GHOST OF FLIGHT 7

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000403000008-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: January 12, 2012
• Sequence Number: 8
• Publication Date: May 24, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

STAT
I Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403000008-0
?RTICLS OPPLARED
01 PAGE
JOHN HUGHES
CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR
24 May 1985
Ghost of Flight 7
C=F
O N Nov 8, 1981, a Soviet Aeroflot airliner en
route to Dulles Airport, outside Washington,
entered US airspace at an unauthorized entry
point in New England. Though its demarcated route
was over water, it flew a course over Pease Air Force
Base and the US naval base in Groton, Conn. Later,
on its return flight, it again flew an unauthorized route
over New England.
The United States protested, suspending Aeroflot
service into Dulles for two flights.
On Sept. 1, 1983, Korean Air Lines Flight 7, en
route from Anchorage, Alaska, to Seoul, South Korea,
entered Soviet airspace without authorization. There
is no evidence that the Korean pilot knew he was off
course, no hint that he knew he was over Soviet tern=
tory. The Soviets tracked the airliner for 2'/2 hours and
sent planes up that reported visual contact. Then an
SU- 15 Soviet fighter shot the airliner down with a
heat-seeking missile. All 269 people aboard were
killed. For five days the Soviets maintained the plane
had flown on. On Sept. 6 they admitted that Soviet
fighters had "stopped the flight."
The harsh Soviet action, a sharp contrast to the
manner in which most other countries handle airspace
violations, was the subject of widespread international
condemnation. It seemed a clear-cut case of Soviet
overreaction and brutality.
Yet still today, most recently in a couple of new
books, there are conspiracy-consumed critics who
seek to pin the guilt for this horror on the US.
Here I must declare a self-interest in this story. At
the time, I was an official of the US government whose
responsibility was to dig out the facts and make them
available to press and public. As a longtime journal-
ist. however, I had a unique opportunity to be in on de-
velopments from the very beginning and to have ac-
cess to the same data being reported to the highest
levels of the government.
The cynics suspect that the Korean airliner was
somehow enga in an intelligence mission or e
US. Both inside and outside government, have di
not a shred of evidence to bear a out.
There remains the possibility that the Korean air-
Iiner was on some kind of mission for the South Ko-
rean government. But again, there is no information to
support that theory.
Critics find suspicious the fact that air traffic con-
trollers did not warn the Korean plane it was off
course. The answer is simple: Radar coverage from
Alaska is about 200 miles. In a very detailed state-
ment, the Japanese government has explained similar
radar range limitations at its end of the Pacific flight.
In between, the Korean plane was flying a route with-
out navigational aids because the Soviets have consis-
tently refused to cooperate in providing them.
Was not miliUkrv intelligence aware of the Korean
planes deviation from course? The fa is that mili-
tary intelligence does every
path evervw ere a-r-o-u-7na the world.
While much monitoring on, data are often ana-
lyzed later, and not on a flying-time basis.
The real question critics should probe is why, if the
Soviets were aware for 2Y2 hours of the Korean plane's
infraction, they did not contact American, Japanese,
or South Korean authorities in an attempt to identify
the plane and its purpose.
The Korean pilot's communications indicate he
thought he was on the right course.
All indications are that the Korean crew made a
mistake in the programming of their computers,
thereby causing them to fly off course. Skeptics decry
this possibility, arguing that highly trained pilots do
not make such mistakes. Aviation experts say that,
sadly, highly trained pilots are capable of such errors,
and do indeed make them.
The weight of evidence is that the tragic end of Ko-
rean Flight 7 came about through air-crew error and
Soviet overreaction, not American duplicity.
John Hughes, who won the 1967 Pulitzer Prize
for international reporting, was assistant US sec-
retary of state for public affairs from 1982 to 1984.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/01/12 : CIA-RDP90-00965R000403000008-0