ZAIRE: CAPABILITIES OF THE FRONT FOR THE NATIONAL LIBERATION OF THE CONGO

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP85T00287R000901290001-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 5
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 8, 2010
• Sequence Number: 1
• Publication Date: June 14, 1984
• Content Type: MEMO

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000901290001-2
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000901290001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000901290001-2
I I
DIRECTORATE OF INTELLIGENCE
14 June 1984
ZAIRE: CAPABILITIES OF THE FRONT FOR THE NATIONAL
LIBERATION OF THE CONGO
Summary
Although the Angolan-based Front for the National Liberation
of the Congo (FLNC) is relative) large-- a roximately 4,000 to
6,000 guerrillas -it has been
25X1
unwilling or unable to mount any significant operations into Zaire
since its last major offensive in 1978.
25X1
warning of large scale FLNC offensives
reflect primarily, in our judgment, Zairian paranoia and wishful
thinking by FLNC leaders. Nevertheless, FLNC probably is capable
of carrying out occasional acts of urban terrorism and economic
sabotage, and may attempt such attacks in the next several weeks
in an effort to embarrass President Mobutu as he runs unopposed
for re-election in July.
25X1
This memorandum was prepared) for the Deputy
25X1
Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, Department of State. It has been
coordinated with the Directorate of Operations. Questions and comments
are welcome and may be directed to the Chief, Africa Division, ALA
25X1
ALA M 84-10062C
Copy 12 of
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000901290001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000901290001-2
Ineffective Force. . .
By all accounts, FLNC has been plagued since 1978 by desertions, poor
recruitment, inadequate equipment, and ineffective leadership and
organization. We attribute many of these problems to the inability of
FLNC to attract significant support outside its Lunda ethnic stronghold in
Shaba. In addition,-since 1978 the organization has been riven with
ideological fissures generated by its leaders' inability to agree on
political or military tactics. As a result, for five years the
organization has been unable to mount any signficant operations in
7_i?_
FLNC guerrillas have had to become increasingly active in the Angolan
conflict as the MPLA regime's military situation has worsened and Luanda
has exacted a higher price for the FLNC's sanctI'll a in Angola
J
The organization also was forced to leave its primary bases in
J
ao
e u area and withdraw deeper into Angola.
Even if Luanda did not need FLNC guerrillas for its fight with UNITA,
Luanda probably would be deterred from encouraging renewed FLNC thrusts
into Zaire. We believe the Angolan government fears, probably correctly,
that another attack on Shaba could provoke Mobutu to step up assistance to
Hume ~.. ~.,,... UL. J 11 _
direct material support to UNITA, we believe that Zairian aid includes intelligence support, the transit of.personnel and equipment, and access
t
f
ili
i
o
ac
t
es for rest and training.
. .That Could Be Revived
Despite FLNC's unimpressive showing over the last several ears we
believe the group cannot be com letel disregarded.
The 'US Embassy reports a
the election, or1gina y scheduled for ovember, was moved forward to July
by Mobutu in an effort to shorten the time available for opposition
m$ erh3 n.P-1,4 wn
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000901290001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000901290001-2
We believe the bombing attacks at the airport, the post office and
the Voice of Zaire radio station in Kinshasa .earlier this year, probably
by a rival dissident group, may encourage FLNC to carry out similar
Outlook
FLNC may be preparing for some sort
of o ensive, we do not believe it is capable of mounting large scale
operations from Angola, Congo, Tanzania or Zambia. Moreover, we believe
that the leaders of Zaire's neighboring states, despite their personal
dislike for Mobutu, would be unwilling to become more actively involved in
Zairian mestic affairs because of their vulnerability to retaliation.
Nevertheless, we believe FLNC is capable of carrying out occasional
acts of urban terrorism and economic sabotage, particularly in the
economically crucial copper and cobalt production areas in Shaba
province. Zairian security forces outside Kinshasa are poorly trained and
ill equipped to handle such attacks. The US Embassy reports, however,
that the elite Special Presidential Brigade and 31st Parachute Brigade in
Kinshasa, composed mainly of soldiers from Mobutu's home region and
trained by the Israelis and French, are probably capable of controlling
most threats to order in the capital area. We concur with the Embassy's
judgment that continued control of Kinshasa is the key to Mobutu's
remaining in power and that disturbances in the hinterland pose a threat
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000901290001-2
 Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000901290001-2 25X1
SUBJECT: ZAIRE: CAPABILITIES OF THE FRONT FOR THE
NATIONAL LIBERATION OF THE CONGO 25X1
Distribution:
Copy 1 -- Frank Wisner, Deputy Assistant Secretary for African Affairs, NSC
2 -- John O'Leary, INR
3 -- DOI
4 -- NIO for Africa
5 -- N IC/AG
6 -- PDB Staff
7 -- C/DDI/PES
8 -- D/ALA
9-10 -- ALA/PS
11 -- ALA Research Director
12-15 -- CPAS/IMD/CB
16-19 -- ALA/AF
20-30 -- ALA/AF/C
ALA/AF/CI I(14 June 1984)
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2011/08/17: CIA-RDP85T00287R000901290001-2