A TWO-TRACK POLICY FOR ANGOLA?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000504400024-6
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: February 17, 2012
• Sequence Number: 24
• Publication Date: January 31, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400024-6
ARTICLE APPS' ED
ON PE,GE
WASHINGTON TIMES
31 January 1986
A two-track policy for Angola?
CORD MEYER
s Jonas Savimbi strived in
Washington this week to
plead his powerful case
for effective American as-
sistance tohis National Union for the
Total Independence of Angola
(UNITA), the Reagan administration
was counting on his eloquence and
pragmatic realism to disarm many
of his critics on the left of the U.S.
political spectrum.
In his capacity as field com-
mander of more than 40,000 UNITA
guerrillas, he led his forces last fall
in turning back at the gates of his
capital at Jambs aSoviet-directed
and Cuban-supported armored
thrust launched by the unelected
MPLA Marxist regime that claims to
be the government of Angola.
'Ib all those congressional critics
who claim that no U.S. military aid
of any kind should be given to
UNITA because it would identify the
United States with racist South Af-
rica and destroy the American role
of honest broker in the region, Mr.
Savimbi need only point out that the
Soviets have already resupplied the
MPLA forces with all the helicop-
ters, tanks, and armored cars they
lost in their failed offensive last au-
tumn.
With Soviet rearmament and di-
rection, the MPLA leaders are pre-
paring for a new offensive when the
rains end in June.
In order to defend his main bases
in southeastern Angola and to avoid
becoming too dependent on the
South Africans, Mr. Savimbi desper-
ately needs American help to coun-
terbalance the $1.5 billion worth of
weapons and the 35,000 Cuban
troops the Soviets have committed to
the Angolan front.
Reagan officials are acutely
aware that General Secretary Mik-
hail Gorbachev's decision to com-
plete this huge resupply operation
has geopolitical ramifications that
reach far beyond Angola.
If the MPLA army succeeds this
coming June in overrunning
UNITAs symbolic capital at Jambs
and in reducing Mr. Savimbi's forces
to a minor guerrilla nuisance hiding
in the bush, the Soviet leaders will
have succeeded in changing the
world correlation of forces. They
will have opened up Zaire and Zam-
bia to destabilization and set the
stage for the radical polarization of
the entire region.
In stark and simple terms, Mr.
Savtm'-Ti can ar ue t at t to ompt
e_iverv to is orces o t e most
advanced American anti-aircraft
and antt-tank wea oar can enable
him to matntam is ases w t e re-
ucing s epen ence on out
ncan asststance. Tf~e arnva o suc
he p, even t provt a cover v
tYOUId send a Sl?nal thrn?ohn?* r{,e
reQton that the Americans are pre-
pares to stand by thetr fnen~c c a~
other countries that have hesitated
asstst~ N A would be enco ~r-
a eta to ago so.
i he Reagan administration is also
hoping that Mr. Savimbi will use the
well-timed opportunity of his pres-
ence here to talk sense to his more
vociferous supporters on the far
right of the American political
scene. Among some conservatives
in Congress, there is the illusion that
massive, open military aid to UNITA
is what blr. Savimbi wants in order
to wtn a clear-cut military victory
over the MPLA.
In fact, Jonas Savimbi has always
recognized, as the leader of the
Ovimbundu tribe that makes up a
third of the Angolan population, that
an eventual end to the Angolan civil
war can only be achieved by a nego-
tiatednational reconciliation that in-
cludes all tribal elements and in-
volves apower-sharing arrangement
between UNITA and the moderate
forces in the MPLA. ONy then will it
be,possible to have peace and free
elections.
As he has recently written, Mr.
Savimbi foresees that an eventual
victory will not be won by a decisive
military defeat in the field of the
Soviet-supported troops, but by rais-
ing the cost of occupation by steady
guemila envelopment to the point
where the occupiers are forced to
leave: A deal between UNITA and
MPLA moderates would be the sig-
nal for Cuban troops to depart and
would make it easier for South Afri-
can forces to withdraw from Nam-
ibia.
Since Mr Savimbi himself sees
the necessity fora negotiated end to
the struggle. Reagan officials are
confident that he will clearly sup-
port the need for atwo-track Amer-
ican approach to the Angolan prob-
lem.
In the past five years, the MPLA
regime in Luanda has fought an es-
calating war with Cuban and Rus-
sian help, while at the same time
continuing to negotiate with Amer-
icanofficials and with South African
diplomats for the possible departure
of Cuban troops from Angola and
South African forces from Namibia.
Now, with the Clark
amendment repealed, the
Reagan administration is in
a position to adopt a similar two-
track strategy of negotiating with
one hand while arming UNITA with
the other to increase the pressure on
Luanda.
In'order to keep the negotiating
process going and to ensure the dis-
creet cooperation of neighboring
black states in getting arms deliv-
ered to UNITA it would clearly be
preferable for the American mili-
tary aid to be provided covertly and
without publicity.
'le Mr. Savimbi can be counted
on to un erstan t e nee or suc
discretion. tt's not at a c ear t at t o
House and Senate Intelligence Com
tnittees as resent! constituted,
have t e require se - isctp ine and
sophistication. Both committee
chairmen have alread ~ called for
U. t to e rv v tv.t it is to
be Given at all. _
Cord Meyer is a nationally syndi-
cated columnist.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/02/17 :CIA-RDP90-009658000504400024-6