OSS - STUDY ON SOME ASPECTS OF THE GERMAN DOMESTIC AND MILITARY SITUATION/DOCUMENTS ON PROPOSED PROPAGANDA TO GERMANY/GERMAN PLANS FOR EXPLOITING RUSSIA/MEMORANDUM ON OPERATIONS AND LONG RANGE INTELLIGENCE, 1942

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: OSS Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 136
• Document Creation Date: November 3, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 23, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: May 29, 1942
• Content Type: MISC

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A COMMENTARY ON SONE ASPECTS OF THE
GERMAN DOMESTIC AND MILITARY
SITUATION
May 29, 1942
came much sooner than previously expected
explains in considerable measure the cur-
rent surge of optimism in the United States.
Close observers of the Gellman scene view
such optimism as unsupported by their esti-
mates of the Nazi domestic and military
Coordinator's office reveal that the
British bombing campaign will probably have
a minor effect this year on the Nazi war
effort against Russia; that the German oil
position remained substantially in balance
even during the Invasion of Russia; and that
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optimietic BrItioh eottmaten of (lemon mon-
tattoo on the Ruamlan front are fru too htcho
On the homo front the allegell
differenoon between the Na At Pup.* nnd
Retehowehr are believed no longer to be an
inDUO of fundamental importanoo. Germany'o
rood pooltlon to probably oared Cot' throurh
the year 1942-10486 The Wily are already
in potioonoton or a lftrge and airntfieant part
or the Rnoolan eounomy. There in nu oonlano.
ing ovidenee that (WIWI morale hoe boon
aeriouoly impairod?
Reoent Oemin ponoe foolovo aro
probably a oign of otrongth rather than weak-
moos in the "ocoupled conntrioo," ao repro-
anted by aftlY, 1rall00, ana NOPINV, 1ie oon-
trolling authority (honoo Nazi influofloe) dmi
not eoem to be throatonod in Any noriona way.
Finally, a judiolouo uoo or prop
ganda can undoubtodly bo elootivo In wtdoning
tho floouroo in tho Gorman Immo front; onoo
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the situation has become sufficiently serious.
But for any large scale propaganda assault a
strategic moment should he chosen. That
moment might arrive after important German
defeats in Russia*
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A COMMENTARY ON SoME ASPECTS OF THE
GERMAN DOMESTIC AND MILITAAY
SITUATION
May 29, 1942
Tho past two weeks have witnessed
a surge of war optimism in this country. This
Ameriean "victory panic)," as one Swedish cor-
respondent dubs it, refleets various develop-
ments--reports on the Battle of tho Coral
Sea, optimistic American official statements,
the Russian "offensive" borer? Khnrkov, and
a vague fooling that the Germans aro serious-
ly weakening and that the eraek-up may not
be far off. This vein of optimiam has de-
veloped despite the warninp: of the President
that the war will be long and that the pre8s
should de its part by redueing individual
vieter5.1s to their proper proportions in the
larger pattern of the struggle. A high point
Wan reaehod When Nemmek carried as the titlILUe
of its loaa artiole: "Chance for Victory in
1942 Causes Allied Hopes to Soar."
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Close observers of the 3erman
view suoh optimiam as ufl8Upport y heir
estimates of the German domestic alid military
situation, The following meinoranduti makes
no attempt to offer anything like a camprehet-
sive picture of the German situation. It has
simPlY ohosen certain aspects of the picture
to which careful study has recently buen de-
voted by the Qoordinatoris office.
EFFEtiTS OF TER RRIT18H Af/c OFFEkSIVE
The press in general has tended to
"p1ay up" the iplportance of British bombing
of Ciermaal 444 the occupied terrItories,
The PUT4is is spectaoular and "newsworthy."
It reppepents the only significant British
4411417 effoPt tle qoment, A survey of
PV44.4@f3 by 44 4412 @xporf poncludes, how-
@Irt43/ 404 t49 ppopekt tempo; this bombard-
4144tW4Lh4V? hut A 41144QP offect on the German
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It is very easy, however, to exag.
gerate the amount of damage which would be
done even if Anglo-American resources permit
a notably heightened tempo of attack. The
blitz on Coventry, most successful of all,
reduced the town's activity index, based on
electric power consumption, to 37 percent
of its previous level. But electric power
consumption had returned to normal in about
five or six weeks. The conclusion i8 simple:
the most damaging blitz of the war must be
repeated every few weeks if the industrial
activity of the target area is to be kept
down to a damaging level.
Bombing operations of this type are,
moreover, relatively inefficient. An estimate
of Britiefh bombardment of individual factories
as of the end of 1941 indicates that, of 100
planes dispatched on missions, 60 will reach
the target area, 12 will actually find the
target, and .-Jf the latter 25 percent will
deliver bombs on the target. In other words,
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three percent of the bombs dispatched will
actually find the target. British experience
ind3.eate8 that 75 percent of the aircraft
assigned a bomber command will be fit to fly
at any one time, that there will be crews
trained to man 50 percent of the total assigned,
and that weather will permit bombardment opera-
tions on an average of six to seven nights a
month. Losses from day bombing are too high
to make that a regular practice. One British
bombardment group showed a loss of 25 percent
per month of its operational strength in day-
light operations against Germany.
THE GERMAN OIL POSITION
Commentators and the press generally
have indulied in consistently loose talk about
the weakness of the German oil position and
the "inevitability" of a Nazi military cam-
paign to acquire oil resources in the Caucasus
or eleeWhere. A current study of the Coordina-
tor's office reveals a very different picture.
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5
It conoludes that petroleum production and
consumption were In approximate balance even
during the German offensive of last fall,
when military oil requirements were at their
peak. At most the Nazis made only nogligible
withdrawals from stooks during that period.
From June to December of last year,
petroleum consumption of the German ground
and air forces on the Eastern Front probably
amounted to about 430,000 tons a month?around
300,000 tons of whloh were for the ground
forces alone. Combat vehicles accounted for
about 70 peroent or this latter figure, supply
vehioles for the remainder. Divisions actively
engaged in combat were responsible for more
than 90 parent of the ground force consump-
tion. Of the 130,000 tons oonsumeti by the
air force, almost all was for planes rather
than for the supply servieo.
DurinR this same period, military
oonsumption elsewhere than on the Russian
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front amounted to about 225,000 tons a month,
with civilian consumption 670,000 tons. The
consumption total of 1.3 million tons a month
was only slightly larger than the estimated
production rate. Thus petroleum production
and coneumption were in approximate balance.
Although this report has not studied
the period from December, 1941, to March, 1942,
as camfully as the preceding period, it seems
unlikely that military consumption of petroleum
during the winter amounted to more than 420,000
tons a month. If civilian consumption continued
at the rate of 670,000 tons a month, total
consumption was approximately 1.1 million tons.
ascompared with a production of 1.3 million
tons. The conclusion is inescapable that
German petroleum stocks last winter were in-
creasing at a rate of approximately 200,000
tons a month.
GERMAN CASUALTIES ON THE RUSSIAN FRONT
Optimistic estimates of Germaa
Permanent, casualties on the Russian front,
'410. k
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from British and other sources, mn as high
as 2,300,000. The estimate of the Coordina-
tor's office, however, is only about 1,250,000.
This figure is unquestionably a conservative
one. lhile these higher estimates cannot be
summarily a1&MJAW1, it is believed that they
are based on total casualty figures which are
too high and that to breakdowns or these
figures utilize percentages of killed, missing,
and totally disabled which ars too high R pro-
It should be noted that any estimate
of permanent losses does not include the Im-
portant factor of men in hospitals. What
may be called the "hospital Pool," in a period
of large-scale offensive operations such as
the campaign of last fall in Russin, probably
results in a constant drain of somo 600,000
700,000 men on the strength of the German armed
One oommontary introduces another
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it refers to the calling up for military
service of boys 17, 18, and 19. It adds
that those groups are being brigaded with the
divisions, and introduce a large new ele-
ment of relatively untrainod men into the
army.
No authority can he discovered
for this report, and it ie not accepted in
certain responsible quarters in M.T.S. which
have been queried. It is be3ieved that the
statement, in so far as it concerns boys 17
and 180 comes from someone who failrA to
distinguish between military service and
Arbeitsdienst. German law makes boys begin-
ning at 18 subject to military training.
Prior to their military training, they are
obliged to enroll in the Arbeitsdienst for
a variable period. In this connection, a
Military Attach report from Berlin, Decem-
ber 5, 1941, states that boys 17 to 19 were
in fact called up for Arbeitsdienst to work
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with the Organization Todt in an effort to
solve transport and supply problems in the
East. But there is no evidence that they
were brigaded with the divisions to fight at
the front.
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PARTY AND ARMY
Certain writers have emphasized what
they term a "fundamental opposition" between
the Party and the Army. But the old independent
Wehrmacht no longer exists. Since February 4,
1938 when Blomberg and Fritsch had to go, the
German army has been pretty effectively Nazi
Lied from the top downward. For some years
now the entire young manhood of Germany has
passed through the pre-military training en-
trusted on January 19, 1939 to the SA. All
the younger classes now in the Army are the
products of Nazi training and education.
Nothing is more certain than that the expan-
sion of the 4000 commissioned officers of the
old Reichswehr into the hundreds of thousands
of officers of the present army has resulted
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in an immense strengthening of the position
of the Nazi Party in the Army. Military
Attach' reports agree that all the officers
in the grades from major downward aro solidly
National Socialist.
The higher officers from colonel
upward are still in the main the officers of
the Reiehswehr. Promotion in tho Gorman army
is slow, oven in time of war. Very few Nazis
have found their way into tho higher and high-
est grades. The officers or these grades aro
above all professionals with little or no
political tradition behind them. It was only
due to the lack of political leadership on
the part of Hammerstein, Blomberg and Fritsch
that the Army, unlike the Navy and the Air
Corps, held aloof from the Nationalist
Sooialist movement. But such an aloofness
as that of the Reichswehr under the Republic
was impossible to maintain in the face of a
nationalist rsvaution which in its essence
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was military. Hitler made an end of that
aloofness on February 4, 1938, and he did
It without resorting to one of Stalin's
purges. The hostile officers were pensioned
or gradually eliminated. It 15 safe to ay
that few enemies of Hitler remain amoni the
This is not to say that there is
no longer any irritation between these pro-
fessionals and the new and more radical Nazi
loaders. A General von Kleist might still
resign after a quarrel with Sepp Dietrich, the
ranking general of the SS-Combat Divisions.
It is also quite possible that the SS-Combat
Divisions were a minor issue in Hitler's
quarrel with the generals last autumn.
Sinoe these SS-Combat Divisions are
now being expanded very considerably, however,
it is not unreasonable to presume that the
high command is reeonoiled to their existence
and special position. They have produced some
abl.e.pfficerp, amorg them General Rommel. They
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are now accepted ns eontributors to the more
conservative military journals, especielly
the oonservative Milititrwoohenblatt, in
spite of the persistenee of oortain irritations
among the older army officers, the relation-
ship between the Party and the Army is te
longer an tost4e or fundmental tmportance,in
the opinion of the best informed of our
former Military Attaehlis.
THE GERMAN FOOD POSITION
The April ()hang? in German rations
gave rise to optimistic oommento in the press,
even suggesting that Nazi food shortages might
soon be serious. A 'went nnalysis or the
German food position by the Economies Divi-
sion of the Coordinator's office, however,
suggette a different situation. Germany's food
posit!gon appears to be cared for through the
year l942-48, on the assumption that the same
areas now available to her will oontinue to be
-
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It is only after the end of the calendar year
1943 that the situation may become serious,
and to a considerable extent this too may be
avoided by a further reduction in rations,
particularly rat5ons of fats and oils and,
In all probability, of meats. Such reductions
might still be made without dealing a body
blow to the efficiency of the German military
and economic machine.
THE EXPLOITATION OF RUSSIAN RESOURCES
Certain commentators on the Russian
front have consistently emphasized the tremen-
dous diffioulties the Germans Laos in exploit-
ing the Soviet economy. This comment general-
ly fails to take into account the fact that
the Germans have been in possession of consid-
erable parts of that economy for many months.
The Germans actually began their spreading oc-
cupation of Soviet territory as far back as
June, 19410 and had occupied before the end
of November, all the Russian lands that they
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now control* Thus the Germns have already
been in covmand of these (=pored resources
for from five=iand-a-half to eleven months,
depending upon the date of occupation, region
by region.
After this occupied zone had been
somewhat reduced by the winter advance of
the ftasslan army, it still included about
50,000,000 hectares of cultivated land and
had had g peacetime productivity very roughly
estimated at 18,0000000 metric tons of coal,
16,000,000 metric tons of iron ore, 3,500,000
metric tons of pig iron, 3,400,000 metric tons
of steel, ingots, 1,000,000 metric tons of
manganose ore, and 32,000 metric tons of
kluminum# Tho occupied area also had numer-
ous large cleatria power planta, aa well ao
the be developed railway net in the soviet
The peaaevtime equity of thiogone
vats, of ?moo,iiwhreduaed by Russian evaoua.
tion of population, animalo, and mohinery, by
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
deliberate Russian wrecking of equipment and
buildings, by damage resulting incidentally
from combat activity, and so on. Besides all
this, other conditions have operated to pre-
vent the Germans from utilizing to the full
the productive capacities that still remained
When they took over; among these, the most
important are perhaps the continued strain of
military activity on this front, and the dif-
ficulty of either operating or replacing the
collective system of agriculture. Yet there
is every reason to believe that long before
the end of this year the Germans will have
realized very considerable economic gains from
the lands that they have already occupied with-
in the frontiers of the Soviet Union.
CONSIDERATIONS OF GERMAN MORALE
Intimately allied to such considera-
tions as food rationing and bombing is the
problem of German morale. The view that
serious cracks have already appeared in the
-
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442ps49111...-
W
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-16-
(;!CRET
morale front and that we can win the war by
propaganda is one of the favorite Corms of
contemporary wishful thinking.
It is unquestionably true that the
German people, imbued with the notion that
they were embarkinp on a short war of brilliant
but inexpensive conquest, have been grievous-
ly disappointed. The reverses and serious
losses suffered by the German Army in Russia
must have had deep and disheartening effects
on all strata of the German population. The
prospect of another winter of war, and per-
haps still another, is doubtless a nightmare
to the great masses of the German people.
On the other hand, there is no con-
vincing evidence that German morale has been
seriously impaired. A recent survey in the
Coordinator's office reveals widespread sup-
port of the existing regime in word and deed.
There is grumbling and SOMB dissidence among
the aged, women, Austrians, South Germans,
fterz
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-
,
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ftrdnnt Luthoranft and Catholion, intolleotnnia,
Jews and oortftin ?thorn. But opparontly
tiler? in no juntirioallon ror ihoylow that
tho organizational ertoioney or tho rorlmo
wi.donproftd roma that, in th0 OVOld, or doroat
tho Gftrman pnoplo wiii roap npoftoo or von-
goanoat hao undoubtedly contributed Lo tho
creation of an aititudo or r in dotorminft-
tion to uoo the war through at 01 man.
GERMAN PEACE PEELERS
In oommonting rrom Limo to timo on
roourront Gorman poaon footern, oorinin orrAnn
of tho prone hay? givon thn impromftion that
such ntopn nocesmftrily volloot Gorman wiftk-
nonu-mthra tho Nazis aro attompting to omoapn
from thn war booauno it has b000mo nnondurablo.
Noro it Is important to Ointintvish botwoon
two typon a poftoo foolors--tho firmt nrining
from oonfidonoo and a dosiro to noo a oonsolida-
tion of tho countrylm war ralno; tho c000nd
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tee,
3*-F.
springing from a convietion of imminent
In the last war, the outstanding
spontaneous German peace offer, that of Decem-
ber, 1916, same when the Central Powers were
in a strong position. They had completely
crushed the Rumanians. The Brusilov offen-
sive on the Eastern Front had failed. And
on the Western Front, the Allied advance on
the Somme had in the previous month bogged
down in rain and mud.
Similarly in this war, the only
clear-out German offer of peace (lame after
the whirlwind triumph in Poland. In the sum-
of 1940, after the fall of France, the
Nazi radio informally suggested that Britain
might as well lay down her arms. Last Decem-
ber, after the disaster at Pearl Harbor (and
When the German shook in Russia was less
serious than many people in this country be-
lieved) the Nazis again allowed the impression
to get obroad that there was serious dissension
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?
SECRET 1
between the Fuehrer and his generals, and
that certain elements in the Reich might be
ready for a negotiated peace.
The second type of peace feeler, the
offer of desperation," is exemplified in
the initiatives of Emperor Charles or Austria
In 1917 (Prince Sixtus affair), or of Luden-
dorff in the autumn of 1918. There is, however,
little apparent indication in any recent Nazi
peace feelers that the Germans find themselves
in a situation comparable to that of either
the spring or the fall of 1918. A more apt
comparison would probably be between the present
position of the Germans, and their situation
In late 1916 or early 1917. And such peace
feelers may be just as much a sign of strength
as was their offer of December, 1016.
German peace feelers in a period of
strength have significant propaganda values.
natever happens, they tend to confuse and
disorganize the Allied powers. If they are
z
VittimavaisLiapa-iftio..
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nonoptad, thOy ()poll thb way NW tho oonnolida.
Lion or Oomann ITInti and tho pomaildo phu/1i
or tho Amp nndor moro ravorahlo oondltIonn.
If thoy aro rornnod, lhoy may at lohla nprwid
tho domoraLizInr. nonviutIon that qormany
In II notnbly woaltonod oondItIon.
I ri
THE MaPW1) Viii.alThR1W3
R0000 dInounalonm or alloo:od
man woaknonn lay oonoldorabto omphanio on
Nazi dirrioult100 ill th0 000110fl(t LorrItorloo*
Tho Implication In thnt oortaln or thoao
oonntrIon aro alromdy dovolopim within thorn
nIrnIrtnant lnatr,Amoato or ravolt and ILO.
thoy aro, thororovo, inoreaminrly ripe) rot.
Alliod Invanion. Troo clountriom aro oontrid
in thin argurnout: ltftly, Vranoo? nnd Nurwny.
In nono or thom doon Llit oontvoiling authority
(Immo Na1 inrluonoo) naom to bo throat:ono('
tn n.ry porloilo way.
Tho throo Cundmontol Coroor. lh
Itattan 'two, namoly, tho monarolly (tnoluding
?
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.4000e.
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the army), the faseist regime, and the
Catholic Church, appear to be intact and to
be united in an effort to preserve the intop:-
pity of the kingdom and the power of the
present government ugainst foreign and domestic
The foreign anemias include the
nations with which Italy is at war and may
aiso inolude Italy's ally, Germany, whose
Increasing power in the peninsula is a matter
of "great (mourn to Italian ruling ciroJes,
At the moment, this concern takes the form
of limiting German control in Italy rather
than of repudiating the German alliance
which, from many points of view, has proved
helpful to Italy (as, for axle, in the
Greek and North African eampaigns). Curious-
ly enough, even in non-faseist or mild anti-
fmscist circles, Mussolini is looked upon as
a bulwark against overhearing Gorman control
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i? - -
? :
? ?
The Savoy Monarchy, with its deep
roots in Italian life, still has cons51orablo
prestige among the pnople and still comands
the unquestioned loyalty of the army. Tho
strongest elements In tho army appear to be
intact and to be still In Italy. Thn monarchy
and the fasolst regime need oach othoP. To
be sure, even it the fascist 1'e0m0 shwild
fall, the monarchy could hope to wirvIva be-
cause it might be able to count on tho mrmy
and wide popular support.
Thu Catholic Church and Min rnsoint
rorime hay() been and arm on frlevOly term.
The Church, oven MON) than tho monarchy, can
purnun an Independent poliny, oven If raseiBm
should fall. It must not be forRotten that
the olercy in italy?inoluding the hierarchy
--
in predominantly Italisn and feels o Rtirvit
sense of patriotism towards Italy.
The rear or national humilliWon,
of dhaos or revolution (oommunism), Is one
o the strong bonds whioh unite the foroos or
, .7.0_;r:4??? 61:
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?
. . ?
.'? ? ? ?
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J
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Ia
,
-23-
faseism, the monarchy and the Church at the
present time. No organized anti-fascist move-
ment, strong enough to seize power, seems to
exist in Italy today. There appears to bo no
immediate prospect that the Cascint rerimo
will be overthrown.
All the above is subjeet to qualifies,-
tion dictated by a constantly changing world
and Italian situation. The most important
qualifioation is this: the return of Laval
to power has created an "opening" which affords
the bent opportunity for a diplomatic: anti-Nazi
offensive in Italy sinoe that eountry entered
the war.
Frame
At least three elements in the current
French situation tend to discount optimistio
views of the early crystallization of French
resistance to the Nazis. First, the political
or5ontation of Laval remains undefined. Anthony
Eden believes that Laval is planning to lie low
for a time to quiet apprehensions in America as
?
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4
well as in France, according to a recent
statement. Laval probably hopes to mediate
between Washington and Berlin and to acquire
enough prestige in the New Order to feather
his own nest and that of France. He will do
nothing about Vichy warships for a time, Eden
indicates, and neither contemplates nor aesires
allowing Berlin to have them. This point of
view receives confirmation from the current
rumors that the Nazis, dissatified with Laval's
failure to plot a clearly collaborationist
course, may replace him with some outright
pro-German such as Doriot or D6at.
The second factor, a logical result
of the first, is a confusion ir. the minds of
the French people themselves. Reports from
Vichy suggest that certain French civilian
and military authorities, although not in
sympathy with Laval himself, are still unwilling
to believe that he will play the Germans' game
completely. This wishful thinking extends
-
-4:
?
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apparently even to a belief that Laval is
clever enough to be able to double-eross
the Nazis. Such a conviction, according to
General de Gaulle, may for tho present lull
the French people Into a falso sense of secur-
ity.
The third factor is an apparent
dl3inelination for organized revolt on the
part of the French masses. A report from
Vichy suggests thnt the Freneh people will
not dare to move until the Americans and
nritish have established a seeond front in
their country. Such a lack of initiative is
not unconnected with the food situation on the
continent of Europe, where undernourishment
induees acute depression, listlessness, and
general lack of interest in life. In the
opinion of the food experts or the Coordinator's
offices persons suffering from mlnutrition
arc not desperate man readily moved to rash
activity. Rather they are apathetic and
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?
?
4t
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3.01.6Li411.4.016.111.6.414.. o..................................,?.........**wroar-vrJAInun.waftaniwaamettoedisaiva4eartitwaz~tizeavilluktits2sise,ai#4
-2(3-
indifferent pooplo who aeeept their lot with-
out marked protest. The United Nationa can
noaroely rely on such men apontanoously to
foment internal rovolt on any significant scale.
Nomx
It la ?leer that since February thore
hAs boon a marked deterioration or the relations
botweon the quisling rogime and tle poopio.
Quis)inr., who in said to have rained the aup-
port of a scant one poreent of the people,
has met mounting hostility since the failure
or his February trip to Berlin. This has boon
sharpened by h3s resent actions agalnat the
clergy and toaehers of Norway. Inoroasin
Coed restrletions and pormoeution have also
inereanea the provocation to revolt,
There also exists an intolliRent,
diseiplined Underground movement, engaged in
disseminating information, planning sabotage,
and oolleeting arms for the day of Allied in-
vasion.
? CIA-RDP13X00001 R000100170006-0
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0
-27-
.ECRET
However, as a recent study of the
Coordinator's office shows, all this opposi-
tion to Nazi rule and these preparations for
armed revolt, do not threaten Germany's present
strategy in Scandinavia. It is the Quisling
government, not the German occupying forces,
which is embarrassed by the uncooperative-
ness of the Norwegian civilians. The sabo-
tage activities of the Underground are not
to be unleashed until Norway is invaded by
British or American forces. Norwegians, Who
six months ago looked forward to such an in-
vasion in the spring of 1942, now hardly dare
hope for it this summer. Commando raids,
while in theory a reminder to the Norwegians
that they are not forgotten, have become in-
'reasingly embarrassing to the Underground,
since they offer an excellent excuse to the
Germans for widespread arrests in reprisal.
In any event: they are only local in character
and do not afford an opportunity for the Nor-
wegians themselves to hamper Ilitlor's plans.
?
?
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z
4-tf,1a
.a./delauoinitil*Kalig.7.41.0.11.......0...014.1.0...liradAiimaaliallit.0...iiiii...G...n.A.Abia.....6...s.W,P4tax.......% ? 0 ---.
(SECRET
Sinoo February the Germans have
Increased their forces In Norwny to eight or
nine divisions. They are steadily improving
communioations, ?specially with the rnr north.
They are obviounly in a position to tighten
up their control or the eivilian population
at any time, an in seen in reported plant.;
for clearing certain coastal nrean. There
moreover, oonsiderable danger of any action
that would prematurely expone the Underground
to the Nazi authorities.
In num, it in clear thnt Norwegian
renintance in stifrening an the pressure in-
ereanes, and it may be thnt the deteriornting
position of the Quisling regime will bring
some kind of a reshuffling in the government;
but there does not appear to be any evidence
that (greatly() Na23 eontrol of Norway is ?rack-
ing, or will craok unless there is an Allied
invasion or a withdrawal of Gorman force's.
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-14
? -taSAii:' ?
?
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'
-20-
THE GERML! SITUATION IN 1918 AND 1942
Historians have long appreciated
the dangers of comparing seemingly similar
events occurring at different periods. To
many observers the last war appears "similar"
to this one, and the optimism of the present
moment even pretends to see in the events of
1942 a situation not too different from that
of 1018.
As a matter of fact, however, condi-
tions on the German home front in 101h were
distinctly different from those at present.
The Empire lacked the propaganda-police en-
vironment of the 14azi state which has made
such strenuous efforts to prevent precisely
such a weakening in the home front as finally
came in the autumn of 1918. At that time the
German governmeat failed dismally in the pro-
vision of a propaganda of war aims, whereas
the Nazis have built up a resplendent picture
of the New Order of the future.
"
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no rood nitnntion In Ootimany by
tho ona of tho fltint World Weir 1td 11Ioroov6p,
bocomo vory ncnto. Normn1 ounnumorn In qopmAny
(honnowlvot) and ?Moo workorti it I' oxnmplon)
woro obtatnino: nbont . 1600 onlorlom 1101v.
thnn 1110 Ilumbov vc(inivod h)
taln .11 lo whtm no rola phyoicol
About NO0 onior,v:! in
n0000nn ry rot 111 1
?,t1 ohinn nr con-
Lhoy Iwo r000iviv
toany In Gormhoy. leor thono who do lho Iriti
ont typo r worht Lim minimum n[mildnrd im
naunlly uot nt 44)00 . 4800 colorlon.
thono workorn in Oormnny nro pr4ividrid
4000 onlorIon tIn I iy vorhopn
PROPAGANDA AT TNE 1RE:1),;NT MIM;T100.:
Tho POM401.0 above, (Jfi qt.WM411 mnrmlo
aro not intonaod to augp,00t Clint pruldnif.nna
may not pPovo n ointrionnt Intammesnt In
in a
nnrove or
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.t=.1
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*W14nit 444 WWI; hicAr' Mak .9Z-611.
hantoning ti o final collnpno or Oormin
anoo. Donbliess n rola lironkdown in tho
limn home front witi cow thitl
191B, an tho retiult or a militnry do r(+0,0
But the fist:Juror,' in LI o GOMM') homo rrola onn
undoubtedly be erfootivoly vildonod hy n Judi-
olous propaganda nflsaull. (moo Iht) nitunfl,m
has become suffictontty noriAmn. For nny 8nch
propaganda annaull, howovor, Wo tdionid choonn
Ft highly ntrategio momont. That momont would
come after a soriona Gormnn deront, who!) propa-
ganda wouJd sorvo to drive home to Min 1:ormanri
the ntark reality or widely r000!TI.;od ractfl.
That moment might arrtve when a low oampni,,rn
In Ruoula had ended in nerinun rtivernor an't
when the GOVM4DS wore faced with Ilio Nyroach
OC another winter. On the other hand, ir
such a large noalo campaign were launohod now,
It would probably be at me followod by
tial German suooesses in Russia. It would then
misoarry and might be difrioult to repeat later,
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weiseitelinffladitnitledlINIAMON26.12121110FEWVIINLCOMINVIUSIR!VIV,M1W-
CSECREI
It is bootless to discuss now the
precise character which that campaign should
take. It should obviously be designed to take
full and precise advantage of the situation
then existing. If, for instance, the Russians
were at that moment rapidly rolling the Ger-
mans back on their eastern frontier, it would
be of little avail for the United States and
Britain to make promises to the German people
unless these were fully concurred in by the
Kremlin and adequate guarantees of fulfill-
ment were offered.
Certain generalizations can be made
now. Such a campaign should avoid saying what
the everyday experience of the German disproves.
It should avoid furthering the cause of those
elements Which would like peace by negotiation
in order to stabilize Germany's position for
fresh conquests in the future. Such a campaign
should probably avoid the /11sonian technique
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and approach which the Germans have been
taught profoundly to distrust.
$,
414 .1 44iirf ? -1? . att. .
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
270 MADISON AVENUE
PEW YORK
'1541,144,
Colonel William 3. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
25th and E Streets, NW
Washington, De C.
With further reference to my yesterday's
memorandum, I should like to develop a little further
the thought expressed on page 4, paragraph (c).
Thinking about this idea last night, it seemed to me that
this particular proposal concerning parachute troops in
Gernany has the merit that it requires practically no
cooperation from anybody, and in one version of the pro-
.ject it requires no action that we could not take ourselves.
What I mean is this:
1. Suppose we got the War Department to give
out, or permit us to give out, a story that a unit
composed of German American volunteers is being trained
to be dropped at night by parachute in Germany in order
to commit sabotage.
2. A little latert the names of some ot\
those who have volunteered are casually given out and\
references made to the fact that several such units halm
already been trained and that this is not the first one.
3, An outraged squawk could be arranged from
the War Department on the grounds that this information
had leaked out. This would insure its being widely dis-
4* Through British or our Intelligence, we
learn that there has been a train wreck or an explosion
somewhere in Germany, although this news has been withheld
from publication by the German authorities.
5. We immediately announce that a few days
ago American parachutists were dropped over a seetion of
Germany in which we know that this accident has occurred.
6. A few days later the news of the explosion
or accident comes out of Germany. If it does not come out,
we can plant the story in one of the neutral countries.
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0 01Rnnninn
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7. Two and two make four, and a lot of
Germans will believe that German American saboteurs ars
at work in Germany.
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This same scheme could be worked in Italy,
or any of the occupied countries.
You remember how effective the stories of a
German secret weapon were at the time of the break through
in Belgium. There was no secret weapon, but the idea
spread terror throughout the world. Thus, in this case
there might be no parachutists at all and yet terror -
and what in more important, hope - might be spread through-
out oeoupied Europe.
Sincerely,
Warburg
Advi Assistant
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SECRET
-e
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
210 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK
Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
ntb and E Streets, NW
.%asbington, D. C.
Dear Bill:
S.
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February 19, 1942
The more) I think about our conversation
yesterday, the more it seems clear that what you have
now aceompliohed le a real mileatono and enables us
for the firat time to plan upon to basis of reality,
This, plus certain organizational changes which I
hope the Roper Committee will recommend, ought to
mobilize ua in sueb a way that the only excuse for our
failure to do a real job will be our own ineptitude.
On February 17th I gave the Roper Committee a written
otatement of what organizational ehanges I thought
were necessary. Tom Early has a copy or this statement
in ease p.m ohould want to look at it.
The attached memorandum contains an idea -
or a group of ideas - which I would like to discuss
with you when we meet again next week. It seems to me
that we must find A way to overcome the difficulty in
which we shell be for at leaat the next six months -
namely, the fact that we ohall probably have no
ouccesaful major notiona upon which to hang our propa-
ganda, and that therefore we are likely to be thrown
and kept on the defensive. I do not think we need to
accept thio position, but to get away from it requires
a somewhat radical approach.
With best regards.
Sincerely,
Warburg
Advi y Asaistant
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0.0481
SECRET
MEMORANDUM
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
270 MADISON AVENUE
NEW YORK
February 19, 3.942
It is unlikely that for the next six months
the United Nations will a000mplish any me0or offonsivo
nueceoses. So far se can be foreseen, the period immediate..
ly ahead will be a painful one of defending ourselves as
best we can until our strength is fully mobilized. During
the next oix months in all probability the Germans will
reoume the offenoive in RUSSIA or the Middle East, or
poosibly Africa, and the JapATIOSS will undoubtedly continue
their offensive both toward Australia and India. This
will therefore be a period during which it will be difficult
to build up resietanee in the ocoupiod and so-called
neutral countries.
This situation need not be accepted from the
Onemais soya Fornew.ms.
point of view of olitical
It ehould not be aocepted, bOCAUSO another six
months of defensive politioal and psychological warfare
added to the inevitable six months of military defensive
may have disastrous oonsequences.
Modern warfare differn from warfare in the past
in that wnr is no longer a matter of armies, navies and
air foroee, nor is political warfare any longer a matter
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of negotiations between diplomats with an occasional
full dress performance for the benefit of the general
public. Military and political warfare are waged today
with practically every man, woman and child in the world
nitting in the theater As an audience, watching every
detail, applauding when pleased, breathless When thrilled,
art ready to throw oggs at the Rotors whenever bored or
displeased.
Hitler understanda this, lie has made the Nazi
revolution and the war A oontinuing drama. He has made
himoelt the chief actor. Ho has for six or seven yearm
managed to keep the entire world talking about what he
had done, wan doing, or was going to do. Since the war
etarted, the British have only on throe eecasions been
able to steal the show: riret, at Dunkirk; second, when
they won the Battle or Britain in the air; and third, in
their first Libyan campaign. But the British have never
understood how to make their cause dramAtio*
The Russians have come clogler to stealing the
show from Hitler than anyone else. Even when they were
being defeated they managed to make their Mae dramatic.
It ban become doubly so since they suet:loaded In turning
tho tide.
Our entrtnce into the war was largely robbed
of Ito dramatic flavor by the feet that we were attacked
and defeated at ?earl Harbor, and have been waging a de-
fensive war over sine*. But MacArthur's defense in the
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defense in the Philippines is dramatio and will oontinue
to bo so even though it was foredoomed to failure at
tho outset.
You said to me: "Our trouble is that we think
4 big nation. Until we are reedy to Rot as a big
Fl
nation, we ought to think as a little nation and do the
thInos thnt a little nation can do."
You were entirely right. What I am proposing
now lc ;along the line of your own suggestion.
Our politioal and psychological warfare, even
during tho forthooming defensive period, should aim at
dramatizing (1) ourselves, nnd (2) our cause. In order
to drawitizo ourselves, we should undertake limited but
spoottioular adventures whieh will steal the show and win
no sympsthy. Such adventures should he designed to
demonstrate tour things:
?
(a) That we aro on the offensive, are
thtnkIng offensively, and aro preparing major offensive
strkAos.
(b) That we are not 'Afraid to take risks,
nnd that the Germans nnd the Japanese have no monopoly
on untcldo vontilrou.
(o) Thnt wo nro onpabltl of planning and
onrryli)g out por.footly 000rdlnntod nnd timod offensive
notions in n11 pnrIA of Lho wor1d.
(d) That we have only begun to fight.
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fore are some random examples or this sort
(a) A division of American destroyers
suddenly appears at Malta - the hot spot of the Mediter-
ranean. It is welcomed enthusiastically by the garrison
and the population, who have been under constant attack
for two years. Nobody knows why the destroyers went there.
Shortly thereafter a squadron of American fighter planes
begins to knock down Axis bombers over Malta. It then
appears that the destroyers convoyed a ship or ships
carrying such fighter planes to Malta tnd that Americans
are now taking part in the defense of this fortress. Why?
Just because Americans are going to be wherever the going
is toughest. Possible loss: Three destroyers and nine
plane crews.
(b) An American submarine division (three
submarines) makes Its way into the North Sea, bombards a
Cow coastal cities, and sinks a few ships off the German
?oast. Possibly one of these submarines makes its way into
the Baltic and joins the Russian Baltic Fleet. Possible
loss: three submarines.
(o) A group of German-American volunteers,
speoially trained for the purpose, are dropped at night by
parachute in Germany to commit acts of sabotage. This
one could take either of two forms. It could actually be
done, or it could be announced as having been done without
snything having taken place. In the latter case, we would
t.
4
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see that a story got out as a leak saying that this
operation had been undertaken two weeks ago, mentioning
a few names of the German Americana and suggesting that
since nothing had been heard from them, they had either
been caught and killed or were still at large in Germany.
The Germans would know that they had not caught any
parachutists and therefore would begin to wonder whether
they were at large in Germany.
Another way to do this would be to wait
until through our intelligence we were informed that an
explosion had taken place at the X factory in Germany.
Immediately upon receipt of this information we would let
out our story that a little while ago parachutists had boon
dropped near Xiwithoutjmentioning the explosion. When the
story of the explosion came out, every one could put two
and two together.
?
'
(d) A hit an run raid by a fast cruiser and air-
craft carrier squadron coming down from the Aleutian Islands
upon Japan itself. If only a few bombs were dropped on
Japanese cities by carrier-borne aircraft - a few shells
pumped into Japanese coastal cities - the effect would be
spectacular. Incidentally such a raid might well draw both
naval and air forces back to Japan and thus relieve pressure
on the East Indies and Australia.
I could go on enumerating such examples, but the
four above stated will serve to illustrate the point. None
of these adventures except the last one would have any real
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military significance. All or them involve very great
risk to limited forces. All of them would acoomplish
Lho purpose of dramatizing ourselves.
But it 1.8 necessary not only to dramatize ourselves
And to steal the show us against Hitler and the Japanese -
it ie ale? neoessary to dramatize our cause Am Against the
"Now Order" in 14urope, and "Amin for the Asiatics" in Asia.
This le a subject about whioh 1 want to do some
more thinking before I make any specific, suggestions.
What I ave in mind ia that we must make the oause for which
we are firhting something more than a more defense of the
world as It has boon and likewise eomething more than a
more promise or a better world in the future. We must find
Q Way LO do what Wiloon did In the last war. We must find
a way to demonstrate that the four freedoms are real and
that wherever we aro viotorious we titian establish them. To
give jubt or examp1o:
Suppone Prance definitely goes with Oermany.
Suppose we then immediately take Martinique and in consul-
tation with the Latin American Ropublies set up Martinique
nn a Republio, giving full freedom to the inhabitants and
equal suffrage to all, irrespective of color, provided they
can pass a literacy tont.
Thim woulu he a practical domonntration of
t
Ilboration.
The) great Maus
or pooplo
throughout the world
/ *
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Imittnettvoly think or Churohill 118 their Defender, but
think or Roosevelt aa their Liberator. This is perhaps
our atrongoot weapon, but in order to uno it we muat
prnotioal and dramatic) demonstration.
Aa I say, more on this Llubjeot in A later memo-
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in considorinG the vcstion of drivinii
4
tho Nazis and their Japanose allies, Wis att#
tliat tho main wol6ht . and perhaps All the weight or
,pimganda must be direntod against Germany since the
sonrcIty of short.wave listening nets in Jvan rendflrs
1,r-adonsts to that country largel:i inerCectunl.
There ure a numb(_, of !)oirltn w I r II mt6ht be
chnd on and oihich mic,ht nnuve dissonqi(m.
Stres the point ttA L in the event or an Axis
^ictor:, Japan, with thu territory which sho will
(ontrol, and the riches which she will command,
will be far better off than qermany, even though
the k(Ich mny dominate Europe.
With command of mw materials, Japan will bo
o'do to live on tho fat of te land, while Germy
%illl still by' u prey to the tyvanny of 1ationint5.
"Vhil(; Oormany 10 still experiencing the
"Uenefits" or orontz materials, Japan will revel
In rcch tImpplIno or natural rubber, and tin, nnd
will ilor it for chcap manufactured ,:;oodn,
Ifowevrr much (ormany emilaves the ooplo or
EtiriTe she catmot, (lompoto v?ith the toomIng millions
or chnap coolie labour which Japan will command.
Howrvor much Germany experiments with sub.!
? LItute oeffoo, nho cannot equal the excellent
richnPos of real coffee which will be amenr JapAnts
1,1zes.
a) A Military trvdition exists between lermany and
Cnina since 1U20. Veal*. German mill'ary figures
- Wetzell and Soeckt turnou to China us
a field cnr. tholv emnius. They knew that the
throat of Japan to China was a throat to all
^ivlilzoLlon.
Thn oevmnn Military MInJton under Palitenhauson
won willdrawn In 1:)7A3 only on the demand of Japan,
31nco when have Garman soldiers been ordered out
r)r Lhulp posittrino by an alien rnce2
) V1L (ioneral von Palkobhkution what he saw at thm
sock or Nanldn6, orld how IL arrocted him? Ask him
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and frightfully treated as Lave the irenchi the
P4Les, the Greeks, the Dutch, ete?il conquered
by littler. just as no Gerian wants to witness
ths national oppression of 4ermany, so no French-
Mbh, no Norwegian, no Greek, no Pole no Russian
Tants to see his countily subjugated#
3) Goebbels lies when he says that the
Nazi regime is fighting to prevent a new Versailles
If that?. the case, why did Hitler make a sneak
attack on the Soviet Union which had nothing to
do with Versailles? Why are the NorwegAans and
the Dutch, who had not even taken part in the
last world war, being so cruelly subjugated?
Why doe!!! Hitler collaborate with Mussolini who
certainly did everything during the first World
War to involve Italy in war with Germany and who
regarded the VDrsailles Treaty as inwafficientIr
drastic for Germany? Why is Hitler collaborating
with the Japane e who were eo-signers or the
Versaillos Treaty and who seized the German
possessions in the Par Fast during the last war?
4) Hitler has pursued un even more
in9anc policy than Kaisor Wilhelms He launched
a trencherous and unprovoked attack against the
Voviet Union and oubsequentlys and 4f1thout prov-
oc;Icion, declared war again bt the United States
Thereby he welded the two most powerful nationo
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of thu twonty ix United Nations. Italy ia juSt
am wrotchvd an Ally us Austria-Hungary was. The
mime 0004 for Japan. Expose Italy's 4nd 41404n14
woaknossoz, as well as the hatred of the Italian
pooplo for Hitler Germany. Hitler Germany is
alrvady doomed because tae most powerful countries
Of the world have united againe.t the Hitler maw,.
Recount eyotnmaticsaly the armament program and
armament possibilities* the human reserves* the
indu:ttrLal ond food reserves* the high morals
which the United Nations 4nd people have for use
adhinmt tho Nagi regime. And the entire Worman
peopl mhould be constantly informed how Hitler
h4p oriven tho Gorman army into 4 horrible dwfent
on the YaAitorn Front. All the losses or the
Uorman arqly shou1d sy:Itemati('ally bo made public
s) Germany has become bigger but the
poople arc hoco,lina poorer and poorer. Poverty
in becomin8 (Ivor. aro/Ater and the people are
boipte. whit0 by the Hitlorite despoilers of
tho Gwin nation 014 poovle. Only the big WM-
mkorut the :unicorn* and the Nasi offieials
pr,ri% frm Hitiorto war. It should be shown
how L1, etc., how then Orown rulers* how
flo G)urr!nc trAmt aro enriching themoelvv,s in
an0 Ivy4 Lhoy aro incororating all the
imdorLi,nt Induntrion in the countrieft ocaupiod
by thoM ho thvir ,11111 private property. Novor has
. :j4:-;;??
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such a small upper-cruat made so much from the
as under Hitlor* The (erman plutocrats,
the Jtnier, together with the Nazi millionaires
uvo robbing the Gorman people in the most horri-
6) Hitler and the Hitler regime have
draggod the German name and the great German
cultural traditions in the mire by their enslave-
ment of and frightful atrocities against the
other ,i0oplea. Tho German people therefore, in
its own interest, must help the other peoples
to cestroy the Hitler regime. Thereby the Gomm
people will ?mte aeatn ro6tA1n respect and the
other ptoplet?. will know that Hitler has nothing
in CO 84X]1 with tho true spirit or the German
poj:iiFffectivo portrayal should be made of
the mtrovitios ,lerpotratod by the Hitler reisime
in the occupied territories atint the civilian
populi;tion And the national rights and inde-
pendence of the conquered nations.
7) Tell why the Germun-Americans are
also for the dontruction of the Hitler regime,
Not only becauso they wnnt to defend America's
national freodom and democratic liberties, bat
fano bocuune they know from their own tixperi-
oncomh w much the atr, citiom porpetrated by the
rogloo against the other peoples are
boAnirchinic the Orman mu, and bocauoe they
know that the only salvation ror Uermany Wits in
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B) It ?
It is of extreme importance that
special appeals should be made to the German
working class. Analyze their standards of liVing,
their lc Lt of civil liberties und free trade
union*. Remind them of the great traditions and
asoirations of the Gorman labor movements
9) Mow that peace could come tomorrow,
the German poople could nave peace tomorrow the
German people cnn determine their own fate in
frec.dom tomorrow, tomorrow the
freely again, tomorrow justice and eanity can
prey 11 in Germany again if the Hitler regime
is dostroyed. For tho centrul iue in this
war is the unitwl and resolute detruintjon of
all frpedom-loving peoples and natton not to
becoue the alaveg of the Drown
the Prussian generals, the German munition kings
The followil.g personalities could be
used very effectively for broadeanting to Germany*
1) American labor and trade union leaders
various industriev. For example, an American
miner could appeal to hi n Gorman colleagues and
Gxplain to them why they have a common interest
from the standpoint of the interests of the workers
of all countries, in the debtruction of the Hitler
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eplain that they are not rioting so Wit Go,04117
In ordor to affect Oormatylo nAtionel itidepend6nee
but only to prevent the people* of tho world fron
boeoming slaves of the Hitler regime.
3) Roprepontativeta of thti Communis Prty
V, 0* A., who could explain why they are one
hundrod per cent behind our govvrnment in thin just
war against Hitler Germany? (It phould be borne
In mind that in the last free 41401410119 in GerN4ny
over 6, 00,0o0 votes were oast for the Communist
Porty of Germany)*
4) German-Amtvicant who would tell that
tZ&yexorciao all demooratio liberties in the
Unit VtaulrA that they have Garman Language nets-.
pupors and maeuzinow publiohed without interference;
that they have German language radio programs sal
that Choy can bold German langunao mootings and
can itseemblo in German /anguade orgt:lasations; that
they nri, flr the dooLruction of the Hitlor resin
not only betftuao they want to defend ;km democrgttic
lihortioY of the Unite Dut also bV6aune
they know the mhame thut the Hitler regime has
brought down upon the Oornan name and people
throurhout the world*
5) Protetant and Cathalo clergymen who
could opcak on the quwtion of religious froedom.
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15) Artists, movie uctors, journaliete,
NvientisUi whoEo mimes to* known in Germany who
ypot.k of their respect for the great Oerman
culture which ha6 nothing in common with the
Nitlur rugimc*
7) Engineore who cou1d epeuk factually
bout thp er.ormoua armament industry And the
ov wGr production In the United
8) .)roninent Amoric(An women, including
or Oe-rmitIn 410Y.cont1 who aro associated with
groseivo otkovement who could
1c, Lh illothers or Germany, especially to
01.1 tald working womon. OimIlarly,
woud bv .iLa rol.C,vInable to Utilizo 40M0 out..
A.:tvirtrilJrx youth loadvr8, ropro-entatives
of vari-uu Utica' tandvnclos nnd fieldo of
ie rcligioua, labors frot-mal,
culforia rlovc.1(10P.
9) Utmaial cmigrocT whosoUtj notice NAND
14 Utmany; 'o:t' example, porNon likJit tnrjh e
It would bo ubeful to eutablialh
ry for broadc44tn to Germaqy
the Ge1M411 lo1jil3ae0 which wwuld includo a number
uuthorittalvto ()ovum anti.fa!sci.vt
(,Acrtn, roprcalit4,t1ve of all political
nd(hvitqi.
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10) It sho40 be roto4 lhat ther* aro
a whol* number of Gorman amigroot in Mexico
have had much valuable experience with NOW- ,
propaganda to Germany since they spent* years in
Republican Spain working on radio compiains
aguinst the Hitler regime? Also some have had,
considerable experience with the illegal Gump
radio etations?
k
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41
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044 ITSILUERVIK.L.Aw?Almat
Mt. Leigh has been mr agent for lecturing in the past year
and his organization has been extraordinarily efficient in arrang-
ing travel and other details of a tour.
Mr. Leigh tells me that he would ask nothing better than to
turn his entire efforts to the service of the nation without cos.
pensation. I an convinced that whether for your organization
or for the whole Government service in organizing tours they
could not be in mare efficient hands than in those of Mr. Leigh.
You may feel that this suggestion offers something of in-
terest to COI; it not, you may think of another wganization
in the Administration to which this might be of interest.
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mrPt9
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4013Mt5cam maroh 17, 19424
Propaganda, in the MAO of the ferosful presentation of new ideas,
seems to be effeotive only in periods of defeat and discouraimment. I
do not know of a case in the past where a people have revolted agaiast
their government when the forma of that government are on a viotorious
maroh,
The Japanese, therefor*, would not seem to be in a mood at present
where propaganda could be effeotive. Furthermore, the oharaoteristios
of that people are so immutable that it ie diffioult to believe that alien
thought and argument can ever maks their appeal,
In Germany, on the other hancil the ground would seem to be Ruh more
fertile, First, the German people are hig)Ay mystic; they readily wept
new ideas. They have no brakes in humor or eommon sense on the reaehos of
their ideas, so that their resulting philosophy frequently develops into
the grotesque of exaggeration. Thus they fluotuate more widely in the
pattern of thnir philosophy than any rao* I know of. Bowl, they have
enoountered a severe military ()hook in Rummies Their losses have been
heavy and they have given ommiderable ground. Further, Hitler has as.
fumed supremo commend at Jut this moment and thus has made himself re.
sponeibie for military romults, and responsible Wore a warrior raoe who
have held their General Staff almost in reveronoo for hundreds or years.
To *nob a now, it suet be staggering to have a lance-corporal move in on
the supreme teohnioal command.
It would appear, therefore, that it is essential at the moment to
expend our greatest effort in propaganda on Germany, and only seoondarily
and in antioipation on Japan,
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6,AP.
For such purpose, we must have a thesis, and one whir* has a (sham
of being tempting to the German people. We can beat Germany ee of this
I am oonvinced but we oast accomplish this in a much shorter time if
we have the help of some of the German people. twenty-five years ago,
President Wilson developed a Oillesophy whioh was worth several argy
corps to us in breaking down German morale. In other words, in giving
the German people an alternative to dying, to the last man, for the
Kaiser. Up to this moment in the present struggle, we have done nothing
nor suggested anything, I feel, whioh has alienated one German in Germany
from Hitler, nor have we offered any alternative to the Germans whioh was
better than a struggle to the death to preserve his nation. Knowing
something of the 3ermans, I feel sure that "amiss to raw materials,"
fair field in international trade, even domooragy and individual rights,
bulk tar less largely in their imagination than the future of the raoe
Geramos place in the famlAy of nations; GermaAylis pride and prestige;
Geranyls desire to be not only one of the great powers but to be con-
sulted and treated cc tuoh.
To py mind, nothing offers such brilliant hope for the future as
the Anglo-Amerioan ecloperation which the President initiated with Mr.
Churchill" It is exaotly the type of thing to oarry into the future.
It is without rigid form, henoe pragmatics and able to follow the method
of trial and error, so dear to the Anglo.Saxon. While the newspaper
headlined have labelled the collaboration as ea Nallianoe," both Mama
of State ban ocrupulously refrained from use of the word, and with
profound wisdom. An "alliance no matter how powerful invariably sooner
or later Galls into being somewhere in ths weal a hostile and counter.,
balancing tom. A "oollaboration" is under no suoh inexorable oondimi
tion.
108:1001
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wOollaborationr0 intimate as it alw be between two parties, is a
fluid thing and has no need to be exclusive. It oan and doubtless will
call into oonforence or even to collaboration, states which have a like
purposes The only yardstiok for admitting the eollaboration of a state
would to its determination to maintain peas and order. Form of govern-
wont would not matter oertainly we will have to oollaborate with a
vtotortooe Soviet Uuion through reoonstruction days and thereafter: Our
only *riterion, it f@OMN to meg will have to be "does this state went to
help to keep the peeoelw If it does, we must work with It and admit it
to our ocranoils, no matter what its form of government. To do otherwise
would be to ensure a ropition of a world struggles
If suoh is our philosophy, there would elm to as every reason to
say go, and to say so formally and emphatically. Oone genius may find
a better approach to Gorman thinking, but my mind oannot oonneive of any-
thing so effeotive. Suoh a deolaration would mean to the Normans that
omis they had thrown out Hitler and his gang and had oonvinoed the Russians,
the Drtttan And oureelvee of peaoeful intent, they 000ld begin to oolbabor-
ate with the Great Powers for the maintenanoe of pulse, for great projeots
of development or backward areas, *to. Their splaoe in the ese would
still be theirs, and they would not neoesearily be condemned to another
generation of humiliation through their exolusion from the oounoils of
the world. As suffering and fatigue wear them down, so more and more the
Germans will be groping or a 'my to end the struggle. If it can be in-
dicated that the way is in their own hands, the war may be immeasurably
shortened, If it is felt that Germany must be punished, and it may well
be advisable, then let her be punished. The punishment may be formidable,
but it must not be enduring. The (Wane themselves may, in their Mew
, ,e?Nitta,????Witt1.
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tuating pbilosophy, resognise the necessity of punishment, but they
will moguls' it the nors readily if they see light bwyond, it they
can be oonvinoed that when they have purged themselves, their plame
as a great people is milting them.
It would be fasoinating to explore this thought further, as to
ito influent's in a postftwar world, bat this organisation is dealing
with the present only. Helm I an treating the subjeot from the propa*
ganda phase only. I oannot refrain from adding, however, that I have
been convinoed for years that there is no enduring pease without Oorman
participation, that even au overehelang viotory would demand from the
viotors a sustained ruthleesuess of which they are inoapable, if they
attempt to set up a pootowar organisation for peace without the ool1ab4.
oration of Oermany.
Oertainly ouoh a declaration as I suggest would have to be most
?irefully Wailed. It could not be pit as an obvious appeal to Germans
to revolt against their lesders. The memory of the fourteen points and
their reception at Versailles are still too vivid in the German mind.
It would have to be done oauti000ly and by inferenoe and the repetition
of the thought would not only make it penetrate, but also sight well,
after a poriod of time, cause a belief in its sincerity.
/ doubt whohor we could oount upon suoh help from the Snglish in
thin conneotion, I have only met Mr. Ohurohill, but have read him
deoply4 / could imagino his showing great generosity to a conquered
foe however, I oould not imagine hie bellicose nature paying great
attention to subtle 1106fta of wearing his down. Mr. Eden, on the other
hand, / know intimately. I ammo that his is not the type of NW to
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dna with matters of /mg range effoot. His mind grasps and *lingo
to the problems of today., President Roosevelt, however, night be
deeply interestod in such a thought, both from the point of view of
stratog, and for the futures If he were interested, he Gould awry
out the program oonommmatelr well.
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v
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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
101111.1?1111.101611651111.111101111M
INTEROFFICE MEMO
FROM: Langer
TO: :;401.on 01 1 tin j ? Donov
SUBJECT:
DATE Vebruary 14, 1042
enti.w. ldr y!loiquidlthi of youtoruay, pciulive
to iosonli .a.Liole of ,iovelabcr 16, 1U41
In LI-to ;Autsohc IL;:l!.eoino :AolLunP, I am now ploasod
Lo aLtAtoh _ciaorunuum oontuinlw, solao
ooluni out
on thi's article Ly ,alLer L. 'Arno ehiee of
oltr 'CH 1, Pit I 111110 1,c ucc Lion.
.L Luctuit
..?
AM= Lunror
DirccLor
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?-!""c4
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41, ?.?
FNfiRMATM SF- ItlfefikinCli
INIffiliffiR *WO
FRoyl: Walter L. Dor
To: Colonel Donovan
SupJECT: Joseph Windschnhts taticle o?oVember 10, 1941 in the
4.)9,11$.,che PAUX4440r.04L141ta4,
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494,ATilebru4kry],4 }942
Geerdl v4awics. Joseph Windochuh does not always hew
closely' to the Nazi party line anymore than AdrIA.rl
Tatiens does in his military broadcasts. Both play a
intAiatin4 role between the old, German Nationalists or
Oan-Germans and the Nazi party. Winascti,ih in particular
is maKing strenuous eZforts to reconcile industrialists,
who want nothing so Much as free enterprise, with the
ctmtrolled economy of trie Nazi regime.
This article appeared shortly after a speech by
Dr. Funks in Onigsberg on November 7, 1941. Funk's
!al)Q0Cit equiValent to a G,irman solution of the East-
cr:A problem: Me Ukraine is an area for German exploit-
ation, 6. source of raw materials; it is to constitute
the busts for a large-..;cale migration of German industry
from tue RLine to bilesia and to serve as a hinterlAna
for t,le German ad-Ltie ports, Danzig and lOnigsberg.
Windscnuh c9uld not have been ignorant of Funk's
speech when he wrote this article. The body of the
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article may be cons &used under two heads: Gomm policy
toward the q.st and the relation of the United States
to the New Order.
I gpmatLALIALtolitxd tttJjj. Windschuh speaks of a
common participation of the countries of Europe in the
exploitation and development of the East as a substitute
for colonial expansion overseas.
There is literally nothing in past Nazi practice
that justifies the suggestion that this now is or is
likely to be Nazi policy The New Order is merely a
propugandu semen designed to conceal the bre:calitios
of Nazi military economy.
a. They are using their currency control not
to stabilize the currencies of the conquered countries
but to undermine them. Local currencies are constantly
being subjected. to German pressure.
b. In the East and South-oust of Europe Germano
have largely bought out French, Belgian and Dutch in-
terestn. This applies to banking, insurance, and all
varieties of induatrial investments. German economy
has been emancipated from outside control, while Germans
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have filtored into the economies of all other peoples
to an unbelievable degree.
c. The trade of all countries has boon made to
center in the Reich. All imports - textiles, food, raw
materials - come from Germany, und all exports go to
Germany. Total trade has everywhere declined, while
tragic with Germany ham constantly increamed. In all
countries Germany in primurily concerned in nupporting
thono inOnstrift which nro working for the Gorman wnr
mchine.
All othor intoronts, including to a largo ex-
tent it4liun, have been excluded from the Balkans.
Already the aumulltrAilLAt41 iB boing groomed to
opovato in the Ukraine, and Windschuh is, to my know-
loage, Lilo only Gorman journalist who speaks of "common
pirtIcipationni Dr. Funk in no roference tu it.
II. Wh4tever Nazi agentn may have; said in the United
Otaten before the war, no Amnrican should forgot that
in the Nazi systom foreign trade is and in likely Lo
roman hiajjatramilLoiLuttaat. Thio is an integral
trait of the ystem, not merely u matter of policy.
Alrgady Nazis bount of having made within the past
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two years the most comprehensive analysis of the Latin
American market yet undertaken. There aro German mil-
itary men and economists enough who believe that the
final test will bo between German-controllod Europe
and the United &Mattis. What in really significant in
Windnchuhts article Is the That that now even he sub-
scribes to this doctrine.
*
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Aitootettill ERMOtilai.SfAMMUNICATKINS
THE SECRETARY CP 3TA1E
? WAINARAITON. D. C.
L C./
1)
ICA
DEPARTMENT OF STATE
WASHINGTON
February 7. 1942
my dear Colonel Donovan:
On the possibility that it may not have coma to
your attention I am transmitting herewith a copy of a
significant article which appeared in the November 16,
1941 issue of the authoritative Detitsohe AlLeadin
Zeta s of Berlin, which article might hove some value
from a propaganda viewpoint.
It appears to me that as of the time this article
was written the Nazis considered the Russian ompaign as
virtually completed and were planning for post-war developm
mints in which they would treat the conquered territory
as a colonial satraphy. In the sets-up envisaged in this
article the United States, of oourse, was ,to have been
isolated from all participation and Europe under the New
Order was to have been a closed compartment to American
trade.
Colonel William R. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information,
144 Apex Building,
Washington, D. O.
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This picture, of course, is ftolly at variance witk
the propaganda disseminated LA this Gauntry by Nee, spats
to the effect that the United States would have been tke
recipient of a huge amount of trade from Germany had vs
remained neutral?
Sincerely yours,
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(COPY:pit:MID)
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sEEM
LOLThLAS: SK RAL rtiopi
"(l) In au article in the prow! gigskajne
:osef Winschuh discuases what the neiglag
conquered territories in the last will mean to Europe
economically. The destruction of Bolshevism and the
progressive conquest of the Soviet sacs and opening
up .on Germany's and Europe's door e e ?? or
land for e tle eaLcoloni t w 'El
I& our i oes n s is d-tr sand
ts _sutra US DOD 04 W 11 bj jb]s to n& smalopient.
"Winschuh says that a 'little' solution of the Eastern
problem is imaginable, working with traditional eonooptions,
methods and tempi, and a 'great' solution, radical in its
methods, planned on a world-wide scale and passionate in
its attitude. There can be no doubt that this ttie
"Such a turning to the East implies a lot more than
just a geographical extension of Europe, with the contin-
ent's centres of gravity and of energy remaining the
same. When towards the end of the Middle-Ages the New
World was discovered; Europe's face turned towards the
West. The colonisation of the East ceased, the forces
of the East became hostile to Europe, the West became
great. Europe's energies flowed out into the wide world
and were lost to Europe o The shifting of Europe's centre
of gravity to the East means for a start that Europe must
emancipate itself from the world outside. Next, it means
that Europe as a whole participates in the construction
work in the East and that Germany neither desires nor is
in a position to revitalise the East by herself.
mrho Eastern territories will see a similar deploy-
ment of European energy as the New World did when the
white races penetrated North America. The East will
become the welting pot of Europe, and a new colonising
race will grow up there.
"The New Europe was helped into the saddle by three
factors: the oommon conduct of the war against Bolshevism,
the British blockade which forced the continent to become
self-suffioient and the hostile tension between America
and Europe. Even when the first named two factors have
ceased to exist, t e to s on betwee ca sd aro??
will remain r a n3 may even $ a ?
the der to endure asid to
e us assume that the war were
tdifolii-tiiiiia-rlyend and trade and shipping wire to
start once more: in that case 'Cu ..e co
wou d ?r.? ? di re to r ? o o ?? ? ? ?
?
ga_maglik.i.e ou s ?e wor ? wou ? aga.n OA 00 ?on.
Ruzrtioipation in the construction work in the
East counterbalances the tension between America and Europe.
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a 4, $ are
raw ma er a s an oo surp usess of the Xast as well as
in the investments for constructive purposes which the
East will require in a large measure.
"Naturally the undertakings and poasessions of the
Soviet State will, to begin with, be taken over by the
State, but there can be no question of Eastern economic
forms influencing the Reich, for instance in the Shape
of increasing nationalisation of industry, but on the
contrary, our energies and our forms must influence the
East. Before the World War, Russian shares were greatly
valued in Paris and everybody on the Stock Exohange knew
the name of Kriwoi Rog. Why should not the same thing
happen again gallAllimaijunisal. The periodical,
fiar?...f..---aitid-irani,--rifixiiiitl-y-lidoated the intro.s
diiiitioricirTastern shares (Ost-Aktion) on the German Stook
Exchange, in order to alleviate the shortage of shares on
offer (See Digest 666, 17.11., A I -). This seams to
dispose of Freneh hopes that French holders of Imperial
Russian shares may now get their money back - See Digest 633,
9.10., r III- 15., - Ed.). The reform of the conditions
of property and industrial initiative in the East would
have important results in many directions, thus one need
only mention t it e w, ? t? ? v.t s t ? o ?
? t ? E . mink 41, grirM1114.1.11.1104114t
am* amoun ng 0m ax.s o mar * oou
mo ized in this manner.
"The 'great' solution of the Eastern problem is above
all a question of transport. The Wept, the North and the
South of Europe are hinterlands to great sea ports relying
on the cheap freight rates of sea shipping, but in the
East gigantic distances must be overcome by land transport.
1,-? tfe t .1 ??rt.be deo ve as t e
OMITI1
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As a post script to the Horst Wessel Lied idea,
an Austrian Jewish friend of Mrs. Morris's Who
had been told about this idea, said that she
thought that it was psychologically quite wrong,
because party members would simply be infuriated
at hearing their song used, and nothing could be
done anyway in winning party member away (?),
and for people who were not a hundred per cent
with the party the tune of the Horst Wessel
Lied would have too many terribly associations.
I think this may be more the exiled and
persecuted German's reaction perhaps, than the
reacti-m of an ordinary citizen of the Reich.
? . :
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*
,
Mrs! Marketa Morris,
M. Morris in Czech by birth, and ?am. from Prague. SNP it.:717ii
to a Gorman Jewish doctor of mehologyt and is herse1f-a_p0044,
analyst of the %Tung school, I think. She left Germany shoit14-)iitte?
Hitler came to power in 1933, and than lived in Italy, then rrallati
and lived through the fall of Pranee in 1940, and has been ifv:thili."
United States now for several months. 3he lives at 605, WeWl13t
New 'York City (telephone University 4-503l). She spoakfi GepOiln,
French, Ozeoh, but her 2Aglish is not yet very good. She hifi*ade
special studios, in the past, on the use of mass suggestion 1he
Nazi mopogandists, and of the power of the unconscious in nigois0 an
national groups. 3ho carried on over a period of about twolears
(1933-1035) a oorreapondance with a woman in Germany, aver she-hers
wns living In Italy, in which she pretended to be an unhappy, eiiled
Nazi, asking for information from a Nazi friend in Germany as to'how
to deal with tho criticisms of the German governmant that she
encountered among foreigners. Sometimes shty was answerdd by the
Gorman censor as well aa by her friend. She was expelled suddenly,
frnvl Italy, but she mild never find out if it had angithing to do wi
ANOmit those letters. Later she not the friend with whom she had
corroopondod in Prague and learned that her reports of the criticisni
of ponplo living in the democratic world had had groat effect not on
In this wiman who had received the latters but also on a groutiof
people t) whom she had read them. She said)in carrying on thig.
nIrrospondaneepshe learned a groat deal about the Nazi 1)01/eft-and
psychilogy, and foots that she could put slme of it to use. I thing'
she w 4' luld like to work in some sort ' advisory capacity, or on. gehno
tdoan, within a propoganda organisation.
,
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Notes on a conversation with Mrs* Markete.Morria*
1229ific Ideas*
To approach the German youth, particularly children, in propoganda broadcasts
to try and conkteraot the street of the education they receive in the 'Wools
and In the Hitler Youth, Which is concentrated enttrely on the pripparation
of ate child to be a Natim--i.o., they are educated to fight from the
rt :Loi moment, to believe only in the German race, and to fight for the
supremaey of the German race. They are appikaled to,)in the Nazi educational
nystem)by way of their emotions, therefore propoganda to be effeetive should
ala e approach them through their emotions--same methods but different
matter.
ROO
1
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006-0
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To have a good song for the German mopoganda broadcasts, which would
capture the imdgination of the German peoplii , a song they would find theme
selves bumming au they did their work. In a ouggestion made later, she
Say S that tre Hort Weaael Lied, which hue a fine, swippg tune, could be
used with different wordo, and it would have the advantrage of being a tuna
which when hoard hummed or played could not immediately be labelled an a
rebel song, in fact it might eauee infinite confusion end embarraesment to
the Nazis, because they would never know Whieh words lore being thou t if
a person whistled the Horst Wesel Lied, and if they forbade its use it
would be a biz blow to the Party. She encloses some words written by her
husband for this new version of the Horst Weeeel Lied, and asks oppiaLally
that it ahall be noted that where the Naxitiolimpaye, "Die Fihno Hoch"
(the fings high) this version says "Die Hetnirlioah", one a mab rial object
being lifted as a symbol, an the other a spiritual idea* Yo 11 SOO
by her attached letter that thin song has been Bent by her hue and to
MUL as an entry In the competition for a German Song of Freedom asked for
by WIWI,.
a In o more general sonno to carry on a propaganda to Germany that is based
cal on embtional appeal, appealing to the sentimental and the mystic side of
the) Gorman race. Logic is no good, because they have been utterly confuse4,
to long by th,., tortured logic of Mein Kampf. Hitler ha e known how
to cohminicate to their unconscioue, he has asked them to "think with their
bl.)ed"and It in only through the same sort of approach that new ideas can.
be got neross to them. Give them strong, emotionalowaty stuff, and they
underntand that sort language; give them recbsonable, friandly, quiet
chatty atatement or facts and everything that they have been filled up with
about the soft, sloppy democracies Who do nothing but talk will be uppermost
In their minds) nnd they won't accept anything they hoar thus presented*
GeneraA, Ideas.
Generally speaking Mrs. Morris diecuesed at seine length the whole subject
of the 1130 of the unconsoLoue on MA3B03. She thought that for someone
Who underntoed the American people, au she said she did not as she was a
newcomer here and did not speak good iLnglish, that the name sort of thing
could be used to bring the war home to them, as could be used immerimit
propoganda to Germany, adapted ofeouree to the Amerioan character. She si.
felt thot the only thing that a European could do in America itself and(W
ftmovittans, is try to impress on them the eerlioulnese of the totalitariah
menacee-the aetual truth of the wcrld convent idea, the fact that you ea*,
truOt *Hitler as you cm hardly trust anyone else to go through with WKO
lue Iliad he intends to do. To make that true to Americans.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23:
? 4'
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
?4141.44ti
1
- ,
kdoiiNiAamiclokiologislierletaisoopoi '4,4,4414,4,060,2.04:',74e4.
t'? ?
Virs? Varketa M. MORRIS
atm*
6OFC Veit 113th StrOOt ? APICA3
WOW York City'
Pbenis UNivorsity 4.931
chbre Madams,
je vous envoi. el-joint uns shanson de MSG
marl. 13. l's faits WA on Prams 0 elle/ orbit dO itro
utilt-
se pour los 4missions in longue allemande do is MIX. Ls dim
fait* do l* rm.* smpisba la rielisation de so projot?
rods sotto IdOo sat vraiment ostuelle, doss
loopinion ousel dos !nations** eormitenteiii Prows: Is fait quo
WIWYL, German Bastion, nous envois just dans sea jour*.
s call for a Goren song of Freed's. On4immenso dons somprendrs
ltimportanis de 14141ment Aggiktsma dahi la propaganda m it mitt.'
oulierement dens sone qui solidness* auilknemanda.
Nous regrettons sopendint quo so sonsours de
wrul fixe tbo deadline pour los sontributions pour 301 lir mat*
Nous scams constornds (Luton sroit 'Noir tent Is temps it queen
puisse retarder losotion tenement urgents do plus dgTois?
ii faudrolt asmildror 311 r4a3isotion do sotto idds
qui eat bonne. clutestmes quo vous in MOOS ?
Mon men i * snvoyd as chins on WM pour me
ooncours C eves 6ndisation de son nom dans uns onvolopps osebet4s)*
Et simojoint tins sopie de is aontributios. Yale nous prifdrerions
si l'on no voulsit pee tordor trap longtempso
lo 16 more 1042.
.74
te
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 [,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
This seas shoula beim.. the Neilimit Anthers fair .11
-
theissrithe sib either inside Germany or shrost.40..ars: fighting few
the destrustion of the Nest -regime and for ths estsioltsismsit
It should be breedeast as often as possible m sad
partieularav-whenever the programs is irtemdei foram emetioam
el appeal and not only for mere informations Sometimes.**
broedossts should be devoted espeeielll to orptiosoutotion of this
By aboosing the melody of the *Rem Weasel Lie." els
Ws medal and rythinie basis, we faellitsto the infiltration
of the 1210r# song among the Norman asses. The firet words of
the text in referring beek to the ipeniftwerds of this Nall-
song show the eontrast between the tetaliterin end the dime**
retie way of life* ',Die Pelmet boob', of the Herat Vocal Lied
Is a military order and hes itio do with the lifting of em
terrial ebjeet m "Diehersenhoebw Is an appeal to our inner WM(
and summons us to the exercise eft free eeoPere$14n?
we reeommend that the text be spoken first by one
person and then bra ohms, seeempenied by soft music, Later ON,
the anthem should be sung by s eberuss with f011 sampspimest.
neclassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
Declassified and Approved For
Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
A Gerson Sees ef Triladia ?
lin doutsebos Preibeitslic4 ?
su stunt nosh dor Atledio dos *Mona Wessel Liodass
Die Harlan Meld taibt Purobt ashy oder Utters
\ter Sobreeltenslierrsobatt. Und "War Tyronnoi
e?al unsers Lobanstraudo was vorbittern?
Autl Doss dor lionsob um wieder acklicb
, I - .S ?
7
Trii ,
win Manor, MUNI, Kinder doutsobor Sproobo
Sind einig goon Meat Hitleroi?
Vi r kiloton Air dos owion Deutsoblands Socha*
Wir welltn sin Deutschland hilfreiobt Viol" fit.
Sohluss mit dew Krieg** Sobluss wit ellen Qualms,
Tfl d4non bout Willson untergebn.
Die meauldigin Amor sellita is bosoblon.
Das deutsche yolk wird **dig auferstebn
Und wird slab nit den enders% villkorn atm
Xa Kampf Air ireiheit und semis is Roelit?
Die welt bat Raus ter elle ?v? sic wird Minos
versobtent wider Reams, nosh Gosobleobt?
Declassified and A proved
For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RnPi
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
TM GERMAN FOOD SUPPLY OUTLOOK
JUNIII 1042
1. In reoent woolint Information trom varioua
601042a
nourooa doolota a deterioration in tho l_aropoan Vood and
ngrtmatnval poattion: food rationa havo boon roduood;
a cold and prolonged wintor ham damagnd oropm; farmora
ore r000rted to have had Inaufillelont mood for apring
Many ouch neoounte niply that 4,ho Gorman food
potlItion i.i nuVVIcinntly unfovernble to be of doolaivo
nId to
In not yit wnrva0L0d.
Vood pueltIon In 4ormany nnd throuzhout
tho pnvticulor3y in iirban orenn, luto undoubtedly
ioLopt?vfo.ma ln LI to imnt 1'ioneLho1mma, the now
,;rimon rotlowi 1:111 pvovIdo Eal (iorman workera and
Noldlewh vitLh dieLn adognoLn tO maintain thoir rroaent
hvtIvItIon. Nvon Clopmnny'm no1'mn1 nonnumorfi, who mnkm
no tp,ocIrlo oro,itrIhntIon to the wor effort, will be
oilownd dietd onfrIcIttnt Le mnIntnin thorn. gormal!onn,
In ruot, :31.111 InmIALIAo momo rnrithor ration rootriotionv
wILtultt 'LI o notivILImm ur the) Unman population
Lho noxt yomr or movo.
Anolytilm or the, told-a rood Pneultlementa In
n.,incQifipd and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
Gortanny at the now ration :Loyola reveals that the
present consumption pattern or one not ripprooiably
inrerlor to It can, in all probability, be maintained
throuph the erop year ending on Augunt 1, 1043, and
perhnpo tltromh unlondnr 1043, Por the Old Heich, oudh
piAWAM will requIre approxima tely the rollowing domestic
ppoduction In the throe basic rood uxoupnt breadgrains,_
1010000000 motrto tone; mento? 203001000 metric, tone;
ol1m, 1,000,000 meLvio tont . it wi 11 also re-
(vitro the tmportation or smn11 additteoal aupdliee of
L1e:14.3 !nimbi o t , t tm y I V tho (hintonn envionF;e
military activity aftep 1d46,
?r;noh pvmhiotton and Import pronpeots still
urn Lt boniAnInfthlm. ovnn grant log orodonee to the
wivorno (loo) ( ondI ti UI E1I1U tho unavailability
1)1 mood. A o tunny', f.1 lin rill x iitttOn or ollrrent crop
roporLm Imilont:on it bho anmnp:0 may well be lona cover*
than Litman vopopLa atti:mat. Total output in 101rope need
llot; he AppveolaWy bolow that or 1041, it in thun irtt
rtnant. Molt production requiromeotm entimatod above are
well bti Luw pve-wav nopmni leve10 in the 010 unieh, and
mvrlo bo how Lhn milhoormn1 prodnottoo or the crop yearn
1940.41 nod 1041-42.
iscifid d Aooroved For Release 2013/09/23 ? CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
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thmt ttio NmAl WIIVWort will tlot bo appveloiably Jnborformd
with by 140k or Nod nominv, yoarp
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
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thmt ttio NmAl WIIVWort will tlot bo appveloiably Jnborformd
with by 140k or Nod nominv, yoarp
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
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thmt ttio NmAl WIIVWort will tlot bo appveloiably Jnborformd
with by 140k or Nod nominv, yoarp
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
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Mr. 'hrun that the dissemintoi,
tion of thla memorandum in its
editod form is in aouoruanos
with General Donovan's
instruotiona.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
ft jt(ot:rci.co.r-,..
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According to your instructions, upon arrival in
Italy on January 20th. I reported to Colonel TrIPMIHAR, Commarolyir
Officer of O.S.S. Special Detachment G 2 Vth Army.
A4 I arrived they day after the Ansio lmtUng, evoirynne
was keenly interested in the development of operations at the
beachhead. Captain OOZE had been ordered from the "'Forward Vohelon"
to cover these operations and in view writhe work to bo Oonf4 or
the 34th, 36th Divisions and contacts to be made with the Fran&
Expeditionary Corps (C37) I was ordered to go to the front as ston
a*I had familiarised myself with the organisation ce CANTIPPA
Loadquarters and with the Intelligence and Operations Sectione in
particular. Owing to the friendly assistance of the Ofoicers In charge,
of these Sections. I was able in a short time to get a fairly accurate
picture of the, situation.
The various activities of our oligauleation are eo
iateresting that it would be difficult not to be *sold on 0.9.g.0
AfOr one has understood the, workhin iteolf end obtained confirmation
that the informitiOn defitrolt4 IA AP* *4004 And r@lied upon by
Allied torsos. the 00100,-Wrtnrr0to beenitee we haw, been 4111efl &
porbQntt7 to rligtetor the Opre$40tow of pgrtien 1010 0 the
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
proved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
beginning might hhve been skerticel about our Ability to ao go. In
addition to U.S. YOTIOVIR, other ALUMS in 'mite of tboir ornoroneo
in G 2 work, here expresmod their inteeekAttlind takon momouroo on their
Part of the front to help 0.9.5. oarry out its Activitioe. This is tho
came of the Yrenoh Upeditionary porno whoohas given our Of#looro a
permanent pass requesting all Trenoh Commanding Offiooro Thittn to
give us every poesible assistance whenever we might neea it. T'4119 ie
not on acaount of existing mowl relations between 0.q.9. aria tho
ALIASTI MOM but because O.L. rsnreeents sometMng new, nattivtoil to
circumstances, the value of which might have boon quontionoa by our
assooihtee in the war until they were convinced ftnA booamo our boot
supporters.
Xxemination of Intelligence collected for instmoce
fromilloptembew 35th to ditto is most illustrAttve becnuee ths ouAlity
and precision of the information indicatee the groving offici07107 of
the work performed, this being equally true l'or torogreilhical And comhnt
Intelligence as well as for political And contact intelligence. while
0.5.9. activities are 'happily not limited to Intolligenoe and firs
ofton eXteriOrisod by operotione planned AV oarried out by un, their
nature obviously cannot be diecuesed here.
The attached name ars therefore based on wimple
experience which is of course oven to *vitiates*
44,11ropla
mr1r1 A nnrnved For Release 2013/09/23 CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
itup, 41,1r. n1/
e ?
? ?
Yor the %roes@ of the 'rile to bm unAortnion ono
because Colonel thougt tt
reettng exnerionce 2 *Past mil 0
ie
Beforo going forward. Oo1on4:46T
outsider did everything piSsible to Assist me to obttn ii
persnective of the Unit under his oommAnd And partinularly of th*
Tntelligence And OnerAttons leottons.
material in the Intel1igecce &Action to, 000rAtnnt*A by th* Into,.
1tgeno0 Offtomr anA tho promaration of rwmorts for rollowinp Ain
A) Oommt ano Tollograltionl Int01110noo
Volittoal Lfl4 Oontoot Intellience
o tlecatiby
s000rding to thnir nntur* gtvon out to ONAtth Army, 00.qedleleres
MOM SR and SIMI etc4...4
Those rerorlivintre?Ae-/Fottewirl
212;111120.R7,0111 wheamme0(rworo2otionti of
Agents Reports" ass remwritten only if nocomittry)),
a) Reports at Agents received through *YorwArd Moholon (AWT)s onlY
when ot Interest to ireotal Detaohment a:keit/1h ArMy for redistrift
button, because t$trnofioe 71 f 01 tnformatto for And nonem
. 4.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
rally utilised by unite in the combat sone.
b) In aikAlaglaro information rooetvefi from Long nnntro Yntolliponca
(LRI) *pinto, This information tp Roneral Am well mm AetftileA onA
while evalustoli am to nouroe AAA reliability, no Atmorimination im
made on the nature of tho subjects oonoerneile
! ' alanaLarjr,",:75,211 0,1 0 ore oonAenflois
from reports reoeived in many 08604 from n,R.g, Algiormo aloo othor
sources. Those extrecto Are vorranfireolateri bpownoit. thoy oinnrinrtts.
thr ettuntion over A wirioft of anyo nnA Ow* /%rooloo informntimn in n
nut-shell.
modo from ohorto ftnA ronorte
of eye witnesses emi which nro of gront imnortoncA whmn ofmroo mg
information to reliablik mnA
lagialMalli which oro writton by :ntollirmnoe
Officer whenever a particular requoot hnn boon rsoolvoid on .11 aortrtin
subject and whenever he considers that tntelligenco wtr be'
of opeci44 intermit to one of the partion to whom Tntellimonoe nommrtft
are distributed' Vol. eonmnle itwoecial report will be mado on t.".
The PlAttionl situation tn Italy...or the PsoA sitnetion in Aome.,
Slack mftrket prices in 'N.,.
region'
services (Wilmati etc..) tntelligence wanted for the Yth Army or
giving Utter boWileisettem4um information requested on a ?ormolus motto?,
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
?
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
z..?
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TPA -Paigivii
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While the Intelligence Sectkon of 00.9# tAkmil no
'treat action on information recAived entl sent, the offiotonoy of
this section fills many gaps nni, in nartioular tnforno onorfAionti
of real conaitions which permit the,- to but1A militory ormAnInAtion.
44.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
Ntt,oit No444
NK,A4
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
r qtElan
The AteCutive Officer with who* / worked showlo ma
how operations pending had boon proparoA anA wore tb bo OarriotA out.
It would be imprepor to detail those in this report.
Operations anA Long range Intellieonco work not
only requires full knowledge of the situation. tound planninr onA
executive talent, but also requires **n of ovnerience nnP courage*
The dispatching of What may ,.?m tho eimrloot mission, rri- instnnno
parachuti:4 or landing of Agents with their radio onerntf,r, n tyom oe
work with whioh we are femtlinrp requires berfect conrAinAtion in orAor
to reduce as much as rossible unforetoen oircumstanoos* Theroeoro
work of thc qApvly Officer of oneratione who hp e to eoe thnt Aponte nr.
equipped with Viings varying from civil clothes nnA undorwonr mnyinfac.
tured in the country where they will operates.. to hemA mi-onnAea or
plastic eta*** or the Inansla Officer who sink*, all arreuromente
and ensures the epee landing of the mon1 or the mungla Oeficor
who checks that nothing has been omitted and is reenoneMe fOr tho
final phase of the onerntion, each in their we are ae tirmortent A fnotor
to the $1100048 of the operation as is the will* which .nre0000 the.
iplanning. I have 'leen an important oreratton postm,ned because in on
kl instance the ammm)riato (Aril clothing boneht at the blnok mnrket
was not available in time to take advantage of the last day of 010
moon period ovost though everything was sot and the "recsttion committee"
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
alerted. In another Instance one of the motors of the nlmne
thronith ignition trouble. Pernono fnimilier with onerntimno
mommtimo* absurd hod tragic) mid* of their work boonii.v.
'fteoutive talent le moot neoPleary in n tyllo
where omohwoperation" to be onrriso out in AiffArant bacesunP nirmum.
atanetqa Ara oeltlom the 4RMA? 1114r work in K territory where
doing on, autonhtlonlly sliminatAo elemento whiob avie not nAwotable
to ohaneing 4ltuatIons. The remaining 060innOrmonnel, .4ireoteli by
an able ohief At its hoed naturally reenrReente n oiret olege outfit.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
' It'F;fiti
? .4
- As stated-previously most of the Omo waR sneint at thp
reb?tiiit= I'Vervard lohelon (I)".
Approximately 90% of the activity Atkesle is nocessw*Ily
Iftsical because when Agents are not infiltrated ts,ronph enomy line
it is necessary to keep close liaison with unqte in tbe combnt gonp
and *SRVI must therefore take advantage dO all ft:militias that its
amtonomy and independnnce conferstron it. Th. romainine 104 rayr-Psonts
coordinating activity, initiative, organisation anP comrPnA.
4, The gpmg, of Short Range Intellipfmce ip to obtntn
information of tltari valu to operations. by moans of sn4cial-
ly trained Agents, sent 00 or patrolled through enemy lines or
dropped in enemy territory. It also obtsine ieo-mation though
questioning of civilians and ID.risoners of war.
3, The SWAM= of short Rang* Intolligonco unAor the command
of a Command/34'01'110er, assisted by on or two other officers 'teeev.
ding to the importance of the govt.:up required, conprisos OW* non.
comm off. for clerical work who can also assist in matters f intel.
ligenoe, interrogation of Agents upon thoir return, interrogstion of
eisilia**, drafting of reports, he also takes carp of sumnliooge civilian
clothes etc... One radio operator and ono mechanic for the vohicules
and transportation. The organisation also includes one or two forner
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????
.?
4
Ar ?
For eIe-seAtel AKOMOMEIBI:arg v
A ..
almateartimintl
. .
/*Ants who are maintained at HOW become of tnot servinoll onA
because of their knowledge of thA country and our nnrtiatanr tyrlo
OVIT:t
-
+.7"4-.? ,
41."4,Mi
The INIMSMSA is required by 0 3 e Army RomAgnartemr*
its WO// AN from Division, Rogimentssoright down the ocele 000 ehmrt
attached) and therefore ?avers Intelligenoo of pommel cko woll st%
detail isTortnnoet whenever lonm rftdOe rfttrole of unite In combat or
air obeervation have not been abl* to mother came. grylprieroe he'vever$
has shown thatt1314* work to moot off/4;AI'. ot the onholon Oorilo ov
Dtvioton be0ause the information obtained ift menmrnlly mn A onalm
in harmony with oporktione they act ion. 'Mt" to obtmln04 wIthIn
A rang* generally not exceeding an winos from onoimi ilnoo an4 thmrAenrm
tiothe not interfere with the work of Lone Range lnte1Iittenee4 Ttio
tribution of intelligence to parties other thin the Above
le deoidod Ipon by HQ, Speoial Det4chaent 0 :lath Army it Agrotmont
with Intelligence ane Olsrations Officer4
Permanent &WM are emtahlieheA follovm s
2) I4 min Special Detoohment 01 for all vottmro of
general interest, somettses with other allied ouftte enoNed it) elmiur
work (example I Vorward tohelon of RR) in ortter to mot 'co ftplionte
scissions or at other times to prevent Auplicittions# Of 00111640 nolynw*.
rAtiOn implying obtaining wag photogrAnho, woo etor,. which we
might Amid for a missto*, is bane through 1140V14
c?xi,
?!???
'-t
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seris.1,
? '
alateftoowe-alws,4.4k4.4406,411klie,Mt*4
v
.4. ?
4 41111100 mei 0.
.04.41sm;
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'.74:41TAL
1
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
.,1,714AIRMA:
4441-
2) with 0 3 Army Headquartere in order to be constenbly
Informed on the situation at thm front AS a whole along with OP nnA
03 Division Staffs in actual combat ( exannlos the 340 pnA 36th )
for mere detailed data which may have n bearing on Aeoinionn to be
taken in connection with accomplishment of Missions.
3) with Units actually engaged in eorosat (
Battalion of x.... Regiment ) or with Commanding Officers of outnoe+Ft
when necessary to patrol Agents outs or making arrangements to
ensure safety our own rmtnrn when Ant m infiltrated without aeoletance
of unit in combat, arrangements for pnmn words for our Amahtn tf We
should be unable to pick them ur upon returns also tomorftry auntoAy nf
civilians for interrogation and interrogation of prisoners of war.
;,(17esiwithont s a hre
aming;t,ii llieno LTATAnng
established by direct contact and t(he del4
di crmen,,and nPin Ansncs of
friendly relations between ouretielsree has hmlned to :lake the work much
As practically all the work in of a physical. character it goes
condition, and if in many cases they were not rielred *or their experience
ix combat work, they lose no time in heoeminn noquainteA with it. The
results of a mission depends on its proper planning nn ti oxecution
'4 I
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Mt
;,*q3g
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
4 iffil I 1 s
4e1
fres ths ssoubtry point of visit. The risks invol7e0
different nature than combat work in ft regular unit beenuno the
work must be undetected aryl whilm retoining ths knowlffilgo at 00
same time that chanoes to pun through are meagre if mtronv
opposition is mot? ?or this reanon when our offloere trPfPet thovir
Infiltrations, they carry no compromtainm Ilagnoret no wIlmnpvqq.
pOssible war a privates, uniform ae it is a question of "Ao or &lens
4' A",
'1441611Mr- 0-04,4
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
"IN
?
?
44.11-fW
far
?
I.
a ?
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
a ?-
ea
1si order to obtain the bost restate for Short %ARM*
,:atelligenoe Work, the ideal would bo to home At our Atouilonl
0A7nb10 Agents And be Able to brie then thoroughly botoro
,
-lher sr* dispAtohode While thin mAttor is in tho sited oo 411 roreons
literosted in the works tho following observfttions wore, tonothor
Whi/o tAkivOpert reoent4 ea A fow 000rAtions rind aot forth ?or 0104
Vag if Any they MAY Wes
%art Range tntelltnenoe (In) conlo,
lite words 0PRMOZRION TN OIM2'LTOITY3 but ovon :hio to Wiloult ?or
two reneonta I) on :mount of the trqinitig Monts .Pao-ivo rt tho
*shoo/ ,ad the fAot tflAt 4104 iR their knowleAgo onunot alwityn ho
/led afterwilids!
a)
the ?lase the Agent!) esolo,yad ifhothn
!Roc high Omni civilians or former tow' offioers.
t$ le Nest important that the Aponte should I" fully
before 'being sent out on a mission anti tilat thas eir Dersonal
4011 so 'their ftsical fitness tor AAetermined mission
* be Won into coneidoratiosi Tht,14e morel And 1)hysionl
factOri oontribute greatlr to the * find with thtm tn
tho ihmoulAing;Offlosr Ototonta000rding to tho
? ?
0010101 41111100"1011 1 OM SA fill ItEr I Mita (11
f
IIiII
A

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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
$.,
4-e
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;
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The present situation makes it 'possible to finti Apeota
nmong patriots whose sole interest le to work for the liberstion
of their country. An Agent who therefore thinv,v AnA eoto ltko o
o o a
soldier is at the nreeent time creferoble to men wh i nmin.
jimmalitte. in 0, very important tootle Whioh require+)
lOte of care. The choice of Agents shgt110 be influsnce4 more by
the souroe of recommenliatiou than by the apparent eince4ty of the
recruit himself. No recruit ehoulti be oontoeteA before the ofoloor
charge hes jut1ge0 of hie qumlificotions .. ono ehou10 obtain
manifest proof of his goof, will before mentionine the tryle of
work with which he might be entrneteti. lt?gerest1 thet privste
lives of Agents, anti their inclination oor inetnoretioee or Ank
have been careful' v ohocketi,but of?Acer in ohmrpo ahmlA row
about the former life of theme men whenever neseible. If sny
Aimaretion hue been oommittmil one muet immOintely pet riA of
his anti follow ur his former oentraoto.
At Asthma Aponte have reoeiveti I2) a basic instruction
which is function of their Maslen anti whiob inelnAmeothe know:1,004m
of the, enemy, of the country sna of the 'particular region where
- 1
":".,4?""??-a,c,
3'?
4
? ?->? at?
P) ft nrnetinoltn
truction which is more or leas comtleite mei tietentie on whether
they operate with a specialist or alone. But there rare also other
'otters in which thy shoulA portoct themeolvess in rartionlari
C4Sirsorss.410Crite eati ssuA their informmtton oritanise their mission
- h
.:41101kr. ,Pln SWIM* of their 0.410.011 us Wen as ito esonrity.
101,04140401W
4,0 VO-VA*4"414}Va .a3VPREO
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115"4,-Z
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7 21
17?2:47;574.4,..1-
4
tr,
1,.% ?
All thillosme sasy and in faot to, but lot us eolimit that nothttai io
fo01,anA that Mars aro many .it who have fteudiPsit itt.' ollwolanee
11.61; tn *new ooviintedTIie territory.
,
pilatotroyfr !IOW to to rather tnovomktion nf
Offrigii*-intiliho main took of the Agent to to obtain Astnil infor.
4
Attica on evoirythinft oonoertlinir the army or the onomy, in nArtiorlor
what ts beina prorated nnti %Pith what moon. Thin in Ant he munt
constantly ohoorve in the sone whiob 11,40 anoteneil tn him.
The constant paeoccuration et thm Oommanti helm,
the order of battle (02), the Arent mutt nlwnyo try itutl *041,115, to tho
three elemontarr questions s who where .mm when. with tbior la
mind ho will mothodtoully novel' his (woo hoenninR hy the looblittoo
where he is observing all &Owns of the enemy whether in bnrraoko,
under testa *tow and nfterwarfis Amino on to tho oevt locality t,0
will get the exact riottro of his area. /Inch otol) wt)1 hp
??.4,?4,?
thoroughly Wort' passing on to thn Mohler.
firtt rule tilioismihgrowe h MI4M1011 to to
Austikyot inImpudie fhoreforo deocribe minutely, giving detnilo
v
whom rossih14146 lhoul0 novorintortrot in hie own wma" tnem'mAtton
csOsoted from a third wily, Use tolain etii
yln!tefliii4lit' VANUA WorAtt
6,4
*WV Large Ulthilk4060 small ditaohmentes?s.. Nemo tttle
'tares are above hooded %IA we eminot be Oven with yJreolaion
they snot always be monttene4 as #aptroximatelvnOt met not be ovoirse,
) oak or9
10000,044A Aants 4r* 4t*so and reocritttttlteir own 441;
ea.,1
.41,1,4????,'
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
4t1,91.1P
IWO;
^
In the cane of meditocre A
4Amte it would', be useleos to
verbally request information on too many subject, but for poet, class
mkon the desired Intelligence can be summarist.d
for instance which can easily be swallowed if Agent in onupht ) &no
auylocations mapped out which will help the Agent as well as engure
precision of the information,
Many Agents do not apnreciats the imnortance of certain
intelligence because it may not have been made clea)- to them. A rme
hours of additional practical training is necessary to confirm their
knowledge of baste intelligence such * 2 1.4.4.71,,of unitq
by their uniforms and badges, typos of tanks tynos of guns and
their calibre, and all vehicules used etc.. tbeir Aireotton of
movements, whoth4r loadod or not, pillboxes, fortifications etc,
StrillaShUZLIALI
q/ias Ments.141.1s AAC448ArF that rrch
4/4"" ? /
7 -
of infori?tiqiehatiid U6 made-with 4sr3001.senhils aiA olwArlino.
The nature of information required from an At epolends
4
1) the Agent)11 personality ( intelligenem
memrry of
Observation .. general odueatilon particular knowleepe Aue to hie
Profusion
2) ie the particular need of RC/ Commanding at a detarmined moment:.?
for example in region, possible indications of an attack or
withdrawal of troops.
'
;
. r ,?;`0 , ,
? ? ? ? ? ?t ?
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11-41k
2013/09/23. CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
7 4."TV fRIY
v?
of ?,
,
firstas the general questionnaire only constitutes ths frAmo in
if
3) et the geographical looation where Agent is infiltratr4d. In
an industrial region)researoh will isXisi- include information on
war nroduction in nartioular:..., in it uort, movement of troonm
0034 er in area liable to beoome oobt 4t off tv
Thersiore in-each/Case a/Yisftble
vigione'tn whidh they will onorntm
ticular requirements of ReadquArters 77....,geogranhicP1
thurbriffing for- **oh partioular,eass.
applying to each particular case can be of use for good clang Agents
only. During the instruction of Agentn nnd afterwar4n in nonvernations,
.At
ohookAihat(they know the basis of it by heart. Of courqe items
this questionnaire aro only theoretically clannigiee since order cr
importance should be modified whenever necessary.
0661??
made to realise that it will often0iffiou1t to satisfy All the '..qui...
remehts of thn command. They will therefore deAl with thm esnentlel
which they operate. Directives they will receive ..;;4. unexnecte4
luck and their own judgement,should help them to make the n000esnry
selection sod modifications on the order of twmortAnoo of the quomtionnal.
aid 4 Smactp4)1*--,lor-ettififfeli.irt letirst. A.MtritiNti-oit of
101,310111--As itestoria,44c,the Aomi4ii*i41attivit-3,0364 - So while rotedniling
'
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'Tr -
r
ft*
?
Agents that characteristic of their work Is NPrectelon in Simnlic1ty4
they will appreciate that complete Information on a few es-outiel points
is preferable to a quantity of varied information on too many subjects.
limio,44watdo questionnaire applylng to the Ants particular casts 4
would include ,In particular, demands of Vivi Comma& ( examille
composition of x.... unit not yet well known ...trafto In parti,-ular
wt,
on a ce Jrtain route etc..).#reelse questions of geoRraphical locafions
;`
( factories, communications, torts etc..) 14Wtel? einT?baviblIvIon-trenla.
formed in 49/4?- thot41oskut4.14eat Ion. s quo t 4 on s, InlroArxi-li-:-44? Agent's
particalar ability. Special questionr requIreW
rules of circulation in x.., town, papnre required, oelimitation of
AZ~(?
( theoretical anA to be modIfled for
particular case)
'Emplacement of POI s
identification )
Composition ti
Importance i
Armament )
Movement of troupe
( road . rail . sea ) (Identification
(irportance
(tostination
1
'''1,7174r
imm1,77._?.4............,..........
?
,
;-----...,... . . ? ,?,,......,,..,,,, A CP i f T.1 . i .., e ?- . . ,1,...;,. . , 4 ...- ,
:till:2' .FT.L.;. -'-ai????IC? ?
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Declassifie al A ro e
Damps berreoks
Defensive works trenches.. itllboes
Aria blockhaus.
Depots ... stocks (ammunition, gasoline, turn, food)
Important rativ-oad stations railways (trpeks) ronA?
and their condition if derived
conntruoted.
Nmplecoment of batteries ... strength .. calibre.
Measures taken by civil authorities etc.. bleckoitt..
Wect of bombardments .- where fell If ilmlettbloi.
liffects from Judi:Atrial roint of view.
ships war & merchant
oftracteriotice ? R8M88
siluktion -. armed .. being reraired and tyne
convoys -. importance rrotection (armament
areas mined .. dates.
survey of coasts patrols etc
batterime positions
roads
organisation and OD
airfields occupied ..
effect of bombardments on airfields
conditions of landing fis.lds
liatgatriikat A4Wifted,
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????? ??????111... ?01..
2013/09/23. CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
Co3t of Itted.. salaries.
Black market eituation.
Rationing foods taken by occurrying
Health situation.
Production essential foods ... stockiv
Resistance.
Attitude occupying authorities.
Public opinion.
Manifestattone.
.74-7,1;4474-u5r.
t
?
s'
The Agents giarmxiarz shonld be
ilgn
and based on the latest available informntion.
ble directives should be given as to beat cover? on
should this cover be left to the Arehtn own initiative? as cases
have occur ed where thoftwho had not been briefed before bon,' Alo
not
return. Agent munt be convinced of Importance of his misston n'
that it
to.esset shown that bravery consists tn resPecting the rules of security.
A
may otherwise not orly compromise himself but the men who are with
The Agent must always know by 'levet his cover story in crier to
prevent coutradictory answers in the couree of hisquestiening aft?41
cross examinatioA? His cover story must be simile Anti based
which can be controlled, otherwise It must be entlrely uncentrol#0,1,0
The Agent must never rotraotteven if the reople qmeettontap seem te,
-
' .41
?
I
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
t 1.,1-A1 ? -4,- ?.? ? _ er.a. a-11.? . ? . _ 10"?V.111,r.
Declassified and Approved For Release 30131/t0793,3.: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0 _
"
. ,
,
*
1
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have persona information contrary to the cover ntory hp hns just
given. He should never give or.dit to ths flo onlloP1 nionod oonfoesionn
of third parties 'wan if thow have work0A vitt him nn th.v mnytho
false. In the course of his interroemtion thA Agont munt net plv. details
which are not asked him and if nosniblo h. will mr.kA nhort and
ambiguous answers, not emnloyina words like "yen"
gorical way otherwise than to dony nominations
or
"no" in A colt*.
nPoinet him. Re* mot
not gorget that the enAmy will use nil m.thodn ! nromin.n, nminbili.
ties, m.nneos and brutality. If Agent mces 1.n A Cmil howAro of tilo
"sheep" nn o do not communicate anvtbinn evmn to
narty about the questioning Ate....
As regords the n-mmandi.vr ofoicAr
knnwn Imedtythi
or qra, ?le must lbecl,
any fneblesneen on the ,art of hl, Arent, nnd nhot thorn thnt h? hoe' puts
an A full knowledge of onch operation ho rim)** Oom=ipnAlnp officor
must definitely know what is wanted and tIle ingtruotione h. hnn rivon
must never be modified if a Aisoutedon onir wt nn Aport.
Of course the work tvlat*can b0 eirfse.ot-A of "'PT ? i*t
dictated by the nature of tho country nn A tho Aitunt4or or #1,o bnttio
front p. it poee without saying thW in a mountp4nous romionll, whore
the combat line cannot b* continuous, the 11,4obler of infiltratinp men
through onen y linos if considorably simpliftoe. ror inotnnoo, et tho
beginning of Febrpary at Cassino it WAR aif14110t to UnAielq41 any
,
?
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
-
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work with assurance of success because of the hanA to hanA fightqn,
and heavy artillery fire there, and onAthe,..041thestaohand the Arent*
infiltrated behind enemy line's a few days before at the same niece
were unable to return for the same reason. During the name nobrioA are!
ry
only some-gifistlew+wasAmat4ms, we were able to infiltrate Aeente
on another mission with a minimum of rink, but these coulA nnt have
fullfilled the original mission booaune of the bigh mounteinn an
the lack of communications between the two noints. Uneler sucll cireamm.
stances the inter,gogation of Ps/Weg may brine in more immPaInto
While the length o? a mission eepend,*on th
Aistanos and difficulty of the terrain, WI micRions ao not 0TcPm4
6 days, as it would otherwise fall under the scone of Lone "Paw^
ligence (LW. No rigid rule can be arnlied however, as thin'riient
can work both ways since it may occur that LRI in not alwayq
( for instance impossibility of parachuting men su9-riciens1y
14_,)
area etc.. ) The example given at-44.--tsilovtror-vaire ? that
typiaftl SRI mission which was recently cnrried nut anA quceeqe.rully
I
It
, 4-
I
The reading of these no/tes may seem a bit coeulive
because they cover vOrted detail/all of whiffiii ao no hangthar0 but it rnuet/ tage-
/
e remember. Ithat neve7/two oto ationn pre alike
down a/1
/genern r4 Oe
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
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The request sij;;In, herebelow ae was maA0
verbally at NIA en the 6th of by tho Ohiogf of 02 of x...
who otatod that it woul4 be very important If infnrmation ?clad bo
obtaiaed for the 8th of.....
We infiltrated onff.of our Agents in the ogily hour n of
thA 7th and picked him up on thm 8th with Om information mnele
available at the required time and greatly appreciated, We lefleoft tn1A
later that our information confirmed information previouely olltained
which had been requested in connection with r.Planned advance in thiv
sector to enable long range guns to onpilato iiermAn batte,bies at
-SAW-MIATO,r818111Wierth PHIN1600i411001-210MA nno elow un to nhmll
supply roads leading to MINA.
Saftuallonata6.9tit4s41,0441.
circulation ( in whet direotton heavier trait ) Imam ilimnWlention of
ma very importnat center as roadkrot sumatos
TW1pory fire.
tf hormital wh4cliy previons17 At
tis etc.. whnt Oa lommis my If
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
4.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/23: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100170006-0
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