OSS - MEMORANDUM ON THE EXAMINATION OF THE ENEMY SITUATION IN ITALY/HISTORY OF THE ENEMY PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE/APPRAISAL OF STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES/DOCUMENTS FROM ONE OF THE MOST DISTINGUISHED MEMBERS OF THE ITALIAN UNDERGROUND IN THE U.S.

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: OSS Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450006-9
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 34
• Document Creation Date: November 3, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 25, 2013
• Sequence Number: 6
• Publication Date: August 10, 1942
• Content Type: MISC

Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450006-9
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Vtil'ic-ist use -0 Oragi.66.1: wOteire ,b6014 :41. :Tb....,,,,,,,
:
,confusiaa of -partY 'struggles and vasi-_ warfare
in Whieb the party vas bOrn. Italy was on the
victorious side but had. suffered terribly in military
casualties and in economic welfare,
nd felt that
she was being treated as a defeated nation.
ighlY
lyrid propaganda tactiem were devised, coMbining
P6 T. Baraum showmanship with the devices developed
in all countries in "Win the War". campaigns, 1915-
1918? to win support for Mussaliai. These efforts
were at first made chiefly fcr home use, but after
1924.1925 were directed at Italian 4colonialsw
abroad and at oreign apiniaa.
From the '?-tart, Fascists put psychological
considerations ahead of all others. Instead of
doing a thing for its own seam mad then lauding
or
excusing it as might bo, thoy consistently planned
psychological 6ffects desircld? than visualized
appropriate al,s upon which propaganda to get those
effects could be based, and then carried out those
acts for the sake of the effects. Of course events
frequently =Ike along over which they had no such
Mg.
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? , ,
PORTL-477"."--
? .11!1,1- l? ? ?
?antra; Alin thab hopenod PdtNicit paioholosii
frequently Iookhd aillyo But evermoll thoir
teohnique helped great17 bo orouto tho illueion
of dplerd ata in their movement, tho ineuleAtion of
which hao In the pub boot% one of ow enemloe
*hitt ovormall triumph%) in tho fiad of payehologm
14A1 WArr4r0 againat their own peoples and againat
j
71,
Purvam2S~Rolai.
Summary or the altuation
Whon hoatilitioa bogan tho Pgaelat leadership
:nood the problom or peranadind A very nonm
bolltpoao population, atill bearing hurt%) from
tho lamb war, inflation, the doproonion,
Spoln, ftnd ovormLanatlon to richt in Allianoo
with tho moot, roarod And hatod notion in Europa,
for torts Lorton row wantod that badly. Added to
th000 poblomo WAM th0 gravor ono, from the point
or viow of V0,0010, loodora, that Itnly wao woarym
inv. of PAIJOitim itnOlft
Tho tanivivol or urttigin, thm Wrriblo ooath
or thy Orook, Multilane geW Libygn warap And the
onLitsv or the Uhityd Statea into bho wgr have
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Viliall*P49,100777:71'
f
,
further encuMberedFOcistPsyci109g0
efforts have been directed at be4ttling
the en
at exalting Axis invindibility, ,and
now reiterated over eighteen years, of bettertim0:-
when these glorious tasks have been achieved.
(b) Effect desired
The main tasks of Italian psychological warfare are
to prevent internal disintegration, and by working
through Italian colonials chiefly in the Western
Hemisphere to give what help it can to German efforts
there.
Radio broadcasts are the chief means employed
In reaching outside Italy, although contact with
subversive elements is also maintained as means
allow.
-
(3) Appraisal of ETSE7-2.1aSalla.a1111-1.2iticassses
(a) Strengths and weaknesses inherent in the situation
1. Fascismfs 20-year record is both its strength and
its weakness. Whatever the facts, it succeeded in
convincing a substantial part of Italy's population
that it had overcome bolshevism, anarchy, and
foreign disdain. It also impressed foreigners
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11(k
triumph's of Agan
"
!
9,192,38_ and a'ue ?lead?
inei4ffM weilie440SA
technique, vas'f Center attentibn -bj:pyrote-C
nioi displ4S'.!upcia' what it wanted seen, hiding
alk othernatters-in obscurity, and
ing such spectators as it could*
Of value from the start were strong senti'
mental affections for Italy found among American
and British tourists and residents, the glorious
reflections of the Roman Empire and the Italian
Renaissance, Catholic respect for the Italian
head of the Church (exploitable after 1929), and
the peculiar ties of emigrant Italians to Italy.
These were played upon in every fashion, most
effects being aimed simultaneously at the domestic
and the foreign audiences. Mussolini was political
boss of a tourists' resort for which he was public
relations ran, and he made each function supplement
the other:
(a) to prove that Italians were clean and
efficient
(b) to prove that Italians were bellicose
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-(c) to prOirb .tliat, Italy
deierveds.nan, would win wIth fle
sword (but ecoaciMically)e her juit x'
-,t
(d) to prove that Fascism was bettt,3i,
thsri
r 11.41
3
a*),
democraCy.
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= ,,r
c.
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(It should be noted that all of those are defonse--
cover's against Italian self-appraisal and fqXeLI1?
e-
attitudes')
Events since 1939 have simply demolished these -
basic propaganda drives; creating that weakness
which comes from false propaganda unmasked.
20 Weakness in face of counter-measures through
psychological warfare,
at All skeptical, shrewd Italians (who prize
shrewd skepticism) are open now to a propa-
ganda which compliments them for having taken
Fascism with a grain of salt all along. Not
one thing Fascist propaganda said for eighteen
years is so.
b. Discontent with a visibly worsening material
situation.
II
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c. Distrust of all leadership.
du -Distrust 'of all all 4
e. Fear of all enemies.'
,.;
f. Weariness with Faseismo:.
of how much worse things will be
Fear of Italy becoming a battleground.
Fear of German vengeance for any defection.
e. Idealistic nationalism which can yet
Mussolini if conditions so develop as to
f. The influence of church leaders against
rocking the boat.
g. The integration of the personal interests
of leaders in government, the armed forces,
the professions, and in business,
with the
?." -
Strength and weakness in the organizational set up
1. The strength in the Faseist set-up for psychological
warfare has been chiefly the strength of Mussolini
c-f,=
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511
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hmse1t e.s4"t?blibli.4-.Tiaiti, edtr, 4eban *P. e-cei.
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'stage designer; lidot-writer,a6d-hief.aetore':
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01.
?,
Its Wile -weakness as been in, the samo histriOnie
approach to affairs, by which aetuai military
operations, for example, have been staged for
psychological effect without making sure the
enemy would play the part of beaten slave, as
in the attack on Greecee
As a man above all conscious of publicity
values, Mussolite, has seen to it that a great
effort has gone into creation for his use of a
mechanism for psychological warfare, with a,
proportionately large budget.
af Intelligence activities
i. The Ministry of Popular Culture (i.e.
Propaganda) has intelligence sections
which draw information on social,
political, cultural, and economic
conditions at home and abroad from its
own agents, as well as from the intelli-
gence sections of army, navy, and air
force. It also monitors foreign broad-
casts, keeps track of Italian organiza-
tions and personalities abroad, and
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5C-,514g.
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- - ?
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attperviSei the ac.tion' ,aild..pro3a6Uttceiin
".
of thach as it controls by s various mec
Army, navy, and air forces have their
respective intelligence sections, perform;
tag according to their megsas all normal
funttions of such sections, but serving
also the Ministry of Popular Culture and
being served by it.
Foreign Ministry intelligence work is
under the ministerial direction of Ciano,
and hence of Mussolini. It has functioned
closely at all times both on the intelligence
side and the policy side, with the Ministry
of Popular Culture.
iv. The Ovrra or secret police has worked above
all in Italy but through the CAO (Centro
American? di Operazioni) and parallel
sections for work abroad has kept data
upon Fascists. and anti-Fascists and in-
fluential foreigners for many years. Now
integrated with and subordinated to the
Gestapo, it is scarcely an independent
instrument for psychological warfareo
v. The Fascist Party abroad, integrated with
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- pow"' r
10.044''1ft,sq4i 6111031-, _
0414%64 -;
tim taken the e4 t
'Itddin pzoUin r1 ctivitie* dolsignea-
,
16 furthei ti t Moots intermits. It is
subdi4idea into elomAnts Which work on:
intellectuals, an laborers, on veterans,
and so forth, to onlist.their support at
Maoism? and to use them as sources of
ieormation.
b$ Oporational activities
i. Tho propaganda ministry has in thy past
spont all it ooald gob from a poor country
and from gifts or genteel blackmail abroa4
The total has-boon lowmr blqan the Nazi
total expenditure), not because\ the Pascist
will and imagination wore woak but bocause
the country is poor. Xuakets to Italy wore
subsidized, "culturs centers" set up to
dloominato propaganda mnd enlist sympathizore
Mae wore made (not very suooesetully), and
radio work war) oarried oni eopeolanLy
direotad at the Balkane mad the Motaam
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-akeminwigs?mag_FT.P.P",ir"-,- -
? - -
,
tbe'eneSi6,;j.find Its
'
.-?
061-Onittli" an.the,pther. In Imperial.
Italian Arica special bursa-Lie- fUnctione
to keep upthe morale of, colonists ia:d tol
control and Win over natIve elements.
ii. The Ministries of the armed forces'haVe ,
doubtlessly tried their best to keep up
home morale, troop morale, and undermine
the morale and fighting efficiency of
Greeks and British, but whatever they
spent or tried to do hasn't worked so
very well.
The operations of the Italian police, to
judge from impressions received by reading
all reports on Greece, have been singularly
ineffective in controlling local irrecon-
eilables. How well they have done their
job on the home population is unclear,
except that it was apparently felt Gestapo
help was imperative.
iv. The Foreign Ministry se l; up large staffs of
extra diplomatic agents at consulates and
embassies, on Nazi pattern, for operational
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74 'fhb ilaPi4'i.,O;Oncidotirig the ,i100,0
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Italana and aeooad gen0ratiO&
:._.
did A zindularly poor job
I J ^ : '' ?' t ' ,
torvenb Viadicte abroad, The oori 0 ::' '
true Vaaointa which did vome to 0%10 kti
tht overcool Paaol must, however,* '',,'
taken serLoualyi, at locct as probable
recruit? for Nati Agenoleal work,
e
Be aaktIona
Tho greatoot veaknena in tho whole impocing
pattorn or bureaum tor thia purpoce and
orgontzationa for that ones le that too fewi
of the human being@ engage6 in doing the aoWal
work OAPO very muoh that 11 be done fact and
ettinienbly. Partly that Attitude abeme from
quiet contempt for Pamlico, partly from inm
differeneop and partly frau aft attitude toward
bimo gild grinding aoottrato doLmil work whioh
deioo oorpootion? Orftrb ntt nopotium have
111
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rt:
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in
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FNMA*
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SUMMIT'
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gdmond L. Tay-or
Li,oz
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tachod Memorandut on
This roport utemtiCtonm
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onia' -10,6 lkokt 1* QM,
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41:11d unOul studioa f th 1.thid thiit I 1i dtsecon,'-
nhoulki thinic that the tirot:part-Atd a tow
cmcorptp rrom tho ouggestions in regard to propagandav
might surely be communicated to tho On und would be,' ,
vbiuubIo Lo thorn) but nAturally, the"question of coouzlity
Nhoulu be curcru134 weighed.
tAt em
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TO: .4
low. 1.10, ith Q40Isikti
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eiwg t:Awb.41,0,irtak 6044.01
1,64, foratose*:0.0 pre-..""a igto.446,
4z.440&441,1 "s4 -er"
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FROM: JOHN C. wILEY
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Attaohod Iktrowith nro1wGOumonto juotAipm
oolvod, vio r it rolinbio oollttiotl Pram owofirt116
vloffit diatinpa ohod fronboro of tholtuliftl unttorgrOhd'
now in Lilo 114 ,tod Antrim. The, htfto boon oxoldnod
rind lh i betiovod thutthoy RP@ oP Vint'
Ifiportmnoo. Thov ohrwit in many roiTiootp with tie?orot-
elld m111,11110 turomilIon. Thoy 600m to oiftriPy tho
,)1.4?rt=10,-Af,y OFLIVILIon crow
tlivo to oxiattin Lho Drohloftn or oondualing
;0'11 ImenrtJ 1Ij1 thy. Fonotnt roRimo.
T 4!.(1 nrrl th0 NAY 00niOM WO }MVO. Y011 mmy wioh
VC i i 4 0 thrvi timorip: tho moAoro rr i 1 r oomM a tO0 8
[ QArotholy onn ridont,i,h1 wituro
1-t,vitrili) to ti f' 000100 r(q.1.
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Al-
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.1014111a11161t
; AU 0PINIO cP0142,10AL
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cr,
wit6on
1) - In 'low of totivities in Whichrilywoccie ot
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tatMearliblitanta retir mmift envisions should be, Mimi itItc 400110
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lta:.ituvo
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At A roAtitively small group of Riteeitite who oonititute igawer04..,09
'r
h14 egonomie maehino and rule the country? Their main strength 410 7tWt
day r:som an ettneiedet and well organized Mice and from .4erita4,atkletti
0 A 14rgo mass 0 people who had adjusted themsolves without too tothol?
datioulty to tho Oti.00ttat maims but resent today tho promOcrman.iclioi
of tho present rtaer$, Thny probably conetitmts the majority of polLitel
00
ly-mlnded itallati*. They belong to the upper classes act well4to to bott
potate510 timd tb omrttiin emotions of' tho working; ?lassos*
Froupt Path the tom an4-ifashoieds are indioated those who hays oppooed 004:
J A rOlfttiVtlr oftral minotity of antifascists reunited from every ettaal.
oi4.prit1y thq POMO-tat regime or those who, aithOugh having boon at tioloo
\
Attntoto4n by fatmist ideologies, promisee and interests, have later on deal*.
Irihitely broken with the regimes
J) The) root of the nation including millions of politically uneducated
porpilm who, muter favorable circumstances, may riot and revolt but mosl
at.p
k. 11
-
,
11,1
!,
;a far maI k.loria tho antiftsoists (group 0) are not numerous in ita744-0,
11 ?
1?Aptmtinp, thoso who have boon arrested for politleal reaeona by the faseia'f.'_
11110 thov Kr(' not a npg1iMiblo minority an it lo shown by the figured
ff)
Ir?
1
e
trip itms simply follow those who aro in power.
nmither tho firet nor the it group will be tann into a000unt in
wpAt follows?
I i
- .rt ',A.TI
;
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poll.tical prisoners wert in ja$1 at the same
0100450006-9
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xU organizations exist nmongItalian antifas* Leto, Thei'a4tit
tr,z1.71,1ding all the antifuscie2s but it is through them th4 haps, 0 '1.0atr.
3
?
vl
ok4t *hat little agitation has existed tn Italy during the last:ti Isenor-
,tw - '
4 -
t-glventeen years against the regime.
Me largest antifascit organization is prOablx thi:irtA* .0 to OC
nitcotec with the Comintern, Italian conmuknists have alwayi had zsie hinds,
'
t. 'Ier datifaseist groups for their underground organization.in /44
la the second place, numerically, come the 04amocratta" groups Which,
tAre developeii in various parts of the coantry wither autonomouSIrrsm under
4ne influence of cailkts not belonging to the pre-fasoist political parties4
:hese vrolps are inspired by a rather vague liberNI-socialist or liberal
7Fith01.1?, ideology. They are not well connected with each other.
In the third place are tne groups which represent the survival of pre-
fascist political movements (syndicalist, anarchist) or of pre-fascist pol-
:tical partieS (socialist, republican, "popolaren, etc,).Some of these gro-
'.,:lb Rfre f::61.rly active until ten years ago. Through death and desertion
they !Lre now very small and are composed of people who are ecoming physital
ly an mentally too old.
it.rould be dangerous to have illusions about the size and capacity
to act of Italian antittanctzu amstat antlfascism. It is practinally non-
exisient In certain districts of the south.
1%0 :ealt
nstirlial areas. In a medium-sized city
It is also nearly non-existent
(I0),000 to 300,000 inh.) a
1-41-; of 50 to 50 organized antifascists in each of the two main tendencies
Cc- -jtund democrat5.0) can be coneidered a laTge group. Only in till
h4 f.dczen of Italian big cities and in some highly developed industrial or
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MallffinatigROWpOIRP!
,;1*ttli rt
I I. i;
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trfti teas,t rthailiffSgtOrn LOINOCAV d
(411 ir;r1,c46 iolth a latyp popuittMortoon4 ligA
rrompub Devor hl!ftrd et orpaloott igniipo or otiSes rot evoivir'
ty thus 2Io to )00 peeplee
F)rganised antiftiltilm in Italy should be ritekiesta at tay4i4oi,
Inovt trt temneande of membora thAn in tens at thotitsinitts
r?cre,g lattle that or nised antirsoolos WO boon anti is 'able to 441
t,411g/. Nit' As own means:, PrmOtiOm114 every Italian antifasciat mbh It tha
rzsiiry ?fmnt ilbradsd with the hope to find outside the help whieh, he theughl
hr ildleponaable in order to aohleve something within the oountwe The ka
,i'oi-tAty or political exiles to satisfy the need for aohievemento keenly folt
iv wh- etayed behind btoame often reeentment against the exiles*
voro riro probably two, main reemono for tho tailure of ItaliaA antia.
r,124040ta tu ROW.V0 More thAntPIJdid achieve: look of funda and the con-
4-
1-07rittid by rtn all-pworful and offieLent polities
?qportnre who camel baok recently hftve @tromped the inoreasing climatic
ttmongitw Mfoiy hmwg oonoluded that these dieeatisfied Italiems
,eromo !,01t)fmeoiate. convereatione whioh / hat with refugee@ (who re-
'. nr. 04 g4000% to n largo 'latent tho attitude@ of thome who etaid behind),
cwInA1 imttere from Italy0 nontaote with ItmlAan aoquaintan000 in New
wavhinFtnn who had not broknn with thn Fauciet oligarchy, inter-
nen-itmliang who arrived here rmoontly after having apent oe''era
voa.-an tRiy, 11 me to the oonolueion that the doduotion was not oorromt
,40mt t'eponflibir, Jtaliane (with thoi tom rmeponeibln I .ndto;ito thoue
At-Ir to think vnlitiomily) ht4d boon ul!molbed into thcp VueOst ova%
',-011.24%0 if tho auworptiOn had takon plmot enthualftetioally, ratio-
tAvki, Ilikilarrtronog. 000nor or ifttmr thenr hud oome to bmliove that
44:%4-?':?:.1,--le.?V.F.44-'*4X7.- '4' '''ICii
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%-,4 ' - i' ? 'r"
u:-'11? ' - ?
,? .,..,-Si.A
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;: Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R0001004sonnR_q
0?:_gz:ki?Ngkr
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25:
Mit WITRMIVIET7 777:47 r4
tf:tt itr
VA.4liem W1.46 dime 'emu sod to titiOit
kal; ailAt. in the typicallimftmoitti e.
tngit-44 iwItitutionse May hofflo * Wrg
CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450006-9
?
7, Ifn rep 11
? 1`01 '0137W
001,44
batep
tqt-
int/1444o the Pritiah 0cmsowe4th aili the VOLV*.
Iscaponiliblosi thro11g0 thAir control bier aVlirgeflOot afthittilf
,
= , ?1,-.:
,..
frit* Ttitlyta goonemlo an4 political dien00141eis ,
het the *We titilitp MOM. or thyme VaSpOrgatle ViiWt#4,
4xio policies of the MitesainitwOiano grogps May tear NasiNti-144
,-
,
it atemsk oaateelpt ear Itte440 preeent XeadeVO?
Tho ditterenoe tetwon tno group D and the group 0 is thaOhe tiist
sir3444, trday Fl *Mingo within VII preoent Sietaitip; Wale iho mond twantspt, a
nhangi olltOttits the rtWolet regime. What 1 may oall ant/irk/Am ttaliatt (0043
,1) oliollt4 bo Wriqentoed by Italian antitacointg whom they 410104 today de
,
m401 .441 thoy dielAhpd theM bdore tht Ai m came into oxiston00# 1 ati unaor
tho iw4.apicn that oonvoT014114 Mgt D to 0 are not 4UMNIVOQ00
fro' no 1 !mow, there is little or no orpniAed oppoloition to 401s
101141ton in tho vfolip B. Tho anti-Asia al6MentO re9rOdent a large MO40 Ot h
Ars
Ilvilunin 'ho nrn tInothlo to expreae d collective personality. Mutual diotri
r4n6. mcrP inortant, tho ooritrol ogeteifiled by the rdeolOt and tho Nati pcl!
00 iiam atrong enough to preVent oonta0to and the octabliehment of organist
Clorma
4 ;vivo broth mOOMilitOd in the paet with the 06101.14 Or ono important
Ian in MtAmn, of A itiading Invairotual, of two genpralo (now In thp
roaxrpd 1101) who, beetamo the eimilar notivitieo or 14 few lukewarm PArty
1n1J-It4, triad to ereato their or organisation among !rands and symporth:
Alig littoMptO failed before mnything oonetruotive could be all
IOW*.
le, It.F111,1
'
c.
-t,tt.,410
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450006-9
`.4 PAgNaNnEM
Lain
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450006-9
I
"?..ero -ire firloorm In the armed 104417who14-04143 the,
. I- 044 V4IVIIIIM *0 clomo ilm 411 40ccid Ili* th4 n4to4 00044
.... v
:.11,,pc ulay oar, d* vote la that direatiena The'vmma is,tru. Or 4- ,
J,a ,.:. tdho group At Pthe big businteenso a tioitertho 414t 'he IlibikONK
kaa.;,4
4
'd*%I.Jletu.,11141 who bowed to Vaseline* tes the mall businalismi
und Wanta tf the more advanced seelouatural net,
st:.1NT
Ca? h" 21t1W)01 *OrKere# NU. c . 4 41
. ?
fri Prc 4 thore le a iplarly complete leak of the 90.iti4
, Inortr-p theno who belong to the group 04) This may perhaps' ectipiob
;!1 lthoh of poporle willing to risk empriecnmont in,er4er to sit
oppositlion?
1.1:1?an thl
inetiotlon between antifasolot Italians an411n414.74s 3
4
11,
e IwporLmat. Thi two dromps carinet two-achy+ the Ammo *sr
-
pqnr,o. bq approa0ed Lty the maw' people An agile WAX lAt tros1e4f
. J-
:
,riAoAtolmt blit not by an anti.Axle TtalAmms mmadoingi amdproalac 111..0
-?
r
to mntifmeetets will haven the eyposite effect On *Mimi:Cie 21
, '011 vi0A-vorta,
r, rind 4mon4j the itntifasoista people who armWt115Jg .to englitg
;cno.ftki,40. No wtoh peolability T WDt be1l070 to exist among th KfltimAxi
r who on Rho othor hand may be willintit in certain 0411.0, to anew{
.:maLtori 4es,ivititala and who aGrtainly can holp in bringing about th
tt,(161 dtoitltplgre.-tten of the rmigimS*
whu thin in terms not only of winning the wita% but almo of w:1
ahouil to11.60 tato eerioom ounstdwration th0 diwia100 in Itm
ta mnd anti-Axio nominate Rnd they shokeid try tl have
1.14,1s it tho tql;%tigei etenpth And tho mime or the two grotapeo
1TSRF-4
A d
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450006-9
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:el-17;W r.
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-el-m>"?91h
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450006-9
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_3 ? Ig'sif;'..
?-?, oar,
rE 1 ANTI AII8 ACTViITIWITW It44-
(r141A,me regd first th$ other onoloota repor0,
,
0
1) - Xt Ss the opinion of the writer'Fiam-nd
,
,,v.tAti 3n Italy ?en give taastiole results Wiltiss,ths:
114'411
,r* realized :
a) kelltch avAon suet be part of a oomprehensiveo Ilnestangeirw
-
different kinds of activities*
ThO GACCUt1001 of the plan to ' be entrusted in the hesids f111,644
Failure4 ,* which are bomnd to be buseroda - to be disregar4odt,
4) Abandant finKnoial and other means to be provid4d*
SeAerecy to be well kept.
9 .
!N,
OTh1WI
,
t
2) - It is also the opinion of the writer that actions. An order tO be
Boo(llesful, must be carried out by grompe or orseaLmations, thlot the tain
pi>lolen is either to develop existing organisations or to oreAle, 114.0 opus.
Th' imaividual agent or operator may know little or nothing 0 the or 41.4
ir.).tion to whioh he belongs, but his usefulness will be determined 105001?
bf-Ing N ciog which fits into a large and emoothrorunning m4oh41e?
- Tho various typos of activities can be grouped undor thr4 Omidinge;
A) publicity ( radio and printed matter )4
4) military operations ( commando raids )4
C) underground vork ( establishment of an organized opositiony infor-
mation/Una si:botage ).
',tot 34,41 gicti p /
Publicity is Ornady being carried out. unfortgnately with a Xamenta.
e, i.447.1* of coordination and with 14 remarkable look of effectiveness*
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450006-9
9 1..ant, in -41-Ve I titliNEERI '470". -
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450006-9
' ? , F*5-- tritir 4n
A i;:r igWrfi'
.4M:v.tri+44w 7 .4 r."
2
6.11.2?????II
str-ialtAffirfr=0.0Aqiewcarrrr-mivr,...7?L
?
?
"41
%here art at pronenta2iL6000;00 V
) =
iPtA?,) nU:uld Mut Cairo, all direlt!tbd to rbai 0*-111
?-;z?
ii'r nbeing dohe thrOuah "bleAO.stai4o04 04401
? t V'itOtit Italian program on (short or uediam weivAsn-ntre otfeW
TtAliane who wieh to risk empxinenment in prdir to
?0
tar?4_, the outside %mad, uemally turn to French ovals
.4 OtklAiinICAOLY fox k'renoh people but often produce-4x deplorablo
r 4.46 :t/Wan audionne. oonnidering the low level of ttalatin
notett%o f7a!a AIIled 4feiolm1 seuroetib it .L0 probably a' good thing-
tare able to eater- the/ft*
it C! prQgrnms, /toad take tho liiii5rty of making the fel3ft
;,nLy news, obiefly news 'so/looming Italy itnolfa
? h- Qnly if what ta written, said and ramored in Italy
nveAlnble to the ocrixt writers?
eommontd, mery brietly.
s rnri t4taaicialts have been eat ofg from aour000 of idsan
twonty plare. Those who maks the effort to listen aro people
intel14ent idemse
; rdlmition between Amoriean, Brit!i.sh znd Oar* radio stem
to follow eimlior pelioieon
t.41
vrwl previmo wtqLoh lo not qOPiALSot with what io naid
? 4cvtivmu of Vic-I tctm3fl ftudlenec ohould be falfluenclee; Se
"ortelciq-" radios Nam to hftwm fo11ormd m genorta poliay of
i. fl tc) To;.-t;ir rivIrynnn; the King Ind tho i?opublioan, Ihe Pepe nd the
!, tht, r,llotitltst and the workors the milionalist and tho
11..40.111;%11P1,1 Itlq result iefn to bo thnt n4 one i4 atitiefied &nd
,1 %V th#1 impr4a4lon of laolaNt eAroetive Nene. A group
pooplo (posmibly nOt Itatauto but ab 10 to
3fltth* lorkinig of the Italian mind) &tumid b* aukcd to detormire
rolt?nn Lhe Rattan natioP. C11 ':u4 mere notful to the Allied
1.4 Fre.rt Chat oncul d be otreootd to Mete over and over again. .
,
,
M111: thr dirnorvnce between (VCUp i3 nd 0 of the Italian
fm0,0 tmu ottlor roport).
1
ti /4. Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001RnnninnAgnnna o
ONSIMM 111
1,%;
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450006-9
1111
rt
4; )4
- 7
4
alotita4o expemmt eho aqua IV
5totrinialt etAles tVid committri 10 in-th
dOuld Uto at got* day and. MAU
writer fwvora a lame distabutiOn Orinted
,t.
ardOr te6b this di otiributtop ,1100114;11i
tr-i)ula bo 4ftsimblio it at regoldir intervals OA 032 4003 4041:reOli
rr
P
tht it* rtt,Pid little risk) mould awcp civastPtiitest ot 100100 -MIL
(Nr siu or *even politically and eoonsmiDetpiy Amportaili I4a3tAit
tht4 prgya43on ot the leaflet one should fonow, the suggom
a4410nakil mudm for tht railo. The otce,si4ni ZttAflpLtt*tj. to
pp01)10 14Ugho
Th 4 ratiuLar one, containing newse comments and ideAs kos
pc,c00 Tho leaf/Ana ihbuld be *Tittor! ana signed bp Ita2immic or by
or itglimo ortgins
? - An ogcnoionra *ommando raid annoys %he pecy%e? A repetition of cenmaf
10 10 qtnif#10 Impr5Ismiono Ptople of /t&lian orogin should partioipate In
"ViriVirotO riAld KA4 their partioipation should be publicised by leavint
? ? matorlea. A oommande raid should 'De evaluated not only OA
tIknia of mWtary ronults but also on the belie of mohologival remm
101,4, Vqr thim rwlgon4 thorn could bo series or aommAndo raids en poimt
mklitnry Amlitto anti thoroforo not etrorAy guarded.
'm;1-rprfUm1 wf.;444 Av ventionod in the tInoleed report, there are in
nmpIl 11natrgrolina proupa, orgnoimed by antirftemimte ( *esti on 0 of
'1; u piItjrn ) Thpitv posisibilities for notion (organization
.414 4 lee/
t iCtif Mil 0,111(1E401 ) 3.0 rixtremnly roduor,dt Among neriourt.
1f1 V
thi"f'n
ohiCh coulti be obvimtea through contaete with the outchde
4 r ig,k or eAlito, iftek of material for the execution of acts of cm-
fly
- :
3
55,1.
ot prport ting in undergroutA work.
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450006-9
3r1 ketiMMEZWRikafiffl
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/25 : CIA-RDP13X00001R000100450006-9
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it ifs.t 1111W041144441144 iht0444 g 0 t41.
f '
r I If
qtulorgroorx droop* la X.W0.44v4 %he D041601 1,0 mr?
4,4111,.?
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