SPECIAL NOTES ON THE ALLIANCE FOR PROGRESS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01083A000100140091-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 3
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 26, 2012
• Sequence Number: 91
• Publication Date: February 16, 1962
• Content Type: MF

Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP80BO1083A000100140091-0
16 February 1962
SUBJECT . Special N_tes on the Alliance for Progress
1. There follow a number of informal comments on the reference
paper prepared by members of the DDI area.
2. In general, we find the ideas in the reference paper
just a little bit out of focus. Specific commnents follow on a
section by section bass-:i.
Section I A: We believe that there is relatively little
comparability between the Marshal Plan and the Alliance for
Progress. Although both were adopted as a device for combating
com~usunism, the econ y and the people affected by the two plans
are completely different and the relative effect of economic as
opposed to political and sociological considerations will
probably elso be vastly different.
Section I B: We are thoroughly in agreement that the
Alliance for Progress should not seek to impose any pre-
conceived ideas of economic system, on the area and that it
should encourage needed social reforms. On the other hand,
we think the paper gets into rather dangerous ground when it try: to
illustrate that the United States has a mixed economy. It
attempts to point with pride to the government-owned (i.e.
"socialist") sector of the American economy. I don't know
where the paper got its figures for the assets owned by the
US and the relation of this figure to the capital assets of
the Soviet Union, but the paper is ccenpletely wrong in
stating that the U9 Goverment' s assets are greater than the
"wealth of the entire 'Socialist Motherland''." The US gross
national product is well in excess of 500 billion dollars a
year and Soviet gross national product is currently estimated
at about 45 percent of that figure. The figure cited by the paper.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP80BO1083A000100140091-0
 Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP80BO1083A000100140091-0
as the value of federally-owned real estate and personal
property would therefore approximate the value of goods
and services produced by the Soviet Union in one year.
Another objection to this line of argument would be
that the figures are so big that it mie;ht look like America
boasting at our immense wealth and that the point we were
attempting to get across right be missed entirely.
Section I C : We agree that priviled ,ed groups in a number
of Latin American countries are an obstacle to the success
of the Alliance for Progress.
Section I D: We agree that non-Goverrimental groups might be
able to assist in bringing about reforms needed in Latin
tsmerica. US Labor organizations would be particularly effective
in influencing counterpart organizations. They might have more
trouble in convincing business executives 'who are not used to
the type of business-labor relations that exist in the US.
Section II A: Cuban military equipment, in spite of its quantity
is essentially defensive in nature and would be useful in an
offensive role, mainly at the level of guerrilla warfare. Vie
should be careful to avoid aver-stressing the idea of overt
Cuban military action against other Latin American countries
when the subversive danger is likely to be the greater of the
two.
Section II B: Insofar as the point covered in this section
relates to economic warfare against Cube, I believe that we
can do a more systematic job of analyzing what such measures
should involve. In the broader context of econcm c steps to
assist the Alliance for Progress, we have a number of additional
points to suggest :
a. A number of Latin rnerican countries have complained
for many years of excessive fluctuation in the prices of raw
materials exported by them during a time in which the prices
of the materials imported by them have been rising steadily.
his is a real problem for many Latin American countries, and
some scheme for giving them a guarantee of a relatively favorable
and stable Income rcm their exports would go a long way toward
getting their confidence and might in turn- permit them to develop
more realistic plans for investment on their own initiative.
b. The large scale purchase of the output of their infant
industries, such as textiles, would also impress Latin American
countries and encourage further development of a diversified
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c. One of the best and cheapest ways of having a major impact
would be to send qualified teachers to Latin America and subsidize
older students to keep therm in school. Education has considerable
prestige value in Latin !;merica, but the area is generally
short of well qualified teachers at the university cud
Graduate school level in many scientific and technical
fields. This includes such subjects as economics and
sociological where Marxist thinking has an excessive influence.
WILLIAM A. TIDWE LL
Assistant to the DD/I (Planning)
Declassified and Approved For Release 2012/03/26: CIA-RDP80B01083A000100140091-0