THE TOP SECRETS OF WORLD WAR II!

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: General CIA Records
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP70-00058R000100080035-4
• Release Decision: RIPPUB
• Original Classification: K
• Document Page Count: 11
• Document Creation Date: December 20, 2016
• Document Release Date: April 9, 2008
• Sequence Number: 35
• Publication Date: November 1, 1953
• Content Type: MAGAZINE

STATINTL STAT
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? ii ^ ups .oca.r cad ur wrurru Aar Eli, ARGOSY Magazine
November, 1953
What was the deal Mussolini made with Churchill? What
did Tito promise Stalin? Who sabotaged the Long Island
saboteurs? What "friend" tipped off the Allied landings?
Read this story of history's most amazing double crosses
by WILHELM HOETTL as told to LADISLAS FARAGO
ANI a marked man. hunted
I and harassed- but. I'cii not
saying this for effect. A\'hether
I like it or not. my lift- is fall
of melodrama. Complete strangers
?
linger me on the streets and secret
agents trail nic all the time. They
watch illy house. search illy files.
rifle my mail and photograph lily
visitors-because for 11) hectic
years of illy life I was one of
ililler's master spies.
Those who know the story of
Illy life--the strings I pulled, the
nxen I united and the evcnis I
helped to shape-rcfnse to bclicac
acn no longer in the espionage
racket. A man like him. they say.
can meter retire! Ile must be up
- or down to something.'uo they
keep after me and link my name
with every spy plot in Europe.
Only a few months ago, when
two American spies were caught
in Vienna. they picked me up
again. '[hev %%eiit through my pa-
pers and carted Inc off to jail. I
didn't know thy. Neither did
they. I was promptly released. But
just as I was leaving the jail, a
headline hit inc with illy name in
it. The article "exposed" me as
Europe's most mysterious mystery
man. and n millionaire to boot. I
was called "the keeper of the fab-
ulous slush fund of Hitler's secret
service that disappeared without
a trace" if it etel existed at all.
III Europe it is enough to men-
lion my name to make certain
people scurry for cover. I am "Ex-
hibit A." a kind of uiusetrnr piece.
because I ani Gcrmaoy's only hig-
tiuce spy echo is still alive.
The strange nren who headed
German Inlelligenee during its
turbulent decade between 19:15
and 191.5 are all dead, and 0111v
ooc ccf them died in bed. I ICinhard
I Ievdrich. I I ctler's personal slit,
chief. was the first Io go. He was
killed by British agents hear the
Czech town of Lidice. Ife was fol-
I'Mcd by his greatest adversary.
Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, whom
the Nazis hanged with piano wire.
Then went Heinrich Ilinnhler,
the Big Boss, and Ernst Kalten-
brunner, ileydrich's successor.
Ilimruler committed suicide and
kaltenbrunner was hanged by the
Allies inAurenilerg. Shortly aft-
erward, the Jugoslavs hanged
Ilernianu Behrens, Ileydrich's
right-hand mail.
My last boss was Werner Schel-
lenberg, the genius of the. German
secret sertice who masterminded
the biggest plots of World War I I
lie died a few nwnths ago. at the
age of 10. under obscure circum-
stances in exile in Italy.
But I'm still alive. a freak by
that very fact alone. But then. I
was a freak. anyway. throughout
my career in the secret service. I f
we should meet by chance. I don't
think you would recognize me as
a spy. I don't look the part. al-
though I don't really know how
spies are supposed to look.
I am still a Young man today.
not quite 41). And I was nothing
but a kid. just out of Vienna 1'11i-
tersity as its youngest graduate.
when I was sucked into the game.
In the University, I was a kind of
prodigy because of illy somewhat
precocious preoccupation with po-
litical science. 11 semis that peo-
ple who looked for budding spy
masters. the way baseball scouts
look for rookies, noticed me as a
"Since Allan Dulles was
the chief U.S. spy in Eu-
rope, it was fortunate we
could read all his cables."
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2.
"The Russians' purge of
Tukachevsky was com-
pletely engineered by
the German Intelligerice."
boy who would hear watching.
Then I went down to the Bal-
kans, the hotbed of Kurope, to
gather material' for illy doctor's
thesis. When it caure out in print,
1 got a call front someone who
said lie was lily friend. "Belot
your paper," lie said. "I think it's
darned good. Would you he in-
terested in working for us?"
At first I didn't quite get who
"us" were. but lily friend quickly
enlightened lire. It was the Ger-
man Intelligence Service. lie said.
At that little. in the middle Thir-
ties, it was just getting hack into
the business again.
I told the man who recruited
me that I wits if sort of intellectual
who had 'cry little to offer by
way of brawn. But Ire scoffed at
inc and said. "Hic spies of today
are no muscle men or buccaneers.
We need people with brains. and
you secrnr to be filling the bill...
The German secret service
which I culered was an untidy or-
ganization functioning on two 1e -
els. f:acli t%-as more or less inde-
pendent of the oilier and even op-
crated at cross purposes. On one
leo,el was Ibe actual Intelligence
Scrvicc called. niislcadingly. ;1ns-
lands-Ahwchr or Foreign Defense.
to canuonflagc its real actin ilies.
The over-all Intelligence Service
of [he armed forces, it was headed
by Admiral Wilhelm Canaris, a
shorlish, graying, soft-speaking
dreamer to whom espionage was
but a means of anti-Nazi activities.
The Abwchr was organized in
three Ucpartnterits. I )eparlmenl I
was Secret. Intelligence Service.
Department II was Sabotage un-
der another biller anti-Nazi named
Erwin von Lahousen-Vivreinont.
Department Ill was Counteresli-
onagc.
The Abwchr, I found. had in-
structions in slay away from po-
litical intclligcnce. This job was
assigned to Bureau VI of the
Nazis' own IISA. or Foreign
Political Intelligence Service. This
Bureau VI was organized in nine
sections, of which Section I) was
spying on the United States.
When, in 1994, the Nazis assumed
total power in Germany. this dual-
ism was abolished and all Intelli-
gence work was centralized under
the IISA.
But when I joined [lie service,
this fateful reorganization was
still eight years away. Because of
the political nature of the work
for which I was slated, I was as-
signed to Bureau VI of IISA. At
that time, in the middle Thirties,
it was in personal charge of Rein-
hard Ileydrich, the notorious
"hangman."
To learn lily trade I was first
ordered to spy on German church-
es and then was shifted to the
Central and Southeastern Europe
section where, after several years,
I rose to acting head of District
VI there. My first, job was a
shocking one. It turned out to he
the plot of the decade. that weird
overture to World War 11, the
Sudeten crisis in Czechoslovakia.
Much has been written about
this but the truth has timer been
told. 'I'he truth often isn't pretty;
in this case it is ugly. But now the
time pus come to tell it since it
provides it vital footnote and les-
son to the history of our time.
here is the true story of the Sude-
ten crisis. (Continued on. page 72)
"Mussolini was ambushed
by the Partisans-after he
was put in their hands by
the Duce's own chiefs."
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 the British Intelligence Service. at its ~~
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man crisis is rememucieu a~ a err. this was my naprism of fire. It was
Nazi plot. In reality it was a conspiracy a fascinating spectacle to watch, if only
hatched within the British Intelligence because ewas done with the
Service as far back as 1933 when Adolph cold precision everything
a surgeon operating, he
Hitler was still more or less an unknown cold body. Far from the con-
tip by Sir ventional cloak-and-dagger stuff of the
quantity. It was thought
Gilbert Vansittart who. as the perma- >py yarns, this was a brainy operation.
nent under-secretary of the Foreign Of- We Set the Pace it yeah battle this
wits.
fice, was the ex-officio chief of the PID, Try battle,
yourself in my place.
Britain's own Political Intelligence Di- From then on we called the tunes and 1 was a mere kid. an apprentice spy.
vision. the British danced. Men like William but I was permitted to assist nn a work
Vansittart tried to kill two birds with Strang. brilliant chief of the British For- of art the way one of Celli on a was
one stone when he developed the gigan- sign Office's Eastern European division. Billowed to help with a precious piece of 11
tic plot. With the settlement of the Lord Rothermere of the Daily Mail, and metalwork. The men with whom I old Sudeten-German conflict, Vansittart even Lord Halifax. did, unbeknown to woked belong to the most obscure pages
hoped to undermine the Soviet's influence themselves, exactly what we wanted r
age
o[ history. l Their names are forgotten.
in Prague, while at the same time he them to do. It was, in a sense. on our Most of them are dead. But then, during i
expected to take the wind out of Hitler's initiative that Lord Runciman was sent hose perilous days, they dominated the
sails. As long as the Sudetens were an to Prague "to settle the crisis." Through- srcene. They were the unseen masters of
"oppressed minority," Vansittart felt that out his mission. Runciman was our un Iene. . And I was one of them.
the Germans had a case against Czecho- witting tool. We listened to his phone Probably because of the lsur-
h, last a name
tegrated But once they were firmly in- conversations. read his mail. overheard vfvi obaably bly b tc of am
tegrated into the federation of the repub- his conversations through concealed mi- is now used as a synonym for all the i name
lie, Hitler could not properly ask for a crophones, decoded his cables. planted isinoc that legend pegged onto Hitler's
revision of their status and mingle in the advisers on him. and in fact, ar- spy system. The chances are, Hough-
internal affairs of the Czechs. ranged his weekends in the homes of that y have Tnever he even chances
heard t name.
An obscure member of the British In. nobility sympathetic to our cause. But I sure you have seen some of the
telligence Service named Colonel Gra- It seemed to me that the British were things I did, because they made the
ham Christie was chosen to develop the
plot. And he in turn picked an unknown so hell-bent on appeasement that they front pages of the newspapers through-
gymnastics teacher and anti-Nazi, Kon- actually wanted us to lead them around out the world.
rad Henlein. to head this British-inspired by their noses. The only man wise to Do you recall Stalin's bloody purge of
and in part British-financed Sudeten- our game was Jan Masaryk, son of the 1937 when he killed Marshal Tuka-
German movement. Right at the outset. founder of Czechoslovakia, then serving chevsky and destroyed the commanders
Colonel Christie took Henlein to London as his country's ambassador in London. of his own Red Army? Or the last day of
and introduced him to men like Vansit- He chanced to meet Konrad Henlein dur- Benito Mussolini and the famous picture
tart, Harold Nicolson. Alfred Duff- ing his periodic visits to England and that showed him hanging upside down
Cooper, and even to Winston Churchill didn't seem to bear a grudge. On the with the limp body of his mistress at
and his son-in-law. Duncan Sandys. Hen- whole, lie watched the unfolding events his side?
lain soon became it favorite figure in with melancholy resignation and said so I was there in the background of both
to Henlein. dramas. I watched them from the wings
London's dnow whether rawitheng British "You, sir," said Masaryk, "may tell and helped move those marionettes.
ank ever
I don't know
realized how delicate and dangerous them as much.as you please. It's quite During the war itself, while you were
their game really was. By the time I immaterial what you desire or what I impressed with the struggle of Mikhailo-
got into it, they had already lost all want. Whether or not we'll slide into a vich and Tito, I used to buy from them
control over the conspiracy of their own war one of these days, you and I have no trainloads of military supplies which
control. The decisions are made else- your High Command had smuggled into
making. At that time Neville Chamber- where." Yugoslavia. Men under me forged the
lain had replaced Stanley Baldwin at During the height of the Sudeten cri- English pound notes with which a
10 Downing Street and appeasement of sis, when lie was on his way to 10 Down- strange spy we called Cicero was paid
Hitler became the official policy of ing Street, Masaryk was accosted by for his betrayal of the Allies' most close-
Whitehall. Sir Gilbert Vansittart was reporters. He told them: "Gentlemen, I ly guarded secrets. You have probably
removed from political intelligence and am merely the envoy of Czechoslovakia. seen this quaint adventure in the motion
men like Graham Christie w-tre quaran- Who cares?" picture "Five Fingers."
tined. The bewildered Henlein was left In the chaos that followed, the British It was a monumental case of espio-
to shift for himself. Inflamed with the suddenly realized that their plot had nage which still makes British diplo.
dream of a German federal state within backfired. In a last-minute effort to re- mats and counterspies blush. The per-
Czechoslovakia. and deserted by the gain control over it, they took Christie sonal valet of the British Ambassador
British, he decided to risk a deal with off the shelf, dusted him off and sent to Turkey, with unexplained access to
Hitler. him to Czechoslovakia to re-establish the diplomatic strongbox in His Excel-
We in Section E had our own agents contact with Ilenlein. But by then, in lency's bedroom, was an ordinary spy
within the Henlein movement and learned the summer of 1938, it was too late. working regularly for its. He was a
immediately of this major change in "I'm sorry, Colonel Christie." Henlein shiftless Albanian who knew no loyalties
Henlein's plans and fortunes.- We lost told him. "I followed your advice for and owed allegiance to no one. When
no time in bringing Hitler and Henlein building a German state and then tied he discovered with what ease he could
together, and from then on the con- myself to Herr Hitler body and soul. gain possession of the most secret docu-
spiracy which the British Intelligence There is nothing more you or' I can do. ments of the Allies which his boss used
Service had launched became our own Czechoslovakia is doomed!" to keep in his private safe, he set him-
undisputed plot. I became one of the Chamberlain made a last desperate self up in business. He stole those docu-
behind-the-scenes managers of the Su- effort to stop the march of events by go- ments. photographed them and sold
deten crisis that was soon rocking the ing to Godesberg and then to Munich in them to us for $250,000 in cash. the high-
entire world. September. 1938, but we in German In. est price we ever paid to a common.
telligence had nothing but pity for his garden-variety spy.
naive endeavor. For the first time in But it was worth it. because through
obtained copies
history, the young German Intelligence this tricky of the we
Service had beaten its great opponent, the P
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CQAfilt;n4 J and ii draft of Operation
Overlord, the A~,l.lied invasion of Europe
scheduled fur June 191.1. It was espe-
cially worth it if we consider that we
paid him every penny of his price in
money we ourselves had forged just for
such an eventuality.
Whatever I did, I was merely doing a
job. I was one of the directors of LISA.
the Haupt Sicherheits Amt. whose Sec-
tion VI was German)', super-secret es-
pionage service. I was assigned to the
Balkans and Italy. traditionally the most
fertile fields of intrigue. I was working
on the home grounds of history's most
intrepid and ruthless spies.
Even when Germany was on the brink
of defeat, l was still fighting on the
secret front. Ask our own spynnrster.
Allen W. Dulles, about tine. He knows
me because he dealt with me when the
German secret service emerged as hit-
ter's most dangerous enemy. What cruel
irony of fate! The fantastic secret force
which Hitler hiniself created. the pow-
erful system of espionage. not only
speeded his downfall but made his vic-
tory impossible front the very beginning.
Today it is a matter of historical
record that instead of aiding Hitler in
his war, his own secret service aided the
Allies. Front the first day of the war.
treason was rampant within the German
Intelligence Service. Its supreme chief,
a peculiar old admiral named Wilhelm
Canaris. betrayed Hitler at every step
by faking information to mislead him
or by withholding from him decisive bits
of intelligence.
Hitler's personal orders. to kill and
sabotage. were thenlsglves sabotaged.
Very often the German Intelligence Serv-
ice worked directly for file Allies. For
instance. it warned the Dutch that their
country would he invaded. it also leaked
information to the Russians about Oper-
ation Barbarossa. lilt- inn anion of the
Soviet Union.
The Allies could invade North Africa.
Sicily. Italy and France with relatire
impunity. despite the fact that we knew
well in advance the exact dates and
spots of the landings. The information
about the landings in Norl li Africa came
to its from two specific sources. One was
a highly placed Hungarian. stationed in
Stockholm. who fooled the Allies by
working for us. But more important was
an unexpected source in London which
had knowledge of Iltese impending land-
ings because of his own direct interest in
them. He was the Spanish Ambassador-
tile allegedly pro-British Duke of Alba.
who was frequently an important source
of information for its, 1?ren during the
blitz when our communications intelli-
gence people proved incapable of break-
ing the rapidly c-hang n_ British codes.
we learned the success of our operations
from the reports which the Duke eras
sending to the Foreign Minisirv in Ma-
drid. We actually read leis reports. as
if they had been prepared for us. on
many an important development in the
Allied world.
Because of the arrangements the Allies
had to make for their operations in the
iuuuediate vicinity of Spanish posses-
sions, the Duke of Alba had learned
more about them than proved healthy for
the Anglo-American armada. This infor-
nuation was passed on by the Duke to
his people in Madrid and front there it
came into our possession.
This was, too, how we came into
possession of information about D-Day
in Normandy. although it was but uric
of several of our reliable sources. We
had our agents planted inside the French
and Dutch undergrounds and learned
from their instructions virtually every de-
tail of the Normandy landings. A final
clue came from Cicero. the A'banian
valet of the British Ambassador in
Ankara. who supplied the date and the
place of the impending landing front
the inexhaustible safe of his employer.
although we could never figure out why
such information had ever been for-
warded to a diplomatic officer in faraway
Ankara.
Confuting Intelligence
But whatever information the Abivehr
managed to collect about the intenliotis
of the Allies, it was either kept from
Hitler or supplied with confusing con-
tradictors intelligence. leaving it fo the
Fuelirer's intuition to make the choice.
In the case of the North African ]and-
ings in Novunnber. 1942. Admiral Carl-
at-is accepted the misleading information
put out by London as fact and served it
up to Ilitler. According to drat. the
AMC,- were planning to invade Norway.
When ]his balloon was pnctured. Ca-
naris set till an elaborate intelligence
conference in Paux in Southern Franc,'
at which Alliednit,'ntions were exam-
ined from all angles. While he had defi-
nite information on file that the landings
would be staged off Casablanca and
Oran. he persuaded the Welirmacht that
they would be at Dakar and Bengazi.
many hundreds of miles front tilt' spols
where the Allies actually came off their
boats.
As a result. the major German air
force was shifted from the Western Med-
iterranean and Southern France to Italy
and I.ibya and tlrc bulk of the U-boats
concentrated off Dakar. All that was left
to them was to listen in on their radios
to tine Allied conununiqucs which de-
scribed Ilse landings. It Normandy.
German Intelligence sold Hitler on the
idea that if was but a feint and that
the real landings would come oil sonu^-
where else. Thereby German Intelligence
became instrumental in holding back the
main Lerman defensive forces in the
Atlantik Wall until it became too late
to throw their weight against tine Al-
lied tide.
German intelligence was among the
best in the world, Throughout the war.
we read every word in the cables which
the American Legation in Berne. Switz-
erland. was sending to Washington, and
every bit of Tito. coded communica-
tions. In November. 1939, Ave smashed
Britain's most important spy nest in
Europe. For almost four years we ac-
luall% managed a whole British spy net-
work from the Netherlands by operating
18 secret "underground" radio transmit-
ters. This story has just been told in
the new book by II. J. Giskes, "London
Calling Non lipole," which has rocked
Britain.
We maintained brilliant spies in Brit-
ain whose identities are still unknown
to M1-5, the British counter-intelligence
service which is supposed to know every-
thing. And there are a few secrets which
we managed to keep even from the FBI.
We read the protocols of the Tehran
and Cairo conferences virtually the day
after they were signed and knew in ad-
vance every move the Allies were plan-
ning to make. We knew them all-but
hiller didn't know them. Information
that could have helped him win the war
was not allowed to reach him. He was
left groping in the dark. blinded by his
own intelligence service.
I entered this house divided against
itself on the ground floor. At that time
Hitler was playing his game pretty close
to his chest. so there wasn't a need vet
for a big espionage organization. But
the world was full of stories about the
omnipresent German spies. I myself
heard it British politician say that in
Britain alone we had more than 70.000
spies.
I looked around in our office and
laughed. At that time. in 1938. we had
about 50 full-Inns operatives. Even at
the peak of our work. during the war
itself. rile permanent staff of our polit-
intelligence service had only 200 nteni-
hers.
This doesn't mean that we didn't have
informers at large in the world: V-men
for f'crhvnrensntrmn. or confidential in-
formers. as rvc used to call them. We had
people everywhere who synnpill hized with
Miler and supplied information to us.
They often even volunteered it against
their own gmerttntenls and armies. if
rot could read tilt, roster of our V-mcn
you would be surprised by some of the
big Haines on our list.
But the agency that co-ordinated and
directed Ilieni. which evaluated and dis-
seminated their reports. wasn't big at all.
The victories we scored were not due to
any lavish expenditures or to the effi-
eienc- of a super-organization. As a mat-
ter of fact. we had to operate on a slure-
slring. Whenever we had Io pay out big
sums fur the real stuff. we had to get
the money ourselves by counterfeiting it.
And insofar as the organization was
concerned. the much r:snared German
eflicicncy was nowhere evident in our
secret service. Tile whole network was
split by hickerings. duplications. inter-
deparlnu-nfal jealousies. There was intle-
cision at the top. Orders were given
only to he countcrnranded. Operation-
were planned and abandoned ahitust in
file same breath.
Once during the war. for reason-
known only to him. Hitler decided to
liquidate the venerable French General
Maxim Weygand. Ile ordered Section Il
of the Abwehr to assassinate Weygand.
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i
and assigned Field Marshal \\'ilhelm
Keitel to stage;vise its execution. But
General Lahouseu. in chaige of Section
II, decided to defy Hitler and sabotage
Weygand's assassination. In this daring
insubordination. Lahousen was aided by
Canaris himself.
Hitler was growing impatient and
kept inquiring about tiisella. the cover
name by which the plot was known. And
Keitel dutifully called Cunaris from time
to time, asking. "\\ ltat about this Gi-
sella? lIow long do we have to wait?"
"For hearen's sake. Keitel, be patient
.
my man! ' Canaris answered. "These
things are not as simple as you think
there at the headquarters of the Ftteh-
rer.
Finally the pressure became so great
that sontellung; had to be done. Canaris
decided to go to Paris to settle Gisella
once and for all. lie was accompanied
by Admiral Leopold Buerkner. Ili,,; sec-
ond in command. and General Lahousen.
the unhappy chief of the sabotage sec-
tion of the Abweltr. B) the time they
reached Paris. they had their counter-
plot all ready: they planned to tip off I
Weygand and actually organize Itis
escape from their own assassins.
But just then \\eygand managed to
escape on his own, leaving Canaris in
a pickle. .Ltd. as usual. Keitel was on
the phone the moment Weygand's escape
became known at the Fulurer's head-
quarters.
"Hitler is very angry." he said rather
ominously. "lIow could you botch up
Gisella so badly?-
At that moment Lahbusen handed
Canaris a slip of paper on which a few
words were hastily scribbled: "Heydrieh
has just been killed in Czechoslovakia.
This is definite."
Canaris read the paper and a broad
smile came upon his face, "This is one
case for which you won't be able to
blame us, Keitel," he said. "This whole
Gisella business was taken away from us;
we were overruled as usual by Heydrieh.
Ile actually forbade nie to handle the
case. If you want to. you may ask him
personally about it."
Ready for Sabotage
At another time, orders came direct
from Hitler's headquarters to sabotage
the planes of Pan-American Airways
plying between New York and Lisbon,
Portugal. When Admiral Canaris learned
about the plot, it was advanced to the
Joint where a time bomb had already
been placed in one of the planes. The
admiral rushed to Lisbon and supervised
in person the removal of [lie bomb, only
afterward thinking up an excu?;e to
Hitler.
The famous mission of the saboteurs
who went to the United States in sub.
marines was deliberately bungled in Ber-
lin even before they left. Orders to kill
Churchill and Roosevelt were dismissed
with scorn the moment they were re-
ceived.
Part of this was undoubtedly due to
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Some of them were lifted from the ar-
chives of the Lerman War Ministry, and
their stationery, rubber stamps and sig-
natures duplicated. Heydrich even man.
aged to procure a typewriter that re-
sembled the one on which Tukachevsky's
letters were written.
Dossier Goes to Hitler
By April, 1937. the documents were
ready. They were bound in a red leather
dossier and submitted to Hitler. All that
remained to be done was to smuggle the
dossier into Stalin's hands,
At first Ifeydrieh planned to let it
fall into the hands of the Czechoslovak
General Staff because lie was certain
that Ihey would forward it promptly to
Moscow. But on second thought, when
Behrens was already in Prague with the
dossier, he canceled the plan. He felt
sure that such a find would gain for the
Czechs Stalin's eternal gratitude. And
he wasn't particuarly anxious to deepen
the bonds of Russo-Czech friendship.
Heydrich decided to make a direct
deal with the Russians. Ile instructed
Behrens to contact an attache of the
Soviet Embassy in Berlin and to play the
dossier into his hands. A secret meeting
was arranged and the attache was ac-
quainted with the existence of the docu-
ment. Ti
---L' "
le
t.,. a..,u?g rue which Heydrich cow with the news `and "returned 1 to
manity, Ca one in naris proved a dismal failure shrouded this plot. He isolated part of Berlin with Genera] Lev Mekhlis, chief
-no matter ]low glorious this failure the dreaded cellars in Gestapo head- of the Communist Part 's military ad-
now may appear from the viewpoint of quarters in Berlin's Prinz Albrecht ministration.
the Allies. Strasse and established an office there Mekhlis was empowered by Stalin
Aside from an insatiable curiosity, his whose sole function was the preparation himself to acquire the dossier by all
love of travel and an uncanny knowledge of the conspiracy. s, ut wen middle-
of the world, there was nothing in Ca- There were only six men who knew man bow much] e wanted art the papers,
naris that qualified him for his job. He about these preparations. They were lie found that the agent was not ready
was a hopelessly had organizer and a Hitler, Himmler, Heydrich himself, and to discuss a price. Ieydrich never ex-
mystic who wrapped himself up in esot- three aides. One of them was Hermann petted to get money for his dossier, so
eric thoughts which had little relation Behrens, Heydricli's personal aide, who he failed to give instructions to his agent
to reality, directed the technical apparatus. An- that would have covered just such an
other was a controversial Russian named eventuality.
The Spy Master Nikolai Skoblin, a former Czarist gen- eral living in Paris. Ile acted as a kind price. It was 6.000.000 pubes ginucashhis
.
The man who was the real spy master of technical adviser. The third was an- The horsetrading began. After a few
of Germany was Reinhard Heydrich, other Russian who deserted to us from days of hard bargaining, Mekhlis paid
known in the west as "the Hangman" the Soviet secret service. He prepared 3,000,000 rubles and left Berlin with the
He, too, was a former Naval officer, but the necessary texts and forged the docu- dossier in the diplomatic pouch.
he was Canaris' junior by more than merits Heydrich needed.
30 years. A fanatical Nazi despite his The consequences of the plot soon At
be-
partly By the strange whim of history, none came evident to the whole world. At
Jewish origin, and a born prat- of these men is alive today. Hitler, dawn on June 5, 1937. Heydrich was
titioner of intrigue. this young nian at- Himmler and Heydriell are dead. So is called by the Foreign Office and told
tracted Hitler's attention even before his Behrens. Skoblin and the other Russian that Marshal Tukachevsky had been ar-
seizure of power. disappeared without a trace in the wake rested the night before. Then events fol-
With nothing but determination and of time plot. I suspect that Heydrich had lowed with machine-gun rapidity. The
zeal to offer at first, Heydrich inched his then killed to wipe out the only outside great Red military purge was on.
way into Hitler's admiration and confi- witnesses to leis scheme. Even on the At 10 a.m. on June 11, Tukachev-
denee. He was about to arrive on top, to Russian side. nobody actively involved in sky's trial began. At 9 p.mn. of the same
replace Canaris, when lie was killed. lle the plot is alive today. There is no eye- day lie and seven other generals were
died at the end of his titanic fight against witness anywhere in the world. But the sentenced to death by a special military
Canaris---a plot by itself within the documents survived. I probably was one tribunal. It was not yet midnight when
greater plot. of the few omen alive who ]tad a chance the flash came that all of them had been
When I joined the German secret serv- to see them before they were finally de- executed by firing squads.
ice, his struggle against the admiral was stroyed.
just beginning. Even so, it was a breath- Heydrich set out at once to produce his setDupiiIiis townr~monitor nglservice innlifs
taking experience to watch their fight. "evidence": letters which Tukachevsky office and listened to Moscow Radio. He
It started in Ilse winter of 1937 with a was alleged to have sent to his German remained at the set to the bitter end-
plot that led to the bloody purge of that "friends." It wasn't particularly difficult to Tukachevsky's hitter end. that is.
year and paid enormous dividends years to forge these papers. There was plenty The backbone of the Red Army was
later when Hitler decided to crush of bona fide correspondence between the 1??"t ; ._ ,__
Russia.
ifs liquidated
Approved For Release 2008/04/09: CIA-RDP70-00058ROO0100080035-4 '
~ Strti c
Il t was
ratnpant in th
:
.
e or- During those winter days in 1937, we
tll~at}oIlut. Part of it was du
e to a observed that Ieydrich had a particu-
delThg, ale, qrganized effort to sabotage larly mysterious air,about him. Ile had
Hitler's plots. 11 wasn't as easy as it just lift on an idea that was so fantastic
sounds to do thus-and probably it would that it staggered even Hitler's imagina-
have been altogether impossible had not tion. It was to become the spy plot of
the British succeeded with a decisive plot the century.
of their own. With that one single blow Heydrich suggested that "evidence" be
to our solar plexus, the British destroyed produced for Stalin himself that the top-
the effectiveness of our organization, a]- ranking generals of his Red Army were
though I doubt if they planned it that plotting the overthrow of the Communist
way or if they are aware even today of regime. There were some rumors abroad
the fantastic egnsequences of their oper- that some of the Red generals did, in
anon, fact, think along those lines. It is en-
This plot involved the liquidation of tirely possible, too, that some of them.
Reinhard Heydrich at the very height had actual contacts with their German
of his enormous powers. Ile was am- opposite numbers.
bushed and killed on his way to the But Marshal M. N. Tukachevsky, the
Reich just when lie was about to take best brain in the Red Army General
over direction of the whole spy system. Staff, had nothing to do with this grop-
Heydrich is the most misunderstood ing design. He was loyal to Stalin and
and underrated figure in the espionage a bitter enemy of Germany. This made
history of World War II. Due to the in- him a marked man in IIeydrich's eyes,
evitable legend which springs up in the who aimed his plot against him. Hey-
wake of every war, it is not Ieydrich drich told Hitler: "I have an idea the
but Admiral Wilhelm Canaris whose pie- success of which would certainly end
ture is etched on the imagination of the with Tukachevsky's liquidation. It would
world as Germany's master spy. start a purge in the Red Army that
Despite his top position in the service, would not only destroy the morale of
Admiral Canaris was merely a minor the Russian officers' corps but a great
character. Called to }mead military es- number of file officers themselves."
pionage on the eve of his retirement. Hitler was fascinated and told Heyd-
never trusted by Hitler, and himself torn rich to go ahead. I was never to see
between his loyalty to the Fu
h
c
rer and secrecy in any secret service even ap-
what lie regarded as his (]lilies to I,,,_
6.
 Approved For Release 2008/04/09: CIA-RDP7O-00058ROO0100080035-4
ing it) war or sending even a -single oper-
ative it) Moscow.
Canaris was not in on the plot and, in
fact, elaborte measures were undertaken
to keep it from him. But somehow the
admiral found out about it and recog-
nized that a formidable opponent ap-
peared on tile scene in the person of
young IIeydrich. lie turned his own spy
organization to the task of collecting
information about IIeydrich. In the es-
tablished tradition of the Continental
intelligence services. Canaris believed
that the rattling of a few skeletons in
Ileydriclt's private closets would keep his
adversary quiet. And he proved right.
His agents succeeded in discovering evi-
dence that Hcydrich, the fanatical Nazi.
was partly of Jewish origin- a crime far
worse than murder in Hitler's eyes.
Then, spying on Canaris just as Cana-
ris was spying on him, Hcydrich got
word of the admiral's discovery. Realiz-
ing that the great secret of his life was
out, lie decided to conclude a tenuous
alliance with Canaris, although his first
impulse was to destroy him.
Yet Heydrich continued to onlsmarl
Canaris. While the admiral was busy
with relatively minor assignments, sur-
veying Czechoslovakia and Poland in
preparation for the Blitzkrieg, IIeydrich
moved about boldly where the admiral
feared to tread.
chiefs, Then suddenly Hcydrich decided
to go after the whole organization.
Late in the afternoon of November 8,
1939, Heydrich called us into his pri-
vate office and I heard him instruct
Schellenberg to bring in Best and Stev-
ens alive. A plan was worked out. The
two British agents would be lured to
if rendezvous at Venlo, the Dutch town
on the German border. then kidnaped
and taken across the frontier. "I ant
sick and tired of this cat-and-mouse
game," IIeydrich said. "I'll feel much
better when I have Best and Stevens
piles of other currencies. The operation
that yielded such enormous results was
based on a monumental ruse. In Sep-
tember, 1940. we succeeded in penetrat-
ing an important branch of the Dutch
underground, taking it under our wing
and operating it as if nothing had hap-
pened. We masqueraded as British spies
and Dutch patriots, and while we had to
supply at least some information to our
enemies, we received far more in return.
Foreign Agents Fall
locked up in the Reich instead of pulling During lite climactic days of this oper-
their legs long-distance." ation, we had 18 radio transmitters in
With confidence in Schellenberg's lion- contact with headquarters in London and
orable intentions, Payne Best and Cap- operated 14 landing grounds. More than
lain Stevens showed up in Venlo as 50 British and Ditich agents fell into our
agreed. The moment their car reached hands. Some decided to co-operate with
the rendezvous, agents of Heydrich, us. but others defied us and preferred the
dressed in the uniforms of Dutch frontier gallows to treason.
guards, rushed at them and dragged them In the end, three such young
into Germany. Like the famous Cicero forced its to abandon , this eesp otnage
case, the Venlo incident remains a soft bonanza just when we needed it most-
spul with the British Intelligence Serv- on the eve of the invasion of Europe.
ice and I atn reluctant to open up old They escaped from us and returned to
wounds. Yet the fact remains that we England with word about the England-
again triumphed where others failed, this spiel. After three years and seven months
tittle against our most formidable op- our great secret was out. We decided
ponent. to call it a day. But somehow we couldn't
Soon afterward we were to add insult suppress the urge to send a last parting
to injury with still another plot that re- message to Messrs. Blunt, Bingham & Co.
mains in the annals of espionage second "W
"
e are aware of the Fact,
the Lines-
only to the action against the Red Army sage read, "that you are doing usiness
British Secret Service General Staff. Holland was the scene of in Holland without our help lrsenng
Havi
this plot as well, and the British Intelli- been, as we were, your sole rep resenta-
lie decided to challenge Cite arch- genet Service was again its victim. lives for a considerable period of time,
enemy, the British secret service itself. This particular operation went under we regard We were on tile very eve of tile second tile code name Englandspiei or England Yet this will not prevent sus, should fyou
World War and large-scale preparations Gant. It began in September 1940 and ever decide to pay us a visit oil a far
were made to gear our work to new lasted until April 1944. During that greater scale, from receiving you with
tasks. Just then we discovered that flue period the German secret service ac- file hospitality which we showed your
British had beaten us to the punch. They tually dominated file major British es- agents."
had an intricate spy net all ready for pionage activities in Western Europe. This last message was dated April 1.
the war, established in The Vague the We directed British spies at will. We 1944. After that the 18 fake transmitters
Netherlands, with tentacles reaching ordered supplies fronrBritain, called for went off the air and never opened up
deep into the Reicli. This net was sup- agents and information, as if we were again.
posed to conduct espionage and sabotage operating within the offices of Messrs. By then, IIeydrich, too, was buried and
during the war. so it became imperative Blunt, Bingham & Co-the phony first forgotten. But in his place appeared a
for us to Best goy it before it could Ire- which served as the cover for this branch still greater genius, although lie lacked
come dangerous, of Britain's wartime secret service. Heydrich's bitter determination and
British spy headquarters in The Hague A few figures might indicate the nag- ruthless zeal. He was Werner Schellen-
were in charge of two rallier lipoid- nitude of this operation and especially its berg, the man who Lured the British
looking mein. but we knew that they were success. While it lasted, we called for agents to their dooni and who, in effect,
ace operatives of the British Intelligence 190 parachute drops and received 95 of controlled the Englan.dspie(.
Service in fact. members of Britain's them. 1Ve obtained from our British At the head of the German secret serv-
professional intelligence officers, corps. "friends" 570 containers and 150 parcels ice. Werner Schellenberg knew that lie
One was a "civilian" or political agent with urore liras 7.000 pounds of explo- was representing a lost cause. His activi-
nanted Payne S. hest. The other was an sixes, 3.000 Stun guns. 300 Brett gums, ties were devoted to an effort to bring
old-timer in military intelligence, (.all- 2.000 hand grenades, 75 radio transmit- the war to an earlier end. In the end,
lain Stevens. Hcydrich decided to sirikt' tors, over half a million bullets, 5.000 lie was a failure. Although lie was only
at tlfent and to destroy their whole net- revolvers. bicycles, raincoats, rubber 33 years old when Germany surrendered
work by removing its doable head. }roots, uniform pieces-everything we unconditionally, Schellenberg was an
Ile picked one of his deputies, a voting needed ourselves to equip our own secret aged and broken man. with no will to
'intellectual named Werner Schelfell ber R
g- anenl.s' live.
to prepare the grorurti. Scheilenbergwent We also called for and received sam- It was under Scbellenberg's direction
to The Hague and established contact Ales of it weapon which the British and guidance that I moved up in the
with Best and Stevens as a representa- guarded as lilt, apple of their eyes: a hierarchy until I became commander in
five of a disgruntled anti-Nazi under- special spy grin that could be fired with- chief of that sector of the secret front
ground within life German Army. The out making a sound. Our British con- that include the Balkans and Italy. The
two Englishmen swallowed the bait and facts were most reluctant to let us have enemies against whom I had to fight were
went out of their way to collaborate with this gun, ])fit we coaxed them long the guerrillas of Yugoslavia, the con-
Scltellenberg. enough and finally received six of them, spirators of Hungary, Rumania and Bill-
Soon we were operating inside the an unexpcelcd gift.
the growing anti-Fascist forces
British spy network. One of our master We also asked for prone - and of Italy.
spies was a trusted agent of its two 500.000 i)~~r,l, .--.;IA-, y ? got of Italy.
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7.
 Approved For Release 2008/04/09: CIA-RDP70-00058R000100080035-4
a matter of fact. 1 never operated direct-
ly against either Britain or America.
Few of it, did. My job was to keep the
tottering Axis coalition together and ]told
Germany's disgruntled allies in line.
It proved it super-human job and it
failed in the end. but only under the
hammer blows of the military defeat.
Even -u. for two Ion:: }ears I was the
virtual ruler of half of Europe?file part
of Europe which proved traditionally the
most difficult to rule.
When I reached the Balkans as chief
of Germany's secret service. I Found all
incredible mess in every country there.
Conspiracies. intrigues and revolutionary
moves were brewing everywhere- Large-
scale civil war was raging in Yugoslavia.
To make things worse. I found that our
own ally Italy, was secretly collaborat-
ing with Tito.
In Btrlgaria. the pro-German king was
in danger, and no matter how I tried. I
couldn't. save his life. In Rumania, young
King Michael was moving to head a pal-
ace conspiracy against its. In Hungary.
the gaga old regent. Admiral Nicholas
Hortlty. plotted jovially and leisurely
with a group of loud-mouthed but weak-
knecll patriots, among wlton a beautiful
actress. Katalin Karady, appeared to be
the only one with a really stout heart.
J didn't know what to do first. Then I
made it hasty estimate of the situation
and decided to take on what appeared
to be the most dangerous foe: the Croat
peasant. Josip Broz- already calling him-
self Marshal Tito of Yugoslavia. It seems
that the western world is still puzzled
by Tito's gyrations and takes his defec-
tion from Moscow with at least it grain
of salt. My own personal experience with
Tito would indicate that at least sonic
caution is advisable in dealing with this
shrewd Balkan politician who was made
by the fortunes of war.
Tito. I found, has three outstanding
points 'of strength. One is his absolute
faith in himself. The other is his savage
determination. learned in Communist ter-
ror schools, to press [ionic his own aims
by all means, fair or foul. And the third
is that lie has no qualms about shuttling
his alliances and making deals with
anyone who at a given tnourent might
serve his purpose.
Tito had no secrets from me because
I had my agents firmly entrenched in his
headquarters and read every scrap of
communication that entered or left his
radio shack. I studied his coded mes-
sages to (1) the Western Allies, (2) to
Moscow. and (3) to Mussolini's High
Command.
I was certain that sooner or later lie
would show up in my camp as well. of-
fering to do business with Ilitler. I
bided lily time, but I didn't have to wait
too long.
I was most annoyed by the way the
Italians were playing ball with Tito. It
was the summer of 1942. Our own forces
were getting set for a large-scale opera.
tion against the Partisans, and the plans
called for an Italian army under General
Mario Roatta to cover our southern front.
But when zero hour came, General Ro-
atta was the little man who wasn't there.
Without notifying us at all, he moved
out of the territory allocated to his
forces and allowed Tito to occupy the
vacuum. With this sudden move, the
German occupation collapsed even be-
fore it could be really started.
"There was little I could do about it.
not even when illy a; ents reported to
me that General Boatta was buying arms
wholesale from 'Pilo's men. But then
something happened that brought nic di-
rectly into the picture. Listening to Tito's
secret radio. or overheard it fascinating
conversation between Moscoty and the
marshal in the nunnntaius.
First I heard Moscow telling Tito that
the Western Allies were planning to in-
vade the soft underbelly of Europe, to
strike at rite Germans by way of Yugo-
slavia. "What do you think of this. Wal-
ter?" Stalin asked Tito. using the
name by which lie was known in Ilse
Komintern. "And what are you planning
to do?"
Tito answered promptly and indig-
nantly, "I will resist than with every-
thing I have and throw dent back into
the sea."
Stalin seemed to like 'fito's truculence
because he spurred Itim on. Just as this
conversation progressed between Stalin
and Tito. an envoy of the Partisans ar-
rived at my headquarters in Zagreb. He
said his name was Doctor Petrovie. He
came to negotiate the exchange of some
prisoners. Ifc bore credentials signed by
Tito himself and we had no reason to
doubt, indeed, that lie was Tito's per-
sonal envoy.
In the midst of these negotiations.
this Dr, I'etrovic suddenly confided to
its that lte was neither it doctor nor was
his name Petrovic, In fact, lie said. lie
was Lyubo Velebit- a general of the
Partisans, and Tito's adviser on foreign
affairs.
Velehil came to us to propose a truce.
I refused to believe lily own cars. but
Velebit went even fusilier. Ile, told its
about the Allied plan to land in Yugo-
slavia. and then. in the name of Tito, he
invited us to form an alliance with Tito
to repel this invasion from the west.
Even we. hard-boiled agents of the
German secret service, were flabhcr-
gasted at such brazen opportunism. Tito
volunteered through his envoy to place
at our disposal the supplies his Allies
were sending in and to collaborate with
us in the field.
The matter was of such importance
that we had to subunit it to Hitler him-
self. But Hitler recoiled. "What?" lie
shouted. "Make an alliance with bandits
and rebels? Never! I won't negotiate
with bandits! I'll shoot them!"
At about the same time. we made an
important catch in Hungary. We cap-
tured a Partisan courier on his way to
Tito from Moscow. We found on him a
crucial document. a letter from Stalin to
Tito. In it Stalin formally endorsed
Tito's plan. to join the Germans and to
8.
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 Approved For Release 2008/04/09: CIA-RDP70-00058R000100080035-4
fight against the Allies should Britain
and the United States try to land in the
Balkans. This at a time when the Com-
munists throughout the world were clani.-
oring for a second front!
This episode of the war is not in-
cluded in Tito's official biography, but
there are enough eve-witnesses still alive
today to bear me out. At any rate, it
provided us with a different picture of
Marshal Tito than the world presently
was holding.
From then on we dealt with him only
clandestinely, as we were forbidden by
Hitler to negotiate with him directly. He
sold us immense quantities of his sup-
plies. But he had an insatiable appetite.
He refused payment in marks or lire, the
currencies over which we had control.
His agents demanded payment in Amer-
ican dollars or English pounds, and
some of it had to be paid to an account
in a Swiss bank.
With Hitler's orders to shoot rather
than negotiate, my work as an opera.
tional secret service chief was concluded
in Yugoslavia. Just in 'time, at that, b--
cause I had to turn my undivided at-
tention to a tragi-comic plot in Hungary.
The leader of llungary. doughty old
Admiral Horthy, was discovered to be
dealing with Tito and planning to desert
the German cause. It was a rash and
pathetic course. At dawn on October 16.
1944, old Ilorthy was taken in protective
custody by the notorious Colonel Otto
Skorzeny, about whom you will hear
more later. Ile was carted off to Ger-
many, and the floodgates of terror were
opened up with his departure. The Hun-
garian Nazis who took his place in Buda-
pest proved worthy pupils of their Ger-
man masters and, if possible, they even
outdid them in barbaric cruelty. They
murdered thousands of innocent people
during the closing days of the war and
joined with the Nazis in destroying their
homeland in futile resistance to the rap-
idly advancing Russians.
Disgusted by the consequences of an
action I tried hard to prevent, I decided
to seek direct contact with the Allies in
the West. I refused to become a party
to the vandal methods of warfare which
a maddened Hitler was introducing dur-
ing the waning hours of his power.
The man I sought out for contact was
a prominent New York attorney by the
name of Allan W. Dulles. Ile was estab-
lished in a patrician house in Berne's
Herrengasse, as all alleged member of
the American Legation staff. But I knew
that lie was in fact my American oppo-
site number, chief of the Eastern Euro-
pean outpost of the Office of Strategic
Services.
As a matter of fact, I knew quite a
lot about Mr. Dulles. His ideas about
the war were all known to me in detail,
not because I read his thoughts, but be-
cause I had been reading ' his cables. I
am sure Mr. Dulles will be surprised to
learn that it wasn't the vaunted German
secret service but merely the signal corps
of the Hungarian Army which broke his
code. But this enabled its to learn a lot
about him and to size him tip.
Reading those cables, we were an-
noyed by the vicious tone of the mes-
sages sent by the American Minister.
Leland Harrison. Aside from their evi-
dent malice, they also showed that Mr.
Harrison wasn't too well informed about
us. On the other 'hand, Allan Dulles
showed a remarkable knowledge of
things and a prophetic foresight con-
cerning the Russians. No wonder! He
was fed accurate information by a con-
spiratorial group in the offices of Ad-
miral Canaris.
It was to Dulles' new mousetrap that
I was soon beating my path, armed with
certain information that proved of ines-
timable value to the Allies. It was in-
formation about the Redoubt, the mythi-
eal mountain stronghold which Hitler
was allegedly preparing for his last-ditch
stand in the Alps.
But before I could wind up my career
as a secret agent, I had a last mission
to perform. It was a tragic mission, at
that. It was probably the very last in-
trigue of the second World War, but it
was intrigue on a monumental scale. It
was the murder of Benito Mussolini, the
pathetic Duce of Italy.
By then it was April 1945. The war
had but a few weeks to go and Musso.
lini, who made all the miscalculations
and mistakes a man in his position could
make, was sitting on the floor between
two stools. He knew that the Germans
in Italy were negotiating with the Allies
and were about to surrender uncondi-
tionally. He also knew that powerful
forces within Germany decided to aban-
don him to his fate. In his despair, he
turned to Winston Churchill with a plea
for help.
The details of Mussolini's negotiations
with Churchill are obscure. But now
documents are, produced to prove that
the Prime Minister promised definite 9.
help to the frantic Duce. The idea was
for Mussolini to escape to Switzerland
and there to place himself at the dis-
posal of British Intelligence,
Into these negotiations burst all un-
expected time bomb in the decision of
certain die-hard, fanatic Italian Fascists
to get rid of the Duce on the very eve
of his escape. The man who was to
supervise the liquidation was Mussolini's
own former Minister of the Interior. ,,
ruthless adventurer named Guido Buf-
farini-Guidi.
His plan was designed to remove the
Duce without soiling his, Buffarini's.
hands with his blood. He approached
the panicky Duce with offers of help in
his escape, and volunteered to obtain
for him the necessary papers and to ar-
range for transportation.
Grasping at every straw, Mussolini
accepted the offer and arranged with
Buffarini the route of his escape. All was
set. Mussolini, carrying his crated state
papers and a substantial treasure with
him, was scheduled to leave Italy in the
direction of Lonza on April 26. He would
make the crossing into Switzerland on
April 27. From there, he would contact
his new friends, the British in Cairo.
Everything seemed in perfect order.
As soon as he made the arrangement
with Mussolini, Buffarini rushed to the
German secret service with the other end
of his plot. It was my misfortune to re-
ceive the Buffarini plan in all its hideous
detail during a meeting at German police
headquarters in Meran. Buffarini asked
us - to supply the necessary papers to
Mussolini and make his flight possible.
But at the same time we were supposed
to tip off the anti-Fascist Partisans and
lead them to Mussolini's trail.
In a discussion that was remarkable
only for its sound and fury, I refused to
be a party to such dastardly a scheme.
But we counted without Buffarini. He
was determined to see his scheme suc-
ceed. When we kicked him out, he went
directly to a prearranged meeting with
a mysterious Colonel Valerio of the Ital-
ian Partisans. He was in reality Walter
Audisio, one of the triggermen of the
Communist underground. It was to this
Audisio that Buflarini carried his lethal
plan. From then on everything pro-
gressed according to schedule.
Benito Mussolini, traveling with his
mistress Clara Petacci. left his hideout
in Conio as planned on April 26. Near
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 Nesso, at the exact spot where lie was
supposed to cross into the safety of
Switzerland, his convoy was ambushed
by an execution squad of the Partisans
led by Colonel Valerio. But a few miles
from safety, Mussolini lost his life. While
Communist Partisans took credit for kill-
ing the Duce, the irony of it is that it
actually was his own Fascists who led
him to slaughter.
Slaughter Continues
His end came on April 29-yet still
there seemed to be no end to the killing
of World War II. Germany's southern
front was wiped out. The western Allies
stood on the Elbe and in the heart of
Czecholsovakia. In Berlin. the Russians
were fighting in ? the streets and Hitler
was preparing his suicide in the besieged
Reichschancellery. Yet the Allies were
still worried that a diehard army of Nazi
soldiers might entrench itself in the
Alps and continue to fight in their im-
pregnable fortress for years.
By then I was in close and daily con-
tact with Allan Dulles in Berne. Not
only did I supply him with information
about events in Italy and Southeastern
Europe, but also served as his interme-
diary with the men who were slated to
prepare this Redoubt for Germany's last
stand.
What was the truth about this alleged-
ly impregnable fortress where Hitler
planned to delay his total defeat?
In November, 1944, the Gauleiter of
Tyrol. a Nazi named Franz Hofer, sent
a mcnun rndnut to Hitler with the recom-
mendation that a fortress be built in the
Austrian Alps. Ile also outlined the pos-
sibilities of its prolonged defense. The
plan has seconded by another Austrian
Gatileiter. Friedrich Rainer. While no-
body in the Wehrmacht seemed to take
it seriously, the German secret service
recognized in it an opportunity to mis-
lead the Allies. Phony blueprints were
drawn up and intelligence was leaked to
the Americans. who seemed to be most
prepared to believe such a romantic
military plot.
Some of the blueprints themselves
were smuggled into Allied hands with
the help of double agents. It soon became
known in Germany that file Allies were
inclined to take the hoax rather seri-
ously. Sporadic items in the Allied press
indicated genuine apprehension. Spies
reported serious concern at General Eis-
enhower's headquarters and also in the
Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington.
Hitler at first ridiculed Hofer's fan-
tastic plan, but when he was told that
the Allies were frightened by it, he
thought the idea might not be so had
after all. Ile ordered Hofer to develop
the southern positions of the planned
Redoubt as quickly as possible. A team
of SS geologists was sent into the region
and pupils of the SS Mountain School
were alerted to begin large-scale blast.
ing. in the Alpine rocks.
But the grand design of the Redoubt
never passed beyond this stage. Even so,
every "move connected with it was leaked
10.
to the A11les--the arrival of the geolo-
gists. the special exercises of the SS
Mountain School. the moves of the
Schoerner Army that was slated to gar-
rison it. They all added up to feverish
preparations where in reality nothing
existed.
It was at this point that I could re-
port to Mr. Dulles the true state of
affairs in the Alps. Even during my first
encounter with him. I discovered that he
was most interested in intelligence about
the Redoubt. A plan was worked out to
gain as much genuine information as
possible and then to win over to our
side those who were slated to command
Hitler's desperate last stand.
An operation plan was evolved and I
got busy with its execution. My task was
facilitated by the fact that the Redoubt's
prospective commanders were, like my-
self, all Austraians, themselves anxious
to save at least Austria from the inescap-
able collapse of the Third Reich.
Very soon I was able to assure Mr.
Dulles that. first, the planned Redoubt
was still in the stage of preliminary plan-
ning. that construction did not progress
beyond some blastings; and, second, that
all the men slated to command the
troops in the Alps had expressed their
willingness to co-operate with the Allies
in frustrating Hitler's last grand design.
My report to Dulles brought forth
genuine sighs of relief. Mr. Dulles stated
quite frankly that my report to him, and
the assurances I was authorized to sup-
ply, removed the last road bloc :.om the
victorious path of the Allies.
When Germany's defeated leaders set
their signatures under the instruments
of total capitulation. my work as Hitler's
master spy came to all end. I thought
that the past would recede from me
rapidly and that I could return to "nor-
mal life," to begin my studies where I
interrupted them 10 years before.
A few months ago, however, this weird
past returned to me abruptly for a fleet-
ing moment. It came in the form of a
strange and embarrassing discovery, re-
minding me of the manner in which Hey-
drich used to do business. The most
secret of his operations. about which we
used to speak only in hushed tones, was
suddenly exposed by the chance dis-
covery of a couple of Austrian fishermen.
The secrets o our "Operation Bern-
hard" were ou:. The last mysterious plot
of World War II tad lost its mystery.
Two fishermen on the Austrian lake
called Traunsee came upon big green
and red patches on the surface of the
lake that at first seemed to them a
strange variety of water lilies. On closer
examination they found that in reality
they were pieces of paper, floating by
the thousands on the surface of the lake.
They picked up an armful of them and
returned to their village with their find,
You may imagine the surprise of the
quiet village folk when the pieces of
paper turned out to he-English pound
notes.)
I am able to clear up the mystery of
their discovery and explain the sudden
appearance of millions of English
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potato: in till )avian Ur. It _was mon-
ey p7lnte .. 1;lun.Sncret Service
on ley driclx a -tit dt ra -dumped into
the sea when this; cud of the war found
us with caches ,of it still on our hands.
Early in our game, and contrary to
widespread belief, the Lerman secret
service was woefully short of ready rash.
What we needed tverc dollars and
pounds, the international currency of
the espionage business. But neither the
Ministry of Finance nor the Rcichsbank
had adequate supplies to pay for our
quaint operations.
Already, in 1939. in the wake of his
discovery of the counterfeit rubles. Hey-
drich hit upon the idea of printing the
money we so urgently needed. At first.
the technical difficulties proved almost
insurmountable. No matter how hard
they tried, they couldn't duplicate the
intricate paper design the British usted
in printing their five-pound notes. Never-
theless. the technical branch of the se-
cret service finally succeeded in produc-
ing counterfeit pounds which were so
good that most of Ilie banks of the world
accepted them.
But it was not until 1913 that the se-
cret service could begin the dissemina-
tion of these counterfeit pounds in great-
er quantities. We had to devise fantastic
methods to hiring this money into circu-
lation. A special branch was set tip with-
in the secret service which was devoted
exclusively to the distribution of the
counterfeit notes.
A network of special agents was estab-
lished in Italy. They sold the pound
notes to Italians for genuine lire and
then used the lire- to boy genuine pounds
on Switzerland's black market. The loss-
es we suffered in these transactions were
enormous. But what did it matter as long
as we were printing 'our own pounds?
Soon another method was found to get
rid of the millions of pounds on hand.
It became known that the Partisans of
Yugoslavia were only too glad to sell
some of the supplies they received from
the Allies-provided they were paid in
pounds or dollars. This led to the de-
velopment of the most fantastic business
in the history of iiartm-e. The l:erm.nl
secret service appeared on the scent' as
the buyer of automatic weapons which
Tito received front the Allies. Soon the
business was flourishing to the point
where whole trainloads of Allied sup-
plies came into our hands. They were
paid for with forged English pound
notes. Our buyers Iraveled freely in the
regions controlled by the Partisans even
while our troops Itad it hard time fight-
in, against tlicnt.
The counterfeiting of dollar notes suc-
ceeded only inward the end of the war.
but cycn then the notes proved to be so
primitive that our agents refused to ped-
dle them. Only shortly before the sur-
render did the Cct-man Secret Service
succeed in iniproe ing the quality of these
forgeries, but there was no tints left to
bring then' into circulation.
The British understandably took a
very serious view of this operation. 'I'hev
discovered the existence of these counter-
feit notes when an airman of the lloval
Air force was t'ailght at all airport in
the act of smuggling French currency
into Britain. He had all kinds of money
on kiwi. including British pound notes.
And on closer scrutiny. more than 10
per cent of them proved counterfeit.
The airtuan confessed that Its received
them as part of his winnings in it Ilc1-
gian gambling casino. This discovery
alerted the Bank of England and Scot-
land Yard. More and more forged pound
notes were discovered and. in the words
of one of Britain's outstanding spy ex-
perts. "the notes were such perfect
forgeries that any British bank would
have accepted theta as geniiitie without
the sliglitest hesitation."
A special forgery squad was formed
by Scotland Yard under the famous In-
spector Jack Smith. nne of Britain's
legendary spy catchers. Squads of Scot-
land Yard men were sent out into the
world to track down every single note.
Chief Inspector Rudkin was sent to
South America. Inspector Smith went to
France. Belgium and Italy. Inspector
Minter moved straight into the lion's
den. into Germany itself.
Minter discovered the German coun-
terfeiting plant in Block 19 in the Such-
senhuusen concentration camp. Millions
in foreign currency were printed there
by slave labor. Most of the men who
worked in the plant were expert en-
gravers and printers. They were taken
from the various camps to this plant.
Everybody concerned with Operation
Bernhard regarded this as ii top secret
and nobody liked to discuss it. The
British were the most reluctant to talk
about it because currency in excess of
?50.000.000 was found and more than
1100,000.000 was believed to be in cir-
culation. When Inspector lllinter raided
Block 19 in Sachsenhausen. lie found
millions of tiomlds still stored there. Ile
also discovered millions of rupees printed
specially for a conspiracy in India
which. however. never carne oft.
The Germans involved in tilt', plot kept
their mouths shut hecanse Ibey feared
reprisals for something of which inter-
national law takes an cxtt?enw'ly serious
view. Were it not for that one airman
and those two Austrian fishermen on the
Trauusee. the whole plot might have re-
mained the war's only undisturbed se-
cret. But their strange catch created a
greater stir than if they bad caught the
Loch Ness Munster in Traunsce.
With the belated discovery of the
counterfeit notes. the se'cret war book
of the German espionage service saw its
last chapter written, As I look back on
my part it) it. I feel it certain pride in
our achievements, just its a British or
an American who served on the secret
front must be proud of what lie did.
My pride is enhanced by the fact that
in the crucial day's of tilt, war's climax,
I found my way to the Allies. contrib-
uting a modest share to the termination
of tilt- Holocaust before tilt' atomic bomb
could make its cataclvsulic appearance
on the European battlefield.
In slaking the balance sheet of this
strange enterprise. I find it lot on bout
sides of the ledger. If in the elld we in
the Lerman Secret Service failed. it was
only because we never wanted to suc-
ceed. ? ? ?
ill
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