U. S. INTELLIGENCE 1965-1970

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP80B01083A000100110014-8
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: T
• Document Page Count: 4
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: March 13, 2012
• Sequence Number: 14
• Publication Date: April 19, 1960
• Content Type: MF

Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/14 :CIA-RDP80B01083A000100110014-8
19 April 1960
MEMORANDUA~ FOR: Assistant to the DD/I (Planning)
SUBJECT U. S. Intelligence 1965-1970
Unfortunately due to being away from the office on an Air Force
Panel meeting last week, I was unable to get the promised memorandum
up to you. I have gone over the paper a number of times and would now
like to offer the following points for your consideration.
III. Personnel and Organization
I agree generally with paragraph A, but would like to point out
two factors. By 1970 the U. S. intelligence organization undoubtedly
will be a highly professional one, but by then most of us who have had
a broad rather than a narrow compartmented experience in intelligence,
some of us starting well before YTorld ~Vti'ar II, will have been long gone
from active work. Unless the community, and more particularly the
Agency, makes a conscious and successful effort to develop breadth
of experience in intelligence as opposed to highly specialized competence
in narrow fields, the over-all National organization may suffer seriously.
~~'~ a have mentioned this separately in connection with the IG Report on
the Agency Career Service Frogram.
Paragraph A., in the last sentence, also mentioned the rotation
practice.
However, rotation in
military intelligence has very serious drawbacks; the most important
of which are (a) personnel are not in the business long enough to acquire
real competence, and (b) rotation causes limitation on access to sensi-
tive material and thus impairs the all-source approach to problems on
the part of the military agencies.
Paragraph B. cites the stability of the organization as being a
factor that would permit increased knowledge of the general functioning
of the community. I am inclined to disagree with this as indicated in
TS #116585
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Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/14 :CIA-RDP80B01083A000100110014-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/14 :CIA-RDP80B01083A000100110014-8
SUBJECT: U. S. Intelligence 1965-1970
the paragraph above because our tendency to strict compartrnentation
and specialization is fostering an unawareness of the general operation
of intelligence among the upper echelons which will have to take over
management within a very few years.
The assumption of the opening of paragraph C, may be wishful
thinking. If there is no easing of international tensions, the tendency
irrespective of the political orientation of the Administration may be
to increase the dollar expenditure on Defense per se with increased
dollar stringencies, making any increase in intelligence personnel
strength very dubious. If the opposite should happen and tensions were
materially reduced through disarmament, etc., we might be faced with
Congressional pressure to reduce expenditures for intelligence as a no
longer critical factor in National security. This sort of thing has
happened before.
IV. Collection
The opening of paragraph A. presents the same general concept
of the future that I recently encountered in the Reconnaissance Panel of
the Air Force Scientific Advisory Board; i. e., that we are coming into
an age of "information plenty". This may well be, but if it is true, we
will be facing possibly even greater intelligence problems than we
encountered during the period "information dearth". As we develop
more sophisticated collection means, particularly technical ones,
we are continually running the danger of surfeiting the analysis system.
Various panaceas have been suggested, usually computers in one form
or another, but it has always seemed to me that the critical factor is the
one you mentioned lightly in subparagraph 2., that of real emphasis on
the requirements problem so that the intelligence community asks with
emphasis only for those items of information which it really needs.
This is a subject on which I could expatiate at great length, but I am
sure you are as aware of it as I am.
2 T5 #116585
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/14 :CIA-RDP80B01083A000100110014-8 -
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/14 :CIA-RDP80B01083A000100110014-8
SUBJECT: U. S. Intelligence 1965-1970
VII. Specific Problems
On subparagraph A., I have no comment, only a question on the
last sentence. I am curious as to why you feel that in this period we will
have a considerably improved capability in the field of strategic warning.
Deputy Assistant Director/Collection
Scientific Intelligence
Distribution:
Cys 1 & 2 -Addressee
3 -Chief, IPS/5I
4 & 5 -DAD/C/SI
19 Apr 60j
3 TS #116585
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/14 :CIA-RDP80B01083A000100110014-8
 Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/14 :CIA-RDP80B01083A000100110014-8
Declassified in Part -Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/03/14 :CIA-RDP80B01083A000100110014-8