WHO'S WHO OF SPYING AT HIS FINGERTIPS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504400035-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: September 16, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Si Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504400035-4
ARTIG_ ;~'~r RED
CINPAC
WASHINGTON TIMES
16 September 1985
Who's who of spying at his
fingertips
CORD MEYER
he defection of the Soviet
Union's sRymaqtpr in thr,
British Isles noses tremen-
ous and endurin roblems
for Genera Secretary Mikhail or-
bachey and his intelligence appara-
tus in the West.
The Tems grow out of the
wide-ranging nature of the duties
and authority of the chief of the
KGB residency in London - a post
held for three years by Oleg Gor-
dievski, who is now revealed to have
taken asylum in Britain.
The Prompt British reaction- to
Mr. Gordievski's defection - expul-
sion of 25 Soviet diplomats he iden-
tified as KGB officers - is only the
beginning of the trouble Soviet intel-
ligence will have to try to contain.
What exactly were his duties, his
authority? What, in short, does a
KGB station chief in Western
Europe's principal outpost really
know?
For openers, the KGB resident in
a foreign country is in complete
charge of all KGB personnel in that
country, undercover agents and
their recruiters alike. When a new
agent is nominated, the resident
must "sign off" (give personal
approval) to his or her recruitment.
Thus Mr. Gordievski. from the
very nature of his duties from June
1982 until the date of his defection,
is in a position to identify not only all
Soviet intelligence officers under
cover in Britain, but also to reveal
the true identities of every British
and oreign citizen recruited for
espionage in the last three years
Beyond the question of mere
identification, Mr. Gordievski
must also have some pretty
good notions of the information
gathered and turned over to the
KGB for transmission to Moscow B
now, British intelligence must
sifting this store of vital data.
Mr. Gordievski, working under
his diplomatic cover of counselor at
the Soviet Embassy in London, was
not limited in authority to supervi-
sion of KGB activities. He also had
important liaison functions with
Soviet military intelligence, GRU.
The GRU chief in London is under
strict standing orders to coordinate
his operations with the KGB chief.
It follows, then, that Mr. Gordievski
will be able to give British defense
officials a very complete briefing on
the extent to which their secrets
have been compromised.
Moreover, Mr. Gordievski's famil-
iarity with Communist espionage
went beyond the Soviets' own net-
work. Intelligence chiefs of all East-
ern European satellites in a foreign
country, as well as those a Cuba and
North Korea, are required to keep
the KGB chief fully informed o
their operations.
We can therefore expect to see a
widening wave of sudden depar-
tures from London of Soviet satellite
operatives who know they have been
compromised.
In addition to his supervision of
all espionage activity, Mr. Gordiev-
ski, as KGB chief, was responsible
for all covert political action and
"disinformation" in the United King-
dom. The British government will
now learn the full extent to which the
Soviets may have been intervening
in their domestic politics, and this
could be acutely embarrassing to
Mr. Gorbachev.
At this stage, we don't know
whether Mr. Gordievski's defection
was a last-minute decision on his
part, or whether he had been work-
ing for the British for some months.
In the latter case, he will have had
time to provide detailed doc-
umentation, which will make his
information all the more valuable.
Cord Meyer was the Central Intel-
ligence Agency's chief of station in
ondon - a position equivalent to
that ofthg KGB resident -from 1973
to 1976.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/02/17: CIA-RDP90-00965R000504400035-4