WITH HIS BACK AGAINST THE WALL

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000505400048-7
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 9, 2010
• Sequence Number: 48
• Publication Date: May 9, 1983
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505400048-7
""EARED r _ 3e
U.S NEWS & WORLD REPORT
9 May 1983
ith His Back
Against the Wall-
Reagan is fighting to `defend
a strategy he deems vital to
U.S. security. He is making
gains-but are they enough?
in the wake of his extraordinary ap-
pearance before a special joint session
of Congress, President Reagan still
faces an uphill struggle to save his Cen-
tral America policy.
His unusual April 27 nationally tele-
vised address to lawmakers appears to
have produced these initial results:
^ Limited success in winning ap-
proval for part but probably not all of
the administration's request for in-
creased military aid for El Salvador in
its ,war against Marxist guerrillas.
^ Little impact on critics pressing for
more-stringent curbs on covert action
b) the Central Intelligence Agency.
^ Apparent failure in a bid for bipar-
tisan support for a strategy in Central
America that Reagan insists is essential
to avert a grave threat to U.S. security.
While the President's speech-wide-
Iv hailed as one of his most effective
yet-may have slowed the tide run-
nuig against his Central America poli-
cv, the Democratic leadership on Capi-
tol Hill left no doubt that it intends to
continue to challenge him on this issue.
Denouncing Reagan's strategy as "a
formula for failure," Senator Christo-
pher Dodd (D-Conn.) declared in an
official Democratic response that "the
administration fundamentally misun-
derstands the causes of the conflict in
Central America." He criticized Wash-
ington's preoccupation with Central
America's military problems at the ex-
pense of what he sees as more-basic
social and economic problems.
Even so, the White House was hope-
ful that a groundswell of pro-adminis-
tration sentiment would, in the end,
materialize across the country and pres.
sure Democrats to change position.
In fact, the President's primary aim
in going before a special joint session of
Congress-only the ninth such occasion
since World War II_was less tc influ-
ence lawmakers than to mobilize great-
er public support for his controversial
strategy to counter expanding Soviet-
Cuban influence in Central
America. "The stakes," says a
White House aide, "simply
aren't understood."
Drawing a parallel with the
Soviet threat in Europe immedi-
ately after World War II, Reagan
sought to impress Americans
with the grave danger that in his
view now confronts the nation
on its doorstep.
His words: "The national se-
curity of all the Americas is at stake in j
Central America. If we cannot defend
ourselves there, we cannot expect to
prevail elsewhere. Our credibility
would collapse, our alliances would
crumble and the safety of our home.
land would be put in jeopardy."
Citing Russia, Cuba and Nicaragua as
backers of Marxist rebellions in El Salva-
dor and elsewhere in Central America,
Reagan dramatized the proximity of the
threat by noting: "El Salvador is nearer
to Texas than Texas is to Massachusetts."
Soothing tears. At the same time, he
went out of his way tom to allay persis-
tent fears that the administration is lead-
ing the country into "another Vietnam."
To quote Reagan: "Let me say to
those who invoke the memory of Viet-
nam: There is no thought of sending
American combat troops to Central
America they are not needed-indeed,
they have not been requested there."
In attempting to appeal to the public
over the head of Congress, the Presi-
dent took what many observers view as
a high-risk gamble. One opinion poll
conducted before the April 27 speech
showed that only 26 percent see the U.S.
role in El Salvador as "morally justified"-against 49 percent who dissent
After Reagan's address, few on Capi-
Hill expected a major turnaround in
tol
congressional or public opinion. Repre-
sentative Les AuCoin (D-Oreg.), while
aclmow)edgin.g that "this was a very
persuasive speech," said most Ameri-
carts will not be willing to spend 110
million more in El Salvador while unem-
ployment here stands at 10 percent -
STAT
Similar s ep csszn was voi
resentative Olympia Snowe (R-Me.):
"The speech provides a better under-
standing of Central America for the
American people, but I'm not sure it
will change a lot of minds. There-is a
reluctance to get involved because-of
fear the next step is sending troops."
If these assessments prove to be ac-
curate, the best that Reagan can expect
is grudging congressional approval of
some additional military aid for El Sal.
vador. Before his speech, a request for
110 million dollars in further arms aid
was in deep trouble.
Hill resistance. The House Foreign
Affairs Committee had voted against a
special 50-million-dollar appropriation
for El Salvador. And a House appropria-
tions panel cut by 50 percent the 60
million dollars that the White House
asked to switch to the embattled Central
American nation from other areas.
. Even this reduced amount was ap-
proved only after Reagan agreed to ap-
point a special envoy to promote negoti-
ations to bring peace to Central Amer-
ica. Richard Stone, former Democratic
Senator from Florida, was named April
28 for that mission by the President
The consensus now is that the ad-
ministration will win final congressio-
nal authorization, not for the 110 mil-
lion dollars the White House is seeking
but for a substantially smaller amount
of additional military aid this year.
However, strings are expected to be
attached, particularly with respect to
the performance of the government in
El Salvador in the human-rights field.
. In the end, the expectation is that a
majority in Congress will be unwilling to
take responsibility for scuttling the ad-
.ministration's policy and risk being
blamed for "losing" Central America.
But clearly Reagan cannot look for
broad bipartisan support for a long-term
commitment to the campaign against
Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador.
Democratic leaders in Congress as
well as some moderate Republicans ad-
vocate a shift of emphasis from military
action to a search for "unconditional
negotiations" with the rebels. The ad-
ministration maintains that any power-
sharing pact with the insurgents would
be little more than a camouflaged sur-
render by the El Salvador government
The negotiations favored by the
White House, and which will be pur-
sued by Stone, will be limited to guaran -
teeing the guerrillas an opportunity to
participate in democratic elections. The
rebels already have rejected the idea
Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2010/08/09: CIA-RDP90-00552R000505400048-7