CIA DIRECTOR CASEY SPEAKS ON WAR AGAINST TERRORISM
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Law and National Security lnteltigence xeporL
Ar1ERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION
November 1985
CIA Director Casey Speaks
On War Against Terrorism
Ed. Note: Terrorism, no matter how repugnant the
word may be, is on everyone's tongue after the Achille
Lauro incident. It was commented on by Senator
Durenberger at the most recent breakfast of the Stand-
ing Committee on Law and National Security (see
separate story this issue) and in our October issue which
reviewed a Senate committee report on terrorism and
briefed a plenary session on "International Cooperation
Against Terrorism" sponsored by the ABA in London.
On Monday, October 14, your editor was invited to
sit in on a conference entitled "International Terrorism:
The Threat to Industry." The audience was comprised
primarily of American businessmen who have to cope
with terrorism here and in foreign countries-be it kid-
napping or attacks on their factories or banks.
The conference was sponsored by Stanford Research
Institute International in cooperation with the World
Power and Terrorism Project, Georgetown Center for
Strategic Studies, and the State University of New
York's Institute for Studies in International Terrorism.
That's quite a mouthful for multiple sponsorship but let
me hasten to add they brought together some of the
world's experts on the organization, training and ex-
ecution of terrorist acts. They ranged from Sir John
Hermon, Chief Constable for Northern Ireland, to the
former Governor for Civil Administration, Basque,
Spain, and included two Israelis who have experience
with terrorism.
The attention of the businessmen was captured
straight off by the keynote speaker, Joel Lisker, chief
counsel and staff director of the Subcommittee on
Security and Terrorism of the Senate Committee on the
Judiciary. He told the businessmen that the infrastruc-
ture to implement terrorism in the United States exists
today and only awaits a Shiite signal to go into action. If
that didn't grab their attention a statement by Dr.
Yonah Alexander did-that of 2,781 terrorist incidents
between 1968 and 1985, 1,698 were directed against
businessmen!
There will be more reported on this conference when
the transcript is available. This brief description is
meant to serve only as an appetizer to the "piece de
resistance" which was served up at lunch by Bill Casey,
the director of Central Intelligence. With his permis-
sion, excerpts from his text are reprinted below. No one
can fail to understand the threat of terrorism to our
country after reading it.
In this conference, we have undertaken examination
of one of the critical issues of our day, for perhaps no
other topic poses as much of a threat to the orderly
functioning of democratic societies as does international
terrorism. The grim reality is that terrorism is on the rise
worldwide, and we can expect only more violence and
death during the closing years of this century.
Whatever his specific political program, the terrorist
always pursues one general goal-to fix in the public
consciousness a sense of the terrorist's omnipotence and
the public's helplessness. To do this, the terrorist takes
advantage of the very civilization he seeks to destroy.
Factors Favoring Terrorism
The terrorist depends upon two factors for success in
conducting his waz on the mind. Both of these factors,
ironically, aze found only in the urban centers of open
societies like ours and those of our friends azound the
world. The first, and most important of these, is cover-
age by the media. In this decade more people can be ad-
dressed by newspaper, television, radio, and magazines
than ever before in history. What is more, the media is
so effective that millions of people may learn of a ter-
rorist attack that has taken place half a world away in a
matter of minutes-or at most, hours.
The terrorist hopes that his deeds will be bannered on
the six o'clock news throughout most of the developed
world, will be commented on at length in the world's
leading newspapers, and perhaps become the subject of
everyday conversation.
Even if an attack fails, as in the case of the assassina-
tion attempt on Prime Minister Mazgazet Thatcher, the
terrorist will nonetheless gain the maximum psychologi-
cal impact of his deed by a bold public threat. As many
of you may recall, the I.R.A. in a public notice told
Mrs. Thatcher that, "This time you were lucky. But you
have to be lucky all the time. We only have to be lucky
once."
The second factor that aids terrorists in their cam-
paign is the nature of modern urban society. The con-
centration of population offers anonymity to the ter-
rorist. Weapons and money can be obtained through an
infinite number of channels, thus preserving the ter-
rorist's operational security. The variety and efficiency
of transportation enhances the terrorist's mobility.
Moreover, industrialized societies have more vulnerable
high-value targets-such as computer centers, airlines,
factories, shopping arcades, and even apartment com-
plexes.
The Importance of Defense
Moreover, for the first time, terrorist attacks directed
at American private businesses and businessmen over-
seas outnumbered terrorist attacks against U.S. military
and diplomatic facilities. I speculate that this shift may
be due in part to the greatly improved physical security
measures taken by the State and Defense Departments.
Terrorist groups may have concluded that American-
owned businesses present "softer targets" that nonethe-
less yield very high-visibility headlines when hit.
Continued on page 4
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Casey Speaks on Terrorism
Continued from page 3
In my view, the Congress acted very wisely when it
voted $360 million to improve security at our various
facilities around the world in the wake of the October
1983 tragedy at the marine barracks in Beirut. Clearly,
thought needs to be given to assisting U.S. businessmen
to improve physical security at their facilities as well.
The risks and difficulties associated with terrorism
are greatly diminished when regimes like those of
Colonel Qadhafi's Libya and Ayatollah Khomeini's
Iran actively involve themselves in the planning, financ-
ing, training, documentation, and providing of safe-
haven for terrorist groups.
With the help of a sponsoring state, terrorist groups
are able to use more sophisticated techniques because of
state-funded training programs and technical expertise.
Moreover, the groups can employ more deadly, more
difficult to detect equipment and arms such as remotely
detonated devices. They also receive intelligence, and
get official travel documents-sometimes used as diplo-
matic cover-to hide their true identities. This support
makes it easy for terrorists to mask movements and
munitions deliveries-and then find safehaven in a
sponsoring state after an attack. So the backing of
governments enormously escalates the scope and power
of even the smallest terrorist groups.
Now I want to outline for you a strategy for dealing
with this problem. Basically, there are three broad
fronts on which we can challenge the terrorist. First, we
can improve our intelligence capabilities and work to-
gether more closely with other countries victimized by
terrorism. Second, we can work toward a stronger legal
framework to deal with terrorist acts. Third, the inter-
national community can work together to isolate ter-
rorist gangs and the states that sponsor these gangs. In
this way, the community of civilized nations can more
effectively prevent terrorist violence, preempt plans and
operations, and-when we can-respond swiftly and
appropriately to attacks.
The Role of Intelligence
Now, terrorist groups are very tough nuts for in-
telligence to crack. That is almost self-evident. They are
small, not easily penetrated, and their operations are
closely held and compartmented. Only a few people in
the organization are privy to specific operations.
Moreover, terrorists move quickly and place a very high
premium on secrecy and surprise. Yet prompt reporting
and follow-up action does frequently forestall terrorist
incidents. The most common example is forewarning to
U.S. and foreign embassies or other institutions of ac-
tual threats, or strong indications of planning for at-
tacks on institutions and individuals. The usual re-
sponse to this kind of knowledge is heightened alert, in-
creased protective measures, or changes in plans and
schedules which frequently disrupt the terrorists' plans
and result in a failure or a decision not to make the at-
tempt.
Recently, for example, intelligence on a threatened hi-
jacking of a foreign commercial airliner, combined with
effective police work, resulted in a change of travel
plans which prevented the intended hijacking. In other
instances, in Europe, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin
America, U.S. officials and businessmen directly tar-
geted by terrorists have been temporarily removed from
their posts.
Through intelligence exchanges, training and opera-
tional cooperation and technical support, we have, with
the intelligence, security and police organizations of
scores of countries around the world, developed a wide-
spread counterterrorism network which needs to be
strengthened and improved upon. American intelli-
gence, as the only worldwide apparatus other than the
KGB, is at the heart of this. So far this year there were
something like 80 terrorist acts around the world where
preventive action was taken based on advance informa-
tion from U.S. intelligence.
The Role of Law
The second major part of our program is to continue
working-as a community of nations subject to law-to
construct a viable international legal framework for
dealing with terrorists and their sponsors. This frame-
work must be transnational in character and supported
by vigorous legal action.
International law requires a state to control the ac-
tivities of persons within its jurisdiction or territory
which cause injury to the citizens of other states, and to
punish any persons engaging in such activities.
During the last two decades, international agreements
have repeatedly restated and expanded this basic duty of
all countries. For example, the Convention for the Sup-
pression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, otherwise
known as the Hague Convention, imposes obligations
on states to establish criminal jurisdiction over the of-
fense of air piracy and requires that countries extradite
hijackers or submit hijacking cases to competent
authorities.
Despite these agreements, the existing legal obliga-
tions by themselves are insufficient to thwart terrorism.
First, not all states are signatories to these conventions.
Second, state signatories face little or no possibility of
being penalized for failure to adhere to their interna-
tional obligations. Libya, for example-one of the
world's leading fomenters of terrorist violence-
hypocritically is a party to the Montreal, Hague and
Tokyo Conventions.
Third, there has been no appropriate articulation of a
formal definition of terrorism. Efforts to obtain general
acceptance of the 1972 U.S. Draft Convention on Ter-
rorism were linked to an intentional avoidance of the
issue of definition and thus focused only on a narrow
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common interest among nations.' However, even this
focus has not led to formal adoption of the convention.
The legal framework is there. What is needed is the
will to make use of it-the will to put teeth into these in-
ternational agreements by severely punishing violations.
Many nations have been slow on this.
And there are still other initiatives that might be taken
bilaterally and multilaterally if we are to deal with ter-
rorism effectively. For example, we should review inter-
national treaties and agreements that define diplomatic
privilege to identify standards of diplomatic practice
and behavior which should be vigorously enforced. We
may need new international measures to counter misuse
of diplomatic privileges by those regimes sponsoring ter-
rorist activities. We should think about developing
multilateral treaties whereby persons who commit ter-
rorist acts against citizens of any signatory state could
be routinely extradited or perhaps tried by an interna-
tional tribunal. Rules also should exist whereby in-
dividuals known to be involved in terrorism can be
prevented from entering any signatory state or ap-
prehended on an international arrest warrant.
Isolating the Terrorists
The third major part of our program requires that all
victimized governments should impose political and
economic isolation on states like Iran and Libya that
sponsor terrorism. I find it incredible that certain of our
friends and allies still have dealings with these criminal
states, while at the same time suffering terrorist
atrocities cooked up in Tehran, Tripoli, and other such
centers. And, as long as they permit Libyan and Iranian
agents to move about freely-and indeed pay huge sums
into the treasuries of those two countries-we have no
leverage whatsoever. Simply put, states that sponsor ter-
rorism must be quarantined from the rest of the interna-
tional community until their behavior changes.
We must deny the terrorist the fruit of his labors-
namely, the ability to exploit the media to instill in the
public feelings of uncertainty and fear. The media itself
must play the leading role in this effort by treating news
of terrorist incidents in a more reserved fashion. Im-
agine if you will the terrorist's reaction if he and his ex-
ploits were downplayed or even ignored!
If we can do this, the terrorist will watch in frustra-
tion as his power over the media dries up and, with it,
his power to assault the mind. If cut off from his spon-
sors, the terrorist will watch with growing apprehension
as he learns that the costs and risks of his operations
skyrocket while the impact of his actions plummets. In
my view, the futility of terrorism will at last be made ob-
vious to the terrorist himself, and his devastating war on
the mind will slowly come to an end.
You might well ask the very pertinent question: But
does all this work? I believe it does. And I can mention
two success stories in the war on terrorism.
It may surprise you to know that the country having
the highest number of terrorist incidents during the late
1970s was not Lebanon or Israel, but Italy. The wanton
murder of Premier Aldo Moro and the kidnapping of
General Dozier galvanized the Italian government into
action. Italian courts have stepped up their effort at
prosecuting and convicting captured terrorists, and
handing down stiff sentences. The Italian National
Police and Security Services have stepped up their ac-
tivities targeted at penetrating terrorist units or other-
wise spoiling terrorist operations. Moreover, European
services have been active in sharing information on
these terrorists, subsequently leading to the capture of
some of those involved.
As a result of excellent intelligence work, vigorous
police anti-terrorist activities, and increased court ac-
tions, Italy since the early 1980s has been one of the
countries in Europe least affected by terrorism. A key
factor in this effort was the turn-around in support for
the Italian Security Services by most parties in the
Italian Parliament and the general public.
Another success story is the Republic of El Salvador.
That small country-the victim of both externally-
supported aggression and terrorism-has risen to grave
challenges posed by purveyors of violence who receive
their orders from Managua and Havana.
In the past 12 months, we have witnessed an increase
in Marxist-directed terrorism that has included bomb-
ings of civilian installations, the mining of public roads,
armed robberies, brutal kidnappings, and assassina-
tions. This increasing turn to terrorism has come about
in part because of the growing popular support for
President Duarte's government and in part because of
the rapidly faltering political and military fortunes of
the rebels. The insurgents increasingly have fallen back
on dramatic acts of violence to draw attention to their
cause and force President Duarte's popularly-elected
government to share political power.
You may recall that last June a gang of Marxist thugs
staged a bloody machinegun slaying outside a sidewalk
cafe of 13 unarmed people-including four off-duty
U.S. Marines and two U.S. businessmen. The so-called
Central American Revolutionary Workers Party-
which claimed "credit" for the June slayings-is a
member in good standing of the five-group Salvadoran
Marxist Alliance and has its command headquarters in
Managua, Nicaragua.
The Salvadoran government responded quickly and
decisively to this urban terrorist threat. Since the June
massacre, the Salvadoran Army has launched opera-
tions against these terrorists and other Marxist base
camps in the central and eastern mountains. The army's
offensive has proved quite successful as a large number
of insurgents-including some field comman-
ders-were killed, communication lines were disrupted,
and supplies captured. Captured documents and
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Casey Speaks on Terrorism
Continued from page S
prisoners, in turn, provided valuable intelligence which
the security forces promptly used in rounding up some
40 urban terrorists, including two of the actual trig-
germen involved in the June killings. The triggermen
will be tried for murder.
The Role of Terrorism
I believe that this network if not a component of, still
works in unison with, what the Soviets have developed
into the most powerful weapons system the world has
ever seen. It consists not only of the missiles capable of
striking at the United States and most of its allies plus
the overwhelming conventional strength which can be
projected into Europe and toward the Persian Gulf, but
also of the weapons of aggressive subversion. It has suc-
ceeded in installing Communist governments in Angola,
Ethiopia, South Yemen, Mozambique, Cambodia and
Nicaragua, and has sent its conventional forces for the
first time over the border of the Soviet Union to occupy
Afghanistan. It consists also of the system of the com-
bination of active measures, political action and pro-
paganda which the Soviets use to influence and
manipulate popular opinion and political processes in
the open societies of the world.
International terrorism plays a role in this weapons
system. A Soviet connection may seem shadowy to
some, but it seems very real to me. Iran and the Soviet
Union are hardly allies, but they both share a fun-
damental hostility to the West. When Libya and the
PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization) provide arms
and training to the Communists in Central America,
they are aiding Soviet-supported Cuban efforts to
undermine America's security in that vital region.
Moscow and its allies allow radical groups to main-
tain offices in Eastern Europe and to grant safe passage
to operatives traveling to Western Europe or elsewhere
to commit terrorist acts. No one can seriously believe
that these activities-which have gone on for at least 15
years-have escaped the notice of the Communist
authorities.
The creation and training of terrorists is the primary
measure of how severe this problem will be for us during
the remainder of this century. This will be determined
by the six hundred or so young men who are brought into
Moscow every year to be indoctrinated to 'serve as or-
ganizers in other countries around the world and how
many other young men are brought into terrorist and
paramilitary training camps. Where are the training
facilities located? They are heavily concentrated in the
Soviet bloc-in the Soviet Union itself, in Bulgaria,
Czechoslovakia, and East Germany-in South Yemen,
Cuba and, increasingly, Nicaragua, and in the radical
entente countries of Syria, Libya, and Iran. So as we
fight the terrorist threat directly on the ground we also
need to bring out the ultimate source of much of this
activity.
The reality-the bottom line-is that terrorism aims
at the very heart of civilization. We have no realistic
choice but to meet it, and that means head on. Nothing
else will work. In the absence of a national will to fight
terrorism at its roots, we must be content only to cope
with terrorism's effects-not its cause. And that will not
be enough.
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