'USS HONDURAS' PUT IN HARM'S WAY

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000605740047-2
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 2
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: May 3, 2012
• Sequence Number: 47
• Publication Date: February 25, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
' Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605740047-2
ARTICLEppPEAR""~
ON PAGE .5
MIAMI HERALD
25 February 1965
`STS
Honduras
By PHILIP SHEPHERD
THE LOWEST priority for current U.S.
policy toward Honduras is Honduras.
The Reagan Administration's policies
there focus not on goals for Honduras itself
but on interests and objectives the United
..States has elsewhere - particularly in
Nicaragua and El Salvador. To put it
bluntly, Honduras - is doing President
Reagan's dirty work in Central America.
The Reagan Administration neither, un-
derstands the social reality of Honduras nor
cares about the. country except as it can be
used as a springboard for counterrevolution
and U.S. military intervention: in the region.
To make Honduras its key geopolitical ally
in Central America, the -.United States has
-adroitly played on ..Honduras's dependence
and friendship, taking. advantage. of its
traditional' fears about its security -
-particularly vis-a-vis El Salvador, with
whom it fought a disastrous four-day war in
1969. . , .; . .
Thus pressured, Honduras's civilian-mili-
tary leadership has .leased its weak but
strategically placed nation ,to the United -
States. It has become, in effect, the USS
Honduras, a sort - of 'land-locked - aircraft
carrier:.. In: return, the United States has.
promised large-scale-economic and military
.:aid to the country
U.S. policy in. Honduras has two:`inain
:.objectives. First,: Honduras has been .-re
cruited into the Reagan Administration's .-
effort to intimidate and destabilize Nicara
gua - an effort-aimed at eventually forcing
a "rollback" of the Nicaraguan revolution
and, by extension; according to the Reagan
logic, checking Cuban ' and Soviet--power.
Honduras's role, then, is to'.be.-the geopoliti-
cal key to'U.S. counterrevolutionary strate-
:.gy'in Central America.
Filling that role requires specific activi-
ties. These include training Salvadoran and
ssibly other nations' military forces in
Honduras for fiscal or politica reasons;.
providing cover and, a logistical base f or the
contras' not-so-secret covert `action, against
Nicaragua; a rapid -Honduras military build=
T.up'to support t ese operations; hosting mint
maneuvers with the United States. neatly
bypassing congressional approval for mili-
-tary auto the region by accepting large
amounts of military hardware and supplies
that the Administration simply never with-
draws; and providing training bases and a
starting point for U.S_ land, sea, and
put in harm's way
airborne missions to intimidate Nicara ua
and the Salvadoran
reparin for a regional war that seems
-mor more probable each ay.
Second, because of the continued stale-
mate in the Salvadoran government's con-
flict with- the guerrillas, Honduras increas-
ingly has been drafted into support of the
counterinsurgency. struggle there. This in- i
volves the interdiction of supplies allegedly
shipped to , guerrillas from Nicaragua
through or over. Honduran= territory, the
ongoing Honduran. cooperation with the
Salvadoran army in sealing off the border to
prevent guerrillas from using ' the rough
Honduran countryside as a staging base, the
training of Salvadoran troops in -Honduras
by U.S. military advisers, and the contain-
ment of refugees.
Ignoring Honduran interests, Reagan
policies already have had a variety of_
disastrous effects including heightened re-
ional instability, terrorist attacks on
Honduras, .pillage byte CIA-backed con-
;'tras marginalization of Honduran civilian
leadership, increased internal repression and
human-ri is abuses, and severe economic
4;. deterioration. A these factors postpone
urgently. needed socioeconomic reforms.
While these -developments have 'resulted
from a complex interplay among Reagan
..policies, internal.. Honduran political and
economic dynamics, and events .elsewhere
in. Central America ill-advised U.S. policies
have'been. the single most important factor.
The -likelihood that much ofAhis could
have:been.,avoided makes :the situation all
the more tragic.":Honduras's 'history has
'-differed in important ways-from that-of its
w neighbors El Salvador, Guatemala, -and
-, Nicaragua: Despite its extreme .poverty-and
domination by Caudillo ("boss") politics -
deplorable even.by Central American stan- I
dards , - Honduras so far has largely :
escaped the violence-that has engulfed other
nations. in the region. Hence. the myth of
Honduras as an; 'Oasis of.Peace."
4amli~sA
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605740047-2
 Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605740047-2
Unfortunately, "much of this Honduran
exceptionalism has been severely eroded;
more and more, Honduras resembles its
neighbors wracked by violence, and crisis. `
Indeed, what we are witnessing 'in .Hondo-
ras is the early stages of the "Salvadoriza-
tion" of .Honduran politics. Reagan policies
toward Honduras have contributed signifi-
cantly to this closing off. of political space
and dialogue. Moreover, by over-identifying
Honduras with U.S. designs in the region,
current U.S. policies risk destroying the
Honduran government's legitimacy at home
and abroad as well as inciting a nationalist
'backlash against the United .States.
. In sum, these policies threaten not only to
undermine. traditionally close U.S.-Hondu-
ran relations, but also to create yet "another
source of instability, turmoil,. and violence
in Central America. The ouster of Honduran
military leader Gen. Gustavo Alvarez Marti-
nez earlier. this -year: by fellow military
officers clearly has bought Honduras some
sorely needed time; but if current .Reagan
policies continue,, then only the form,and
not the substance of the U.S.-Honduran
relationship will change. One cannot expect
a -small,. poor, highly-dependent 'nation
single-handedly to.,bring the richest,-,most
powerful country, in -.the world back to ,a
more-responsible course.
.,Time is. running out: in-'Honduras; the
.,,sense of .urgency. that=.is so palpable there
needs to be conveyed abroad while-:the
worst can; still be avoided. If'theReagan
-Administration will .notralter its-policies,-:-:it
will be up.to. Congress the public,.and other
parties, to seize Lhe"initiative". and :prevent-
still another Central American tragedy
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/05/03: CIA-RDP90-00965R000605740047-2