THE ILLEGALITY OF THE SECRET WAR AGAINST NICARAGUA

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP87B00858R000200170007-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: November 17, 2010
• Sequence Number: 7
• Publication Date: April 25, 1984
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2010/11/17: CIA-RDP87B00858R000200170007-9
April ,25, 1984 L...NGRESSIONAL RECORD -- SENAi-c
Breaking Point in CIA Aid -to the Con-
tras," be printed in the RECORD.
The analysis follows:
[From the Los Angeles Times, Apr. 3, 1984]
LAW 18 AT THE BREAKING POINT IN CIA AID
TO THE CONTRAS
(By David J. Scheffer)
This week Congress continues 'its debate
over the Reagan Administration's request to
funnel $21 million via the Central Intelli-
gence Agency to rebel forces battling Nica-
ragua's Sandinista government. The oper-
ation, still officially "covert," raises serious
questions about the Administration's will-
ingness to comply with U.S. and interna-
tional law.
In its stated goal to protect "our strategic
interests" against the spread of communism
in Latin America, the Administration has so
far bent at least four legal strictures to its
purpose-or ignored them altogether.
First, there is the problematical CIA man-
date, which was overhauled in the late 1970s
in response to agency excesses. In addition
to intelligence-gathering functions the CIA
is empowered to conduct "special activities
approved by the President" (this under Ex-
ecutive Order No. 12333, signed by President
Reagan in 1981). These activities are to be
"in support of national foreign-policy objec-
tives'abroad which are planned and execut-
ed so that the role of the U.S. government is
not apparent or acknowledged publicly."
But they should not be intended to "influ-
ence U.S. political processes, public opinion,
policies or media."
In public references to the so-called con-
tras' activities, Administration officials have
almost exhausted their lexicon to admit the
unadmittable. Reagan speaks in general
terms of "supporting" the contras, describ-
ing them as democratic elements of the, Nic-
araguan revolution who have been shut out
by the Sandinista government. Off the
record, Administration officials confirm
that the CIA is training and equipping the
contras. Members of Congress routinely give
reporters details about the size and type of
the aid.
Is there any doubt that CIA support for
the contras is both "apparent" and with any
reasoned interpretation of Administration
admissions, "acknowledged publicly"? Isn't
it clear that the effect of the CIA oper-
ations is to influence not only Managua,
Havana and Moscow but also U.S. public
opinion, Congress and,'perhap, the 1984
elections?
The purpose of Executive Order No. 12333
has thus been abandoned.
Second, Congress has been clear in its
intent that covert assistance should not be
used to overthrow the Sandinista govern;
Department of Defense for that purpose,
for "provoking a military exchange betwe
the CIA operations to interdicting the flow
of arms from Nicaragua to guerrillas in El
Salvador. The Administration asserted that
it would not try to overthrow the Sandinista
government, with which it still maintains
diplomatic relations. With that -understand-
ing, Congress scrapped the legal restrictions
on the purposes for which the covert aid
could be used. To meet its oversight role,
Congress then imposed a limit-$24 mil-
lion-on 1984 expenditures for "military or
paramilitary operations in Nicaragua."
Congress was misled; at a minimum it
should restore explicit prohibitions on use
of aid to overthrow the Nicaraguan govern-
ment.
The contras' recent attacks on major oil
and industrial facilities and their mining of
Nicaraguan ports arouses deep suspicions
about the actual use of CIA assistance. On
Monday an anonymous "well-placed U.S. of-
ficial" was quoted in this newspaper as pre-
dicting that an entire Nicaraguan army
unit-3,000 men.-would soon loin the
contra forces. To employ a favorite Reagan
buzzword, how does the United States
"verify" what . the contras are doing? Are
they using CIA training and supplies-and
risking their lives-exclusively to stop the
arms now to El Salvador, rather than to
further their expressed objective of toppling
the Sandinista government?
Perhaps it doesn't matter. Regardless of
the contras' true intentions and perform-
ance, Washington can continue to insist
that whatever they do they are thwarting
Nicaragua's ability to aid the Salvadoran in-
surgents.
Even if that somehow could be proved,
U.S. participation in Nicaragua's guerrilla
war and the U.S.-Honduran army maneu-
vers have undoubtedly heightened the pos-
sibility of a military exchange between Nica-
ragua and Honduras, where the anti-Sandi-
nista rebels find sanctuary (and,--presum-
ably, their CIA advisers).
Third, the 1794 Neutrality Act makes it a
criminal offense to furnish money or pre-
pare for a military enterprise against a
country at peace with the United States.
Last November a federal district judge in
San Francisco found enough merit in a law-
suit alleging violation of the Neutrality Act
to order the attorney general to conduct a
preliminary investigation into U.S. support
for the anti-Sandinista rebels. The Justice
Department has not commenced that inves-
tigation because. the judge's ruling is still on
appeal.
Finally, CIA support for the contras chal-
lenges international law. The charters of
the United Nations and the Organization of
American States, the Rio Treaty and vari-
ous U.N. resolutions and declarations make
a strong case for prohibiting U.S. military
support to guerrila groups seeking to over-
throw the legitimate recognized government
of a sovereign state.
Of course, Nicaragua also violates interna-
tional law when it lends military assistance
to guerrillas in El Salvador. But the CIA's
"covert" operations are doubly unjustifi-
able, both in terms of international law and
in the spirit of executive and legislative
oversight of covert activities.
On both sides of the debate over aid to
the contras, senators and members of the
House typically argue whether such aid is in
the national interest of the United States.
They either ignore the legalities or attach
them as addenda to their main arguments.
Perhaps this year enough members of our
legislature will agree that it is :in the high-
est national interest to observe the rule of
law.*
SIT OF ARGENTINE FOREIGN
MINISTER DANTE CAPUTO
? Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, 2
weeks ago I had the honor to meet
with the new Foreign Minister of Ar-
gentina, Mr. Dante Caputo, a thought-
ful and vigorous advocate of the new
democratic government's policies.
During this first official visit to Wash-
ington, Mr. Caputo delivered an in-
sightful speech to the National Press
Club. He discussed basic problems in
Latin American relations with the
United States stemming from differ-
ent emphases on security.
S 4851
Comparing the development of post-
war United States-European relations
with United States-Latin American re-
lations, Mr. Caputo made. an extraor-
dinary point-that our security con-
cerns in Latin America did not have
the same link with freedom and pros-
perity that had been established in
Europe.
What meaning can there be in defending .
the freedom you do not enjoy or protecting
a prosperity you do not have? Mr. Caputo
asked. Here, every time the United States
tried to preserve its security interest by de-
veloping ties with the dominant minorities
in Latin America, the result has been con-
flict and controversy. .
Mr. Caputo expressed his concern
that United States and Latin Ameri-
can points of view might drift apart to
the point of closing off candid dialog.
But he also offered the hope that once
democracy earns the predominant po-
sition in Latin American politics, the
United States concern for Its security
will no longer be seen as an "attempt
to exercise hegemony" because democ-
racy will be more than "empty rheto-
ric."
For all my colleagues who share
these concerns and hopes, I strongly
commend Mr. Caputo's speech. I
submit the full text of his speech for
the RscoiD.
The text follows:
SPEECH DELIVERED BY THE FOREIiGN-MINISTER
or ARGENTINA, DANTE CArUTO, AT THE NA-
TIONAL PRESS CLUB
Ladies and Gentlemen: I year the Ar-
gentine people in a free r an end
to half a century of polftlest lino and
tragedy which has had; by^ airbus
economic and. Social SW0841060000; I& 010t
election Raul Alfonsin obtait4eal4uwe than
half the votes and received a slier mandate
to rebuild the economy sad to remora de-
mocracy. protect freedom,, guarantee plural-
ism, human rights, and the due process of
law..
To understand the magnitude of the chal-
lenge faced by my government it is perhaps
useful to recall briefly, the evolution of our
country in the last 50 years.
In 1930 Argentina had onlf bU st
income per capita in the world.,, _L I-L
Though our land was rich, an ,'tbp;aatture
of our people and our society aia that
it promised a future of peace, prosperity,
freedom, and justice, that future never
came about.
In the last fifty years we have not pros-
pered, but rather we have lived from crisis
to crisis. A fact which resulted in poverty
and even hunger for many Argentines. In-
stead of freedom, we were frequently sub-
jected to authoritarian rule. Instead of
peace and justice, we suffered violence, in-
tolerance, and inequalities.
Today my government is committed to
change these conditions by turning the
democratic faith of our people into a living
reality.
We do not doubt that these democratic
goals are also shared by the people of the
United States. Yet, despite this coincidence
in values, there have been-and still are-
problems between our two countries. I am
speaking about the kind of difficulties that
are systematically present in the relations
between the United States and the majority
Approved For Release 2010/11/17: CIA-RDP87B00858R000200170007-9