders, the most active on Latin
American issues has beea L~TFe>Itpe Gonza iez, who has often
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.,.. ..-.
mostly at papering over divisions within the SI.
-also chairs the Committee for the Defense of the Nicaraguan
Revolution, a body formed in the afterglow of the Sandinista
victory. that has fallen progressively into disuse. After the
Spaniards, the French Socialists and the West German Social
Democrats are the most active. SI President-Willy Brandt's
personal interest in Central America has been sporadic and aimed
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attended-socialist gatherings In the Western Hemisphere and is on
a -first -name -basls with isoss :regional representatives. Gonzalez
Formulation of Positions
West European socialist leaders, in our view, are painfully
aware of the fact that although they are the mainstays of the S I ,
they have been so preoccupied with other matters that they have
been unable to control declarations on Latin America. Despite
the disclaimers of Latin American parties, it is these parties
that continue to shape resolutions pertaining to the region,
largely by writing them in advance at meetings of the SI's
Committee on Latin America and the Caribbean, chaired by Pena
Gomez. Subsequent meetings of all the SI parties -- which have
never been known for their thoroughness or procedural correctness
-- allow little time for a West European contribution. Debate
about Central America often begins (and sometimes ends) with
statements by Sandinista representatives and Salvadoran leftist
Guillermo Ungo who recently one of the many vice
presidents of the 51.1 t __ ?
including the Puerto Rican Independence Party.
parties from Latin American and the Caribbean were admitted
The West Europeans have tried to correct these problems by
creating a new position at SI headquarters in London to
coordinate Latin American matters. Luis Ayala of the Chilean
Radical Party has already been appointed to this post, although
his duties are still unclear. Since Ayala's party has on
occasion displayed sympathy for the revolutionary left in Central
America, he seems a doubtful candidate to play a moderating
role. West European members have also told US officials
frequently in private that they want the SI to stop admitting new
members from the Third World -- yet at last year's Congress four
Relations Among Leaders 25X1
SI member parties still have differences about Central
America, but they probably are closer. to a consensus now than at
any time since 1979. On Nicaragua, for example, none of the West
European parties and few of the Latin American parties now take
an avidly pro-Sandinista position. Reports from US diplomats in
West European capitals indicate that most leaders have abandoned
the earlier image of the Sandinistas as "new wave" socialist
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heroes and now see then as exasperating individuals who
nevertheless must -be -dealt -with -te-prevent -their -further - _25X1_
radicalization. A cross-section of SI leaders from Western
Europe and Latin America -- including Willy Brandt, Felipe
Gonzalez Carlos Andres Perez, and Daniel Oduber -- now seem to
share'thts analysis. Even the French Socialists, erstwhile
defenders of the Sandinistas, took a critical attitude durine ST
meetings this winter
Although the recent announcement by Managua scheduling elections
for November has created a positive impression, the honeymoon
period of 1979 is unlikely to be recreated completely
Among the West European SI parties, the Scandinavians
(particularly the Swedes) and the Dutch probably still retain 25X1
vestiges of the old romantic view of the FSLN. At the other end
of the spectrum, the vigor of attacks by the Italian Social
Democrats and the Portuguese Socialists against the Sandinistas
has diminished somewhat in recent months. Mario Soares'
preoccupation with his duties as Prime Minister may help explain
this trend. On the other hand, both the Portuguese and the
Italian PSDI may believe that they have already made their
point. Gonzalez and Willy Brandt currently re resent the middle-
of-the-road position in the SI on 'Nicaragua. 25X1
Last summer, Brandt Gonzalez. Perez, and Oduber
labore
mightily over a letter 25X1
advising the Sandinistas to implement the-fir-promises 25X1
regarding democracy, political pluralism, and non-alignment. The
letter was sent to Managua, but it was phrased as advice rather
than as an ultimatum. The contents of the letter leaked despite
efforts to keep it a secret, and it provoked considerable
criticism from other SI parties, which had not been consulted.
Later, during the fall, "SI leaders became convinced that the
United States was about to invade Nicaragua. They called media
attention to the "danger" and even warned US officials against
military action. The fact that the invasion did not occur
prompted some leaders to declare later that they had prevented
These two episodes during a period when many socialists were
becoming more critical of the Sandinistas suggest the probable
.limits of SI action regarding Nicaragua. They indicate that
despite concerns about Managua's policies, the SI is still
unlikely to criticize the Sandinistas publicly; indeed, the
acrimony surrounding the 'ultimatum that never was' -- and the
inability of the leaders to agree on a tough message -- may
discourage further attempts in the SI context to jawbone the
Sandinistas. Private bilateral talks between the FSLN and
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T
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produce
individual parties rather than the SI seem more likely to
--"e-kind of -toug - V t- r -n,e,h of Nicaraguan
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democracy desire.
~ 7
The invasion scare, on the other hand, shows that She SI's 25X1
growing disenchantment with the Sandinistas is not Incompatible
with a strong aversion to the perceived military pressure applied
by t
e United States against Managua.
On El Salvador, the SI recently has avoided statements
supporting a military victory by the insurgents, but almost all 25X1
members continue to back a 'negotiated settlement" that
presumably would give some power to the extreme left. There have
even been signs recently that the West German SPD has become
impatient with Ungo and the MNR for their lack of influence on
the FMLN and unwillingness to participate in elections. Italian
diplomats have noted that, privately at least, the SPD may now
look with some favor on Christian Democrat Jose Napoleon
Duarte. The attraction of Duarte for the socialists, however, is
that in their view he might be willing to engineer a peace
settlement with the extreme left. The SI as a whole would find
it difficult if not impossible -- particularly with Ungo still a
major figure in the organization -- to abandon him and adopt 'its
earlier villain, Duarte. Moreover, few'cSl -parties seem likely to
oppose resolutions calling on the US to cease military aid to the
'
Salvadoran government. Even Mario Soares, the Sandinistas
nemesis within the SI, has told US officials that he opposes the
military aspects of US policy in El Salvador.
Relations with Communists
During the 'Brandt era' tpost-1976), meetings between SI
officials and Communists to discuss world problems have become
routine. SI leaders stress that they are opposed to Communism as
a system, but they insist on the pragmatic necessity of dialogue
to promote peace. In our judgment, many SI leaders have trouble
taking Communism seriously in a Third World context. They
especially tend to place Latin American Marxist-Leninists in a
different category from the Soviet variety, seeing the former
primarily as anti-colonialist nationalists who in the long run
will be open to persuasion from more 'sophisticated" social
democrats like themselves.
Many of the socialists' recent efforts toward a Central
American settlement have been focused on Fidel Castro. The
discussions Castro has had over the past year with Pena Gomez,
Oduber, French government representatives, and delegations of
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west Berman 3oc 1 a i memocravb -- as we i i as win re i i pe monz a 1 et
--in-Madrid -IC &t -= tUppoPt-lbejudgment- tbat most -SI members
envision Cuba playing a role In a regional settlement.
and the hostilities in the country prevented a fair result.
Under the circumstances, no one in the SI really expected Ungo's
party to participate, and the absence of the left reinforced the
socialists' impression that the election was meaningless.
Although the heavy turnout in El Salvador probably caused a few
doubts in SI circles about the organization's position, the
argument that the election would not end the war predominated.
Most party leaders still maintain that only direct negotiations
between the Salvadoran government and the FDR/FMLN can do that.
The willingness to-carry on a dialogue with Communists and
other extreme left forces, however,, does not extend to allowing
them membership In the SI. The SI's major faux pas in that
direction -- admittance of Grenada's New Jewel Movement is a
move that is unlikely to be replicated because of the negative
fallout that it brought on the organization. In our Juagment, it
is unlikely that the SI will admit the Sandinistas as members,
for example., unless Managua u ocally than es course toward
non-alignment and democracy. ne
Positions on Elections 25X1
As avowed supporters of social democracy. SI members favor
free and fair elections, but the simultaneous emergence of the
issue in E1 Salvador and Nicaragua places these parties in a
delicate position. We believe that most SI leaders will welcome
enthusiastically Managua's recent announcement that it is
scheduling elections for November. They will undoubtedly claim
that the decision vindicates their attitude toward the
Sandinistas of public friendliness and private urgings toward
liberalization. Recent statements by a French Socialist Party
functionary (to US off-icials) and by an _aide to a prominent West
German Social Democrat (in the press) suggest that some parties
may be leaning toward providing observers for the Nicaraguan
balloting. US diplomats also report that the SI has encouraged a
Nicaraguan opposition group to participate in the election. We
suspect, however, that the socialists are seeking primarily to
bolster the legitimacy of the Plactinn an to promote the
cause of the opposition.
The elections in El Salvador pose a different kind of 25X1
problem for the SI. The organization criticized the 1982
election, arguing that the influence of-a rightwing government
We suspect that many SI leaders would prefer to present a
uniform position.supporting elections in both countries, but
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between an
some SI members have ureed Ungo and his party to take part.
believe they are unable to do so unless Ungo and big associates
participate in the -Salvadoran balloti0g.J7l-rICUtt"varribn
strian Socialist and a US official Indicates that
A
00 , a candidates would be
challenge Ungo's old argument
murdered if they campaigned 25X1
Although the SI almost certainly will refuse to reverse its
well-publicized attitudes toward Salvadoran elections, the
organization's relatively low profile so far does suggest that
its pre-election rhetoric could remain relatively muted this
time. Once the election is over, chances are slim that the SI
will take a positive position on the process unless Ungo sees a
possibility of compromise with the government that ensues.
Still, some of the more influential SI leaders might make an
effort to abstain from negative comment if the Christian
Democrats win and the SI's bete noir, the ARENA party, is
excluded from the government. 25X1
In our
view, however, this behind-the-scenes pressure- though 25X1
significant in itself -- probably does not foreshadow a' new
public stance supporting the Salvadoran electoral process. The
FDR/FMLN apparently has no intention of letting the SI off the
h k nd we doubt that in the final analysis I leaders will
In sum, SI attitudes on the electoral processes in these
countries are by no means uniform or free of bias. It seems
likely at this point that at least some of the major SI parties
will send observers to the Nicaraguan election, while most if not
all will refuse to do the same for El Salvador. It is even
conceivable, if SI leaders continue to perceive political
?progress" in Managua, that they will send observers there under
the SI's aegis. We believe that parties contemplating such a
dual policy realize their vulnerability to charges of
inconsistency. In order to avoid the many possible awkward
questions about Salvadoran versus Nicaraguan democr-acy, civil
liberties, pluralism, wartime conditions, etc. they probably will
try to let the question of the Salvadoran elections die down
before taking positions on Nicaragua. Rather than link the two
h
em as
cases themselves, we believe they will try, to treat t
separately and unobtrusively as possible.
Funding
The SI's annual budget of around $600,000 is made up of
contributions from member parties. The biggest contributors
traditional1" hip hppn the West Germans, the Swedes, and the
Austrians.
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 re have ao reason to believe the situation
-bas -changed - $ tj-nth
Central European orientation-7
the Sandinistas.
Publications
The SI publishes two periodicals, Socialist Affairs and the
Socialist International Women Bulletin. The former, which is the
I's main media out et, appears quarterly. The publication
schedule for Socialist International Women Bulletin seems to
vary. Both publications devote substantial attention to Latin
American affairs through feature articles and news of regional
parties. Articles in these tublications are not restricted
exclusively toithe ew socialist
groups like
presented the v
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Assistance to Latin American Members
UU14-I
believe that current budget a oci ions are use a mos
exclusively for necessities such as running SI headquarters,
paying the s taff organizing meetings, and publishing SI
periodicals.
SI leaders are quick to point out that organizations
affiliated with individual West European parties that do fund
travel and training-- such as the West German SPD's Friedrich
Ebert Foundation -- have no direct connection with the SI. We
suspect, however, that in some cases advice from party leaders
who participate in the SI would have some influence with the
foundations if those leaders decided to weigh-in for or against
specific projects.
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