GULF STRATEGY: BOTH BIG POWERS GAIN

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000706790005-1
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: December 2, 2011
• Sequence Number: 5
• Publication Date: November 24, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000706790005-1
ARTICLE APPPE~ttED NEW YORK TIMES
ON PAGE A14 24 November 1986
Gulf Strategy: Both Big Powers Gain
By BERNARD E. TRAINOR *
Special to The New York 'rimes
WASHINGTON, Nov. 23 - In justify-
ing his secret arms deal with Teheran,
President Reagan cited Iran's strate-
gic importance and the Soviet threat
not only to Iran but also to the entire
Persian Gulf region.
These same concerns
were expressed by Presi-
Analysis dent Carter in 1980 when
he warned, in response to
the Soviet intervention in
Afghanistan in December 1979, that the
United States would use military force
to defend its "vital interests" in the re-
gion'
In the almost seven years between
the Reagan and Carter speeches, both
the United States and the Soviet Union
have done much to improve their abil-
ity to fight in the region, according to
military experts who study the balance
of superpower forces there.
The increase in Soviet military
strength marks a major commitment
by Moscow to upgrading the equipment
and training of its forces in its southern
theater of operations. In 1980 Western
military experts questioned the seri-
ousness of the Soviet deployment, not-
ing that Soviet units along the Iranian
border were of low quality and readi-
ness. This view was confirmed by the
poor performance of the Soviet units
initially sent to fight in Afghanistan.
In the years since, Pentagon sources
say, the 32 Soviet divisions now sta-
tioned in the border region of south-
western Asia, while remaining under
strength, have been given the latest
arms, including the most modern tanks
and artillery.
Before 1980, American intelligence
reported, the best equipment went to
Soviet forces facing units of the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization in Eu-
rope and the Chinese troops in the Far
East. The Soviet Union's southern mili-
tary theater made do with older sec-
ondhand equipment. Now it merits the
same priority.
The Russians are also known to have
substantially improved their communi-
cations and command in the area. The
headquarters for regional Soviet forces
is 100 miles north of the Iranian bdrder
in the city of Baku, capital of the Soviet
Republic of Azerbaijan.
An indication of the increased impor-
tance given the southern theater,
American military sources say, was
the appointment in 1985 of Gen. Mikhail
M. Zaitsev as regional commander.
General Zaitsev, whom NATO officers
regard highly, was the Chief of Staff of
Soviet forces in East Germany before
assuming his current command, which
includes the force in Afghanistan.
Upon arriving at Baku, General Zait-
sev started a vigorous training pro-
gram, with an emphasis on offensive
operations. His trainin efforts contin-
ue. American intelligence sources say.
Soviet Concerns Cited
Western military sources say they do
not believe these Soviet improvements
are in reaction td the better American
fighting ability in the region. These
sources say that in spite of the Amer-
ican improvements, the Russians be-
lieve the United States is limited in its
ability to fight in the Persian Gulf and
Iran because of the area's remoteness
from the United States and the concen-
tration of American forces in Europe.
Rather, the" buildup of the Soviet
forces is believed related to Moscow's
concerns about Afghanistan and Paki-
stan. The Russians were apparently
embarrassed by the poor combat per-
formance of. their soldiers in the early
days of the war in Afghanistan and set
about to shake up the southern com-
mand. Their efforts are also viewed as
an attempt to intimidate Pakistan and
to discourage it from providing aid to
the Afghan insurgents.
One American military expert said
he doubted that' Iran was a military
target of improved Soviet forces. The
Russians seem more intent on wooing
Teheran than threatening it, most mili-
tary analysts say, although they ac-
knowledge that a power struggle in
Iran leading to civil war could change
Soviet policy.
In any case, most of the Soviet forces
in the region are operating at reduced
strength, despite their improved readi-
ness and would need a call-up of re-
serves before they could effectively be
sent into combat.
Western military experts also as-
sume that the Russians would not
lightly undertake an invasion of Iran
while they were tied down in Afghani-
stan and uncertain about an American
reaction.
U.S. Called Better Prepared
Senior Pentagon officials say they
believe the United States is better pre-
pared today to confront any Soviet
moves than it was in 1980, when Presi-
dent Carter warned in his.State of the
Union address that the United States
would fight for its vital interests in the
Persian Gulf.
At that time, American armed forces
were ill prepared to resist any Soviet
effort to consolidate a strategic posi-
tion that.would threaten the free pas-
sage of oil from the Gulf countries. The
United States had neither the forces
nor equipment to defend the region.
More important, ships and aircraft
needed to move any American forces
to the Persian Gulf were inadequate.
Many military leaders believed at
the time that Mr. Carter was either
poorly informed about American mili-
tary abilities or was trying to deter any
Soviet moves by bluffing.
Since then,the Pentagon has devel-
oped a rapid deployment force, called
the Central Command, made up of
Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine
units earmarked from other com-
mands, and has improved its ability to
deliver the units to the region. The abil?
ity to supply these forces by air or sea
has also improved, and equipment and
supplies have been positoned in the In-
dian Ocean.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2011/12/02 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000706790005-1