WESTMORELAND BLAMED FOR FAULTY TROOP REPORTS

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00552R000707150091-3
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: August 13, 2010
• Sequence Number: 91
• Publication Date: January 15, 1985
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Approved For Release 2010/08/13: CIA-RDP9O-00552ROO0707150091-3
LOS ANGELES TIMES
15 January 1985
j
A
Westmoreland Blamed for Faulty Troop Reports
Witness for CBS Testifies General's Policy Caused `Massive Falsification'
By RUDY ABRAMSON, Times Staff Writer
NEW YORK-Former CIA ana-
lyst Sam Adams told a federal jury
here Monday that Army Gen. Wil-
liam C. Westmoreland caused a
"massive falsification" of intelli-
gence during the Vietnam War by
imposing a ceiling upon the num-
bers of enemy troops.
" Winding up two days of testimo-
ny as CBS' star witness against the
now-retired general's $120-million
libel suit, Adams insisted that the
network's controversial 1982 docu-
mentary, "The Uncounted Enemy:
A Vietnam Deception," was a care-
ful and "accurate reflection of what
went on."
The intelligence community, he
said, tried to fool the American
people about the strength of U.S.
adversaries in Vietnam but "wound
up fooling ourselves."
"It explains, in part, how we
managed to lose this war," Adams
declared.
Left CIA In 1973
Adams, who in 1967 was one of
the CIA's top experts on the Viet
Cong, resigned from the agency in
1973 and spent several years con-
ducting research and arguing that
military intelligence on enemy
strength had been purposely doc-
tored.
His persistence led to the 1982
CBS documentary, which contend-
ed that Westmoreland, as U.S.
troop commander in Vietnam, was
part of a conspiracy to underesti-
mate enemy strength so it would
appear that the war was going
better for the United States than
actually was the case.
CBS contended in the documen-
tary that an arbitrary ceiling of
about 300,000 was set for enemy
forces.
Adams, who will be cross-exam-
ined by Westmoreland's lawyers
on Wednesday, ended his direct
testimony by contending that a
ceiling ordered by Westmoreland
was the basic cause of all the
abuses that followed.
During his investigation, Adams
told the jury Monday, he had
thought there was more to the
story than the documentary finally
reported.
Sought Evidence of Pressure
"I felt there might have been
political pressure on Gen. West-
moreland to come up with what he
came up with," he testified. But, he
said, when no evidence of that was
developed, "it ended up that we
went with what we had."
The documentary focused on the
several months leading up to the
January, 1968, Tet offensive. At the
time, it appeared that the United
States was gradually, winning the
conflict. But the offensive set off a
profound political reaction, which
the documentary contended was a
result of the country's having been
misled about the progress of the
war.
During Adams' six hours on the
witness stand Monday, CBS law-
yers showed the jury much of the
hourlong program, interrupting it
at crucial moments to question'
Adams about the evidence he had
for major assertions in the program.
Asked whether he believed the
U.S. command had failed to report:
honestly on enemy troop levels,
Adams testified that "every report
coming out of MACV (the U.S. high
command) was dishonest." I
The view, he insisted, was'
shared by Col. Gains Hawkins, who
was Westmoreland's expert on the
"enemy order of battle"-the
phrase intelligence officers used to
describe troop strength and de-
ployment.
In the telecast, Hawkins said of
the official estimates: "There was
never any reluctance on my part to
tell Sam or anybody else with a
need to know that these figures
were crap."
Adams testified Monday that
both Hawkins and Maj. Gen. Joseph
McChristian, Westmoreland's chief
intelligence officer, had heard
Westmoreland express concern
about the political repercussions of
reporting higher enemy numbers
to Washington.
At the time of the Tet offensive,
official U.S. estimates put enemy
strength at 224,000, even though
some 35,000 were killed and as
many as 150,000 were wounded
during the offensive. In March,
following the offensive, Adams said
his own estimate of enemy strength
at the time of Tet had been 600,000.
Approved For Release 2010/08/13: CIA-RDP9O-00552ROO0707150091-3