SUICIDE BOMBERS?

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP90-00965R000100110147-0
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 1
• Document Creation Date: December 22, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 5, 2012
• Sequence Number: 147
• Publication Date: February 2, 1986
• Content Type: OPEN SOURCE

Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/05: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100110147-0
STAT
WA; HINGTON POST
2 February 1986
The next Shiite strike was a series
of simultaneous bombings in Kuwait
against U.S., French and Kuwaiti tar-
gets in December 1983. Seven of the
eight vehicle explosions were dito-
nated either by remote control or a
timing device. The only terrorist w'6o
died needn't have. He accidentalY'br
deliberately failed to use the safety
fuse that would have allowed hirs- to
The specter of fanatical Moslem
trronsts seeking one-way tickets to
through kamikaze attacks on
extern infidels has been burned into
American consciousness by no less
an authority than President Reagan.
More than two years ago be 'an-
nounced that Iran had trained at least
a thousand of these potential nartyis.
And terrorist groups themselves have
done their best to encourage this
image.
But without minimizing the gha$tly
damage that even a single dedicated
fanatic can wreak, we suggest that
there may not be as many suicidal
crazies out there as the d etermind .
nonsuicidal terrorist leaders would like
the world to think. Examination- of
highly classified intelligence files :ne
Shiite Moslem terrorist activities pro-
vides a less apocalyptic picture. --
Consider the opening attack in Abe
Shiite terrorists' overt but undeclared
war on the Western presence in the
Middle East: April 18, 1983, when an
explosives-laden van crashed into the
U.S. Embassy in Beirut, killing 17
Americans. According to investiga-
tors' reconstruction of the incident.
the driver of the van was probebly
blown to bits-but not voluntarily,
Evidence indicates he had been told
he'd have time to jump out of the van
before its deadly cargo was detonated
by remote control.
Six months later, two devastating
truck-bomb explosions at the Beirut
airport killed 241 U.S. Marines and68
French paratroopers.g-
rts reed that both drivers shad met
Me MW before with a
Shute Widier, who okeW them and
assured rem were
m the attacks they would go to~haav-
en.
Nut French intelligence reports,
later, wit the , a some
rascuating intormation ou
two drivers were Suites, their ren-
Jack Anderson
And Dale Van Atta
3uicide
Bombers?
In September 1984, a van with gj
bomb hurtled into the U.S. Embus-
annex in Beirut, killing two Amer4carw.
and the driver. It is not kndWn
whether the driver went to his death,
willingly, because bullets stoppN&inim'
before his van reached its goal: thd4W
rage under the annex. "
Other acts of Shiite terrorism
against Americans since-two ? ptane
hijackings and a series of kidnappings
-showed no evidence of a suicidaliim-
pulse by the perpetrators.
There is also serious doub'' that the
number of potential martyrs is asbigh
as the Shiite leaders claim. A top-se-
cret report on a high-level meeting in
Tehran on May 26, 1984, sugggsts
that the terrorist leaders have diffi-
culty finding suitable recruits. The gist
of the minutes was that Iranian Nbv-
ernment officials had been ordered to
produce 1,500 to 2,000 young men,
preferably bachelors and veterans of
the war with Iraq, to form a sun de
brigade.
"I must say that we have at present
a number of dedicated groups whdare
ready for action and who have, to the
outside world, become known as .sui-
cide groups," one official declared.Byt
he added that "these groups that,.we
have are inadequate by tktenselves."
One problem, the official acknowl-
edged, was that the existing rec? its
had faith but no expertise in the basics
of terrorism. In fact, according to'ee-
cret U.S. intelligence reports, even
the suicidal sincerity of the terrorists
is doubted by their leaders. A dozen or
more recruits reportedly have been
killed in Iranian training camps in ran-
dom tests to see if they actually wetild
go through with a suicide mission. ?~
Footnote: Intelligence anah is
stress the difference between ibe
hordes of teenage "ooktiera" who
have supposedly volunteered for am.
dal mine-clearing operations against
dindividual terrorist w
tough time backing out. is not the
case with a terrorist, w motiva-
tion may also be less overpowering.
eia umd errstu suse"%res.
Declassified in Part - Sanitized Copy Approved for Release 2012/09/05: CIA-RDP90-00965R000100110147-0