TOP REAGAN AIDE DEFENDS THE USE OF COVERT ACTION

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Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): 
CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640015-4
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RIPPUB
Original Classification: 
K
Document Page Count: 
2
Document Creation Date: 
December 22, 2016
Document Release Date: 
September 26, 2012
Sequence Number: 
15
Case Number: 
Publication Date: 
May 14, 1984
Content Type: 
OPEN SOURCE
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PDF icon CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640015-4.pdf147.24 KB
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Declassified in Part - Sanitized Co ARTICLE APPEARED ON PAGE TOP REAGAN AIDE DEFENDS THE USE OF COVERT ACTION AN 'INTERMEDIATE OPTION' Adviser Calls C.I.A.'s Secret Central America Activities an Alternative to War By BERNARD GWERTZMAN ? SpmWtonieWmWmialum WASHINGTON, May 13? President Reagan's national security adviser said today that covert action in such re- gions as Central America was increas- ingly necessary to give the United States an alternative between going to war and doing nothing when a friendly nation is under attack. His comments constituted one of the strongest Administration justifications for thejaElLvizjiting_saraisimuLL Central America under the supervision of the Central Intelligence Agency. The security adviser, Robert C. McFarlane, said Americans have to wrestle with the question of "should we or should we not have some intermedi- ate option of policy, covert action?" "The real issue which is being chal- lenged by people on the Hill and pub- licly is should you do these kinds of things at all, and I think we ought to come to terms with that," he said, referring to the sharp Congressional opposition to covert activities. No Plans to Send G.I.'s In an appearance on the NBC News program "Meet the Press," he said his personal view was that the United States should use such covert activi- ties. While repeating that the Administra- tion had no plans to send United States combat troops to Central America, Mr. McFarlane did not rule out the possibil- ity that this could happen if Congress fails to give the aid the Administration says is necessary to let the Salvadoran Government survive a predicted in- crease in rebel activity in the fall. py Approved for Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640015-4 NEW YORK TIMES 14 May 1984 United States aid in Central America falls under three broad headings. The first is direct, public support in mili- tary and economic aid of friendly na- tions such as El Salvador and Hon- duras. The second is covert backing for anti-Sandinista rebels based in Hon- duras and Costa Rica who have been fighting the Nicaraguan Government. The third is the presence of United States forces in the area to demon- strate the ability to respond directly. Seeking Public Support Senior Administration officials have said that Mr. McFarlane has been a leading advocate among Mr. Reagan's advisers for concentrating on gaining public support for both the public and covert aid programs. Mr. McFarlane has told associates that the public has to be educated to the fact that there is a "gray area" be- tween "total war" and "total peace," i and that the United States cannot af- ford to give up covert activity. , Mr. McFarlane, in fact, had let it be known _privately that he pressed Mr. Reagan to deliver a speech Wednesda_y_ on Central America in part to secure mere_ Dads for the_ LIA._a_ctigps_jn Nicaragua. which have been_stronglv .0moacgd_ip CengresS. The critiosm increased when it was disclosed that thehad been in- nlYed.. _the raittini_s4.1licaragun harbors.. Administration officials have said that the miningimmelat theand of March and that it wpuld not be re- sumed. Programs of covert action in Nicara- gua are in danger of ending, Adminis- tration officials have said, because of lack of money. Congress has not passed a request for $21 million for the anti- Sandinista guerrillas and there is a strong possibility it will not do so. Mr. Reagan, while condemning Nica- ragua, Cuba and the Soviet Union for their activities in Central America, did not directly mention covert activity in his speech. He concentrated on the , need for Congress to approve the mili- tary aid sought for the Salvadoran Gov- ernment. The next day the House, in a sym- bolic vote of support for Mr. Reagan, narrowly approved a bill that would allow House committees to appropriate up to $129.4 million for the fiscal year that ends Sept. 30, and $132.5 million for the 1985 fiscal year. It did so without at- taching the conditions that had been op- posed by the Administration, but also without approving any aid for the anti- Sandsta rebels. That bill is an authorization, not an appropriation measure. The vote was a way of sending a signal to the joint House-Senate appropriation confer- ence committee that is to meet this weelL The bill approved Thursday was dis- tinct from the pending and more im- portant requests for wiiat the Adminis- tration calls merger y aid for El Sal- vador and for the Nicaraguan rebels. Those funds depend on the House-Sen- ate appropriations conference, which will discuss requests for $32 MilliOn in military aid for El Salvador and $21 million for the Nicaraguan rebels. Both were passed by the Senate in early April, but have not been voted on by the House. Because the House last week approved the other El Salvador aid request, it is expected that the con- , ferees will approve substantial emer- gency aid for El Salvador. Nicaraguan Request There is less of an emergency char- acter now to the $62 million Salvadoran request because the Administration has used a special feature of law to allo- cate $32 million in military aid to El Salvador. The major question is whether the President's speech urging a fight against Communism in Central America has convinced to approve the $21 million for Nicaragua. Mr. McFarlane rarely speaks on the record to reporters, preferring to keep his remarks anonymous. But hte has ap- peared particular Administration poll- on television interview shows to cies, as be did today. He said today that American lntei- had'cked inf Cubans had decided to rouzlily dou- that the ble" the violence being carried out by ;.? ts in El Salvador who e . , . would result 1 In a "Tet-like" rebel offensive this fall In El Salvador, referring to the heavy attacks by the Communists in South Vietnam during the 1968 Tet holiday , period. Mr. McFarlane said that "we believe twinckeu.,11-.. the+ ma., ars., ?11,, c?-0.-- ? Continued STAT Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640015-4 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640015-4 2. ran Government is going to be able to deal with that is to prepare the army in terms of training and equipment and so forth, to be able to pre-empt it." Mr. McFarlane repeated that "the United States has not, is not now, I don't anticipate will plan in the future for the involvement of U.S. troops in combat in Central America." "Our expectation is the Salvadorans can do the Job if they're given enough in the way of resources," he said. Mr. McFarlane was asked if the United States was not being drawn into a situation analogous to that in Viet- nam, where American involvement that was limited to aid and advisers grew into direct combat participation. "Only if we don't do enough right now to enable the Salvadorans, Hondu- rans to dolt themselves," he answered. "Now, it's important, whether it's in Central America or somewhere else that we choose carefully problems where there is still a possibility of re- trieving it before there is any need for U.S. involvement." He said that if not enough aid is sup- plied, "then we are assuring that later on they will lose." Defending Interests When he was asked if this did not mean logically that the United States would send in troops, rather than "lose" in El Salvador, Mr. McFarlane said: "The United States at all times and today will defend its interests. That condition simply doesn't exist today and I'm confident we can prevent Its occurrence." Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/26: CIA-RDP90-00965R000302640015-4