THE DIFFICULT ART OF COUNTERINSURGENCY ELUDES THE RUSSIANS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504490003-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 23, 2012
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: April 13, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
1 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504490003-0
ARTICLE AP I - NEW YORK TIMES
ON PAGE 13 April 1986
The Difficult Art of Cbunterinsurgency
Eludes the Russians
WASHINGTON
THE Soviet armed forces, which have been fight-
ing longer in Afghanistan than they did in World
War II, have apparently learned relatively few
military lessons there, Western experts say. In-
deed, perhaps the Russians' most important decision in
Afghanistan has been to resist the temptation to escalate
the hostilities. With an estimated total of 110,000 men,
"the Limited Contingent of Soviet Forces in Afghani-
stan," as it is called in Moscow, has lived up to its name,
having grown only insignificantly since it entered Af-
ghanistan in December 1979.
Moscow's limited-war policy may be strained by the
Reagan Administration's recent decision to provide .
shoulder-held portable antiaircraft missiles known as
Stingers to rebels fighting in Afghanistan and Angola.
The decision also worries some Western experts because
some of the Afghan rebels are based in Iran. Critics fear
that the Stingers, which could be used against civilian
airliners, might fail into the hands of international ter-
rorists. President Reagan, asked at his news conference
last week if he had such concerns about Stingers report-
edly destined for rebels in Angola, declined to discuss
who is getting the missiles.
The Russians have not followed the United States ex-
ample in Vietnam, where the commitment of 19,000 ad-
visers grew to more than 600,000 combat troops in about
three years without decisive results. The Russians have
not achieved decisive results, either, but they have held
down. their political, economic and military costs by,
limiting the size of their quagmire. "They do not need a
quick victory," said one American military officer.
However, despite Moscow's reputation -as the global
incubator of guerrilla warriors and teacher of insurgency
techniques, its achievements in the difficult art of coun-
terinsurgency have not been impressive. "The Afghani-
stan experience suggests that armies will do well only at
those things for which they habitually prepare and prac-
tice," concludes Maj. Joseph J. Collins, of the United
States Army. Since its last big war ended in 1945, the
Soviet army has prepared almost exclusively for large.
mbcianized Warfare against conventional ene-
mies. Soviet military journals have published relatively
few articles an Afghanistan-related subjects such as,
mountain warfare, helicopter operations and physical
conditioning of troops. Analysts think the Soviet high .
command prefers to concentrate on conventional opera-
tions and regards 'the guerrilla conflict as an aberration
with little future applicability.
Muth of what Moscow has learned in Afghanistan
has been mundane and of limited value. For example, to
safeguard roads from ambushes and mines, the Russians
have sometimes dropped flares to protect trucks at night
and have spread smoke screens for convoys, an innova-
tion of sorts. Road clearing is a problem in all. guerrilla
wars. Large numbers of soldiers are required, but the re-
sults are often poor and seldom lasting. Partly to leap-
frog the nagging road problem, the Russians have em-
braced the helicopter much as the Americans did in Viet-
nam. But they are using only an estimated 650 helicop-
ters, including about 250 armed gunships, far fewer than
the thousands the United States had in Vietnam.
Tactically and strategically, the Russians seem to be
as baffled as the Americans were in Southeast Asia. Ac-
cording to some reports, the Russians are increasingly
moving troops by helicopter. They have apparently
learned - as the Americans did - that in guerrilla wars
small units are more useful but at greater risk than large
ones. And in the central Panjshir Valley, where the Rus-
sians used to bombard an area with artillery and air
strikes for a week before attacking, they have learned to
move more quickly.
overall, however, the evidence is overwhelming that
the Russians have tried to quell the insurgency with
heavy firepower, much as other armies have done with
only limited success. They have succeeded in depopylat-
ing sizable zones, which may have helped them, Wedtern
experts think, but have not come close to ending the war.
"Soviet` strategy appears to have been to hold the
major centers of communications, limit infiltratiorrand
destroy local strongholds at minimum cost to their'own
forces," Major Collins wrote in Parameters, the Army
War College journal. "In effect, Soviet policy has Bien a
combination of scorched earth and migratory genocide."
But even the limited use of toxins and poison gas appar-
ently has not stopped the insurgents.
One Washington expert thinks the Russians' .best
hope, although a wan one, is to strengthen Afghanistan's
army. They have-had some success, according to West-
, mass oesenions sins
ern intelligence t e ear u
mutinies. But few experts think e war will -
stanized" soon. Jane's Defense Weekly once said thg war
was giving "vital experience to the Soviet officer corps,"
but not everyone agrees. No interesting new Soviet knili-
tary doctrines have emerged, and their rigid, formal sys-
tem does not encourage innovation or flexibility. One Af-
ghan army colonel who defected told Western interroga-
tors that the Soviet forces were oversupervised, lacking
in initiative and "addicted to cookbook warfare."
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/23: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504490003-0