WHAT'S BEHIND REAGAN STRATEGY IN NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B00858R000200170012-3
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 12
• Publication Date: April 17, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

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OPERATIONS CENTER/, ~JRRENT SUPPORT GkiUP
Jews Bulletin: U. S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, 23 APR., Pg. 27
Interview With William Casey, Director, Central Intelligence Agency
What's Behind
Reagan
Strategy in Nicaragua
Washington's ultimate goal, the
CIA chief contends, is heading
on a massive refugee crisis on
America's southern border.
Q Mr. Casey, with so much attention fo-
cused right now on Nicaragua and the con-
tras, can you give us your assessment of
the Impact of the anti-Sandinista guerrillas?
A They're creating a great deal of dis-
array and pressure on the regime.
They've damaged the economy. Daniel
Ortega Saavedra [leader of the Sandinis-
ta junta] said a couple of weeks ago that
the contras have cost them about one
third of their exports.
The main impact, however, is to di-
vert Sandinista leaders from supporting
the insurgency in El Salvador and bring
pressure on them to negotiate sensibly
to a more peaceful situation in that
whole area. They are perceived to be
the threat to the peace by all the surrounding countries
because Nicaragua is the base for supporting insurgencies
not only in El Salvador but in Costa Rica, Guatemala and
Honduras as well.
Q While the United States may want to pressure the Sandi-
nistas to and support for Marxist guerrillas elsewhere, Is that
really the goal of the contras in Nicaragua? Aren't they bent on
overthrowing the regime?
A Those things are always mixed. They would like to
unseat the regime. The question is: What is the U.S. govern-
ment's purpose? After all, in World War II we were helping
the Communists, the Royalists, the Gaullists and everybody.
TheN were all trying to get power. We didn't care about
that: we just wanted to get help against the Nazis. It's an
analogous situation we have here. Our own national inter-
ests need not be strictly tied to any one group's goals.
Q What chance do the contras have of overthrowing the
Sandinista regime?
A I think there's no chance that they will be able to
overthrow the government. In the resistance, you have, it is
said, perhaps 15,000 men with rifles scattered around the
open, unpopulated parts of the country, which is where
guerrillas can hide. They can't go into the cities, which the
government is protecting with tanks and 75,000 men in the
Army, the militia and the security forces. So they're not
going to overthrow that government.
It could be-but it's a very long shot and unlikely-that
the government would dissolve because the people would
get fed up and fall away from the regime. But it's hard to
change a government that operates a system of control
where everybody in every block is counted and any strang-
ers who show have to explain themselves.
Q What Is your response to published reports that the CIA
was Involved In the mining of the Nicaraguan ports?
r
o
g
e govern-
A I can't comment on such allegations. _.__-_____-.> .-irs-g have an impact. The supplies are still
Q What about reports that the CIA Is actively ram ing this coming in from N'oi`:aragua, but we think it's in reduced
iX
17 April 1984
Item No. 9
mining operation with a mother ship
offshore?
A I never comment on such reports.
Q Are the Cubans still heavily in-
volved In Nicaragua or have they reduced
their presence there as some recent re-
ports suggest?
A While the Cubans have been
talking about lowering their presence,
they've actually been moving in rnor(
people. The Cubans run the security
services that manage the block-popu-
lation-control system.
There are about 7,000 to 9,000 Cu.
bans in Nicaragua including 3,000 to
3,500 military advisers intertwined
with the Nicaraguan militar-,. Thee
also have 5,000 to 6,000 teacher-.
construction and health workers who
are regularly taken back to Cuba on
rotation. The replacements no%% be-
ing sent have had military training
and are under 40.
As we saw in Grenada, Cuban con-
struction workers carry rifles as well
as shovels. There have been occasions
where these Cuban construction
workers joined in the fighting in Nic-
aragua when contras tangled with the
Nicaraguan military.
Q Is there any evidence that Cuba or
the Soviet Union is converting Nicaragua into a kind of strategic
bass along lines you've warned about In the past?
A We were concerned about that because they were
lengthening airfields in Nicaragua to make them long
enough to handle supersonic planes. And we know, Nicara-
guan fliers were going to Bulgaria, to the Soviet Union and
Cuba to be trained. Now, that has continued. The training
has been completed. We believe that MiG-23s are in Cuba
earmarked for Nicaragua and that Nicaraguan pilots are
practicing in them. We believe the planes haven't been
sent over to Nicaragua, because they're concerned about
our response.
Q How many Nicaraguan pilots have been trained?
A We don't have an exact figure, but it's substantial-
something like 40 pilots, enough to handle a squadron of
planes, which is what we think they have in Cuba.
One thing you've got to understand is that both the
Soviets and the Cubans go to great lengths to keep their
military support for Nicaragua quiet and ambiguous The
heavy Soviet weapons come largely in Bulgarian and Alge-
rian ships. Soviet and Cuban ships bring in the lighter stuff
mixed with commercial cargo. We have intelligence that
the Cubans in Nicaragua shave their mustaches and hide
their dog tags. They are mixed in with Nicaraguan units.
not kept in separate Cuban formations that could be
identified.
Q You mentioned that an objective of the contras was to
divert the Sandinistas from their support of the Marxist guerril-
la In El Salvador. Are they having an Impact on the flow of
supplies to the Salvadoran rebels?
A Oh, they certainly have had an impact, though it's
hard to quantify. To start off with, the Nicaraguans have to
use their weapons and ammunition to fight the contras
instead of sending them to El Salvado
t
fi
ht th
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amounts. We know that the Nicaraguan government and supplies and build up the Salvadoran Army by 25 percent
the Army are having to pay greater attention to dealing to 40 percent to improve the ratio of Army to guerrillas.
with the internal resistance, which means that there's Q How do you handle the growing pressure In Congress to
much less attention they can give to exporting revolution. cut off military aid to El Salvador if the death squads continue to
But I can't be very much more specific than that.
Q If Nicaragua is being forced to divert its attention from El unoperate there? Why is the able to deal with the death Salvadoran government unwilling or
Salvador, why do the Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador seem to A I think it's a cultural problem. It's a violent society like
have been gaining In recent months? most of the societies down there. Everybody talks about the
A Well, they might be doing better without that diver- right-wing death squads. During recent months, most of
sion. We do know that the Salvadoran guerrillas have been the assassination victims have been supporters of the Ro-
able to increase their numbers by training and arming berto D'Aubuisson movement, the so-called right wing. So
some of their support people. At the same time, we have there are left-wing death squads. The guerrillas practice
pretty good reporting that they're short of ammunition and intimidation, and they slaughter people as they, did in V'iet-
thev're short of funds and they're not as effective as they nam. It's a civil war. And they also have this special kind of
would be if Nicaraguan support were unimpaired. free-lance, nongovernmental death squad that practices re-
Also. the Salvadoran Army has been getting more effec- venge. That works both ways right across the society.
Live. Before the period leading up to the elections, the Besides that, the judicial system in El Salvador leaves
Army had the guerrillas pretty well broken up and pushed much to be desired. They have a hard time getting any
back into their bases in mountainous areas. convictions. But basically what we're talking about is
Q How do you reconcile your claim that the Salvadoran Army whether our primary purpose is to establish a better society
-
Is getting better with the constant criticism that It's still too in El Salvador, which isn't likely to happen quickly under
Incompetent to make headway against the guerrillas? present circumstances, or to protect the security interests
A It has a lot of deficiencies but it is improving steadily of the united States and give Salvadoran democracy, a
through better training, better leadership, more-aggressive chance to develop.
tactics and more-sustained operations. It needs more mobil-
ity. It is not a perfect world, and there is still plenty of room issue Inethe you political worried that campaign anntanld America will
undermine e popular s popumes ppo or
for improvement. That can be said about any army. for administration's upport
The main problem in El Salvador from the military stand- A I think that people in thetlong run are less concerned
point is this: As a rule of thumb, experts say that an army about reports of mining Nicaraguan harbors than they are
needs an 8 or 10 to 1 advantage to win a guerrilla war. Look about the danger of creating a wave of immigration into
at the Nicaraguan Army and militia-75,000 men under this country if Central America or any part of it should fall
arms-and they are unable to cope with 15,000 contras. under Soviet-Cuban domination. If we have another Cuba
Now the ratio of the Salvadoran Army to the guerrillas is in Central America, Mexico will have a big problem and
something like 4 to 1, and the guerrillas have a safe haven, a we're going to have a massive wave of immigration. The
supple and a command-and-control base right across the effort to prevent this from happening is not going to excite
border in Nicaragua. Given that situation, the Salvadoran Americans as much as the threat they would face if things
Arms is not doing badly.
The only way you're going to resolve the conflict in El go
Also,nI think people are concerned about the military
Salvador is if two things happen: You have to deprive the danger. If the Communists solidify their hold on Nicaragua,
guerrillas of their safe haven and further reduce the flow of the other countries down there would have to accommo-
Main Points Made by CIA Director
Controversy over mining. "People are less con-
cerned about reports of mining Nicaraguan harbors"
than they are about dangers of "another Cuba" in
Central America.
Impact of contras In Nicaragua. While "they're cre-
ating a great deal of disarray and pressure on the
regime ... there's no chance that they will be able to
overthrow the government."
Arms to Salvadoran rebus. Guerrilla operations
against Nicaragua's Sandinista regime 'certainly have
had an impact" on flow of weapons to Marxist insur-
gents in El Salvador.
U.S. concern about death squads. The real issue is
"whether our primary purpose is to establish a better
society in El Salvador ... or to protect the security inter-
ests of the United States."
Iran-Iraq War. "Prevailing opinion is that in the long
run the Iranians have some important advantages" that
would pose grave dangers for entire gulf region.
State-sponsored terrorism. International communi-
ty should isolate diplomatically and impose sanctions
against countries sponsoring terrorism.
date in some way. The Communists would next be looking
at Mexico, to find problems that they specialize in exploit-
ing. So what you're looking at for your children and your
grandchildren is a long-term prospect of a hundred million
hostile people immediately south of our border if we fail to
give democracy a chance to develop in Central America.
Q To turn to the other spot that worries Americans-the
Middle East: What Is the likelihood of an Iranian victory In the
war with Iraq?
A The Iraqis should be able to stave off this current
offensive because they have such a preponderance of air
power and artillery and tank power. But the Iranians have
the numbers; they have the staying power; they've got the
economic resources. The Iraqis are in bad shape economi-
cally. They've also got a big Shia population with religious
ties to Iran. I think the prevailing opinion is that in the long
run the Iranians have some important advantages.
Q What dangers might the United States face If Iran does
win?
A If Iran prevails and a radical Shiite regime is estab-
lished in Baghdad similar to the Khomeini regime in Tehe-
ran, there are a lot of people they could turn loose against
Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and the gulf states, which have sup-
ported Iraq.
The Iranians are in a vengeful frame of mind. We have
seen what they can do with the terrorist attacks on the
American Embassy in Kuwait and the Marine barracks in
Beirut. They are taking people from those gulf states to
camps in Teheran for terrorist training and sending them
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back. So already they have a
pretty potent subversive poten-
tial in those small countries.
Q What would the United States
do If Iran moved against these oil
states in the gulf region?
A I can't speculate on that.
The U.S. government said that
we would keep the Strait of Hor-
muz open. As to something hap-
pening in one or another of these
countries around the gulf, any re-
action, I would suppose, would
depend upon the circumstances
at the time.
Q That brings up the problem of
state-sponsored terrorism that Sec-
retary of State Shultz has been talk-
ing about: What can the United
States do to counter terrorism
sponsored by Iran and other gov-
ernments-assassinate their peo-
ple, bomb their capitals or what?
A Don't put words in my
mouth. As Secretary Shultz said,
we're dealing with a new phe-
nomenon in state-sponsored ter-
rorism-a new weapons system
that obliterates the distinction
between peace and war.
The Iranians use their diplomatic facilities as a platform
to make revolutionary guards, communications facilities
and money available for terrorist planning and action.
They've attacked us twice in Beirut-the American Embas-
sy and the Marine barracks. They turn up in many coun-
tries in Africa, Asia and Europe, and we are likely to see
them here. They send their missionaries across the whole
Moslem world, from Morocco to Malaysia and Indonesia,
preaching Khomeini's brand of radical religious-social gos-
pel. It's a force that we're going to have to reckon with in
many dimensions.
Q But what can you do about It? Do you get into the business
of assassinating terrorist leaders?
A We don't engage in assassinations. We have to depend
on a combination of strong security measures and interna-
tional cooperation to deter and defeat terrorism.
Let's look at the problem of state-sponsored terrorism
and international terrorism in a little more detail. There
are more than 50 major terrorist organizations, and hun-
dreds of mom and pop shops-little groups that take on
operations for hire. We can count scores of terrorist-train-
ing camps in Iran, Libya, Syria, South Yemen, Bulgaria, the
Soviet Union, Romania, Cuba and other bloc countries.
Now, there are several things you can do to cope with
this kind of terrorism. You can handle it by defending
yourself, defending potential targets. That's pretty tough
because you haven't got enough policemen to protect ev-
cry target and you don't know where they're going to hit.
So we are engaged in helping security organizations in a
great many countries to improve their training and opera-
tional proficiency. These countries have their own intelli-
gence capabilities to watch the terrorists. They're apt to be
better at it than we are because they've got to live with
them all the time and they're closer to them. A qualified
antiterrorist network has developed through the liaison
relationship between intelligence and security organiza-
tions. It is being improved by intensified intelligence ex-
changes and by training and other forms of assistance.
On top of that, there's a question of deterring terrorism
Contras: "Perhaps 15,000 men with rifles scattered
around the unpopulated parts of the country."
by sending the message that if
the terrorists attack there will be
retaliation. It's not necessarily a
matter of striking back directly at
the terrorists. The Israelis, for ex-
ample, send the message "If
we're hit from your territory.
that's your responsibility and
we're going to kick you in the
teeth somehow." I think you %%ill
see more of that-retaliation
against facilities connected with
the country sponsoring the ter-
rorists or retaliation that just
hurts the interests of countries
which sponsor terrorism.
Some people say that you've
got to find out who the terrorists
are and make sure you hit the
people who hit you. Well. usually
that means you're not going to do
it at all. If retaliation is going to
be a deterrent, the countries
sponsoring terrorism has e got to
know it's going to happen quick-
ly and with certaintx.
Now, there's a third ryas to
handle state-sponsored terrorism
which, in my view, needs to be
developed faster
.
Q What's that alternative way?
A That's a kind of international, diplomatic counterof-
fensive against international terrorism. In effect, it yyould
apply a modern version of the 18th-century international
law on piracy that charged every nation with responsibility
for picking up pirates and putting them away where then
could do no more harm. It's a little hard to get acceptance
of that in today's world, and I'm not quite sure just host you
would implement it.
But nations could join together to invoke economic sanc-
tions against and isolate diplomatically countries, such as
Iran and Libya, that practice terrorism as a matter of state
policy. They could collaborate more intensively on the
screening and surveillance at entry and departure points of
travelers and visitors suspected of terrorist connections
They could agree to respond more quickly and surely to
requests from other countries for extradition and assistance
So there are three ways you can deal with state-spon-
sored terrorism short of sending out hit squads. You can
defend, you can retaliate and you can impose international
barriers and sanctions of a nonviolent nature.
Cl If we can turn finally to the Soviet Union: What. as you see
it, has been the effect of the change in leadership there from
Andropov to Chemenko?
A Minimal. Chernenko is clearly a transitional leader.
but nobody knows whether he's going to be around six
months, two years or five years, and it doesn't make much
difference. We predicted that China's Mao Tse-tung syould
die 20 times before they finally buried him. So we are yers
shy about predicting how long Chernenko will last.
My view is that under the Soviet system today everything
is worked out in a collegial way. Certainly with this kind of
short-term leader, no one man is going to have the poster
to make a drastic change of direction. And there's no reason
to assume that when Chernenko goes, the situation will
change. What you've got in the Soviet Union is a generation
of septuagenarians who are reluctant to forfeit their perqui-
sites by passing power to a younger generation. They're
intent on hanging on to power. F7
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