CIA'S CASEY GETS GOOD MARKS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505410029-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 10, 2010
• Sequence Number: 29
• Publication Date: September 14, 1982
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505410029-7
ART = L A:-FEAR.-ED
ON PAGE
"ASHEJGTO:'i T=S
14 SEPTEMBER 1982
MARVIIV LEIBSTONE
CIA's Casey
gets good marks
When Bill Casey became CIA
chief and Max Hugel head
of the CIA's clandestine
services, critics balked at their lack
of experience. Hugel quit last sum-
mer because of past doings, but
Casey, after Senate examination of
his business affairs, is still around.
Mr. Casey has to provide the presi-
dent a coherent view of the world.
'Ib do this, CIA analyse develop truth
and speculation from information
sent by agents or spy-machinery.
Except fora January 1981 overdra-
matization of weapons reaching the
Salvadoran left, Mr. Casey has
received good marks. There have
not been repeats of such CIA faux-
pas as election rigging in Chile, con-
fidence in the Shah of Iran, or
misperceptions of Soviet behavior
toward Afghanistan. And there have
been few White House, State or
Defense Department complaints
about CIA documents.
About all critics have of late is the
Wilson-Terpil matter, an account of
gun running and Libyan terrorism
involving former CIA agents, which
is pre-Casey stuff anyhow.
If the CIA is doing well, though, is
it because of Bill Casey's leadership,
or is there another, perhaps more
important reason?
True, Mr. Casey's predecessors
captained the disastrous Bay of Pigs
invasion, illegal spying of anti-war
notables, excessive LSD experi-
Marvin Leibstone, a former Army
officer, is a Washington-based col-
umnist.
ments. Congress had the good sense
to urge them to "fess up!" Some,
like Richard Helms and Bill Colby,
were dragged through the fires of
criticism mercilessly.But too often,
CIA's critics home in on broken
branches while blaming the wrong
tree. For example, it was President
Johnson who kept returning Vietnam
assessments to the CIA to have thjm
reflect not truth but his politics
regarding the war. It was Johnson
and Nixon who ordered the CIA to
spy on anti-war activities in Chicago
and Washington, and Nixon who
suggested dirty tricks inChile.It was
Jimmy Carter's indifference to CIA
capabilities that prevented tougher
assessments of Iran's pre-Khomeini
instability.
Presidents are much to blame, it
seems, for an intelligence commun-
ity's wrongdoings. Yet today's much-
improved CIA performance not only
results from Mr. Casey's doings, but
also from a relationship that exists
between him and his boss, the
president.
Whether President Reagan is guid-
ing Director Casey or allowing him
the widest of parameters is of less
concern than the question of presi-
dential politicalization of Mr. Casey
and the CIA. The president has dem-
onstrated little interest in using the
CIA to support foreign policy notions
or political need, and that is cer-
tainly among key reasons why, today,
the CIA receives better grades.
Probably the non-political presi-
dent-CIA relationship is the most
important managerial requirement
for an effective intelligence program.
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/10: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505410029-7