OSS - FIELD REPORTING, 1945

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: OSS Collection
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5
• Release Decision: RIFPUB
• Original Classification: S
• Document Page Count: 100
• Document Creation Date: November 3, 2016
• Document Release Date: September 27, 2013
• Sequence Number: 3
• Publication Date: March 21, 1945
• Content Type: MISC

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$POIRET
LO Ildteft * UNITED STATES GOVERNIVEN/
B. L . Penrose
: Charlez: S. Cheston
Field Report - 194
Lois Lozibard
kill you and Co/one/ Pfaff get together and
dIscuss tills report, and let Jae have your coraments.
the indlvidlaal referred to by the writer in the /ast
paragraph of the report one that we shoala question?
Also *hat about the pollcy of continuIng to
use native personnel in that office?
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rod to correspond vit
',skeet undDer ea hnbmberch comment.
slof be/ uoirl Ars o column.
alai lobe,* mark insufficient) before further routing.
hat indicated In Coftmests column.
,wvgarned to Recistry.
4404,444srate sheet.
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A
.? (Vice Memorandum ? UNITED STATES cGOVERN4"igehl4Y9(/4"
:1714;
DATE: '';..114elr'19411.v5 C72-
Direotor, OSS
Chief, Sr
Field Report - Lois Lombard
tho field report on the activities
dated 26 March 1045.
SECRET
pe7,51ity.w4,0?,,
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OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHSHOTON WC O. O.
Lois Lombord Fiold Import
Oubjoot, opproximatnly rorty yoors old, unmarried,
wos rooruitod to h000mo Taosso moorotary when ho Wko osslood
to LI Nb as dopoty to ArKos fur rortoilal. Moue, sohjnot's
voliflootions prn P thorooGh kouwiodcn of Prnooh pod ltotian
o$ w? 11 as oskblo Uponish, isort000so and Unrman.
IH 0000notion with her reforeoos to Mr. Vood I wish
to may that Mr. iivod in sorvio6 to Lim ookt ompaolty of hood
or tho UJ brmnoh om wmli 040 tho Floomoiol Affooho, its wfiloh
latter position he has oonsidoroblo dottss to perrorm oh behalf
or tho Trolisury imopowtmont whloh, rkthnr thoo Ontrootio6 from
his utility to or, strongthoos his stotos, portioolmrly lo
mattors partaloior, to Ws haven oporntions.
Roports that wo bow, r000iyod lo tho pnot tHdlopfn
thot Mr. Voodss work hos b000 r000gnitod kod bi6hly oommeoded
by rumor Ambasmkdorm, Hish and Norweb, am w011 MN by thn
!Mktg importment and Troopory.
Uobinot hos rosiGood from bhn orgPolsation ma or
April 12 t4 retool to hor rumor work of privkfe loormomo
insfrootor in how home oummuoity of Riverside, thm000tioot.
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00100060003-5
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHSHOTON WC O. O.
Lois Lombord Fiold Import
Oubjoot, opproximatnly rorty yoors old, unmarried,
wos rooruitod to h000mo Taosso moorotary when ho Wko osslood
to LI Nb as dopoty to ArKos fur rortoilal. Moue, sohjnot's
voliflootions prn P thorooGh kouwiodcn of Prnooh pod ltotian
o$ w? 11 as oskblo Uponish, isort000so and Unrman.
IH 0000notion with her reforeoos to Mr. Vood I wish
to may that Mr. iivod in sorvio6 to Lim ookt ompaolty of hood
or tho UJ brmnoh om wmli 040 tho Floomoiol Affooho, its wfiloh
latter position he has oonsidoroblo dottss to perrorm oh behalf
or tho Trolisury imopowtmont whloh, rkthnr thoo Ontrootio6 from
his utility to or, strongthoos his stotos, portioolmrly lo
mattors partaloior, to Ws haven oporntions.
Roports that wo bow, r000iyod lo tho pnot tHdlopfn
thot Mr. Voodss work hos b000 r000gnitod kod bi6hly oommeoded
by rumor Ambasmkdorm, Hish and Norweb, am w011 MN by thn
!Mktg importment and Troopory.
Uobinot hos rosiGood from bhn orgPolsation ma or
April 12 t4 retool to hor rumor work of privkfe loormomo
insfrootor in how home oummuoity of Riverside, thm000tioot.
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hialORANDillt
A.,??????^?00?11yrAcio??????,?,
I1Sr34 ? VII I14. ? tl?tt, Q,sq -
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WAISHINOTON b, 0,
TO. Chief, MI
via) Saeoutive ()Moor, CI
now Lois Lombard
UUBJECTI Field Report
?
?
Maroh 20, 194G
4 t 1?14,5i
1. ,Utiotual Ueoretery and general eosin-tent,
Stenograp14-, ond oode with 81 in Lisbon,
Portugal from June 1, 1W44 to Deoember 2, 1W44. Then wes
sent to X..2 division to work on otArdinG 4nd Uerman papers
(mostly from German Propaganda ortioe, Lisbon) until my
deporture on the %owns!'" February 1G, 11)46.
Z. UI hod numerous reports on eneow eotivities in
general) purchase of war mi,teriels ond food in Portugkl) in-
veotAents) bombing objectives In the Reioh) Politiokl sitnetiono
(mostly in enemy oodupled territory). The number end length
of these rcports beget' to dwindle sometime in November 1144
and at Llaot time the "bore, lieven" projeot took their piton,.
3. UI hid, until reoently, more 'eortugneee then
American (Alio, employees. They did not have acceso to the
?ode nor to the safe in whioh code Mee ond funds were kept,
but they we telephone operators, trensleLoro end ettended
to the outgolnc, pouch. There were two among them) reoeplion
olerk named Westwood) end telephone operttor Reoul Rodrigues -
whom Miriom Forbes, Betty Robertson and myself ounpected of
disloyolty. Ne hod no proof but Rodrigues lintened in on
telephonl ounversattonn And he end Westwood hobnobbed and hod
nothinG in oommon es e heels for friendship. I believe both
these mon are still in our employ thongh Rodrigues hes been
given a three insteed of on eightmhour telephone shift. The
trenslator0 knowledge of Lnglish was so poor thRt Romn of
their translations (whioh i. ourreoted) aoluelly sold the oppo-
site of the originel. This situttiun hAs been somewhet oltered
reoently. Villiem 41, aheeler, Ubourity officer, made objeobions
aid now the pouoh is handled exoluaively by Americans. I feel
thief; Portuguese should never heve been employed in our offine
but I oleo feel it is bed polloy to get rid of them kt thie
time.
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Thor, is sae Si ?Moor in Lisbon for whom
worked eke I found impossible to get along with - Janos
Its Abed? head of the $I Lisbon branoh. He had nuns or
the simaliflootions that I have always 40011 manifest ia an
oamentive *Meer La any office. Ale *am un000perative fad
WI bad offset on the maralo.of the whole offioe staff
4Neerleaa sad Pertuguese alike)* HO displayed more interest
La reports to the Treasury Department thab in reports to NW.
Deria4 iv stay in Lisbon / sever met anyone who liked kr. good.
I thiak it important that we maintain a post-war 088
ervaisatios at stratogio points all over the world.
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ti.vesk Its 1,6041
*MN Ws !maw* ,* 1414 &pert
!Sift% APPINNestAr risre did,'II umarvi?d?
11!,41046B4 to Osseo" %owe
*kw he asid dimigadd
A.0 .41.11* 14 '
_ Mesa subjest's
4... , filL.:,...,,,, ., imilittria= aild Italia'
11.71: ull.
allift10,100111 14* lbw sOodidreas to in Weed X wield
*1*,t0,44,. lisioill on$04 tut the Awl *pow* dr hoed
1 4,10 1041 ill *hi PladadOil,,. Attasks. Is sitisb
Aso "didisiderule oft** ti i?,_ flora sid Walt
IWO*. 'rather Mod dosstaistisig trod
hia Oats% portioslarit is
, boo verstione.
:v. that we halo dieleived, Ls We paiitHistdisst-
.1080,1 -? L.,.fs smirk las Willi rt.sig.- 4.41 God 14414 4'
il*sor doefoubdard /IA sild ,INIPtrib. lie sell as kr CU
' asismilival imsdlessaft. '
. Illsk)setIns re fres Slido erewrimaktea ad at
Aritt 11 wMum O. hop diet si prive,e, largasse
adinsieser is hvid bow oftweiiiiiv at itIversids? Osombeirtiost?
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CI
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Cbc
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?
I. . Sooretasy sad gemeral assistomti
Ptottn"r?a tilled rad sod* with a la klohoe.
Oka 1, 1044 to Sosember 11, 1N1Thes *Ss
piii-471.11 divisism to sorb ea eordimi sod Soma papers
111000610 bee derma lespasee_de Otis., Lisboa) NOLA iv
departure am the %maim" Pshomam, liii 10416
S. SS hod memorems roperts ea easy aotivities La
immoraiil iteerohme et ear materiale amd food la Partegal$ law
vAsemmets sombima shjoetivei La tie liotoei Polittoal sitmatiems
(me* im sm. 0004044 11_AierrSilor)? the amsher amd loasth
Ot Sham ?sports boom to mosmdlo O1Mt1140 la M000hhor 11104
deilmihs6 time the Niste MAW props, took their plaeo.
So 81 hod? mottl riftohtArr more Perttimese them
dmerica Wise hap did Olt hot' 140000 to tho
eed0)mor to the "Moth oede files sod teats were kepti
lib lamormars telephoto operators, tramslaters sad steamed
jots**. there weft be a1M4 them reeaptiom
0104 mommods OM telaphom epeeists, kaial Medrigses ?
eiweltrimm loft's, doe* IOWAN* mad myseltssupeeted of
ly. lb had so pros/bit leapioes lAstesed im oci
400111011410sa sad be and WOOUsad astislobitsd SW had
Is imam se a basis ter frismdohip? X believe both
Urea 411111400 sin 60 04P 44,0ib1104110 ??,41$004 1140 b004
a iss**610.6?41 of as edwommor lampiruano Watts V.
ak w_y_ 11,4meemedle offload' silo ee that some er
maaldera OW* I the! _ _rooted lip said the opps-
o000 ot the fbie oivmaim ha boom oresoisoret sitsrsd
,yeeratipe Mil
eirilmwo male ebjeetioas
ad
a.. ?M i
,W, AMorisoma. 2 feel
., ,1110.4ricisiese Amid weer hove beck- leo* Is our Otte,
ow 1 also 001 141 1.1114 .to gist d et thee 14 this
tileo
i t
?
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rare *IAA 411111014414.
*11011 i10 wairseeigeed
Wisklose* Stel ealim=is
irleitoeiii, est Ilirses?
. her reterese* W itro Wised I wish
1100,40$ Ii tho dhol sapid* et heel
li itke Atliaolioa is *Ash
4101??. t* porters es WOW
petite, the* tetreeibiss &es
lois Mots.. pertioularipLi
-Met* eparatisse?
11,11 p4osivet in 4101,000(Aileisie.
hi. lois riesiptilodM4Mt* easselled
1.1 0114 111040111. se 1P0ii 00 V/ 11110
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4660441,010,* 4114 Wm With 0: Li 1,440a,
lidd DeeemborA, We* this is.
J1?11 dirisiies to work sr ssaliss tad Germs paws
*mos Preposisda ottiloo. Wows) lista of
0,01,00 fibt igeeesei Rebroary leo 1041*
$0 41 hhi eismorons report,' on am" astivities is
dmoirelt Ishrihosi sem, anotorinlo Sod toed is Pertnols is-
11,000hennhos 1411111614 lejleiktfee is t W
he oks Pelitisal
f situations
emet4 sew sooppied territory)* the softer and longth
of %No reperto boons to dbrisAftv sosouse in ilevember 1044
Mid et that tdme the list" Moen' potion took their plasm*
44 II had. 0611 ropoontAy, mere Pertupose than
Aelerteee set* emOomrses. thny did not have *Hose to the
sedo star site in whioh *ode tilos asid tondo semi WO,
bo6 tbor got, tslopbsso'vorstiors. tresslsOre asid attended
both" ists4a lonosh* There wore two see% this reeeptiem
440111 wbeteeedi hot telephone operator haeol hodrisues
Adimssidirina Forbes, Sooty *aborts* and veldt msweeted et
tsI1itr. ft had me proof but asodripos listened in is
oemiorineitso sat he and Wieh000d hobnobbed aid had
lio66604 14 OWNS sam basis for trismiekip. I UtAieve both
*ea mos am obill la au*
1::o throe imatosd et an ' telephone -shirt. the
viss ripe" has boon
Mil it %Mob oso op poor that Hoe or
thoir trim MO (atelli I oerrooted) aotoo14 "Aid the sop.-
0000 it the or As this stioottas los boom somewhat Altered
reomblIp? Mt . , Sigiespilr *motto nide objeetioas
sibil,,._ _ WO 'lilt 1104 tioly Asstriesse. I fowl
IWO 141,141.110 Oleg* moor bsoi simp wit is sour *Mee
tine* alashell 66.44Upsd 'Why 61 set rid et this at this
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44?, VI.V T2 18
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r
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Supply Miser at NS bases ea Ismir and the Island of
Stem loptelber 1943 ts 'Orson 194,9 Lt. Savage gives au
, seem, et the supply oetegap sod states that adequate impales
mod the mown ot equipment vhile available at Cairo headquarters
ware est semi ea to the atomised bases where they were seeded.
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"." "kL,s
/(e (eL-
INIMINIS ORM Ink
Pirootor, 038
Chlmor, 31
Viola Report IA* John 11. gevNle
DATIII
name Cito-tA in tosrentnr
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4
Imeeutive ?Moor* 111 DAM SI Maroh 1940
Mie D. DeSardeleben
SUSJSCTI Report on Meld Conditions Submitted by Lt. Sevage
There hey* been several report. or uneatiefeobory eupply to
the Turkish buss. Moot probably there wore many end perhaps
aomolex reasons for this deficionoy, At the risk of over
simplitioation I eumeet that failure properly to eupply thee,
bevels was largely due to lack of,direotly interested and
responmible eupply pereonnol.in Wm). SI oould requisition
ropeetodly end insistently without evell ir the 'supply offioer
was indifferent or willing to lot proouremosit take ite tor.
Vous unipAginatiV* witer40.
On page 4, peragraph do there is reference to divided euthor-
ity end the difficultiee resulting' therefrom. There ehould
oortainly be no divided outhority in the field. The 00 or
civilian head Is reeponsible for Operrtions under his oolitrol
end hetwe the authority should he hi.. The verioue branches
(referred to es departments in this report) must 000porate
d1reoted by the 00, This principle eppeerm to be basic*.
In paragraphs bo page 0, end so pen Op it is 0044 thet the
authority of tro commanding Orricer over ell personnel in his
command or In his area either temporarily or permanently was
not generally reoogniked. Obviously euoh t situetion would
be intolerable for the responsible person.
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WONT ON PIED CONDITIONS
by
1st L. John Wo Savage
4. Istablishing "Poston" Base
Os Aehlevements of 04S, Ismir
S. Diffgoulties in the Pield
S. Divided Authority
b. temponsibility without Control
o. Confused Polley in Cairo
4. Supplies do notS. pass Headquarters
Unsuitable Personnel
M11,4 ta.rnex.....
t
?.1
r*I'1754.,tilktiNb.411,7i
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19 September 1943: Plowed on detached servioe with Office of
Strategic Services, USAFINE, Cairo, Egypt.
19 September 1943: Departed from Cairo for Itmir, Turkey, via
Cyprus ?
3 October 1943: Arrived Izmir and was assigned
clerk, supply officer, and supervisor of bases.
17 November 1943: Returned to Turkey.
23 Nay 19441 Placed in charge of "Boston"
SO September 19441 Wade reconnaissance trip to Tinos.
31 January 1945, Dmpartki for Washington.
11 ftbruary 1946, Arrived in ftshington.
When the staff in Izmir consisted of only three Americans,
it was necessary for each of as to do cryptography secretarial
work and to act in one another's absence, )r particular duties
rs to serve as supply officer and supervisor of the bases.
Supplies of food and equipment for the bases were purchased
locally or obtained by requisition from Cairo. Local purchases
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-.MAitiZtVir-av,70.),711,,,,flt...., , q?t '
*ors diffieult booauee of the soaroity of goods in Torkey and
iwkinaio of the inflation. On the other hand, many tiems were
not obtainsble in Cairo or wore of the wrong type, aod bill long
40100 in transportation (mulled grvat inconvenienoes An order
Cop light salI oloth vont to Cairo in Ootobor 1043 wag Atit
tiliOd Until August 1044. The supplies to be prooured were
the gear tor oaiques, material for ?alto* repair, rood for
bes6 perponnel, eamouflage dirgeful, and oquipmeot Por miomionos
Th. distribution of lie bases around Ismir made it noose-
entry tor Ati American officer to spend a groot deal of time
going from one to the other to 000rdinate their aotilvitiom
aad to aot as liaison between the ?reek mmployees end the
Turkish offiolole. The trAp by auto to "Koy West" was two and
a halt hours south, and to "noston" was two hours north. Those
or a oombination
S. The island of Samos
When Samos wee liberated in Septomber 14a, tt woo
djd?d
to 64400114h a Woo to supplement "Key West". A base on Allied
territory avoided the troubleeome cuetome and movement restrio.
%lona of the Turks and alio provided better howling and anohorage
faeilitlea. / was sent to Samos to owt up tho boo, for our
operations. We were just getting building' and anohoragoo and
establishing relations with the britleh and Orook authoritleo
when the (Norman attaok nos made and the /eland evaouftted.
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During the battle of ',soros, our oalques helped embark rein-
forcements; and, when the order came to evaouate Samos,
our
were abi,
to oarry British and Greek military personnel
as well as hundreds of oompromised Greek oivilians to Turkey.
4. tatablishi 'Boston" Ballo
rh? evaouation of Samos compromised "Key West" and made
it neoessary to obtain another base on the Turkimh coast. The
port of Reshadiye, two hours by oar north of Izmir, was chosen
and a large warehouse was hired for storage and living epaos.
Through tho Smniyet (Turkish Military Security) wo wore intro-
duced to the local civil and military authorities. "Boston"
was the main base of operation(' of the Izmir area and
ta1ne4 the mission calques and stored the supplier
brought from
Personnel quartered at Bonton a.mounted to
t. 4%flioroan.
and fifty Greeks. Most of the missions sent into
maintained at "Boston" and doparted from there.
Tho ba10
sufforsa from ?ramped quarters, leek of supplaauj
ies,
trained personnel. Nhaign Spence of the Maritime
Unit arrived
at the end of Aucust 1944 and closed the bare about
of November.
About 75 men imr? 'feint into oocupici Grooms.
these were selected and trained in Ismir,
by Caj,
These mon were maintained and partially equipped
in Izmir and arrangements made for their reoeption in Greeoe.
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1111ML
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t74.,%1 AZ.
After the *lesions were inside, they were supplied and their
iatelligence eolleoted. In order to oarry out these assign-
moots we obtained and supported a fleet or small claques. For
each vc;tage a calque had to have talse navigation papers and
a camouflage cargo. Those caiques wore almo used In the evacua-
tion of Samos. At the request ot the American Military Attache',
a membor of the Oerman Nmbamsy staff was pent to Oyprus to
',soaps the Gestapo which was pure in her. We also inftltrated
an MO mission, maintained it, and evaouated it after its work
was done. The MO also established 04 voicto hroadoamtlng station
at "Dostoni
6. Diffiouktier in the Field
46+00461.a. 4MS Abo asatamoieasoaaraisrows
SO 1g4""lAitttLott
iwo
The jurisdictional disputes and the confusion situated
by several separate departments operating In the same arca
causod diffloulties in the field. The Maritime Unit was
given the authority to organise and maintain the oaique
service and to establish bases in Turkeys nowt/over, they
did not hove the personnel to operate the service, or an
understanding of it purpose. As a result, the supply
OiliqU04, operating from Ngypt, were improved and thn mis-
oalquee, whioh did the dangerous runs, were neglected.
It was bad for the morale of all pqrsounel when a 0-knot
one.loylindor calque had to mak+. a 300,0mile run through
enemy meters and a powerful silent motor wan installed In
_ IMACAI141414.4t,0-.4n)01.
" - 1,41mowv.1111W:4-3Vg&IN x3414?.40g,o4 r 014;414ER St, iAt 0.04""'"""'"" "
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100414r4saintp.m---431mcgetlii'
6 se
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cou,trl not be given duties outside
ive most essential item such as pistols 'and Mills bombs.
,W4, never did receive any of the special gadgets. In Cairo,
itagrever,overal of the enlisted men kaa,one.shot pistols
\\
that worQ smic?ter than a fountailent?'
Unsuitable Perscnwa
\\\
11
\\.
The communiimitiot:CW6d maritime periOnnol'it\nt to us
were not intoreettyti in 8INeotivities.1 They oonsidc ed
61.
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,4
themse17zii rovonsible only to their ohiefs in Cairo 'a d
ks,
* ?
1.7 - ste
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ltteir own field.
,ere wore only two SI officers:In the\ it was im-
.
sible for either to go to Caiio heia4luitkers. 'Etixtepn,
too ,long for an offiOer to remain etv.illt Iron' his
tJ
W
? john L liavage
'A.mtAAboutionant, Ordnance,'
CLL
C.r.
rEetarr
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?
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Thiore iv attaohed the field report of Cuptain M. M.
Pittard, im him Ran Innen t with Drittlohmont lot ?
. tonroae
Aotim Chinf
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'
Captain M. M. Pittard
%port on Field Operations
arrived in India in Number 1943) and reported to Lt. Ool. Hammon
After eight deys in Mew Delhi t was *feigned to temporary duty with Dot. 101.
The first few daye were spent in obeerving end eeeieting with al work
at Pet. Neadquartern. The majority of the work was ?oncoming operations in
aurae, and I brought Oaptein Chartrandos residence and merlon?, in Hume
to the ettemtiom or the Chief 81 Officer. Then X eychenged plots*. with
Captain Ohertrend and was treneforred to Ochool and Training Headquartere
where I 'tidied the *Duress and observed the teaching or these course by
the inetructore.
After learning the location of the *ammo I was given from 18 to 36 bourn
per week of instruesion work in addition to other duties such as supervision
of reeds and oemp maintenanoe, and the construction of new comps.
X also spent *onaidsrohlog time,' in the schools end training office sestet-
ing with record., censoring letters end other administrative duties.
Even though the greeter port of my work wito with schools end training
we ware well informed as to the progress of SI and operetionel activity.
The morale of the *Moors and men at Dot. 101 was very high. They lived
up to their motto "rho difficult can be done immediately. The impoosible
takes a little longer." We were doing a job and it was a pleasure to work
with than.
In April 1944, I was recalled for duty with Det. 404, end arrived at
Plort. Needvartere on eth Soy 1944. 1 was sent to Olodegh to assist with ito
preporatiem 44 4 ?amp, and I served as oonducting ?Pricer for Thai vocruits?
Poring the *oath of June, I served as conducting officer for aMelhy
pomp of recruits at Camp I. Attar the arrival of Captain Heltoe, I returned
te Oamp 01t0 to eontinue with It. preparation as a wimp and serve as a conduct.
lag officer for Indo-Ntsian, Thai mid Towel recruit'''.
In August 1944, Dr. Lyon arrived and it was decided to use amp "K"
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se aa aseesemen ?amp. '4t then beoame Commanding Officer, at the requemt
of*. Ilgme and *erred umtil the arrivel of 8chool And Training pernonnel
la Norember 1944.. Until this time most or our personnel were on loan from
other brsaahos inniuding spoilt*
lS levember I asked for a transfer with A view to more aotive servi..24,
oithor with $I or 306 In Depoember / reoeived orders to return to Washington
?
,h
and arrived in slushington 2nd Yebruery 1945.
hattaigagaguiLiDAILSMI.d,
Valuable information is being reoeived from all areas in which we ore
interootod. SI and SO work in generel le making good progreom from All reporto.
Schools and training have reoeived pereonnel who hove hid epeoial trein-
ing snd the pommel from other brennhem are being replaced. Dr. Lymhn has
done an exoollent job In the amseeemeut field, All diffioultieo and handioapn
being oonsidered.
Conditionsit the field which migh be t improved, - speoiflo difficultien
and suggestions,
The limited 4umber of recruits who can qualify as native Agents hem
handloapped the progress of Dot. 404.
Individual rtoruiting is preferable to givap reorutting whenever possible
and when more recruiting con be done from within oocupled coantriem OUP reoulta
should be proportionately better.
In my opinion the preliminary pheoe of ansensment, oonnioting or inter.
views and tests, *covering m period of from 4 to 7 ftymi, mhould be placed near
the recruiting oentor in order to ellmlnete the obvioun rejectn before they
reseh the treining fines. Thie is espeoially important in group reorultIng.
The majority of recruits sent to Ceylon for aooeonment were recruited In
India end elsewhere, and it wee neoegostry to reject A Dirge number And return
them to olvilien lite from ) to 10 woke after being recruited.
Speolel efforts should he conetently exercined to coordinate the work
et all brenehes, oepacially recrultIng, armeonment, trelning end eeourity.
It wonlid be of adventege to sll brenohem for Sohools *lid Trelning to
have designated, personnel to revise oourses, id arrenge the subjeote pro-
greeelvely where students receive treining in more than one cemp, And make
avsilable solootsd information to instruotorm with i view to keeping the
students interestisd end informed am to their respective oountrieo during their
Period et training.
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-
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iiiminownw
?
"v.
tgv,
, A
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atie. ea? ieljj
"tit4s1,
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The constructive side of en agent's work nhould be emphenized AA well
sia the eubirorelvs. Por exemple, A course on nircrAft, pilot mono work, And
Milled plane and part molvoge (such ma bomb sightn, etc.) could be omphanized
alonir with the eseential courses of SI, much no reaonnninvonce snd reporting#
obeervetion and description, relent:ion of target pip] viti pouting 10cati0nn,
nap reeding and 004p#1114, SO courses much es svlention oil lending ntripe,
signaling, iiirplane sabotage, etc. In conneetion with the ron,un of pllotn
4 liberal rowsr0 might by offered for each pilot renoned from onomy territory.
Such a course would verve tIn an excellent reviow for recruits nenring
the completion of their treining, And the pilot rescue work would give to
tho reorult A constructive approach which might help to discover the possibility
tad extent ofsupport that on be expeeted from Oovernmont offico:1n
i nnd others
in occupied areas, who might not be readily inolined Co porticipnto In rubvernive
activity.
The acoomplishmente or Dot. 101 in the field ha n oonvinced me of the
possibility and Importance of a courae of training that will omphnniao the
rescue of pflotn Ane'f other aircraft personnel. Wharf, our react's, work from
within the ocovied area can 1>e coordinated with the work of (1-;" Ana A-2 who all,
workt,g from omaide the occupied organ, it Appeern thnt we art, in a ponition
Jo Ponder even greater serving thnn we hove in the peat,
It woe obrioun befoft I lett the flold from moent ohrIngen in personnel
and policy that other specific difficulties which might be mentioned here have
elreedy received' attention end something In being done about thorn.
_
etaitteg 01. (1.*4
.-""ft".. ?,atttr?V?ft?-????.?.?
-r
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-
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Aft
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Id
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.tifttftiolt*
rum 011
. ? ,
e Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GO ENT
to Acting Director
ommm Reports Office, Secretariat
r- r 1
Pield Report of Clip (P) Nelson Conroid NoNdward F6/\',1
mural
A
( C (r(
ilv"1
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ItAnti 16 April i943,
1. Cep (P) NoNdward participated in photographic
misslons in the British Isles durihg 194:2 and 1943 and
1.4 Rapt during the winter and spring of 1944. Prom
April to November of 1944 he did darkroom work in italy.
2. Re found the food generally poor and auggesta
that ft regular OX mess be set up with Army cooks.
J1. Nr. Noldward has praise for cooperation of the
British in his work In Brigland and of OSS personnel in
lgypt, but not in Caserta.
4. Ke notes that OBS naval mon, even chiefs, are
requirod to perform fatigue duties at the receiving ship
at Maples.
Attaebiscrat
>r,3146?ZtZede,
W. B. Kantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer
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Il
?S?
7
411
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1,
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0".
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4Al?teitti..sAt.,-...f,... t. ?
.4.016 114
?
Office andum ? uNinD STATES G:1)1 NT
Tit kiting Director
0110.416 Apr
il 190
&sports Office, Secretariat
Maa Field Ihiport of Cap (P) Nelson Conrad Madward
r
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k- ,;.,4 (-?
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/AV
AtCcnj
1. Cap (P) Noldward participated in photographic,
misslons In the British Isles during 194:4 and 1943 and
in Rapt during t winter and spring of 1944. From
April to November of 1944 he did darkroom work in rtnly.
2. Re found the food generally poor and suggests
that n regular 0/ moss be set up wIth Army cooks.
ie Mr. NeNdward has praise for cooperation of the
British in his work in *island and of os personnel in
Ngypt, but net in Caserta.
4, Me notes that OSS naval men, even chiefs, are
required to perterm fatigue duties at the receiving ship
at Maples.
vi
Attaehment
)r13441t4i4,
W. B. rantack
Capt., A.C.
Reports Officer
,AJAA.K.:411311Pillk,0?AgAtaAA,A.???-=
1-4
Tr
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7,16
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MeinerandUM ? UNITED STATES GC! ENT
Se k
Aettog Director
16 April 190
Reports Office, Secretariat / 6 r
; f
Field Report of Cap (P) Nelson Conrad Madward ("?
,17/5
1. Cep (P) Madward participated in photographic
missions In the British Isles during 194;2 and 1943 and
in Rapt during the winter and spring of 1944. From
April to November of 1944 he did darkroom work in Italy.
2. Re found the food generally poor and suggests
that t regular 0/ mess be set up with Army cooks,
3. KIN Madward has praise for cooperation of the
British in his work in ngland and of WS personnel in
ID'Pt, but not in Cagepta,
4. Re notes that OBS naval men, even ch1er, era
required to perform fatigue duties at the receiving ship
at Maplos.
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tk49 I
SECREF ,
e Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
Director, 088, Administration Building
'las Sooret.ariat, Administration Building
MON Chief, Field Photographic Branoh
DATA! 28 Maroh 1945
MOM Report. from Personnel Returning from Yield
Yorworded for your information and fil*.
1 Bool.4oport of C8p (P) MoMmard
SECRET
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-a
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ik 714ss 4...1/4
ki t'ir ?
f:
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1114.011100?..."
Imoompsessisp
SECRET
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
101 Kreuter, 088, Administration Building 28 March 1945
YXAs Secratariat, Adninistration Building
Chief, Field PhatograPhic Branch
FROM:
cap (P) Nelson Conrad Moldward, U8MR
SOBJECTs Reports from Personnel Returning from Field
Arrived in Ragland 1 September 1942. Went to Roseneath, Scotland on first
amalgams!. Photographed U. S. Army and Marines during training. This
asaignmemt lasted approximately six weeks and consisted of motion picture
work.
Returned to Lamdon 11 November 1942 and assembled gear and equipment for
mew assignments On 12 January 1943 reported to Lt.Col. Jeffery Courtney,
la Glasse of Combined Operations Experimental Establishment, located at
Westward No, North DOV03, England. This assignment consisted of photo-
graphing all 'caret operations held in this area, with still photographs
lmeluded. Photography was made of all tank wade operations, waterproofimg of vehiclec, landing waft operations, mine laying devices, mortar
firing, track devices, stretcher devices, cable living devices at
Mimehead, firicg of bangalores, eggs, blowing up of underwater piping -
them photographing results at low tide. The foregoing operations were
photographed 'eider fire. At Portland photographed operations of Vehiole
Landing Ramps tied on Port and Starboard deck, wired with Hexite, and
shim fired Landing Ramps mere blown off, tied to Bow of LST, then all
vehicles were driven to Shore; total time of operation 16 Minutes. Major
Pillar was in charge of operations. All still work at Westward Ho was
dome by Field Photographic Branch. All supplies and equipment used at
Sootuord No Imo furnished' by Field Photographic Branch. Upon completion
of this assignment, entire darkroom supplies were retained at Westward Ho,
with the exeeption of motion picture cameras and still equipment, in so-
serdmaee with instructions from Lt. M. Z. Arvistead of the London Branch.
Dosing this ascigmmest 137,000 feet of raw negative was exposed; 3,000,
4 z 5 stills ware made, from which 30,000 prints were made, not inoluding
enlargements. All British Army personnel on this assignment were very co-
operative. Transportation difficulties were encountered due to the fact
that faellitlec were limited. The food problem was our worst difficulty
dos to the fast that no OI Mess was available in this area. These oper-
ations were eoadmeted in preparation for D-Der Invasion. Assignment was
emmpleted 28 Imember 1943.
Retuned to London 2$ November 1943 to assemble gear and equipment for new
assigmmemt. On 12 Amory 1944 was assigned to USAFIKE in Cairo, Egypt.
F Vr.
tt.
A 1
424k
SECRET
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?
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. -
640
?41411$*.}714im-ek; maw. 7 r ?yr. ?
SECRET
ttrintor, oss.a 28 Marc& 1945
Photographed Beirut Agent School near Cairo for Major Yassos of 008. Mx-
*ellen! oeoperation was reeeived by OBS men there, a11 officers being very.
*cooperative. Atter completion of foregoing assignment, PW E School near
the Pyramids wato photographed for Nritish Arvay.
Om 2$ April 1944 left Cairo br plane for Bari) ttaly, arriving in Bari on
26 April 1944. A complete darkroon was established there for us to devel-
op sod print any operations taken oss offioers who photographed opera-
tions La Yugoslavia and Albania. Our principal job there was to go in the
field to photograph these operations, come beak to Bari and print and de-
velop these photagraphe to be turned in to Major Ross, Mead of Operations.
Due to the loss of Chief O. P. Yowler, taken prisoner In Tugoolavia, we
were mot permitted to leave, but Bpi/0 J. B. 111in left for two missions
in Yugoslavia for Marshal Tito and to photograph general Mihailovitoh.
While assigned hors I oompleted darkroom work, mapping, and reproduction
work for the Operations Offioe. All OSS men stationed here were very oo-
operative and excellent results were obtained. I feel sure that these 058
nom did their job in an excellent manner and it was a pleasure to work for
them. food ?auditions in Mari were mediocre, but the food in Caserta is
terrible due to the fact that no 01 Mese is ettablishod and all food is
cooky* Italians,. Not much 000peration was given us ay 080 men stationed
in Caeerta, living oonditiont were diffioult, and there 'ma such resentment
by offieers stationed there. Dispensaries in Marl and Caserta are stranded
for Implies such as bottles and various articles. All pharmaoisto matee
there are exoellent workers and very cooperative.
Left Caserta for Napier 6 November 1944, arriving at Reoelving Ship in Naples
store all OSS mon leaving for the United States scrub floors, paint walls,
sad nave furniture, Chiefs are expected to do likewise. The food was excel-
lent om the Reoeiving Ship. Left Casablanca 11 November 1944, arriving in
Now York 1 December 1944.
Ii sonalusina, will state that all COS men in the field do their work very
roll and the omly complaint I nave to make is that the food is poor and the
emly solution I see would be to have a regular established OI Ness, with
Army crooks.
?
v:/(14,e.A Grf/ re6
MUM CONRAD MolDWARD
08 (P), tIOUR
SECRET
.4-A?t?-
-' rnr Release 2013/09/27 CIA-RDP13X00 01RO
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i
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,
Acting Director
i Reports Office) Secretariat
mom Field Report of Capt. Arthur S. Bates
/6, 4 ((
\//c /(/
S 'GOVERNMEg:
d
t1i 16
4)
' April 190
(1.1CM\ (h If I 44 it
\i/ 6
(Communications/)TO.)
Attached 1s a report from Capt. Arthur 8. sates
who was in ch4ge of the London Message Center, Capt.
Dates says that, the principal difficulty he encountered
was that not enough time was allowed to train and brief
agents in ciphsrs, which resulted in decipherment diffi-
culties once the agent was in the field. He suggests
that any branc contemplating the Use of agents make
every effort to inform the Cipher Section of Communica-
tions as soon as possible am to how many require cipher
training. For security reasons this information must be
definitive.
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CONFIDIATIAL
Ce Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
The Direeter, OM, through (1) Chief, Oommunie OATH! 29 )arch, 1945.
oationernranch, (2) Secretariat
PION t Capt. Arthur S. Bates
SUNlitil Report on Field Condition..
1. begriglign,gljaim. Offieer in Charge of London Massage Center,
6 April, 1943 to 31 January, 1945, duties involving the supervision of
aryptographing and decryptographing of claseified mongsages, assurinp, the
proper handling of OSS cryptographic systems, the acoounting for cryptographic
material received from Waehington and other USS offices, the isauing or such
met4ria1 to field detachrents and to agents, the oryptographio training of
agents, and the training of Measage Center personnel recruited in the ET?.
2. PlajaatligjliDijilialastnaligli. The only diffioulty vorthy of
particular montion has to do with the question of agent training in ciphers.
On a number of occasions the Communications Branch in the ETO VOA not allowed
adequate time to train and brim" agents in thin subjeot, with the result that
decipherment difficulties arose ono(' the agent was oppmating in the field.
This difficulty has been remov1.4 to a oertain degree by re-vampting the agent
training program, but agents are still being brought to the Communications
Branch for cipher training as late as a week or ten days before their
departure for the field.
I would reoommend that branches contemplating the use of agents be urged
to make every effort to inform the cipher section of the Communioations
Branch as soon as possible at to how many require cipher training.and au to
the type of work the agents will be expected to do.
It is also important that the cipher training section know as soon as
possible whioh men are 4glaillx going on missions becaune of the
insecurity attaohod to teaching spocifio top secret detail to men who may
mot be required to use them.
-
.101040Now"?L"
(?gff4.
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CONFIDENTIAL
e Memorandum ? UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
TO
PROM
SUIVICTI
ir Wiser la Cherie et Imedos asses. ?eater,
6 60,11. , 940. duties imvolviag the supervieloa of
orpptesrephleg sad destyplosraphi et sleesitied assesses, assurimi the
proper heedlia, et
as ern systems the asiesstios ter eryptesraphis
usterildirsosiwed fres asehlastsa and other OSS Wiese, the iesaiag of gush
materIi te :told driaehments and to asents, the sryptosraphis Mutates of
wisp sad the tabu of alesease Water pommel 'intuited is the Wfts
The oldr diffioulty art* et
questioa of asset train*/ la elphers.
ember et essaeleas Osmossioatiese Irameh in the Reuss sok aliened
time to trate sad bried assets is this eubjest, with the result that
ditflosities arose ease the asest was opematies is the field.
this dittisalt, how hese removed to ? sertaia degree tir ro-vampOmih. most
hut &seats are still helms brought to the Oemmasioatioes
lima Iv= treislasos late as amok sr ten days before their
depertere ter the field.
ruseid reismsemd that *when eeetemplatime the use et iasnte be urged
to rho ever, otter% to Wens the elpher sostioa of theOIaiO.tLQaI
Ireseh 0 sees es possible as to hen seamy require sipher train*/ and as to
the typo emelt the assets will be espeeted to de.
It Le else *sportiest that the sipher *aisles ',sties lamas soot as
Ildleh sem are seta, es missies, bosoms. a the
atteshed to Ofitteliesitle top omit detail' to mem who may
mei roliired to we them.
? .?
CONFIDLIT,?!41,
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Aeting DirocteP
Reports Office, Seoretariat
mmact Pield Report of John Waldron (X-2/IT0)
1. Attached Is ? report from Mr,
*niched to the X-2 Wmr Room in Paris
to participate in disousaion relative
tbe now German War Room in Lond
2. This report tokplaini in some detmil the funotiohm ;And
adminlotration of the War Room, the differonce lh the duties,
of and relations between the British mnd Amerlomn mtmffs, mnd
eohelon !Andoni
the relation between thy forward unit ln Paris And the resr
in
3, Mi. Waldron points out that Nano, the British unit WMN
AttiO1244 1411 SHAW while the American SCI units were attsched
to Communications Zone, there WAS a oertsin divergenoe in the
funetions of the two units. Moreover there was M dUpilvMt1011
Of work and personnel as a result of the division of the FrOh011
Desk between London and Paris. Mr. Waldron Aim o es that
American ICI units ere forced to do more C.I.C. work than mhould
be expected of ea fully trained OCX officers.
4. In lomolus on Mr. Waldron points out that many of the
between Mlilild MU.
?title**. leveled gainst the Prow War Room, were due to Nfeudien
, .
John Waldron, who
And returned to Washington
to the emtobliehment of
13-Z ,? - .? ?
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Gonerft1 Ni
DohOym
Attlintlont Captatn W. P.
Lt. Col. Rorr A. torkpr,
*toting Chief, X-2 branch
Attmohed im ft romport pr,pawmd by W.
?covering the purled 17 Marah 1044 to 1 dftnumry
?
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nAtml 11 January. 1045
Retaraiail: I lett Leaden se 1 Ammo 1045 sad the v. ?e 4
ES on 5
Late is Oetaber X visited the Paris striae tor a week, pours*
Atter a tow weeks et 1440410144U* and o;:4 with the 10-5 - 141
0 Sifters, whisk is venal with newly arrived personnel la Londe' i was detailed
to IRS ter trawl la the Medlin at Special *pat eases. th: intsetioe
wee thin ! sheild eke eare of the Landau sod at all gush oases as we eight
rim either tree tho V. R. er la Pram or the Loelaeds. to this end I shared
the ernes it the Ohio, et the seethe et MRS that samood wok 041106
Ilesever1 ehmores is the Loads% agar 1~ ocasequant am Mks. liturpbea
dasisiste to establish a terverd detaehmset Is Paris stter the liberatise et
Met litre led te ir bails asked to Wild the Amortise side of the Just
Orittsbqamer._ieem Shr Sees? lost relistaet4, I screed to take over aid rem
the !hi selAy with mr Dritleh opposite amber netil I retuned to Washlaltsa
ter seepage. I.
je
ilIMMIUMMIMULammiaa1
I els ashed to seas toSesbdarszttnpor ea the preliminary dis-
sessimat at the am lo_aeda agereee Shr mommeseeme - liseussions 'blob
! 'Oared with the MRS armors hes the begiloplret their plasm* for the
eseiblisheret et mesh as focsaleetiaa. Mr. mad Mho. Pearsall telt, too,
theS asoll4 be et gee have la the Im4appeetettem et Lambe marts sm the
aide with reepeek te the mew eiratienanto
alLammikatime
NI 01900446 ?ht.:lir& :II. I sa !rte. the into I lig the bittioss
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'
4fik,
?
Up bVALML`63 .!**** re. "e tvisetrad Poiar brow:,
ese As sheet. the Probeh Beek geared to hemdle the multitudinous
asise:ted elth our esplettatiss et the IstellAgemoo opportunities
Miramar behind the 4,0160 and to serve, through our de the?111.4 various
latellAgesee argosies la 'Silo, the jab well death
nor et Wm ear MIN Ile to assist the alto is the field kr
V . ? . . 4
11. ?4 'd I
- 711 qr-rjr- rrnir virrn.iirwriv
? ac.
'r. r
?
are. oaf
tisk asd Ameriees, that west to the field?
fhe intersetios thus sallied vas drams fres all tha sources
e_ivallehe
to Ifte aad IOC War seour* ramose, the
intermaties thustfrevided was to be made available to other
emotes le the old threigh dieeraet dietribution
trebled 24 /14 Misers,
fr soap Utilities?. organisations,
tssisieg oehestsi Isom er suspect siesta aod the like, ill
a pertehle tent* the use of Set sem with task forams
Field result' and the reports et field ?Moore Wiest*
that these lists eere,et the greatest value.
ir
O.
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arAll or: 4411: 141" ..0144.. ws;tiejse
queut eft "moo eq. "%torten," ask: tessii
10,
.01"7;11744"1,11. grirST?tir ipeata..?.118.$31* Wif" Pireikt 1134
.:411:vt..._aftft4 0$ s?qr peames'Aft ja."7?41* 4011$1 age
etea isto "ftftkit %ow eft asj gro
ocult e?rulics-r:41. 414,1111.141.44004104. aerilitriterykstr ortio:111"--posAl? ?ram:
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'efts; ; a ega 4eurs am**
so ifty
tdewr PooseratZ "I" drati
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pose _w Zap v %P.m "44r ale "ft -Ps
.4autaa 840 4441 /1/t/ /41 Alo ell$ ---
*.14;;40"; lanta.41114.41? $11:444.4"; it*Z .11,73;11DPs eva
Irt 44.14 ito .4141/11).?484 *RI 4%;41 es elPra.it
uliontreer nv . "*** Paso 04 wag AI et,
viiasi4 zap
blip 404
*like $haqua Oft*, .2_,M1,100
41to "11110 /41074:01,11hras.?.411444/.
10100 0114
11eadt,..
--mm41117 qo sX411110
Mali aft 1114 ;4061,00 441; Margie._
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fipiir 4444 3t4tr eqs Ilsoottoot Pi*
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410 ""V 0Pft 114 q * ?pp ' 444 441.11,:. 14414
11,414.2 try 40 j. (.81, .7Pelv ".41.4 /De 44; gr/or" 4R1 1.4
trIAN411 41q; ay. ftriglipels.tir 11114 ,4108 46") 4411C
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dr.4404074 alllisrefto 4"1") ,...._"q1704. y."4 Pie
401;
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;Pr -vw IPT 1.00Saao Waqi IOU Arr ea?fts
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Oho
SECKE1
41,
?
The MU* side of the Varlet* has boom sommod by am average of
sees doses sees Wise's, snob of shem WOs sorviess et e soerwkagy, the
Sumplemm side, by moo tam Wiser., sees of oboe bad a oeoretegy. The
Ameriesm shaft hes bed mo Ameriamm seeretarial assistemts. Two of our yowls
memo typists wars assigned to the Mese, het thy were very telly oesepied
Wattle espying mei distribution (to ihritisk sod &martian offieers in the
Room) AmerisemaM Sritieb eibles, reports, eta., sad in the loggias
sod false at digimastee It le see dear to the aseruitimg Mice in Washimgton
%bet *tot ;mowed ta the field are inbalirmetysimg Poem who sem amd are
'Wing to 4o typing sod other oesses4Artal walk.
14,k Iwo 0 Os lwritish oposu9 la the Mhr licoo is * trio of brillisetly
gee. NOV iotollipistfr soli traiaad, 400rizres4 orrAters? 74r tho row*.
WO/ ottieors sod iphoir sooretscies have, T41 the rhols, all000d to @thy
lime 44:1U0 0 their speol,41 tarks to dovolv iuL* ottlAtitm* #1mlistaats is
the work.
The Amerioem poop, os Ow other haa4? was rathom e,410
at the time of the establishment ?t the Fart. *trio., With he oxsoprioa tor
eme. Dolowits, all offisers and soorokariss who had to4s traleimg and
:111for tho Job tho6 las to bo does le Leedom Iwo tam for the use
11 et es to inhledimg the too *plat assisteets . bad to loam as
we did ea* Oyes work, !shish by this time (our drives earess !ranee was is
Ml swims) lest with a dimerimg reek es6 always mew prehlsese Oir Ihrittsh
sellegies ompremely taproot cod helpful durimg thou, early weeks. For
the most pent oirleopito respeaded gemorovely amd latterly we have boom holding
mp our end vow doissoW sal* Soso thins that we saw seeded doimg bed),
? thst vested to de for the teller .port of the Paris and tho field
effigies hod to go enema. Newever, we made me major mistakes . wham we eight
tm the ems. ot amy emir of them, days have made mew amd we earned tho
lospeet amd the so/id friendship of orer eelleageos by the work we, so meetly
nerieos, sommged to get dome.
Smog the Amerieems is Moller Room to* should be mentiomod for
Notably SW won are, .
1. Was Oraeo Dolomites by tar the most everionood end well
'raised ettilber as the Preeoh Desk. She had sated as
eseratert to NO. Robert has ter more than *your Ker
gemeMMObad brilliantly latelligont otudY of not omir the
treash but the general looters luroposs 0. X. situation
made her ma imvalumblo officer in the War Room. Nor work,
WA bed ohiefly to do with the letsrprotatioa of vest
sosrot mime, weed her the highest reeReot free the NIS
people.
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44
ft?
3
P17-1
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SECRET
-4. tk. sods ?ewe yew soeestly arrived hies lashiaston
.3. lifter as am them the naval train* there, he gave his
SIM rote intalliirome nith Illienotie eakeraeity to the
beskteee et lea** his Job sad tatting it dose. ile hue
. not bad 0, eneept ter a ter thadeys im aw Wider' in tour
asnilhe mid mely leaves the Otte. until, late at nights
110 ill ON flay likedbat eitaired by our een people aW
by tbi *Utah sinews who him muted with hia? a selfless.
La
_owasi pal vell trained. mobile and linguieto he
se the woe,*** woo, z woe. ma is the smelts
as lo as II tke Irtvatt tor 1/2,Azirti big sort as 101 unit with
, ile aillW. kV* he vtil bo. ttavalueble at esir Brain *antra
et ow vol,?,k6 fYx.t6 11).1tiallilifee peeplA would, it seem to
,
is U. orioti bwictirona tet.trit,
a% es will. 1,r". 4:ip.rp win efei,-,41 ter ? poet in the eirviee
?
,
11# LC Mtn &runt 0630Neitt an4 thi ntor.itlit 1urke have
devslopod %to vary. call'oase ottioere, *doable ot doing
a large wolves at watt, Nies Allem Demo with her lone
lbshingtor *North Atria' owporiesoe as preparation has
boom most bagel show imikiiewleal Is London. Sheiwill,
hewer, preboblr novo or to Ports later.
idlikemildmilliLiCtilli
;:arlflag thelreneh. _Iller leen ate a Joist Almeria,* Lettish siDeekilithe
iitth tOist ad* shish the Latish 'nom worked.
shies the amine* we. rade its eantribution vas not quite
The
Drit_ish ettisere in Paris nere_undsas the diroition or their
WAS daisy the assriesa loftiest"' there sanded te milk as as iadepoident
, soy Mat repefted... _ Ito alliblitti. to Lesion. nob, ow. as Louisa bee done,
AMA dims. to ussaingtes. Oopplote iidopsediON moo ot (soiree, set possible
lad Pude 104 eseeteatly to have raterame to London tor helps et ono Mad
or safter? this pliyaisal supaistisa of the tee parts of the Peak* Desk 46
.,.1.
.;?:A.f.-, t..4U.;p::7;-_1_ tar t,het sae the etoattial Stet et the eitartios i? Galled for not eak4 a
.. ,
psi,g
_ it, bit a duplication of seek else. Iambi to, Inatome,
los MO lip to St. Its oun sot it mires. Doubtless this situation has been
dimmed by Ihr? IWO, an his mem, visit to Peri. end Dome
> 'et the two Wises.
seeermintlesa AU by nes hive been nelde as to the relations and reeponsibilities
. the Ileitis* ettiaere Is Paris sure. to ropesto oder the dirsetien
It Iseedie?_ they vase, also. . to mote *ether Mat or diverge'''. Iron the
Aserlies.arempaeint, ettoshoWl to Napo simmer ear people were attaahed to
lone. teathdelts: in atteastrajenr!kbp understood as
MIA IMO.
jolt esek et the SOX *its wee to have boas advisory. to pose on
.0, I. egoaeloe +Ike interaation ado dkvailable br the rosouroes
aine
? ,,Vp?fi''
t
SECRET
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fi?
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roved For Release 2013/09/27 1 CIA-RDP13X00
SECRET
01R000100Uouuu,,,
et Mk rt, MIS, sad to advise sad direst such owcioo ta the use of thAt
Interafttien, The Oritish An hese* end the Lowlands kept, ktipeciallty
*maser tt the role of adviser, to such American, Ingiioh, Preach
aid ether Cy Z. ageinciec vat 'Tlidalt they bad tUaliagse They did tic wider
dive01,,* toga MOON rwt left thin, illi Itarlop In the happy posit1=Nn of
Weteng, oo the atm af aetual opolice* opartton4i tc gather
the at. or Aseriese activity as it dev4p4d g'et.0 4Ar
Sutotqesgelt4tm *i4a; timOirttod hi our er.tnies.
Ilioaticheent of our SO/ tblitio to Oomamnioations 140* for44d U6
ti 10 rather sere 210.140.* work than our oarefullly trained 80X offimllow ohould,
periao?, Wee bees askei to do. Homfte, had to do it for the reason that
the immiums 0.1116 vas it su loll ohossen, or twitted, or experionoed for its
$4b, se wey, the *MA P.O.?. were for theirs. Ile had, therefore, to help
not say* previdlas the kind of intensities available to us sad with advice
ad dinettes, but had to jump in sad do no mall asouat of 110.4.0.11 work as
sell. The disadvestages of this Vidition were olear4 reoognised by the heads
et ear Dreash, but the disadvasiages of act doing what we did were equally
sad of eossidereble weight. Oa* large result of our generosity was
t our *Moors ens eepywhire the respest and good will of the Arey people .
sm asset that will stead good stead for Witt the low ram.
It meet be said th.t the Iritish 801 its is the 21 A. 0. area
bed to do mere field and ordiaary woe work than they "WOW to do. It is,
hesewer, s fixed priasiple if pair, with this to avoid suoh operations and
they aro pleasing, oder direetioas from Loodon, to turn over most of this
to the Prima, Wiles, sad Dutch peewit, services in the near future. Their
atm is to get fres thee* servioss full, reports for their files an all such
eases is ',tura fer'sseh Asformatisa and *doles as they pass as. They feel
that thsg should sew be giving their thought and energy to realising their
Dog range plass emd are doing so. They have concentrated their 801 Omits
in Smells. ese or thee* As a fay large mit of **radially doses youeg
corniers she were 04104 et in the.haadlAwg of Special Agent oases.
Us mats Job et the small loiat ?mob kr item in London would
sees as to bey* bees demos At sea sad probably will *outlaw for a bit to
serve the Josiah British, Amerioan, and PrenobsLewlands operations in the field,
but the several Weeks within it will doUbtless some more and more to serve
the le operations of the erreeal, or the interested governments.
ass important value of the War Soots has beat its use as a laboratory
ter thaw plasm'', the Oerwea lir hoist the weaknesses in the present eet-up
sad its imadelsasies for getting a f- satisfeetory job done Mee booms
very. ilearly *epeeist as the weeks by. The remedies for these that we
bad to imprevise mad revise as we went along son now be inoorporeted in fairly
?
SECHE
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AR
""A
Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5
1/413001frO".
Pat w
thIllik stfective work to get itself
MN Ms thealrg:=6.
Ifs vats failure of the Or NW 4m, 60000,1*$ to reports of tritish
Wises's, lbs it seted is was %regime% it OS gisSms,mid 11112?Mag to offiooro
is the fist& It bissobeweverelbees meted abaci-hi-that Leads* *as the Volta Office
tel ttairtileratiess esd their Lomas people kept a fit* bead os their visite
IS es OM, people, es tbe other hood, were inolised to get thiags dose
eat
to toll is about VIOS atiffara - oallimg is the seastiee for every possible
is C*
!WI* errespobrak was based os two importent considerations I
sirwiee Wad give os
IW
the tss% that Weiss lad is WWI sad III regietries sad in the files of
west Wiest swarees,? sass of detailed intonigoomo that *oat not be avoilable
te ettieers is the fie* sad tie the feat that it tad oleo e pool - is MIS \
isils espesiellyMISS - et istelligesee Wise's oho hod loos sad fell exptriesce
it 1010111110101110111 is the fleld. Os the 'hole the Americo* ?Moors etc had
lad smikieufersem... -that with the visits ester L-por ...seri, themselves in
pude est tath the armies. the relattvelr great American case officer's in
LemAssisere see likely to have midi of value to Wigf to the people in the field
sodium, set likaly tabs tistesai to whoa they did. Our Loudon pelople did,
Mesmer, liars the )ch of processing the saterial available in 'Audi,* sad of
esereletimg it with messages sod reports fro* the Croat and did a potato Sob
Of prewillmg istormatiss that peeved valuably as a
ti
Ibis servioe vas often of t spertamoo.
asailll' ag that tweed out to be most useful.
0I% is Mews is Ils=tes, ef oourse, that the oriticises of the
* Or Triad' Ines wet is so part, the resat of the log 'tome between
Ilio Trawl' tor Swaim*ossomisod woldwe the symptom, of NIG - Wash
U is shag* et assert* outside the U. I. owl to custodian of Circle informatioa.
OS saint.
Os the etherbode the SO aegistry le the rioheet sad most useftl in loglaid
ea vour.10/ et Vrio iss ?Mews here bsiro boss trsis?ii by 1110* It to true
that Mai of the WOW/ motoriol toot to the field Ime be prepared by 11111,
es sio ell ONION Worts. VIS is, %Wrote's, swims to team a greeter share
. ts the Weir sperstiess, Nemo, they hellfire thet 0.00 they balm boos oaa-
traveling so heavily is Ohet las tees dams, tbor (mto have a proper share
it tea sad of wastrel is the lowlier Roes.
Visa diswassiess of these setts& aro sow going forisrd is London
sod repasts as Magee WO sad desisioss soopoottos the Dermas Illar loos will
00014 eselidae WO. Wog as our Imputes to MU aro, us gill do4btless
tied ea alljoir to tiost so volottoto betimes omothing 1110 a joist SO - 1nS --
is Or Wigs INoi Soo* - sot ors17 poostiao tut savostroovo. Ito SO Or r000rd
boo *Pm Ito013141041. & Watt Use sober ot Z.11 Winer. bairo bad traipsing
Meer 0. 04? Ws UM/ oar vativiri is We a htet adietriktios set asy
tel their Milt as isibuLltissee ? tut SO SOS or trot lenerellitel ea
taros*
Jioholeks?omihket+.,
?
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NAMOUTIVI4
N.
Hettheim
11,
fe? N*fhosio
js Mortimer:
AS ja tOZ
Tit e it #
Ildwor fel WI 141,11
_
ji0hf, Os W1141074- --
, ?
v.
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Declassified and Approved For Release 2013/09/27: CIA-RDP13X00001R000100060003-5
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON. 0. C.
Acting Chief, SI
Field Report by Jameo M. Henry with
Ooomento by Major DIoncen 0. tee
Attached Is Field Report of JameN M. Ownry, June 300
1944 - January 22, 1945, with oommonto thereon by MAjor DtrnQI a,
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S
,
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,
,
OFFICE OF STRATUM SERVICES
WASHINGTON D. Cts
18 April 194,
TOs Ohi.f, 81
PiIOIs ?Mr bet Divieion, 81
SWIM' tiladlik11921.,Ligt.whismILAIRCI
1. Dr. Henry's field report dated 16 April is forworded
herewith. It im believed that you will find this rmport unuouslly
latereetinei Beetione 511 6, 8 and 9 will be of intorest to mll
eranehos and to mil OPS personnel preoesding to Chine. Smetion 8
will be of partieuler intermmt to MO,
2. There are attached herewith for your signmture note.
of transmittal savoring oopiem of thim report to be sent to the
Direetor end to the Chief of MO,
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k ?FMCS OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.
Report of Teohnioal Representative Jaws M. Henry
June 343, 1944 - January 22, 1945
Resume of work.
Central Government and General Political Situation.
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,47
-2
Aloft,
1. Itugo. Left Miami June 30, 19441 and arrived in Kunming
July 17th, was finally assigned to AGFRTS and August 22nd went to Kweilin.
From there I was aseigned to Detachment 6 in Kwangtung. Reach KuKong
Septouber 1st. Helped organise and run radio school for selected men
from 7th and 9th War Zones. From end of October until I left January 22nd,
1945, was in charge of the liaison with the 7th War Zone Headquarters.
And also one (AI) operating in Hongkong and reporting to Capt. Lynn
at Detaohment 6 HQ in Hing Ming.
2. ThiadainkfistrimmtlasUngitil Political Situation. From
talks with some of the political loaders, including Sun Fo, Wu Te-chen,
Madame Sun Tat Son, Kan Naikwong, former Kwang-et war-lord Li Chai-Sam,
bankers, merchants, professors, the whole civil and military group in
Zwang-tung, I received the distinct impression that the popularity and
prestige of Generalissimo Chiang Kai-Shek in 1945 was less than in 1944,
and that vis-a-vis his own political entourage he was weaker.
Sun Fo seems to be generally regarded as an ardent advocate
for drastic reforms within the Kuomintang. In conversation with me
he was emphatic as to the necessity of coming to terms with the
Communists. He seemed worried over the results in case nothing was
done. He believes Russia will enter the war.
There is continual political maneuvering between the Central
Government and the various provinces. A definite struggle is now on
in Yunnan. Former Minister of War Ho Ying-yin now holds an important
Central Government post in that province and is definitely trying to
undermine the power of Governor Lung.
Generally, the Chinese regard the present Chungking trend as
fascist. Freedom of movement, and of speech, is certainly in many
quarters being interfered with.
Practically every intelligent Chinese with whom I talked,
outside of purely government or military ciroles, was pessimistic
as to post war China, envisaging a prolonged period of internal strug-
gle.
1 3. &month !far Zpiag. This takeji in the Kwangtung Province. The
Commander-in-Chiefa, Yu Han Mao L 3 star general of whom there are
eighteen in Chink,/ is the man primarily responsible for swinging the
Kwang-tung Provinoe into line with the Central Government in 1936.
General Yu and his group are very friendly with General Hsiao-Yu,
Commander-in-Chief of the Ninth War Zone, which takes in Hunan and the
Southwest Section of Kiang-si. The troops in this war sone are to a large
extent Cantons's*, Gen. Asia? being ? native .of the Kwang-tung Province.
k
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Both the 7th and 9th War Zones are very bitter over the
Changsha and Hengyang defeats which they attribute to the mishandling
of the defense by Chungking. Some go so far as to claim that this
was deliberate and that the loss of Cantonese troops, estimated at
100,000 was part of a settled policy to weaken the war strength of
those two peripheral sones.
The comparative lack of resistance to the recent enemy
drive in lamas and Kwangtung, is in part at least due to the present
weakness of these two war sones. It may also be in part due to the
desire to husband their strength for the final struggle with the
japans's.
The Seventh War Zone appears to have some excellent men on
its general staff. The second in command, General Chiang Kwong Nail
was formerly number two in the famous 19th Route Army, and is also a
three star general the dosen or so two star generals, one comes
from the Virginia 1..,..LItary Institute, one from Stanford, and one was
trained in Prance. One is the highest ranking Chinese General to have
studied in Bawer, India. The Colonel of a special training regiment
is himself English trained, ? graduate of Woolwich. To a man they
are all pro-American and can be relied upon for active co-operation
and valuable assistance, should opportunity or occasion arise.
4. This haA been headed since 1939 by
a General Left Han-wen Two star general/ who had a considerable
military reputation some years ago. This man while pro-American is
surrounded by a number of poor assistants, of whom some are considered
as very corrupt. A goodcmany financial scandals are attributed to
his regime. He is very ambitious and his underlings and the 7th War
Zone underlings have created a very unco-operative situation as between
the civil and military authorities. Governor Lee's strength derives
from his friendship with the Chen brothers in Chungking. Many unsuc-
oesisful efforts have been made to unseat him.
The writes has had many conferences with him and credits
hist with being sinoorely anxious and really prepared to co-operate
with American toms if and as an oppertunity arises.
Should there be a landing in the Kwangtung area by American
troops, there will be 100% cordial co-operation upon the part of
the Civil Government as well as of the Military Government.
5. jimmals. Thepe are innumerable and everywhere. Presumably
the various Chinese secret services know many of them, but the greater
number are not known.
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Our airfields are policed by Chinese soldiers. The Hostels
are staffed by Chinese. Undoubtedly a percentage, particularly of the
soldiers, are saw agents.
Tha writer would seriously urge that even greater measures of
eeeurity be taken is respect to both these classes than seem to be
takes.
Boot-blacks, newsboys, professional people, attractive young
moues, have all figured in "spy arrests' from time to time. In each
large city there is a big list of suspects, many of whom, of course,
are innocent.
There can be little doubt, however, that every section of
4,00140ty in "free China" is eaturated with enemy agents.
. Poverty is perhaps the greatest cause for these. Resentment
over previous unfair treatment is another cause. Thimeroenary motive
is another and impoOtant factor.
In the writer's opinioa there are no pro-Japanese Chinese.
The mem agents probably hate the Japanese worse than anyone else,
and moue of these are pro-Japanese, unless it be that group concern-
ing whose existenoe the Chinese are most insistent, a group of real
Chinese adopted in their childhood by japanese and educated for this
purpose.
6. Anulgia niers Mho Have to WI. Qxt in Occqpied_Territory.
I have had some experienoe receiving these men from the guerrillas
the brought them in and have talked with others. I have discussed
this with 058 authorities in Kunming and with the appropriate or-
ganisation for dealing with this question. I feel I should stress
the importance of making sure that the guerrillas or farmers, or troops,
eho resew our Mem should never be in the least out of pocket.
When rewards as high as $1,000,300.00 Chinese currency are offered by
the Japanese, it seems to no it should be our duty to make sure that
all OM men at leamt, should be instructed that there should be no
withholding or hesitanoy upon their part if any ocoasion should arise
when some payment or reimbursement in this connection should seem
either necessary or desirable. I do not know how to emphasise this
as much es it should be emphasised.
I have heard the statement mode that 95% of our men who
have had to bail out behind the lines have been rescued. I have
also heard the statement that ? large percentage of these rescued
have beim in AGMS areas and have in this last analysis passed through
A07128 beads. If so, then it should be all the more important that
oar people should have specific instructions in this matter.
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7. 16.24.6*. P*om conversation with people who have come out of
attempted South China, workmen, business men and guerrillas, it is
evident that in this section of China at least the Japanese soldier
la ? tired and pessimistio person. In spite of widespread reports of
better treatment of the people, one gets the same story. Billeted
Nadler* prefer to burn furniture to firewood and consistently defile
the houses whoa they are billeted ia preference to going outside to
the toilet. They are consistent in "paying" for what they use, on
the basis of 5 or 10 oents - to the dollar. They reproach the people
for feeding the* fUlse news, indloating that they have a very fair
idea
as ,to what is happening and after leaving a plea., walls and
blackboards when they happen to remain, are covered with pessimistic
writing* indicating that for the soldiers the future holds nothing
but death and umhappinens.
The situation would seen to be ready for a big increase of
MO work.
8. ussugAiazi plia. The greatest care should be
exorcised in the oholoe of personnel for the China Theater.
Certainly no one with race prejudice, and no one conscious3y
oototemptuous of the Chinese, should be sent out.
In view of the evident inorease in MO and Commando work, it
would be of great value if a few more mature men of the right attitude
and qualificatione, who know China particularly who might happen to
'peek Chinese, were added to the 04S groups in China. Such men, if
nothing else, could serve as advisors, ae liaison men between our
Commando SO, and MO groups. The better the co-ordination and mutual
understanding the more successful will be the resultant work.
9. . . A war is being fought. Men are in
a foreign country, often poorly fed, uncomfortably quartered, deprived
of companionship of their kind, and out off from normal diversion, often
storm; for reedine matter. Drink and women are the common and perhaps
natural reoouree under such oircumstances. Moderation in the one and
discretion and commen-seuse in the other, will win commendation from
the looal people.
Intemperance will only win thorough contempt, While flouting
311160the conventions has brought on definite dislike and indignation in many
11.
OBS being what it is, and particularly OSA in China being in
a manner tied up with the Tel Lee organisation - a 'caret service
organisatiem with an incredibly large force and the ability and deter-
mtmation to kw, everything about OSS and its members - should litres'
with all its members the importance of each memberoa behavior and
comportment in China.
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Chairman or the Moportimg Board, SI, and Mr. D. DeSardeleben,
Chief, Southeast Swope Section, SI.
?t IS 3.3
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:Sseeutive Offioor, Sr DATE: April 18, 1945
D. DeDardeleben
Concerning the subjects discussed in the several paragraphs of
Kr. Nu1ley's report on the activities of the Yugoslav desk, I offer
the' following comments,
Paragraph Is Reports previously received from informed observers
Indio& Chat the supply of 8/ personnel in Yugoslavia has been, on
the whole, unsatisfactory. I am not prepared to state the reasons
for this state of affairs, but I do feel that it is most unfortunate
because supply is a most essential requirement of our activities
there. I do not know what section in Caserta or Bari was directly
oharged with the supply of activities in Yugoslavia. I do know that
Colnnel Glavin arranged his staff a000rding to the usual four-section
design with section four charged generally with supply. It is reason-
able to presume that the supply section was responsible for over all
supply in Yugoslavia. However, it seems illogical to me to hold the
Yugoslav Desk, SI. entirely unaccountable for the supply and equipment
of personnel working under its diroction in Yugoslavia. It just does
not seen posnible to me that a desk head, aware of conditions described
in such general terms as those used by Mr. Hulley would be unable to
do something about a situation so injurious to our operations.
If the Yugoslav Desk was dissatisfied with the state of supply, and
upon investigation had specific oritioimms and protests to make, cer-
tainly sosewhere alonr the line between that desk and the Strategic
Services Officer sr410.,i,-, wuld e lone to remedy the situation.
However, if it covld vat two ,.9?noollinhed In field, then it seems
to me that the Ittigue 'ii. thc protwrlbed ohennels, Chief
SI, Stretegie 8erwric.,,3 E-Tflter, wtmld te %;(? present the
facts to the Chief :opHngton, aud tho DL' c? for apprnpriate
corrective action. Or Oltole, t oma to onitroly ilicAppropri$Ite
that an individual ag.*-iled to f56 flas1(, oharreAt wit,!t II adminintegtion
in a certain area, should oriti4ii,a4 an avtivity so vital aa oupply
and disclaim all disoredit for tiLm unmatisfaotory and inexcusable
conditions reported upon.
Paragra h 2$ When an independent United States intelligence system
was established in Yugoslavia, it was well known by those concerned
that the activities or this system would frequently duplicate the efforts
of our British anies. However, this duplication was considered of no
great importance compared to the profit to be derived from receipt of
information provided by our awn people over our awn oommunioations and
to our own interested agencies. It is true 'hat because of certain
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S.
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