SECRETARY S REMARKS MEETING WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP88B00443R000100540012-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 12
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 16, 2010
• Sequence Number: 12
• Content Type: REPORT

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SECRETARY'S REMARKS=
MEETING WITH THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES
I appreciate the opportunity to give you my views of where
we are in Central America. I think sometimes that the dialogue
between the Congress and the Executive is so dominated by the
news of the day that we rarely get the opportunity to treat the
basic issues in a rational, longer term perspective. That is
what I would like to do with you today.
First let's take El Salvador
Three plus years ago El Salvador was staggering under the
weight of seemingly intractable problems:
a sharply declining economy
a undemocratic political system
inequitable land ownership
constant brutal violence on all sides
an active insurgency supported by Cuba and Nicaragua
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an ineffective and often indiscriminate military
an unresponsive system of justice.
But, difficult as these problems were, they were not
hopeless. An alliance of young officers and democratic
civilians had begun to sow the seeds of a possible solution. A
land reform program had been initiated; there was a new
emphasis on human rights; the United States had responded with
economic and military assistance.
It was the considered judgment of our experts that with the
commitment of resources and with patience and tenacity we could:
Promote and establish a democratic process
Stabilize the economy and lay the basis for renewed
growth
Rectify the land ownership problem
Build respect for justice and human rights
Develop a military capable of preventing a guerrilla
victory
All these things we thought could be done.
But there was one thing we knew we could not do in El
Salvador alone: cut off the outside assistance to the
guerrillas. We knew that no matter how successful the
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Salvadorans' internal reforms, they could not end the war if
the guerrillas could continue to count on material support from
abroad. That meant addressing the problem of Nicaragua.
Let's look at Nicaragua three and a half years ago.
The anti-Somoza coalition that had come to power in 1979
had a broad base. The new government included men of
conviction who believed in the promises of the revolution: free
elections, true non-alignment and respect for the sovereignty
of neighbors. These men included:
Arturo Cruz: President of the National Bank, later member
of the ruling Junta, and Sandinista Ambassador to the U. S.
Alfonso =.obelo: a prominent anti-Somoza leader who was an
official of the provisional government and leader of the
Junta of National Reconciliation.
Adolfo Calero: an anti-Somoza businessman who strongly
supported the revolution.
Eden Pastora: the famous Commander Zero, the military hero
of the Sandinista revolution, Vice Minister of Defense and
head of the National Militia.
Alfredo Cesar: President of the Central Bank, member of
the FSLN and architect of Nicaragua's post-Somoza economic
policy.
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Because of the presence of such men, the U.S. worked hard
through 1979 and 1980 to support the new regime, to encourage
moderation, to strengthen the hand of those who shared our
democratic ideals. We provided $118,000,000 in 18 months in
this effort making Nicaragua the highest per capita recipient
of U.S. aid during that period.
But, by March of 1981 it was clear that, despite our
efforts, the moderates had lost out. It was not the Cruz or
Robelo groups who were guiding Nicaragua. It was the hard line
commandantes, those trained in Cuba and faithful to it.
This faced us with a difficult choice. We had watched,
traced and recorded a steady flow of arms, training and combat
support from Nicaragua to the Salvadoran guerrillas. And we
knew the war in El Salvador would not end so long as that flow
continued. Therefore, in August of 1981, we made an intense
effort to get the Nicaraguans to cut it off. We told them that
we wanted to resolve the issue peacefully. If they stopped
their support for the Salvadoran guerrillas, we would guarantee
their security -- we would cooperate with them economically and
otherwise enjoy a normal relationship. But, if they did not,
all bets were off. For six months we probed, directly and in
detail -- but to no avail. And so we embarked on a policy of
pressure. A policy designed to ensure that Nicaragua could not
subvert its neighbors with impunity.
Now, a lot has happened in the three years since these
decisions were reached.
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In E1 Salvador, democracy has taken hold, the land reform
is over half completed, the Salvadoran military is vastly
improved, a modern constitution has been approved, judicial
reform programs are getting under way and Napoleon Duarte ---a
man committed to reform and full respect for human rights --
has just been elected President, setting the stage for further
gains. -
We have every reason to be proud of these achievements.
But the guerrillas are still there. General Vessey will be
briefing you on their tactics and military logistics, which are
more sophisticated than ever before. I will cnly add that,
though the trained forces available to them have also
increased, the guerrillas' political support has shrunk
steadily as the reforms have taken hold.
Yet the munitions and money from Nicaragua continue to flow
-- every day of the year -- provisioning and paying for the
insurgency.
we were right in 1981. The outside flows are critical.
Despite internal progress, the stalemate continues. The
Salvadorans can contain the guerrillas, but cannot eliminate
them as long as this flow continues.
And in Nicaragua today, we see a sorry situation. The
Sandinistas continue to support the guerrillas in El Salvador.
They still deny it publicly but their protestations of
innocence have so little credibility, that they have dropped
them altogether in private discussions. Major Latin leaders
have told us that the Sandinistas make no bones about their
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support for the guerrillas in their private bilateral
discussions. Let me read you an excerpt from a letter I
received from a colleague representing one of our NATO allies.
The Sandinista leader QUOTE acknowledged to me that
Nicaragua is providing 'revolutionary assistance' to the
F11LN in El Salvador. He explained that because the left in
El Salvador had provided important assistance to the
Sandinistas when they were embarking upon their own
revolution, the present government believes that they have
a moral obligation to provide some support in return. END
QUOTE
Indeed, in his discussions with us, one member of the
Directorate spoke freely of the existence of the Salvador
comma-nd and control center in Nicaragua. In fact, our
longstanding dialogue with the Sandinistas has been
characterized by pro-forma denials of Nicaraguan support for
the Salvadoran guerrillas while simultaneously discussing the
terms and conditions for a cessation of such activities.
But, as your intelligence committee knows, our knowledge of
these activities is not limited to the Nicaraguans'
admissions. We have ample radar and human source 25X1
The Sandinistas have also aligned their foreign policy with
the Soviet Union and Cuba. With the help of these countries
they have transformed their forces into a modern and and well
armed military machine unprecedented in Central America. Since
1979, their trained forces have grown from 10,000 to
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100,000. That is a major change in four years and a new
geopolitical reality.
So too is the X350 million in Soviet military aid, and a
staff of Cuban and Soviet bloc security advisors numbering over
3,000, which so clearly underlines Nicaragua's reliance on Cuba
and the Soviets.
And because of these factors the reasonable men who
gave us hope in 1979 and 1980 are all gone.
Alfonso Robelo is the key figure in the ARDE
anti-Sandinista Group in the south.
Arturo Cruz is the leading spokesman of the exiled
democratic opposition now teaching here in the United
States.
Alfredo Cesar is another key spokesman for the democratic
opposition.
Adolfo Calero is head of the FDN anti-Sandinista group in
the north.
Eden Pastora is the military leader of ARDE forces in the
south.
Those moderates are no longer with the Sandinistas. They
lead the anti-Sandinistas. Their goals have not changed. They
still want democracy and they still want respect for
neighbors. Theirs is still the original struggle of the
Sandinista revolution. Maybe we should not even call them
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anti-Sandinistas. They are, more accurately, the true
These men are not fighting because we want them to, or
because we give them support. They are fighting for values in
which they believe. And which we share. No amount of money
could cause them to undergo the suffering and self.-sacrifice
they endure. These are not right-wing thugs. They are not
"Somocistas". Somoza is dead and we will never do anything
that would return his style of government to Central America.
Today, under the leadership of moderate and decent men,
thousands of Nicarag>ans are mounting a challenge to their
government. They are acting in support of their belief in
democracy and freedom. And their resistance is also pressing
Nicaragua to stop its support for the guerrillas in El Salvador.
The Sandinistas face opposition because life in Nicaragua
has become intolerable. Internally, with the help of their"
Eastern Bloc allies, they have put in place police-state
controls -- featuring control of the media, curbs on organized
labor and political expression, neighborhood watch committees
and vigilante mobs to harass and intimidate any dissidents.
The Church is harassed and besieged, the Pope insulted, and a
new phony church stimulated to fool the people. Repression of
the Indians has been intense, involving killings and mass
relocations. These are the inescapable facts of Nicaragua
today.
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III
The Question facing us today is where we go from here.
Two conclusions stand out:
First, we are on the right course in El Salvador. We should
stick with it. The funds requested in the emergency aid
supplemental currently before the Congress and the entire
Jackson plan should be approved. I see a growing consensus on
this, and I welcome it.
Second, a policy of pressure on Nicaragua remains essential
to our objectives in Central America today -- for all the same
reasons we embarked on that policy two and a half years ago.
Now, we have learned a lot.
Clearly operations must be based on realities
including the political realities here at home and in
world opinion. In some cases actions in Nicaragua
have not been sufficiently sensitive to those
realities.
mining operations, or other acts that could endanger
the citizens of other countries, should not be resumed.
The sovereignty of neighbors must be fully protected.
Care should be taken to assure reduced profile.
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And we agree with the Chairmen of the Select
Committees that better monitoring and reporting
requirements are needed. We are working with the
Sr-nate Intelligence Committee on new procedures. We
look forward to the same with the House.
Finally, I understand and sympathize with those who are
concerned over the use of covert means to achieve our
objectives.
But I believe the record demonstrates that we turned to
covert means only after it had become clear that our objectives
could not be achieved through persuasion and diplomacy alone.
We cannot now simply wash our hands of this activity without
doing our nation a great disservice.
Let me examine the consequences of a termination of our
support for the anti-Sandinistas.
First, I do not believe that the forces of the Kremlin will
be assaulting the White House gates if this program is ended.
But, even though the immediate consequences may not be
apocalyptic ... they will be profound.
We supported the democratic forces of Nicaragua when
they were in the government and we have supported them
in opposition. They will keep fighting whether we
support them or not. But, in time, without support,
their fate will be sealed. This will be a tragedy,
for Nicaragua, and for us.
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An even more serious problem will be the effect on the
perceptions of our friends and allies -- and our
adversaries -- of U.S. will, of our reliability and
steadiness of purpose. In Central America and
elsewhere we are looked to for leadership and support
when our friends take a stand -- on behalf of
democracy or other values that they and we share, or
against violence of the right or left, or against
communism.
What are the Presidents of Costa Rica and Honduras
going to think of our resolve if we back out of our
policy in Nicaragua, a policy they have told us they
consider essential to their security? What value
should foreign leaders assign to our word and
commitment if, instead of adjusting our policies to
make them work better, we simply give up?
We must also ask ourselves how we will address the
problems of Central America if we no longer have an
instrument to pressure Nicaragua. I do not predict
collapse but I fear that we would be denying ourselves
the prospect of success. If Nicaragua is allowed to
support revolution in neighboring states with impunity
then we will be locked into an interminable test of
wills. Will we keep up the aid longer than they?
Every dollar not spent in Nicaragua will have to be
multiplied a hundredfold in neighboring countries for
the symptomatic relief of insurgency. We will have
foregone the cure.
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Finally a word on negotiations. Our strategy has been
to establish a situation in which Nicaragua had as
much to gain by a fair negotiated solution as do we.
We are now at or near that point. For the first time
in three years we have begun to receive signals that
at least some in Nicaragua's Directorate might be
willing to meet our agenda -- to include an ending of
support for the guerrillas in El Salvador. The price
they would demand would be an end to our support for
the anti-Sandinistas.
I cannot promise you that these signals will yield
peace. But I can promise you that I will let no
opportunity slip by. But what chance do I have if we
preemptively surrender the only position for which the
other side might be prepared to pay at the negotiating
table?
We are finally achieving success in both El Salvador
and Nicaragua. It would be a tragedy for everyone
concerned if we abandoned a winning formula just as
has begun to work.
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