JPRS ID: 8708 NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA REPORT

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1~OIt OI~I~IC'1:11, litil~: ONI.1'
JPRS L/8708
15 October 1979
~ear East/ '
North Africa Re ort .
p
CFOUO 39/79)
FBIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFOE~MATION S~RVICE
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JPR5 L/8708
15 Octob~r 1Q79
NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRI~A REPORT
(FOUO 39/79)
CONTENTS ~ PAGE
INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
Saudi Arabia Strives To Lead Gulf Area Defense
(AL-WATAN AL-'AF~RI, 13-1g SeP 79) 1
NORTFI AFRICAN AFFAIRS -
Resumption of Moroccan-Mauritanian R~latio~s Possible
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 31 Aug 79) 5
Editorial Denounces Moroccan Power Play in Tiris El-Gharbia
(Editorial, Hassen Zenati; AFRIQUE-ASIE,
20 Aug~ 17 SeP 79) 6
ISRAEL
- Quarterly Reviews Arab Education in Israel
(Michael Winter; THE JERUSALF,M QUARTERLY, No 12, 197~) ~
MAURITANIA
Central Bank of Mauritania Report on Ecanomic Indicators
(MARCHES TROPICAUX Er MEDITERRANEENS, 1? Aug 79i.... ~0
MOROCCO
1'rime Minister D~scusses Sahara-Related Topics
(MtHa.med Boucetta Interview; A~-WATAN AL-'A.RABI,
2~+-3o Aug 79) 22
RNI Leader Discusses Background to Sa:~~.ra Issue
(Ahmed Osma.n Interview; AL-WATAN AL-'ARr'~BI,
31 Aug-5 SeP 79) 2~~
_ [zzz-rrE&A-i~irovo~
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COIVTENTS ( Continued~ page _
TUN I.~ Ill
Oppos.iti.ouist Brahim Tol~o-til Ret'lects ori 5ituation in Turii.si~1
(Brahim Tobal; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 20 Aug -17 Sep 79~ 34
'Limited Pardon' of Trade Unionist Achour Called Insufficient
(Anis Wahid; AFRI~UE-ASIE, 20 Aug -17 Sep 79) 3ti
WESTERN SAI~IARA !
- Polisario Determined To Make Life Difficult for Morocco
(JELTNE AFRIQUE, 5 SeP 79) 40 ,
S~Lhar~ln War Sa:i.d To Threaten Moroccan Ttirone '
_ (CA1~I0 16~ 9 SeP 79) ~~1
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INTER-ARAB AFFAIRS
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SAUDI ARABIA STRIVES 7'0 LEAD GULF AREA D~;r'ENSE
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 13-19 sep 79 pP 22 & 23
[Text] The Kingd,om of Saudi Arabia has d.evoted huge sllotmen~ts to its
military defense agreement. Thia apecial message which AL-WATAN
AL-'ARABT has received f~om Riyad sheds light on these e~eements and
draws general outlinea for thr~ goais of the d,esired military defense pl~n,
vhich may be summarized in clear and simple words: that the d+efeuse
security of this Arab nstion xill be Saudi Arabia`s oxn security and will
be bound up in its destiny with Arab security, especially the security of
the sister nstions Which extend a'~ng the shores of the Gulf.
Riyad - "The Arab Nation"
It is no secret that, r~ith regaxd to expenditure on the building of its
a~� ~d forc~s, Saudi Arabi.a is seventh among the nations of the World, _
coming af`ter the Soviet t~,~ian, the U.S.~ China, Nest Germeny, France,
and Britain.
Unofficiol statistics ;;-ertaining to d,efense in the ~978/~979 bua8et are
estimated at about 10 'bi~lion d~llars, or slightly lesa than the defenae
bud,3et of Iran last year.
; In fact~ there are many political~ geo~caphic, and economic reasons Which
~ustif~r this expansion in military expenditurea, for Saudi Arabia is a
country of vast dimensions~ whose area amounts to one-third thut of Indie.
F~irthermore, it poasesses huge petroleum resources, xhich put it in Pirst
pl.ace aapng t,he nations of OP~C, and it must protect these resources con-
stantly. Likewise, the frontiers of the country are far-flung. Ita
shores face many Waters, vhich are consid,ered navigational arteri~s. The
_ petrole~ tankers which traverse these xatere are exposed to nu~erous
security risks and hazards.
When Saudi Arabia saw the Egyptian forces being transported 3,000 ki~o-
meters to land in Yemen during the first half of the 1960's~ it ~e:ceived -
the need to re'vie~r its d,efense plan.
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The :.ieal Building Uperatinn
Aoxever, the real oporation of building the arm~ed force~, in the mil.itary
sense, is a d,efenae plan which d.id not a~cusity begin till five yeers ago.
The climax came in the transaction whicL the kingd,om conclud~ed With the
United Stateg f~r 60 F-15 aircraft, which a~~e consid,ered the most up-to-
date and strongest aircraf`t known in the U.S. and Western araenal..
Although Israel has concluded e transactian fo:~� theae aircraft, neverthe- ~
ler~s the Zionist lobby in Congress set Washinf,ton in a turmQil for Presi-
dent Carter's administration on the pretext that the sircraPt which Saudi
Arabis received constitute a menace to the aecurity and saPety of Israel
becaus~ of their long rang~, ~ahich enables them to take off f~om their
bsses in Saudi territory to boaib the hesrt of Israel.
Neverthelerjs~ the Israeli and Zionist tricks have not k,ept Saudi Arabia
fYom rece'ving this po~rerful weapon. 'Eae Saudi government~ in it~ pri~rate
contacts With U.S. officials~ had hinted that, in case the ~ransaction
should be withheld from it or canceled~ it r~ould be obliged to seek
another source~ perhaps France~ to supply it xith coraparsble eircraPt.
Sau.di Arabia has received small quantities of these sircraP~ regularly~
and severel groups of Saudi pi.lots have been receiving tra~ning to Ply
them at the same time. ~e training of these pilots takes a long time
because of the complexities o~ the weapon end. the neceasity of extremely
long and rigorous training on it.
Air Defense Neta
~ Seudi Ar~bia now intends to set up air d~ePense nets equipped with the ;
~ moat ad~anced electronic observation devices and surface-to-air missiles. ;
S~udi Arabia posseases n~ore than 500 t~verick eir-t~-ground rock~ets, 10 '
ftawk surface-to-air rocket batteries, and a n~ber of French CHA~iINE ~
rockets, which are a developed version of the Crotale rocket. i
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For the purpose of completing the d,efense plan and insuring the neceasery
defense of the far-flung f~ontiera oY the kingdam, the construction of
military bases and camps is in progress. The sites for them have been
selected With care to answer t~he necessary requiremeata in emergeney ~
aituatione~ The kingdpm is allotting extensive atimis for this purpose
from its revenuea. T~ie expenditures on the conetruction of the said
military install.ationsemounted to 16 bilZion d,~llsrs at one time. ~
. . I
Direci~ng attention to the air and. ground arms cLoes xwt mean n~;~lecting ~
the building of the neval Porce, although this force is still. smsll in ~
considerstion of the leng~,h of the eeacoast of the kingcLvm and in com- j
parison with +.he f.leets of other conntries. ~
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There are no official statlstics sl~owing the number of the ground forces,
although estimstes range from 50,OU0 to 60,000 men and officers, who have
received excellent military training. Among these forces, there are tWo
aruiored brigad,es and tWO parachute battslions, in ad,dition to the Royel _
Gusrd battalion.
'Ib encourage Saudi~ tu ral.ly ar~ound the banner of the gervice of their '
country, high salaries are offered to military persoruzel~ and Prince Sultan
Ibt; 'Abd-r~l-'Aziz, minister of defense and aviation~ looka af`ter his
off'icers with special concern and affection. T1ae of#icers of the Saudi
air force receive high-grecie training courses ebxoad, especially in the
U.S., in view of the fact ~t most of the Saudi weaponry is mad,e tYiere.
The White Guard -
In addition to the regular arm~ed force8, to Whose training and erpansion
fLll attention hes been devoted since y978, there are the forces of the
national guard, or the White Guard, which is coa~and~ed by Prince 'Abd.allah
Ibn 'Abd-al-'Aziz, second deputy chairman of the cabiuet.
The number of these forces is eatimated at 20,000 to 30,000 officers and
men, and it is possible to increase their number to ~+0,000, if need be,
by calling up those whose period of training has ended, and who sre members
of the de:~ert tribes which live in the highlands of the Ne~jd, the ancestral
home of' the Saudi ruling family and the ob~ect of its pride and gl.ory in
its pure Arab origins.
Although the national guard is a small, swiftly-moving force, which is
equipped With ~eapons to meet the requirements of dAmestic security~
nevertheless it can be used at the most diatant frontiera in d,efense of
the nation at need.
- At the same time when the regular arm,ed forces vere being d,eveloped, the
national guard forcea were also being d;eveloped and equipped with mod,ern
ueapons. They have been recentl.y supplied ~ith radio and telegraph equip-
ment at a cost of 1.3 bil.l.ion dpllars, and their coamsend has b~come capable
of making contact With its units and cti.recting them in any area of the ~
kingdom.
Saudi Arabia has ambitious defense aad military programs. zt hopes to
increase the s{ze of its regular forces to 3~00,000 men and tha'c of the
national guard to 75,000 msn by 1985. ~e military maneuvers Which took
~~.ace at Khamis I~ushayt base near the Yemen bord,er last Jul.y showed that
the regular troops Were capable and prepared to enter into combat with
live ammunition in desert conditions of extreme harsYbness.
The authorities concerned in Saudi Arabia say thaic the country~ which is
building its armed forces With the utmost s~iftness, is di.rectin~ its
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atctention to the modernization and drevelo~ent wbich is in progress in
the area of the Arab Gulf, and is highly d,esirous of playing, in coopera-
tion with its siater Arab states, especially the Ciulf states~ the cLefense _
role which appropriate to its economic and political position.
The Saudi Defense Role
Contrary to the stories and official U.S. neWSpapei accounts, the Saudi
authoritiea have not been beset by a~y consternation ov~er the security oY
the Gulf area, including that of Saudi Arsbia, since the collapse of the
regim~e of the shah of Iran, Who set himaelf up as a policeman for the Gulf.
Instead, Saudi Arsbia had become exssperated to the extreme vith this role,
xhich prov~ked Arabian and Islamic feelings.
Consequently, the Saudi authorities Yeel that the aecurity end defense of
Saudi Arabia sre firat and last the responsibility of.Saudi Arabis, inclu-
ding the protection of its p~troleum fields and Wells.
These sut,borities entertain no d,~ubt that the day When Saudi Arabia Will
be flilly and completely confid,ent of the ability of its forces to iasure -
a fti11 cover ~or its skies and its land is vcry nesr at hand.
COFYRIC~iT: 1.979 aZ-Wstan sl-'Arabi
CSO: 4802
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NORTH AFRICAN AP'FAIRS
RES[J1~iPTION OF MOROCCAN-MAURITANIAN RELATIONS POSSIBLE
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 31 Aug 79 p 2384
[Article: "Denunciation of Defense Treaties Taith Morocco"]
[TextJ Mauritania's desire to otserve a"strict neutrality" in the Western
Sahara conflict was reaffirmed by its minister of foreign affairs, M.
Ahmedou Ould Abdallah in Dakar at a press conference held on August 21.
Mauritania, he stressed, "is not a participant (in the Saharan conflict) and
demands respect for its territorial integrity and its strict neutrality."
It "would not be able to accept any attempt at destabilization wi~thout re-
acting," M. Abdallah went on to say.
Further, the CMSN (Military Co~.mittee for National Salvation) recommended
that the government denounce the defense treaties signed with Morocco in
riay 1977. The CMSN, ronsisting fo 27 members, is the governing body of
Maur:itania, and since the government is bound to carry out its instructions,
the denunciation must be considered official. Nevertheless, one cannot rule .
out the fact that the primary motive of the defense treaty's denunciation was
to respond to King Hassan's declarations at his Fes press conference and,
according to indications in Nouakchott government circles, Maritania would
consider that it had therefore expressed its discontent sufficiently and
that a resumption of negotiations with Rabat would be possible.
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
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NORTH AFRICAN AFFAIRS -
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EDITORIAL DENOUNCES MOROCCAN I'OWER PLAY IN TIRIS EL-GHARBIA
Paris AFRIQU~-ASIE in Fr~nch 20 Aug - 17 Sep 79 p 31
[Editorial by Hassen Zenati: "Rabat: The New Armed Attack"]
[Text] The occupation by the Moroccan forces of aggression of Dakhla, the
capital of the Tiris E1-Gharbia region, which Nouakchott had decided to -
give back to the POLISARIO, according to the terms of the peace treaty
signed in Algiers, took p.lace after the first article of our correspondent
in Algiers, Hassan Zenati, had been published (see p 14). Here is his~
second article, which arrived 2 days agc., It completes his analysis.
Blackmail, provocation, occupation... Just as in 1975, on the eve of the -
signing of the Madred agreement, the same cycle is beginning again in the
Western Sahara. After having thrown out the Mauritian governor of the city,
the Royal Armed Forces (FAR) raised the Moroccan flag in Dakhla, the capital
of Tiris el-Gharbia, which had practically been given back t~ the POLISARIO -
_ by the peace agreements of 5 August 1979. A new attack, then, carried out
under the pr~tection of a thick smoke screen which consisted of a"right of
- preemption which Morocco would like to see prevail and of the "continuation -
of the kingdom." Paying no attention to the appeal of the POLISARIO that
it join "the irresistable march toward peace," Hassan II thus chose the
path of war and military adventures. It was foreseeable that he would do _
"something" to save face after so many snubs received since the lamentable
testimony of his diplomats before the Security Council of the UN, going
~ so far as his condemnation without appeal by the OAU [Organization of
African Unity] in Monrovia andincluding his poor showing before Chadli
Bendjedid, whom he had rashly "chall.enged" concerning a case he had always _
considered "closed..." "Something," that is, as usual, rushing ahead, taking
another step on the way to military adventures.
Insidiously, Rabat let it be knosan that the illegal occupation and pure and
simple annexation of Dakhla is the result of a bargain struck with Mauritian
Prime Minister Mohammed Ould Haidallah, who was subjected, on 11 August,
- to outright blackmail, which recalls the black days of Nazi Germany and of .
Austrian Chancellor pollfuss: Nouakchott was to close its eyes to the
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occtcpation of Tiris el--Gharl~ia and Hassan TI would put a gag on Col Ould
Abdelkader ("Kader"), the promoter oi a dubious "committee of free officers"
against what he calls the "Mauritian capitulation before the POLISARIO.
If that were the case, it would be, in this instance, a new bargain of
dupes. For "Kader," who just barely escaped capture by the POLTSARIO in
1977, having been evacuated at the last minute by the Moroccan secret
- services so that he would not have to face justice iii his own country, which
wanted to prosecute him for cor�ruption, does not have much influence in the
Moruccan army. In power for 14 months, the Moroccan army is actually
"firmly decided to definitively get out of this un~ust war," t.o use the
words of its leaders.
Whatever the case, for the moment, in this small mishap, two remarks can ~
now be made on the complicity from which Hassan II has been able, or might
be able, to benefit in this new fait accompli.
1. There is no doubt that certain French circles must find it difficult
to hide their satisfaction; we know, actually, that French speciaiists
in dirty tricks had already last February and March strongly advised
Mustapha Ould Saleck to get out of the war by handing over Tiris el-Gharbia
to his Moroccan ally. They had then been sent packing, since the Mauritian
leader refused t~ accept this "peace" with dishonor. A few weeks later,
he was stripped of all his powers. Right after this attack, these same
specialists would be tempted to suggest negotiations on a mini Saharan
state, or a Saharo-Mauritian state, having given up trying to cut up the
present Mauritania in order to turn over the northern bank of the Senagal
' River to his very interested neighbor. Just as in Chad, France has mcre
- than one iron in the fire in this business. In any case, it would be goo~
for Paris to show itself without further delay, rather than keeping silent,
which in the long run can only be interpreted as complicity.
2. The complicity of the United States in this new poker game of the king
is more obvious. A fer,v months ago, already, we were pointing out Washing-
ton's new interest in the Western Sahara, which coincided with the resounding
attacks of the POLISARIO agair_st Tan Tan, Assa, etc. Since then, another
step has been taken to help Hassan II: the establishment of an airlift
for the repatriation of 1500 troops of the FAR from Shaba, the supplying
uf new weapons, along with the possibility of using them beyond international
frontiers recognized by rlorocco... The Moroccan lobby, which has close
contacts with the lobbies of the shah and of the prozionists in Washington,
are said to have succeeded in having Moroccan aggression a~cepted against
the threat of the overthrow of the monarchy and imaginary "Communist and
Khomeyni" dangers in Morocco. He who wants to drown his dog claims he has
' rabies...
Anci now? As in 1975, the cycle is not closed, for a11 that. After the occu-
pation comes the resistance. That is the sensitive spot for all those who
- continue to believe (or pretend to) and act as if the Saharoui people did
not exist.
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evert}~eles:~, the ev:ldence o~: their existence ~.s too blinding and too deadly
to their enemies for them to be treated lightly. ~'Tn 1979, as in 1975,"
a POLISARIO militant told me in a11 seriousness, "the struggle to impose ,
independence, the retsrn, peace, stability in our region, continues." And
the recent offensive of the POLISARIO which inflicted heavy losses on the
Moroccan troops have shown that the Saharouis are more determined than ever
not to permit the monarch in Rabat to have a good night~s sleep.
COPYRIGHT:. 1979 Afrique-Asie
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e
ISRAEL
QUARTERLY REVIEWS ARAB EDUCATION IN ISRAEL
Jerusalem THE JERUSALEM QUARTERLY in English No 12, Summer 79 pp 112-1.22
[Article by Michael Winter of Tel-Aviv University]
_ [Text ] When Israel achieved independence in 1948, it already possessed
a well-developed educational system which had grown up over
decades. Arab education, however, had functioned minimally un- _
der the British Mandate, and with [he War of Independence and
the depar.,u~e of many Arab intellectuals and teacheis, che system
fell into disarray. We shall review here how Israel established a
system of ~1rab education, and how it compares to the nauonal
picture as a whole, as well as that of the Ar~ coun~ries in general.
_ Israel's Arab population in 1948 was overwhelnun~ly rural,
Primazy schoois could be found only in some of the largervillages, _
and high schools were few and far between. Institutions of higt~er
education were non-existent. During the British mandatory pcriod
higher education was the domain of a privileged elite, who were
sent to study abroad. In Israel today pi�ur~ary education is univer-
sal, with almost total enforcecnent of the Compulsory Education
Act in the Arab sector. There are kindergartens and primary
schools up te grade eight in even the smallest villages, including
bedouin encampments. A widespread network of academic,
~
vocational, and agricultural high schools has been developed. The
'reforIIi which was introduced into the educational system in
1968 whereby 'middle schools' (junior high schools) were set up
aiid teachers trained for t~4ese classes applied equally to the Arab
' ser,tor Increasing numbers of graduates of Arab high schools with
matriculation certificates continue their studies in Israel's
institutions of higher learning. An Arab with a~~cond academic
degree is no longer a rarity on the Israeli scene. ',here are Arabs
~ teaching at Israeli universities today who graduated from Israeli
� M. Wincer teaches Islamic hiswry at Tel�Aviv University.
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universities anci were scnt abroad by llu~cn f'or furtlicr study, The _
Arub 1~opulat~on i� gcnE~ral, I~;~;c:ly illitcrate in l~J~lE3, i~ow ~
E~c~ssesses a liigherdeF;re~~ oCliterar.y tJi,iu ~~revails ii~ most, if no[ ~ill,
Arab cc~untries tod~iy. .
It is valid to compare the Arab to the Jewish educaUonal situation
ui Israel since they buth share the sarne privileges ~nd services, '
including educaeion. Att~ie same time tt~ers are a number of fac-
' tors which must be taken into account when making such a ,
comparison. In che fir~t place, the two cocnmu~iities did not share
t.he same starting point. Thc newborn State of Israel had to build an ~
Arab educational system from sc:ratch, while Hebrew education ~
was well under way. This development ntust he viewed against a i
background in which we find a Jewish populaeion ~vith a high ,
degree of modernizatio~i and a traclition of literacy, togecher with !
an Arab population which was largely rural and traditionally ~ ~
- placed little value on education. i
The natural increase of'the Arab population in Israel is the highest
in the world and far surpasses that of the Jewish poptilauon.' This ~
makes it much more dif'ficult for government and local authorities ;
, to meet growing demands for more schools, teachers and f'acilities. !
Educaeion was not traditionally regarded in Arab society as an in- ,
- tegral nart of the life of t,5e community, in which t}~e involvement of' ~
the cicizen is both natural and desirable, but was seen rather as a
service provided by the government for the passive acceptance of
its citizens. This view is expressed in the attitude of t}ie Arab ;
poQulation towards educacion in general, and in their limited
reaciiness to invesc time, money and ei]'ort in it. However, Arab
society is undergoing rapid change and modernization, and this is
discernible also in changing atdtudes to education.
Although Israel's Arabs were compl~tely cut off from the rest of ~
the Arab world from 1948 up to the Six Day War (and even af'ter
1967 these contacts have not been direct), there is no doubt that
from a social, cultural and religious point of view they are an in-
tegral part of the Arab world. Thus it is natural to compare the
educational attainments of the Israeli Arabs with those of their
counterparts in the Arab world, and especially in the Administered
Territories which came under Israel's jurisdiction in 1967. The
general picture of Arab education in Israel is far better than that in
the Arab world as a whole. But t~'us does not apply to the field of
higher education, where their achievements are less impressive
than those of important sections of the Arab world, including the
Administered Territories and Arab states bordering Israel. It is at
~ Out of 595,000 non-Jewish persons living in Israel by the end of 1978, 579,000
were Arab. They constituted between one�sixth and one-seventh of the total
populadon of Israel, which numbered 3,730,000 pe~ons. While the rate of
gro~vth of the Jewish population in 1978 lincluding immigradon) was 1.9 per
cen4 natural inccease in the Arab secWr was 3.3 per cent (as against an average
national growth rate of 2.1 per cent for 19781. [See the daily ha�Areu of January
3, 1979.1
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this sla~e tliat their minorily posiuoi? is reflecled. Uii lhe onc han~l,
the educational attai?unen~ti of' many ?iiii~orities are a w~~11
~ docurnenced pk~;tnomenon - and t}iis applics to the Israeli Arah; as
, well, desE~ite: ttic fact lhat th~ry ~�e a minuricy in a society which has
reached a hi~;her st~ige ot' dE:veloEnnent th~u~ thi:y h~va Un thc
other hand, t~~ere is no doub[ that ti~e very situauoi~ of lhe Isracli
Arabs as a national and cultural minority hinders c1~e~~i i~?
obtainin~ higVier education. A high school pupil in the
Administered TeiTitories may con[inue his studies in an Arab state
(or in the territories themselves) ~vithout havuig to overcome lhe
difficulties of social, cultural and language adjuscments t'~iced by
the graduate of an Arab high school 'u~ Israel en[ering an lsrae.ti
institution of hi~her learning. The chaiices of the Arab university
graduate in Israel of achieving professional integration seem ;ass
promising t~~an the chances of a university graduate from tha West
Bank or Gaza of'finding work in the Arabstates, especially in the oil
� sheil:hdoms of tlie Persian Gulf.
Primary Education
The most in~portant educational achievement of Israel's Arabs is in
the field of'pre-school and primary school education. No other Arab
.
society apart from Israel starts compulsory education in
kindergarten, at the age oF hve. The Arab kindergarien is usually
attached to the primary school. In Israel's early years, Uie
unplementation of the Compulsory Education Act among tl~e Arabs
met ~vith either passive opposidon or apathy. Many parents
refused to send their children, especially their daughters, to school,
whether because they needed their help athome or in the fields, or
for fear of what might happen to the girls outside their homes, or
simply because they did not grasp the importance of education. _
Dropping out was a frequent phenomenon, aiid girls especially
were of'ten taken out of school whe?~ they reached adolescence.
The poGcy adopted by the education auttiorides was usually one of -i
;
persuasion rather than blanket enforcement of the Compulsory
Education law. Ln [he first years of the state it was even accepted
procedure to close the schools CIL1I'lll~; the most demanding
agricultural seasons in order to enable the children to work on their
parents' farms without fallin~ behind in their studies. The _
percentage of girl pupils in the Arab school system rose steadily. In
1959/60 o?ily 36.8 per cent of primaiy school pupils were girls,
whereas in 1973i74 they accoutited for 45.7 per cent. This
increase stemmed from a number of ~measures taken by the
Ministry of Educadon and Culture: che ope~iu~g of separate
primary schools fur girls wherever the demand existed - wluch
was in the great majority of Arab population centres; providing
them with women teachers wherever possible; and the inclusion
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of pre-vocational training for girls (sewin~, cookinE;) in school cur-
ricula in order to increase their rtiotrvacion tc~ attencl school.
\'ore important, however, thaii i?icentive and {x~rsuasion fi�om ,
al~uve was developiu6 awareness of the import~nce of education
am.~ng the Arab population itself. No~ orily h~s tliere been no
~:urrence of tt~e famous incidenc duru~g the fiist years of the state
~~hen a bedouin sheikt~ used school furniture to fuel his stove, but
t3~e most remote villages and bedouin encampments are nuw _
demanding local schooling of a high standard for their children.
The expectations of the villagers rebarding the development of
~ local educational facilities sometimes outstrip not only available
mzans, but also objective needs.
- The implementation of the Compulso~}r Education Act, while not
}it complete, has made great s[rides forward. In 1973 the rate of
uuplementation of the law in the Arab population was 90.7 pr;r
~ cent, as opposed to 98.6 per cent of the Jewish population, i.e., a
' gap of only eight per cent, and this gap too is narrowing steadily.~
There is no Arab state which can point to similar success in the
implementation of compulsory education. It must be remembered,
of course, that the above statistics are based on nacional averages:
sc:hool attendance is higher in the towns than in the villages and
bedouin encampments, amang boys than girls, and among
Chrisdan Arabs than among Muslims and Druze.
The Compulsory Education Act has had a revolutionary effect in
raising the educational level of the Arab population of Israel.
~ According to the population census of 1961, almost one half (49.5
per cent) of the Arabs of Israel aged fourteen or over (i.e., above the
~ compulsory education age) had received no education whatsoever
Izero years of education). And even the 1361 census reflected a
great advance on Israel's first years. In the 1974 census those who
had received no education whatsoever were less than one quarter
(24.4 per cent), i:e., the percentage ~ad been cut by half. The rate of
L'teracy of the Arab population above the age of fourteen rose from
48.3 per cent in 1961 to 63.5 per cent in 1972, an improvement of
15.2 per cent; in the Jewish population during the same oeriod the
rate of literacy rose by only 2.9 per cent- from 87.9 per cent to 90.8
per cent.'
For pur~wses of comparison we may note that the rate of illiteracy
_ in Egypt is close to seventy per cent. The percentage of literate
Arabs in Israel is similar to that in Jordan, where compulsory
educadon has been more successfully enforced than in any other ,
Arab country.
2 Sami Mar'i and Nabia Daher, Facts and Trends in the Development of Arab
Education in Israe! fHebrewl, School of Education, Institute for Research and
Development of Arab Education, Haifa Univecsity, 1976, p� 51
~ lsmelStacisacalYearBook,1975(Hebrewl,CentralBureauofStatisdcs,pp,299,
601. '
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~
Secondary Educatio~i
The development of t}ie second~u~y school system h~is also been
unpressive. From fourteen (sic) secondary-school pupils in 1948/~,3
the number of pupils in Arab high schools in 1974/5 reached
15,119. The most siy,nificant rise came in the sevenLies, when the
number of pupils attending Arab high schools will be dou6led.
Huncireds of Arab pupils attendirag Hebrew academic, vocational
and agricultural high schools must also be added to the above
numbers.' The number of institutions of secondary educacion in
the Arab sector rose from one in 1948/9 to thirty-five in 1959/60
and to ninety-seven in 1974/5. There were sixty-oiie teaching posts
in Arab secondary education in 1959/60, 286 in 1969/70 and
1,145 in 1974/5. . -
Despite the impressive quantitative achievements represented by
the above figures, there is no doubt that the ~avest problems
facing Arab education in Israel are in ttie field of secondary
education. The system suffers from flaws in its structure,
administration and educationa] standards. Wh;le objective
conditions are partially responsible for these flaws, they are also " -
~ due in some measure to the form of ownership of secondary
education in Israel. Unlike the Arab states, the secondary school
- system in Israel is i~ot state owned. While the prima.-y school
system is run by the state through the Ministry of Education and .
Culture, secondary schools are in the hands of non-governmental
agencies, which are not always capable, in the present state of af-
fairs in the Arab community, of shouldering such a burden. The
Arab secondary school system is administered by municipalities,
local councils, and parochial bodies. These agencies are frequently
lacking in the know-how and administrative stability needed to
sustain a creditable educational system. While che village school is
a source o: pride to ihe local inhabitants, it is only tuo often the vic-
tim of political and clan power-struggles. The parochial schools -
~ too, which play�an important part in the secondary school system
(far greater than in the primary schools) often suf'fer from an even
greater lack of competent staf~' than the municipal schools. The
- parochial schools are generally regarded as being on a lower level
than the other Arab high schooLs, although there are a number of .
important exceptions to this rule. Although the above scliools
receive supervision and financial assistance, this cannot -
compensate for their administrative weaknesses.
The main flaw in Israel's Arab secondary school system lies in the
discrepancy between academic and vocational education. In
~ A muniripal high school in Haifa has been conducting a unique experiment u~ the
integ~ation oCArab pupils in a Jewish educational institution since the beginning
me sixties. The Arabs study in separate classes, acwrding to the Arab syllabus,
but socially they are an integral part of the'.7euvish school.
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_
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mnny cou~~tries, includinf; lhc Arab states and Israel, ttie en~phusis
has shiRed f'rn~it academic to vocatiunal ecluca~ion, c~iusin~ ~i
decrease in acadenuchighschoolenrolment.'I'hecoustructionand
maintenance of a vocat.ional hiEh school is I'~tr more cocnplicated ~
and ea-pensive than that of an acade~�ic one. Some of tt~c
vocational schools in the Arab corrut~unity art owned jointly by the � ,
municipality or local council and the OR'I' or Amal organizations,
which maintain a large ?ietwork of Jewish vocational schools. The
agricultural school in Rama is state~owned, Most of the
vocadonal schools are housed in modern buildings and fiunis}~ed
witti up-to-date equipment. The graduates ot'vocational schoc~ls ~
have no difficulty ui being absorbed in the labour marl:et and are
far better off in this regard than the graduates of'the academic high
schools. Nevertheless, the prescige and standards of the vocational _
schools in th'e Arab sector are lower than those of' the academic
_ schools, and a vocational school which does not prepare its pupils
for matriculation is considered inferior. Although a survey ~
conducted by Haifa University found 'a clear preference for '
technical over w}ute-collar occupations' in the Arab sector, the
same survey also found that'the acquisition of'a trade takes second
place (after higher educationl as a factor in ttie improvement of ,
socio-economic status.' In other words, a general education which ,
does not lead to higher education is considered inferior [o'
vocadonal education which does not lead to higher education, but
the aspiration (in many cases unrealistic) to higher education and
the status that goes with it is strong enough to send most of the
pupils (and all the good ones) to academic rather than vocational
high schooLs.
This situation persisted at the time of the survey despite the fact ;
that all Arab pupils attending vocational schools were eligible for
reductions in t~ution fees based on the size and economic '
~ circumstances of the family - an important incentive if we take into '
account the fact that in the conditions prevailing in the Arab sector ~
this meant virtually free high school education - whereas in the '
case of academic high schools oiily those pupils who passed special ~
aptitiide tests were eligible for these reductions and the rest had to
pay full fees. While the findings of the above survey regarding the
attitudes of the Arabs towards vocadonal education appear to be
reliable, their actual behaviour, for whatever reason, does not ap-
pear to be an accurate reflecuon of these attitudes. ~
Without ignoring the differences between Arab society in Israel
and those ofEgypt and other Arab states, it is worth noting that in
Egypt too, if it were left to the free choice of parents and ctWdren,
without the direct government intervention which limits the ~
s Sami Mar'i and Avraham Benyamin, The Attitude oj Arab Society in lsrael
towards Technological� Vocational Education [HebrewJ, School of Education, ;
institute for Reseazch and Development of Arab Education, Haifa University,
1975, p. 20. !
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nwnbers of pupils eligible for academic hiYh school education, the
' majority would opt tur no?~-vocational education, without t~~kinf;
practical considerations into account. [t ~s interestinf; w no~e el~~~t
although t,tie Egyptian ~uthorities have succeeded in directinf;
most of the high school population to vocational schools, they too
' have had orily limited success in raising the prestige and standard
of vocational education.
Vocational training may yet come uito its own among Israel's
Arabs.l'he foundation exists, and with more variety in the ran~e of'
subjects offered, the extension of two-yeal� to three-; ear courses,
etc., there is good reason to expect progress in this tield.
For many years Arab secondary education suff'ered tiom a
~hronic shortage of qualified teachers, especially in mathematics,
science and English, as well as a shonage of textbooks. Towards
the end of the sixties, however, Lhe textbook problem was solved,
and suitable material was prepared in all subjects and at evecy
level. Most academic high school students choose humanistic
subjects, and only a minority choose the mathematics-physics
stream. Here there is a stiortage of teachers, and tt~ose there are
hold more than one teaching post - with all lhe negative effects this
- implies for the standard of their teaching. Mar'i and Dat~er }iave
, rightly suggested ttiat with [he increase in L'~e number of Arab uni-
� versity graduates, and perhaps, too, with the rise in the acadet~uc
standards of these students, an attempt should be made to L'mit
Arab high school teachers to one teaching post, in order both to
raise the standard of teaching and to allow university gradua~es to
be absorbed in the profession.b
~ The Parochial Schools
An important role in Arab secondary education is played by the
Christian parochial schools, popularly (although inaccurately)
known as 'missionary' schaols.' Primary and secondary sctiools ~
are often run jointly under one roof. Many of these institutions are
af~'iliated with a church organization based abroad. In such cases,
the formal directorship of the institution is in the hands of a foreign -
priest or nun, French or Italian as the case may be, bu[ tt~~,, actual
running of the school is entrusted to a local Arab principal or vice-
principal. Most of these schoals are Catholic (the Greek Catholic
Seminary in Nazareth, the Terra Sancta schools in Acre and
Nazareth, the Franciscan convent school for girLs, etc.?, but there
6 Mar i-Daher, p. 87.
7 The parochial schools operating in the Arab sector are not attended by Jewish
pupils, and they are not to be confused with the missionary schools which operate
, in ehe Jewish sector and which are noC, of course, under the supervision of the
Educaoon Ministry. Christian missionaries are not and could not have been
active among the Muslim popula~on, and the only missionary activity possible
among the Arab population is inter�denominauonal, e.g., Protestant missionazy
activity amang the Catholics or Greek Orthodox.
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~
are also Yrotestantsct~ools, and a Greck Orthodox school i~?Haila.
While ttie majority of t}ie parochial schools are academic, thereare -
also a t'ew vocational schools f'or both boys and girls. The parochial
schools have played and continue to play ~in important part in
vocatioi~al education (e.~., ths Silesian Don Bosko school in
Nazareth) and 'ut the education of gicls (e,g., the ~anciscan .
convent school, St. Joseph's, etc.l.
The parochial sc}iools are accredited high schools. Although the
atmosphere differs slightly f'rom that in the municipal schools -
~ with greater emphasis on discipline, uniforms, religious
instrucdon for the Christian pupils, etc. - these s~hools follow the
general syllabus and accept pupiLs and teachers from all
denominations. Even the Greek Cacholic boys' school in Nazareth,
which is stil~ classified as parochial and was originally intended to
prepare candidates for the priesthood, has long been transformed
. into a regular high school despite its clerical administration.
The parochial primary schools are under the supervision of the
Ministry of Educa[ion and Culture which grants them financial
assistance according to their size. At the secondary level their
status is no different from that of the more numerous public high
schools run by the municipalities or local councils.
Offiaal policy towards the parochial schools has always been ex-
tremely liberal, in striking contrast to the situation in the Arab
states. If private parochial schools are allowed at all in the Arab
countries,' they are generally subjected to a variety of restrictions:
the school principal, and sometimes the teachers too, must be
citizens of the host state, and 'national' subjects - Arabic, civics,
history, etc. - must be tauglit by a cidzen of the state in the official ~
~ � language of the state, The schools are strictfy supervised. In Israel,
- government supervision has never been imposed on Arab
- ~ parochial schools (this holds true for the parochial schools in East
Jerusalem, too1. On the consary, requests for supervision &om the
Ministry of Education and Culture came from the schools ~
themselves, which had to prove that they met the requirements of
the Ministry as regards their curricula, textbooks, staff
qualifications, equipment, laboratories and buildings. On condition
that the school met these requirements it received supervision
- from the Minis~y as weil as its participation in tuidon fee
r~ductions, and its pupils were entisled to sit tor the matriculation
examinations. The majority of the parochial schools are today un-
der the supervision of the A4inistry of Educadon.
The schools in East Jerusalem are a special case. With the
unification of Jerusale m in 1967 a combined Jordanian-Israeli syl-
labus was prepared for these schools, in order to provide students
with the option of sitting for either Jorda.~ian or Israeli
matriculation examinations. It soon became clear that despite the
� In Egypt, Cor examp~e, foreign schools weie closed down after the Suez War in
_ 1956,
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legal and poliUcal status of tl?e city, lhe Arab u~hahit~i~~ts contuwed
to belonE both socially and techrucally (most opted to rer�ain
Jordanian citizens) to ttie West Baril: rather tl~an to (srael, a~id saw
their education as connec~ed with the West Bank ~ind the Arab
worid. East Jerusalem hi~h-school ~;radu~~tes want to cantinue
tl~eir studies in tiic Arab states and nc~t u~ Israel. Consequently, it
has recently been decideci to tc�ansfer lhc EastJerlisalem schools to
tt~e West B~nk Ii,e. t1~e Jordanian) syllabus, alttiou~h i~~stc-uction in
Hebrew will continue to be provided.
Teachers
A great deal has been accornplisfied over the past chc�ee decades in
training teachers for all stages of Arab ecl~acation in lsrael. At first
there were hardly any teachers in the E1rab sector.'I'wo rneasures ,
' were adopted to remedy this situation. Firstly, young Arabs with
any educationa] quaiifications were appointed to [e~~chin~ posts,
while at the same tur.e steps ~vere taken to ensure th;~ir profes-
sioi~al advanceme~it. This is a method which has been at;~pted 'u~
- many educational systems sulleru~g f'rom a lack oF pro('es:ional
, manpower. Secondly, Jewish leachers who had inuiiigrated fron~
Arab coui~;ries (niauily Iraq) with the establishmen~ of the stat~`,
were appointed to teaching posts in Arab schools. Tl~ese were
. qualified teachers who could not be absorbed in the Hebrew school
system because of lan;uage problen~s, but w}iose laio~vlecige of
Arabic made them natural candidates for teachi~ig posts in [he
Arab sector. Gradually many of these teachers were uitegrated
into the Hebrew school syscem or found other jobs, while ochers
remained permanenily in the field of Arab education in teaching,
administrative or supervisory capacities.
Apart &om these emergency measures, teachers in the Arab
schools are, of course, trained in teachers training colleges. in 1956
a college for Arab primary and kindergarten teachers was
established in Jaff'a. Today there are two institutions for training
Arab teachers in Israel - one in Haifa and one in the centre of the
counUy near Netanya. Special courses for teachers iritended for
the bedouin schools in the Negev have also been opened in the
teachers training college in Beersheva. In 1948/9 there were 121
Arabs at teachers training colleges, in 1959/60 thei�e were 370,
and in 1974/5 there were 723. Courses and examinations are also
given outside these frameworks to enable working teachers to
4u~Y� -
Teachers for the junior high school and secondary schools require
academic qualifications which they obtaui at various universities.
Arab students of education are eligible for government grants and
for loans which are converted to grants on condidon that the
recipient accept a teaching post stipulated by the Muustry on -
completing his studies. The Arab teachers belong to the general
teachers union, but have a special department to promote their
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specific interesls. They also produce an Arab-language publicatiori
- $~zda al-Turbiya.
Glirricula and Educational Aims
Vo picture of Arab education in Israel would be complete without
taking into account its content and aitns, and the problems peculiar '
to the Arab schools. Their curriculum is based on the principle that
, the material tau~ht in the Arab schools must be equal in quan[ity
and quality to that taught in the Hebrew schools. The same ~
standards apply to both Jewish and Arab pupils sitting for
examinauons. In the matriculauon examulatians, papers set in -
such subjects as geography, the natural sciences, and
mathemadcs, are simply translated from the original Hebrew into ~
~ Arabic for the Arab candidates. The same means are also applie~3:
streaming, modern methods of English instruction, and the junior
high school system have all been introduced into the Arab schools.' '
Arabic, as the mother tongue of'the Arab pupIls and the language
of [heir culture, anci also as one of the official languages of che State
of Israel, is the first language, and the language of instruction, in
the Arab schools. Arab pupils learn Hebrew from the fourth grade.
The question of the correct relation between Hebrew and Arabic in
the Arab school has aroused discussion and controversy. On the
one hand, the Arab pupil has the right to be educated in his own
language, culture and tradition, and on the other, he must be suf'fi-
ciendy fluent in Hebrew to understand :he culture of the State of
Israel, which is a Hebrew-Jewish culture, and the problems of the
Jewish people - although he is not expected to have as intimate
knowledge of these matters as his Jewish counterpart. An ,
adequate mastery of Hebrew is also necessary for the Arab
citizen's integration into the economic life of the country, his j
absorption in the laboui market on leaving school, or the ~
i
continuation of his studies at an Israeli institudon of higher ~
learning. '
The Hebrew literature syllabus, too, has been the subject ofsome '
debate. For example, the requirement to study passages from the
_ Old Testament as a source of understanding the Hebrew language
and Jewish culture has provoked complaints that Arab pupils were ~
being forced to study the Jewish religion. The suitability in general
of the Hebrew literature taught in Arab schools has been ~
questioned, it being argued that while the syllabus should be ~
representative, it should not dwell too closely on subjects of specifi-
cally Jewish interest, which are difFicult for the Arab pupil to -
understand or identify witt:. One guideline that has emerged from '
this controvecsy is that modern Israeli literature should be
' The 'reform' was appGed to the Arab sector in 1970, when four junior high '
schools were opened. In 1975/6 there were thirty-tlvee junior high schools
operating with about nine thousand pupiLs. In the same year there were one ;
6undred seventy�six junior high schools in the Jewish secwr. '
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- dominnnt in the material taught _n the llrab sec,~tur, while materiA!
dr.alinF with Jew~sh life in thc Diaspora is es a rule unsuitable fnr
cetichin~ in t}~e Arab sc:hools,
The study of EnF;lish raised a practical, rather tt~a~i ideological -
problem, The burden of a second forei~n language in addition to
Hcbrew was felt. to be excessive,'� and a special English
_ programme was accordingly worked ouc for the Arab tubh schools ~
in t~~~ early sixdes. Arab matriculation candidates may now sit for
their examinations in English according to the special programme
or the general one, as determined by the school.
General history is taught at the same level in both Jewish and
Arab scl~ools. But in the Arab schools the emphasis is shilted from
Jewish history [o the history of the Arabs and Islam. In civics the
Arab pupil studies Lhe structure of the state and its institudons, but
not recent Jewish history and the history of Zionism, which form
~ part of the civics syllabus in the Hebrew school system. The history
of Zionism, in a condensed form, is taught as pari of the history syl-
labus in the Arab ~chools,
There are three altarnative programmes of religious instruction
in the Arab sector - Zslamic religion,.Ctu-istian religion, and the
Divze heritage. �1 In the primary schools a certain number of hours
are allocated to religious instruction. In high schools religion is
offered as an elective subject, but it is not compuLsory. The
Chrisdan parochial schools give religious instrucdon, from which
the non-Christian pupils are exempt. SchooLs in en[irely Muslim
areas (the 'IYiangle, at the centre of the country) generally give ~
instruction in Islam. Academic high schools in mixed areas do not
provide religious instruction.
Finally, the most fundamental question of all arises, concerning
the aims of education' for Arabs in Israel. Obviously, the
educational system cannot be separated from the political, cultural
and social systems. The~sensitive situation of Israel's Arabs as a
minority living in a counhy which is in a state of constant
confrontation with the Arab world must inevitably be expressed in
the educational system. The fact thaC the Arabs have a religion, a
culture, a language and a history which differ fi-om those of the
Jewish population cannot be ignored. The Arab teacher cannot be
expected to educate his pupils in the spirit of Zionism and the
national a.~pirations of the Jewish people. At the same time, it is
understood that he must educate them to be loyal citizens of the
state, to obey its laws, and to take pride in its development and
achievemenis in general and in those of the Arab community in
- particular.
10 The study oC clasacal Arabic, which difTe~s considerably from spoken Arabic,
poses an additional problem for the Arab pupil, and there are some who argue
that it should be taught almost as a foreign language. '
The pruze religion itselfis not, of course, taught in school due to its esoteric nature
and the fact that its secrets a~ not disclosed even to all the members of the ssct
~ itself. ~
COPYRIGHT: The Middle East Institute, Jerusalem
cso: 4s2o lg
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MAURITANIA
CENT'RAL BANK OF MAURITAIVIA REPORT ON ECONOMIC INDICATORS
Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS in French 17 Aug 79 pp 2270, 2271
[Article: "Recent Factors In Mauritanian Ecoaomic Qutlook"]
[TextJ The Central Bank of Mauritania recently released its latest report
on economic indicators (May 1979).
Foreign trade represented, in millions of ouguiyas:
. lst trimester lst trimester April
- 1978 1979 1979
Imports CAF 2,271.4 2,289.5 845.3
Exports FOB 1,894.4 1.696.7 419.5
For imports during the first 3-month period of 1979, consumer goods
accoun~ed for 50 percent (especially foodstuffs) and motor fuel comprised
21 percent of the total. France remained in first place among the suppliers.
Export~ for the same 3-month period included iron ore: 23 million tons
(up 0.9 tons over the first 3 months of 1978) at a cost of 1.4 billion
ouguiyas (up 0.5 billion); and fish, at a cost of 0.3 billion ouguiyas
(down 0.1 billion). Copper ore exports ended in mid-1978. As in 1978,
France was the main purchaser of Mauritanian iron ore (741,OC~0 tons),
followed by Belgium (435,000 tons), Italy (354,000 tons), Spain (204,000
tons), England (197,000 tons), West Germany (166,000 tons), and Japan
(126,000 tons). For the first 3 months of 1979, fish was exported to Japan
(76 percent), Spain (12 percent) and Italy (11 percent).
During the first 3 months of 1979, iron ore mining reached a greater level
with 2.1 million tons, compared to 1.6 million tons for the same 3-month
neriod in 1979. April 1979 production had as its object 0.8 million tons,
and by the end of April stocks had reached.l million tons.
In all, 22,000 tons of fish were unloaded at Nouadhibou during the first
3 months of 1979 (compared to 16,500 tons in 1978), and 4,600 tons were
brought ashore in April.
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At the end of April 1979, the si.x most important public works projects of
_ Nauakchott took up 2.1 billion ouguiyas, from which 0.6 billion ouguiyas
for works remained to be implemented.
During the first 3 months of 1979, the port of Nouadhibou recorded a trade
- ~f 8,600 Cons of imported merchandise (not including fish), and 8,300 tons
of exports. During the same period, the wharf of Nouakchott handled 53,700
~ tons of imported merchandise.
Purchases of oil products in the first 4 months of 1979 comprised 198
mil.lion ouguiyas (710 million for all of 1978).
Wirh regard to domestic trade, the state company, Sominex's (National
Import-Export Company) sales of. major necessities (sugar, tea and rice)
showed a marked progression during the first 2 months of 1979: 0.9 billion
ouguiyas.
Over a base figure of 100 in January 1975, the general price indicaror of
consumption for a European-type family increased to 151 by the end of April
1979 (up 10 percent over the end of March 1978).
By March 31, 1979, currency and notes in circulation totalled 2 billion
ouguiyas (up 10 percent over the end of March 1978). The total number of
bank deposits reached 3.5 billion ouguiyas (up 0.1 billion over the end of
March 1978), credit to public organizations accounted for 0.6 billion at
the end of March 1979 (down 0.2 billion).
Likewise at the end of March 1979, the Central Bank of Mauritania held a
credit of 2 billion ouguiyas in terms of authorized advances (compared to -
1.8 billion at the end of March 1979).
_ The incurr.ence of economy credits as a resulC of the banks' offers totalled
8 billion ouguiyas at the end of March 1979 (up 0.8 billion over the end
of March 1978).
The incurrence of economy credits as a result of the banks' offers totalled
8 billion ouguiyas at the end of March 1979 (up 0.8 billion over the end
of March 1978). Furthermore, the banks' consolidated position takes into
account 0.5 billion ouguiyas in credits which are questionable or involved
in lawsuits. For amounts of credit allowances used, trade is in first
place (2.7 billion ouguiyas), with mining in second place (1.4 billion).
Mauritania's indebtedness abroad has worsened: 3.4 billion ouguiyas at
the end of March 1979, compared to 3 billion a year before. _
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., Paris, 1979
9475
CSO: 4400
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P10ROCC0
1'RIMG hIINISTER DI5~U3SES SAHARA-REI,AT~;p mnPIi:S
Paris AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI in Arabic 24-30 Aug 79 pp 28-2g
~ rIni:erview with Forei~n Minister M'Hamed Boucetta, Conducted by Faruq Abu-'Lahr~
[Text~ Morocco's Foreign Minis~Der M'Hamed Boucetta is also secretary general
of the Istiqlal Party, the number-txo political force participating in the gov-
ernment. It is the party founded by the late national leader 'Allal al-Fasi~
and it played its ma.jor historic role in resisting French colonialism.
M'Hamed Boucetta is known for his vehement~ patriotic stand on the Sahara issue.
He has called for ariaing the citizens in the regions alcng the Al.~erian and
Maw^itanian borders, and hris also called for mobilization in order to meet fu-
ture eventualities. ,
A correspondent from AL-WATAN AL-'ARABI met with the Moroccan minister on his
return from a surprise visit to Nouakchott, whexe he held negotiations with
Mauritanian officials.
I began n~y interviex by asking the Morocca.n diploma.tic chief, "Some observers
feel that the coup which ousted Mauritanian Eresident Mokhtar Ould Daddah in
July 1978 augured the stand which the pre~ent regime adopted on 5 Au~;ust 1979~
whic:h culminated in the signing of the agreement with Polisario for giving ul~ `
Tiri$ E1-Gharbia,. Do you believe that this is the correct analysis?
(Ansxer] 41e expressed our stand at that time. Our view was that what happened
in P~:ai.sitania last year~ in particulzr on 10 July 1978, was an internal Mauri-
tanian issue. ?ut it soon became clear to us, from the stands talcen by rla.uri-
" tana.an officials~ that this line augured a cha.nged with respect to the Saharan
issue, which became apparent from the statements ma,de by the officials in
Noua.kchott all last year in:spite of the relations and treat ies linking Mauri-
tania and Morocco.
Other parties interfered in the matter~ one of them the so-called Polisario
front, which bega,n exerting strong pressure on the members of the r9111tary Com-
mittee for National Salvation in Mauxitania,.
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M'H~.med Boucetta was silent for a moment, and then resumed speaking sadl,y.
"Rec:ent Ma~uritanlan statements ,~e during the OAU conference in Monrovia con-
flic~t with the apirit of firm relations with Morocco. iKauritania voted fo.r and
abid.ed by ~t;he recommendations presented by tne arbitration committee. This be-
came more obviotu~, and perhap~ in a questionable manner, xhen the ao-called
Algi.ers ~greement was signed with t{~e Polisario. We feel that there is no basis
to j.t~ nelther from the legal nor the international standpoints~ and not even
from the standpoir,t of its cainciding xith the real factors of the region~ be-
causa it doesn't take~ into consideration the clauses of the treaty c~ncluded be-
tween Morocco and Mauritania."
[~~uestion~ What were Mauritania's motives for signing the Algiez~s agreement
on 5 August?
[Answer] ~Ia~~;.~itania says that it is working for peace and to finish with this
issue. We don't dispute this~ but there is ar~other way of evading responsibility. i
We Yiave told our Mauritanian brothers plainly that the im~ortant thing is for the -
relations betweEn our two countries to remain on such a level as to maintain and
ensure the well-being of the two states. I want Mauritania to agree xith us on
this point.
We Hope the A].gerians Understand Our Position
- [~auostion] After recent developments~ from the Algiers agreement to the raieing
of t;he Morocc~,n flag oyer the city of al-Dakhila.h~ the capital of the Rio de Oro
region, the ball appears to be in the Algerian court. Ho~r do you evaluate the
Alg~:rian position?
[Answer] You have seen the spontayeous responses of the Rio de Oro inhabitants
after the s3.gning of the Algiers agreement. It xas thes~ reactions Hhich ma.d~
us adopt some necessary measures so that the authorities managing the r~gion's '
affairs xould not get into probleles xith the local inhabitants, Hho had expres-
sed their attachment to their Mor~ccan-ness. After tha,t they came to Rabat to ;
pa.y homage according to the prevailing traditions of that area and of Islamic ,
countries in general.
And now the region faces a new situation, although it is the natural one. Our
most urgent~ greatest desire is that Algeria understand this situa.tion, so that
there can be stability and so that we ca,n build a real peace in the future.
~'his will not be achieved by driving a w~age which people call Polisario, which
is generating a serious problem which none of us need. _
Morocco's genuine desire ie to build up the region economically and socially~
and to establish a political ra.pprochement confirming this desire. We also hope '
~::~,t th~ Algarian ~fficials ryill ca~~ or~ ~r,a ~c~.la whic~ M~iocc~ is striving ,
to aci,i~ve. We certainly don't Hant them to take the opposite line~ the road
to expa,nsion and hegemony at Mo~occo's expense~ for this is something xe will i
definitely not accept. '
rauestion] It is said that the Algerian forces have entered the Nouadhibou re- ~
gion on Mauritania's northern borders with Morocco. Is this true?
,
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� [Answer~ I don't know anything about this. 5ume o~' tk~e tlaws agencies have -
reported something on that order.
~auestinn] It is said that there is a feeling of anger on the part of Morocco
tawards ~he American refusal to supply you w3th arms~ In fact, there are some
American circles which call _�oz~ nat glving Morncco arms because, accbrding to
their claims, that would encourage the army to escal.~.te the military situation
and expand the scope of the fighting.
[Answer~ ~We cannot look at the problem this way. Thexe were some questions
among American circles a year ago~ espec.ially about the difference Y,ween ad-
_ ministration and sovereignty, but after the ~ta~emerits ~xid contacts made with
American officials, and after tl~e King of Norocco�s visit to the United States,
the American position softened and relations resumad their normal cowcse. I
, don�t know if there is any American opposition to ~lorocco which refuses to
supl~ort it and ~ive it the good.s and arms it neecis ~
[4~u~stion] Does that mean tha,t the United States has responded to Morocco's
' reqixest to be supplied with arms?
[An~wer~ Yes.
[~uestion~ Some international circles have proposed the internationalization
of i:he Sahara issue, by bringing in other interna.~iona.l pa.rties in an attempt
to find a compromise.
CAnawer~ We feel that this issue has gotten more attentior~ than ii deserves in
the international sphere, The fact is that it is a completely internal issue.
If in tha past we have brought it up before internat:tonal circles, tha,t was in
order to elimina,te the colonialism which was so claaxly connected with a certain
~uropean colonialist state. Hawever, as soon as -the oxiginal inhabitants return-
ed to their natur2,1 situation~ they plain~y exprESSed their viexs. We pla,yed
our part by carrying out our interna.tional commitment--fulfilling the Security
Couricil's call for conducting n~gotiations witl-, the colonialist states accord-
in~ to the provi.sions of Article 33 of the UV cha.rtex.
Anything else is an infringament of ~Ioroccan internal af.fairs. In the future ~
Morocco will conduct itself in this manner in everything pertaining to this if~sue.
The Required Dialog With Algeria
~~uEStion~ There are direct Moroccan contacts with the i~auritanian side~ and
there are direct contacts between Algeria and Ma.uritania. Are there any direct
or indirect con~acts between Morocco and A7.geria,?
[Answer] As of now~ I don't knGx. But in the pa,st, before the death of Presi-
dent Boumediene, there were contacts on the possibility of arranging a high-
level meeting between the King ~,~nd the la,te Fresideni;, Then this pa.ge was turned.
[~uestion~ And during the last QAU con.ference?
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[An:~wer~ There were no contacts in the real sense of the word, but there were
per,~onal contacts~ although not to study the problems existing between the two
countries. Tha nornlal situation, as expressed by some African atates~ is that
no ~ceal, decisive solution can be reached without a constructive dialag between
Morucco and Algeria.
~Question] But are there Moroccan precondi~tions for direct contacts with '
Algeria?
[Answer~ No, there are no preconditions for contacts, or for sitting doxn at
one�table to build an Arab North Africa. This is our rea'1 conviction~ and we
axe convinced that there will be no progress or mutual understanding without
a peaceful environment among the parties of the region.
[~uestion] Or~ the other ha.nd, are there Algerian conditions for opening the
dooi to discussion?
[An~wer] In President Chadli Bend3edid's statement, Algeria stipulated a con-
dition we cannot except--giving up the Sahara.
rQuestion] Obviously the region is on the edge of explosion. Or can that be
avoided?
~Answer~ We don't want war~ but you must understand, on the other hand, that ~
we will not stand by with our arms folded in the face of aggression and the
exez~tion of force agai_nst our territorial integrity.
[Question~ In your capacity as leader of one of the major I~Ioroccan political
blocs~ what do you think is the domestic stand towards the Sahara issue?
[Answer] We feel: that terxitorial integrity and the Saha,ra are the causes of `
the entire people. There is complete concensus among the various political
groupings about supporting and ba,cking ~:ing Hasan II's stand. We feel that
this is one of the fundamentals revealing the true face of t~orocco, something
which our eneiqy does not have.
Insistence on territoria,l integrity reveals ,just how attached the IYioroccans
are to their Sahara~ although they ~liffer on other issues. _
[~Quest3on~ Do you believe that recent developments in the region call for the
establishment of a national federal government comprising all Morocca,n political
trends?
~ r
L [Answer~ This is a secondary question, We are not a,gainst a na.tional federal '
government aiming at adding other elements not present in the existin~ coa,lition I
~overi~;;:ant. But everyone, inside or outside the ~overnment~ has a z.inified stand ~
on the national issue. i
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Dl/1\ Vl'1'1V1c11~ U~Jli V141_~1
t~etween Rumor and Faci.
~Que,~,E,~.on~ Has there been any talk abo,it ;:abint:t ~,ha.ri~.;e?
[Answer] There are rumors, which outnumber what is ~ic~ually being done in
official circles on this matt~r,
[~uestion] There are those who accuse Moraccari d~~~l~rr~~.cy uf weakness and hes1~
tancy~ and who feel that the htonrovia con~'er.~nce rnsol.utions and the recommenda-
tions of the arbitratiori cornrnitte~ were a. d~;l:'eat; far Mc~ror,co.
[An:~wer] As for. the recommendations of the arbitxatiun r,ommitte~~ they didn't
ast~~nish us, As for the OAU's stand, it is a_repel.j:~.io~~ of :previous resolutions
about self-determination. We tried to mak~ ~those pc:c~E,le tinderstand that this
principle had actual~}r been applied~ and had been ar,hi.eved with the Saharans'
demand to return to Morocco. This is what we wo~~ild I~ava done origina,l~~ ~ if
~ things ha,d go.r.e along without chaos and tumul�~.
If the recommendations made by the arbitra~tior~ comrnl~L~ee had concentrated on
finding sound ways of eliminating the t~nsion ~.n the x~;ion, and Ezad tried to
remove the causes of ~ossib].e con:frontation bettireen rioror,co and A].~eria, we
woul.d have welcomed these recommendations with oF~;ri armU, We told the committee,
the formation of which wa,s recommended by the OAU~ tl,~at the xight to self-d.eter-
mination is a subsidiary fac~tox� as far as we are cc;ncernad, because the matter ~
here pertains to our territorial integrity, Nanethel~ss, in compliance with
their wishes ~ we are ma.king it pla,in to them ~tha,t tr~e ri~ti-~ to self-determination
_ has been legitimately applied through the electiar~s he)..d in the region, and the
residents of the region have fully expressed their. d~sii~eo
Hwever, we feel that the recommendations xere fox7ntiJa,�ted in a cha.otic atmosphere
spread by some states during the Monrovi.a coriference, and that the resolution
of the arbitration committee was an irresponsible one.
4Ie are most definitely unconvinced that Moracco has bc~can~e dipl omatically iso-
la.ted since the Monrovia conference. On the contrary, the states which enjoy
some degree of equilibrium will return to suppoz~t our stand. At present we are
makj.n.g contacts on various levels, and we are receivi.ng encouraging support from
everyone.
~urope Is Ileutral
~auostion] And is there encoura$ii~ support :frorn Europe as well? ,
[Answer~ No, the Western states pref~r to remain noutral
The Moroccan mini.ster lau~hed and said ~"Tha.t' s the hay it 3.s . But as the
Ptoroccan stand becomes clearer, so will matters ~ecorne cJ.earer. We have stres-
sed. the need to continue brotherly contacts between us and Mauritania, affirming
our desire to continue providing the aid which we h~.ve pxovided in the past~ on
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I
rvn ur~r'l1:1k1L U~~; U1VLY -
condition that Mauritania not become a center of emnity towards us. 't'he of-
ficials have stre~sed their desire to continue re]ations with Morocco~ ca111ng
~ for finding a peaceful solution to the Saharan issue."
COPYRIGHTs 1979 "AL-WATAN AL-ARABI`~
8559
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MQRO~:CO
Rr1I IEADER nIS~USSE5 ~AC~;GROUN'i3 TO SAHARA I: S,~
Par~�s AL-WATAAI AL-'ARABI in Arabic 31-Aug-~ Sep 79 2,~~ ~?OT~1
~Ini:erview With RNI Leader Ahmed Osman, Conducte,3 by l~~ar~.iq Abu�-`Lahr~
[Exr.erpts~ AL-W~1TAN AL-'ARABI is continuin~ a_~,s exa.minatiion into the opinions
of Moroccan officials and politicians on the S~t~ara issue, and is ~toclay pub-
lishing an intervieK with Ahmed Osma.n ~ the leader ~f ~th~ ma.in party in the gav-
ernment coalition. There ha,s been a new esca].a~tion of' developments with the
Pol~sario attack on the Moroccan town of al~Buwayrat duxing the 'Id al-Fitr
holiday.
AL-~~ATAN AL-'ARABI met with Ahmed Osmano former Norocca~a prime minister and
heacl of the National Ra11y of Independents (RN~), the ~.argest po].itical force
in the parliament, Hhich constitutes a ma.jority in ~i:h~ present government coa,l-
_ ition,
AL-'rIATAN AL-'ARABI also met with the Socialist Unior~ o~' ~'eople's Forces, the
largest political force in the opposition, represented by Mohra�med E1 Yazghi,
the number-two man after its Secretary Genex~al Abderx~ahim Bou~.bid, who is in
~,urc~pe undergoing treatment.
Here is the text of tl~e interview with Osman, and :t.~ t~e next issue we will
publlsh the discussion with E1 Yazghi. The re~.der ,~i7.1 perhaps observe the
simllarity in the stand on the Sahara, issue between the govQrnment supporters
and the opposition, which is an expression of the consistent national Noroccan
stand towards this fateful issue.
Weapons Are Not For Everyone
I said to Ahmed Osma.n, "You led the Green March in 1975, and were one of the
first to ca11 for distributing arms to the people of the Sahara. Was that a
r*a,rning and a herald from you of what is now happeni.rag?
[Answer] In general, at all festivals I, in the name of the RNIj would ca.ll
for arming the citizens living along the borderg, because we xere starting from
a clear-cut theory--that however strong the regima's .farces~ they must be
strengthened and supported by the Moroccan peo~le, :for 'this will make our
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forces always superior to the ene~y forces. But we must give arms only to
certain tribes~ not to everyone. These tribes are known for their courage~
and we have complete trust in them.
In another context~ Ne have called and a.re still calling for the formation of
light units--I don't say commandos~ for that is not the right xord. I don't
want to impose any solution on the military coaimand~ but it Hould be nice if ~
thex~e were rapid units intermeshed with and supporting the Moroccan ar.med for- ~
ces, for We are anticipating an escalation in the situation and we must fortify !
- ourselves~ even~though we are a peaceable country and we don't ~aant to att~,ck
anyune.
[~uQStion~ There was a call to ~stablish a Saharan entity in the area under '
Mau.ritanian administration, but you had an opposing opinion. Why?
LAnsKer] This concept was current a year ago. I don't lrnow Khere it started--
Europe? Africa? Some people here and abroad see a solution in it, whereby the
ter:citory of Tiris El-Gharbia would be given to th~ Polisario or to Algeria,
acc~~rding to an agreement guaranteed by the superpowers, and thereby the problem ;
would be ended.
I feel that this proposal is childish, first because Algeria xill not be satis- ~
fied with this portion because it would not enable it to reach the sea except
through the Western Sahara. Secondly~ assuming that they are content with that
region~ it would definitely ba a jumping-off point for aggression against us
and Mauritania.
i?nfortunately, the rulers of Mauritania are obviously naive ar~d don't understand
the situation. They would be the first victim, for the region would be changed ,
into a red-hot arena of problems and stability~ just as we see here and there in _
Afr:Lca. Naturally~ this would concern all the states of the region~ especial~y
i~lauritania, and rrould also concern the superpowers.
I
I personally am opposed to this solution. In ~yr view it doesn't make sense for I
us f,o accept a soiution depending ~n Tiris F1-Gharbia without ftnding a solution ,
to the Sahara, issue as ~ xhole.
~ ,
[~~uestion~ How do you envisage the peaceful solution to the Western Sahara?
[Answer~ ~~ie agree to negotiations with Algeria, for the ma.tter basically de- .
pends on good neighbnrliness bet~een the two countries. Colonialism left the .
reg:Lon in November 19?5, and we are ready to consult and negotiate in order to ;
improve the region's circumstances and to fulfil its states' aspirations to !
build a greater Arab Morocco in xhich brotherliness and cooperation prevails.
After that~ the 'oorder issue becomes secondary. The starting point is respect
for the natural territory of each country. We will never dispute the matter ;
of the Algerian Sahara~ and in the past we opposed General Gharles de Gaulle's ;
plan aimed at separating the Sahara from the rest of Algeria by means of a ~
referendum organized by the French administrati~n. We opposed the notion, ~
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saying that Algeria must liberate all of its Sahara. Algeria ought to accept
_ this lo~ic; with respect to the Western Sahara.
[y~,uestion,] Iz~t'~ ~o back t,o the pravious agreements between the two countries.
For examp:?e, why xasn't the Ifrane agreement eigned in 1972 lmplemented?
[AnsNer~ What happened at Ifrane was merely a cooperation and solidarity agree-
ment. There was a more important agreement signed between Morocco and Algeria
after the 19?2 African summit conference in Rabat. It dealt with the territor-
ial integrity and the issue of cooperation, two ma,tters which are firmly linkad~
for Algeria cannot apply one and reject the other. This is what actual~y hap-
pened. Algeria si~ned the agreement after a short time~ and we are waiting for
the parliament to ratify it. -
What happ~:ned was that A].gerf.a. violated the sp].rit and text of the agreement on
a number of occasions. Only two months later, during the regular UN session,
the Algeri.an maneuvers over the Sahara issue began. During the 1q72 session
Algeria introduced the notion of "concerned pa,rties" into the matter~ claiming
tha~t it was concerned with the issue. Naturally~ that led to a halt in activ-
ity on the economic and cooperation side. Qs we see it, the agreement no longer
exists.
Morocco Opens the Tindouf Dossier
~~uestion~ '~11th respect to the current situation, Morocco is considering
ceding the Tindouf (border) region, and the agreement basically means giving up
this rich region...
Osma.n interrupted me, asking, "We are ceding Tindouf? You cannot say that.
Nat~lrally, the implementation of the agreement might call for that~ but it is
not being applied. Each party to the agreement has the right to act."
[Quastion] Meaning that the border problem still exists?
[Answer~ The border problem actually still exists between Morocco and Al~eria.
This much is clear. The agreement is not being applied. His Highness King
Hasan II gave a valuable opportunity to his neighbors~ but they wasted it.
[~uestion~ In your capacity as head of the largest ga.rliamentary bloc, do
the current events call for the establishment of a national federal government?
[AnswerJ Right now we have a coalition government incorporating a considerable
number of the country's pa,rties. Alongside the government exists a very import-
ant or~anization, the P�1a~ional Security Co,~u~~~2e, ::ea,3ed by riis Hi~hness~
which includes all the political authorities. Events oblige us to defend our
tc?-r.itory, to drop side issues, and to dedicate al1 our efforts to protecting
an~ safegua.rding the nation.
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We Lack Money and Allocations
[Qu~jstion; Does it a].so demand development of the Moroccan arnpr's resources?
[M~wer] The Moroccan arn~y is continually being developed.
~+~uestion] And as for the difficulty in acquiring American arms? :
[Ansxer] By God, the question is not one of difficulty in acquiring arms~
but is one of al3ocations and money. The arms Rre there xhenever i+e want them~
and in general it can be said that our arn~y is in a ~tate of continual devel-
opwnt. The fact is that the Green March was protected by our armed forceso
xhir.h actively participated in it.
[Question~ After the Monrovia summit conference and the recommendations of the
"arbitration committee~" some people accused Moroccan diplomacy of failure and
indecision.
[An~r+er] I don't like to criticize~ but it must be recognized that there are
shor.tcomings. The least that ca.n be said is that at the Monrovia conference
we could have done more to succeed.
Fir~t, with respect to the arbitration committee~ perhaps we should have de-
nounced its formation. For exa.mple~ xe accepted Tanzania's membership in the
committee, Imoxin~ that it supported the ca~np hostile to us. We should have
rejected its membership as soun as it recognized the Polisario. Tanzania has
become an adversary~ not an arbiter.
As for the other member~ Mali, xe should have rejected its membership as xell~
eapecial~jr after its forei~n minister's visit to Algeria and the statements ~
he made in support of the Algerian point of viek. ile ahould have had reserva-
tions about the vs~lidity of the committee as a?rhole. ~
I don't Imow if the xidgspread chaos in the Monrovia conference Kas the reason
for the Moroccan delegation's i.nability to explain the facts. It ~?as said to
me that the president of the conPerence refused to give the head of the Moroc-
can delegation the right to speak. In addi~ion, according t~ the agreement
made during last year's Khartoum African suna~it conference, the report of the
arbitration committee should have been presented during the extraordinary con-
ference. What happened xas that the recommendations xere presented during the
regul.a.r conference i:~ the Liberian capital.
As for the voting in the OAU, it is unimportant because it is neither a parlia- r
ment or a governmerit. Efforts aust be made to reach some settlement~ and an
attea~t muat be made to convinced the parties concerned xith the natter. It
is meaningless for the delegate of Botaxana to vote alongside the rebels and
determine the fate of an entire nation.
We tried to establish an arbitration committee during the Libreville conference~
and xe made a personal effort to do so. At the same time, Algeria Kas against ,
the idaa at the ~~?artoum summit. Unfortunately, the committee exceeded the
task assigned to it.
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The Sahara Issue Is an Arab One
~Question~ Can the Arab League play a desi~na.ted role in the atruggl~?
[AnsHer] Above all the issue is an Arab one, betxeen two Arab Moslem countries.
We muet not forget that the Arabs lzari their say during the 19?4 Rabat conference.
President Doumeciiene had his say as well, but he changed his mind, ~s he himself
acImoxledged. He said, "Actual],y~ in 1974 I spoke of Morocco's right to the
Sahara, but nox we have a new policy. We support the Saharan people and the
polisario now~ and xe will supp~jr them xith equipment and men."
This was an unfortunate position~ for the question is basically one of good-
neighborliness or unneighborliness~ the balance between some states in the re~
gion~ and the relations between them--strong ones perhaps~ but not good neighbor
re ]a,t ions . ~
As fo.r the talk ~.bout the right to self-d.etermination~ I ask~ "Where in the
xorld has this principle been applied? (Here the former Moroccan prime minister
had a long laugh.)
[Question~ You said that Mauritania xould be the greatest victim of xha.t hap-
pened recently. What do you mean by that?
[Ansxer] Mauritania is threatened Kith an explosion. The fact is that he~ciing
this na.ti.on today is a group of people who are unfamiliax xith a.ffairg of state.
By God, this is strange, for this is the first time in history that a group
heading a nation sacrificed territory xithout recompense, the first time that a
sta~te aba.ndoned territory so easily Hithout losing it in a Har, for examplQ.
We have offered countless support, in view of its limited means and the depri-
vation it suffers from. We must point out the exemp].ary conduct of the Moroccan
arn~y in Mauritania. Our soldiers are always offering aid to the Mauritanian
citizens--provisions and medicines as well as dai]y necessities. The Moroccan
arn~y did not interf'ere in internal matters during the first and second coups.
[~uestion] Let us go back again to the issue of establishing a nationa,l feder-
al government. Do you personally agree to its establishment?
[Answar] Naturally~ the governiaent is an important tool for facilitating af-
fairs of state, but the matter depends on His Highness, He might maintain the
existing government or bring in another government. But the important thing is
to avoid discord.
The Moroccan officia.ls do not rra,nt the people to live in want. Perhaps the
tiern has come to review some of the ways we live. This is a bitter fact. We
mwst anticipate ba.d things from adversariea. The moroccan people are prepe.rod
to sacrifice, prov~ded that in this case the way be ma,de cleax to them. This
is our duty as a government and as political authoritie~. Our people are ready
_ for conscription. All these ma.tters depend on His Highness, xhose experience
. 32
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t
has been proven through hia wisdom and experience. My final xord is that '
ever.yone must bo mobilized in deed~ not xord, to face the aituation and the
futiire posaibilities. ,
COPYRIGHT ~ 1979 "AL-WATAN AL-J1RA~3I"
8559
cso: ~oz -
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TUNISIA
~
OPPOSITIONIST BRAHIM TOBAL REFLECTS ON SITUATION IN TUNISIA
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 20 Aug - 17 Sep 79 pp 29,30 �
[Article by Brahim Tobal: "Destour: What Congress?"]
[Text] The congress of the Destour party, which meets next 5 September,
has :tnspired the following reflections by Mr Brahim Tobal, the leader of
the national Tunisian opposition, reflections which mirror the concerns of
- the people.
Little tactical maneuvers to win over the undecided--as in the case of
Bouraoui--going so far as using the army against the trade union demonstra-
tors of the UGTT [General Federation of Tunisian Labor], the Destour regime,
which finds itself today facing several impasses, has used every means to
assure its survival.
But cahat it is proposing is ridiculous. A brilliant idea, certainly, which
_ offers us, in order to get our of the crisis, nothing more than this,
the reinstatement of totalitarian regimes: the institutionalization of
the single party, which is dying and is so discredited that its own secretary ,
general had to denounce it not long ago as the den of opportunists and
unscrupulous people of all sorts.
Another brilliant idea is the electoral list on whick~ there are twice as
many candidates as there are seats in a national assembly which is, by its
- mission and its nature, a recording body. This idea is an old one of Tahar
Belkhod~a, the former minister of the interior, at the very mom~nt when
the Destour congress, which will open next 5 September, is being organized.
And what showmanship and solemnity went into the announcement of the
release--conditional, of nine prisoners, grossly and un~ustly condemned
for their political opinians, an act which cannot make us forget that
dozens of other political militants and trade unionists are rotting in the
miserable jails of the regime and which cannot, either, make us accept the
label, dear to those in power, of a moderate and eemperate Tunisia. This
spectacular gesture is a vain one because everyone knows that the release
of Habib Achour was not due to presidential clemency but to international _
pressure and to internal struggles which have continued since 26 January
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1978. Because we know also that Achour will remain the hostage of the
government as long as his companions in the executive office of the UGTT
remain in prison.
No. We do not see in that a demonsCration of clemency but rather a detzat-
able Machiavellism. Out of all that, one thing atands out clearly: every-
thing atarts with Bourguiba and everything comea back to him, whatever
they say of his illnesses and of his withdrawal from the affairs ~f state.
He is the only one in ~charge, even if, like Pontius Pilate, he has to wash
� his hands and find the necessary alibis. Prime Minister Hedi Nouira and
the director of the Sayah Party are only, in the final analysis, the exe-
cutors of the will of the master, which is right in the Destour tradition,
which consists in dividing responsibilities in order to direct better the
crises of the system. The retirement of Bourguiba and the death of his
regime will. inevitably coincide, whoever his designated heir might be.
And he knows this, since he keeps saying: "I am the system."
The Crucial Problems
_ Founding a strategy on a possible "contir.uator" is to move, in our opinion,
directly toward failure. To take charge of the post-Bourguiba period is
to begin already to challenge all the claimants coming out of this regi~rie,
whoever they may be. That being the case, if ~he problem of Bourguiba's
successor as chief of state and of its various mechanisms, constitutes the
background on which the Destour congress will take place, the crucial
problems faced by the Tunisian people will remain steadfastly ignored.
Rereading the abundant literature which, on the eve of the meetings, is being
circulated in Tunis, one notices, certainly, that the Nouira government
(which has been strengthened since Dece~ber by the addition of a few techno-
crats) not only is not in control of the social and economic situation,
but also does not know how to say what are, and what might become, its
nature and its political continuation.
They say this crisis is a consequence of the world economic depression,
of the wild consumption by Tunisians (of whom about two thirds are on the
verge of malnutrition), even that it is due to weather conditions! The
government ought to admit, however, that the wage freeze (which is causing
a sharp decrease in the buying power of the masses), that the facilities
granted by the EEC to textile exports, that the flow of petrodollars brought
in by "tourists" from the gulf and from Saudi Arabia have not, to say the
very least, contributed to lessening the effects. On the contrary, the
crisis is worsening and is disproving the alibi of the government, which ~
claims in this way to justify "infitah" [translation unknown]: the crea-
tion of jobs.
The los~ search for "social peace" is merely the necessary political counter-
part of the economic policy followed since 1970 by the regime and which
consists, because of the laws of 1972 and 1974, of making Tunisia a"tax
paradise" for foreign investors (particularly French and West German) of
making rdom for imperialism and neocolonialism and of inserting the Z'unisian
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economy into the world capitalist market, by 3nvoking the class~c pretexts
of under-industrialization and export industr~.es which are tightly controlled
by the multinationals. A plan for society, the one which will be proposed
to the Destour congress, underlies the whole structure: building a"median
society."
It must be emphasized here that since the word "class~' was banned from the
official political vocabulary, this terminology was quickly invented to
avoid speaking of a"middle class society."
Ten years later, Tunisia is at the same point. It is certainly not blocked.
But it is marking time, and time is inescapably playing against the carrying
out of this "grand plan" of the regime. The delays registered in all areas,
the deficits in the trade balance and foreign financing, domestic tax pres-
_ sure which is weighing heavily on national praducers, the exhorbitant rates
paid by the government (using public funds) to foreign investors, without
getting anything in exchange, etc., are the obvious signs of a fatigue
which the regime can combat only by giving up a little mnre national sover-
~ ~ eignty and reducing the standard of living of the people.
The official explanation of this economic morass (the world crisis) is not
enough. If the crisis has effects.i*~ Tunisia, it is not because of a blind
mechanism, it is the result of a deliberate choice which dates from 1970.
All the developing countries are not being affected by the world crisis in
the same way, precisely, but according to the political and economic choices
that they made in the preceding years. The fault with the official explana-
tion, a classic fault, comes from the fact that they want to attribute
to a"strange phenomenon coming from somewhere else" what should be attri-
buted immediately to internal decisions taken to serve precise class interests
and to assure the success of strategies of domination.
The result is that today one sees a few foreign investors pull aut with
juicy profits and one sees the resignation of local business buyers on which
Nouira was claiming to found his economic system. They left behind them-
selves a padded bill, which the Tunisian people are still paying off. ~
Another result: more than ever the "median society" has become one of the
illusions maintained by official propaganda; more than ever the gap between
the mass of poor Tunisians and the minority of rich Tunisians is widening;
more than ever the split between the workers and the bosses who are exploiting
them is deepening.
Even the uwdest rights of the retired workers to social security and to
family allocations are, today, the object of middle class attacks.on the
part of the bosses and of the govemment, which finds they are too high.
The �ailure is due essentially to the organized and canscious refusal of
the workers in the UGTT to accept national and social subservience. We
see it today: the major concern of the government is to end the popular
and trade union resistance, which is continuing in spite of political
trials and massacres. In spite, also, of the "public relations" operations
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which cannot fool seasoned mil~.tants who have tnadP up their minds to�give
a political and economic content to the struggle of the Tunisian people -
for their Cotal independence and to obtain by force autonomy for the UGTT
in order to make it a dPmocratic and combative union. '
Let no one be mistaken; the independence of the country and trade union
independence are the major stakes in all the struggles, active and passive
which are being led today. The crisis was born out of that and it is on
the battleground of these struggles that it will be solved or not,, in some
sort of political context, even if it is that of the congress of a Destour
which has, more than ever, its future behind it. ~
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
8956
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TUNTSTA
'LIMITED PARDON~ OF TRADE UNIONIST ACHOUR CALLED INSUFFICIENT ~
Paris AFRIQUE-ASIE in French 20 Aug - 17 Sep 79 p 30
[Article by Anis Wahid: "A Pardon but Not Amizesty"]
[Text] In deciding on a limited pardon, Bourguiba has not responded to
the requirements of the situation. Mr Habib Achour, the rightful secretary
general of the office of the UGTT [Tunisian General FederaCion of Labor],
~ who was sentenced on 10 October I978 to 10 years at hard labor, was released
on 3 August on the occasion of the 76th birthday of President Bourguiba.
Expected for a long time, in Tunisia as well as abroad, the belated pardon
will now have the appearance of a limited release. Mr Achour is reported
to have been placed under house arrest in his villa in E1 Menzah and entry
to his home is denied to all visitors, except his children.
_ It is undeniable that the freeing of the secretary general of the UGTT is
due, to a great extent, to national and international pressure, which has
never weakened since the massacre on 26 January 1978. Internal considera-
tions also played a role, since this action was taken a few weeks before the
opening of the tenth cc+ngress of the Destour Socialist Party. The opera-
tion daes not seem, however, to have yielded the anticipated results: most
of the political and labor organizations, which praised the release of Mr
Achour, deplore the continued imprisonment of a hundred or so political and
trade-uni.on prisoners. Certain European socialist parxies invited by the ~
` Destour party made it known that they would not participate in the work
of the lOth Congress of the PSD [Destour Socialist Party].
None of the union officials (all of whom were members of the Executive
Bureau of the UGTT prior to 26 January 1978, and who received sentences at
the same time as Mr Achour of from 5 to 10 years in pr3son, haue been
released, which has greatly r~duced the effect of the presidential clemency,
which is believed by some to have been motivated more by humanitarian con-
sidnratiQns than by political ones (at 76, Mr Achour suffers from hyper- _
tension and diabetes).
For its part, the Movement for Popular Unity (MUP) feels that the measure
"translates the embarrassment of the governa~ent, since it has rreed the
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person it has always cla~med, wxongly, was xesponsible for the bloody evenCs .
of 26 January 1978, while 3.t continues to hold 3n custody the other officers
of the union." Announced by the chief of state in person, the pardon was
extended to the five oldest political prisoners in Tunis3a, now called by
them "the forgotten men of Bord~ er-Roumi." Militants from the group ,
known formerly as "Perspectives," and later as "E1 Amel Tounsi," they have :
spent more than 10 years in prison, after Bourguiba had withdrawn 5 years
ago a decree which pardoned them. Weakened pfiys3ca11y, they are uow free,
thanks in particular to the international campa3gn (3n wh3ch this newspaper
participated) conducted on their behalf a few months ago.
What Opening?
Freeing these pr:tsoners shows, certainly, a retreat on the part of the
government. Indeed, it would be hasty and premature to consider this action _
as a harbinger of political change in Tuni~ia, and even less as the beginning
of a political liberalization. Certainly, Mr Chatty and Mr Kooli, the f~nrmer
ministers of foreign affairs and of health, respectively, who had resigned
a fe~w weeks before 26 Januazy 1978, rushed to the palace at Carthage at the
call of President Bourgui'oa to make honorable amends and to return to th~
Destourian bosom, while Mr Taher Belkhodja was also said to be getting ready
to be received by the "Supreme Combattant."
What is more, certain people, who obviously do not understand the true ;
nature of Bourguiba's power, now seem to be thinking of an "opening" and,
because of that, have taken a dead end. For the Tunisian Government is
still not willing to give up the instruments of repression. '
General and unconditional amnesty for all political and trade-union prisoners,
which has been called for by all the political sectors in Tunisia, has
not taken place. Nevertheless, only that, as the respect for rights and i
the return of the union officials to the posts they held before 26 January I
1978, can bring Tunisia out of the political impasse in which it has been I
for many years.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie f
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WESTERN SAHA~tA
i
POLISt1RI0 DETERMINED TO MAICE LIFE DIFFICULT FOR MOROCCO
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 5 Sep 79 p 21
[Arti.cle: "Sahara: War at its Heels"]
[Text] The Battle of Biranzaren (J.A. No 973) had aot yet finished teaching
its lesson when a new attack was launched by the POLISARIO on Friday,
August 24, against Lebouirate, a village located 150 km inside uncontested
Moroc:co. The confrontation was brutal: for the first time it was favorable
to the Saharan fighters who occupied the territory and, according to their
account, killed 230 Moroccan soldiers. This outcome, if confirmed, repre-
sents pretty accurately the effectiveness of the Moroccan Armed Forces
entrusted with the defense of Lebouirate.
Without citing figures, Rabat acknowledged the extent of the operation, and
pointed out nevertheless that the garrison commander "had not used suitable
means in resisting the enemy, and who even abandoned his defense positions
as well as part of his weaponry." The Moroccan authorities added that
"the guilty will be punished," and have announced that Lebouirate has been
recaptured by relief forces.
Ttie acts of aggression at Biranza~en and Lebouirate, committed within 15
.
days of each other, indicate to what extent the POLISARIO is determined
to make life difficult for Morocco, after the latter's recovery of the
~ former Tiris el Gharbia--a recovery which further accentuates that kingdom's
isolation on the African chessboard. The recent recognition of the SDAR
(Saharan Democratic Arab Republic) by the new Ghanan regime is one proof
of ttiis. During that time, King Hassan II did not appear at all discouraged,
having always been the recipient of his people's unconditional support. His
appeals for recnr.ciliation concerning Algeria are multiplying, and his charm
tactics with regard to the United States, from whom he has requested new arms
shipments, are becoming more persistent. While awaiting the U.S. Senate's
decision on such shipments, Morocco has already gotten its "installment":
six Augusta Bell combat helicopters manufactured in Italy under a U.S. license.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
9475
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FlFSS~FRN SAHARA
. SAIiARAN WAR SAID TO THREATEN MOROCCAN THRONE
Madrid CANffiIO 16 in Spanish 9 Sep 79 p 41
[Text] The impression that the Sahexan war is being fraged with almost
catastrophic results for Mor~cco was confirmed onl,y 7 days after Kin~,Iiassan .
II announced to 200 newsmen from all over the world, that the stru~3~,le to
defend the annexation of the former Mauritanean Sahara will continue to the
end.
According to an announcement issued in Algiers, the city of Lebourite in the
southeastern region of Morocco--1956 border--and 150 km from Tind.ouf, the
guerrilla base on Al~erian territo ry, was in the hand of the Polisario gue- _
rril.las for 24 hours on Friday 2~+ August. In the entire history of the
cons'lict, this was the most daring Folisario action and victory.
The death toll funon~ PQoroccan troops was estimated at almost 800. Wounded and
prisoners were also in the hundreds. The capture of weapons--7 Strela missiles,
81 mortars, 100 machine guns and 51 trucks--was spectacular.
The seriousness of the disaster forced the Rabat government to report it
officially and with harsh details, blaming the defeat on the post cotrrtnander in
chief, Azelmat, and announcing that an investigation would be~in to determine
responsibilities.
The Army is Uneasy
If the Rabat government carries out its purpose, it is sure that the malaise,
alreac~y present within the army, will increase. The army, in addition to
feeling uneasy `ri.th what the Moroccan officers consider inefficiency of th~e
central government, knows that it is at a disadvantage in desert warfare.
This disadva.ntage, in principle is one of morale, and is the result of a
series of successive defeats. The Moroccan numerical superiority is offset
by the e::perience of the Polisario guerrillas, used to this type of combat
in which they are veterans. For any Moroccan soldier it is necessary to go
through desert warfare training before he can go into combat.
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Tf this were not enough, the spectacular escalation oF Polisario armament--
whose Sam-7 missiles ~;ive them decisive advantage in air control--is
threatening to make come true the forecast that the war would b ecome the
grave of Hassan II.
In addition, the Alaquite monarch is on the eve of suffering another serious
diplomatic defeat at the Conference of Nonalined Nati~ons in Havana, where the
recent condemnation by the African surrm~?it in Monrovia will be repeated and
will be harsher in tone.
ftassan's diplomatic counteroffensive began at the same time. The kinq has
the unconditional support of all Moroccan political forces, united without
divisions in the case of annexation of Sah ara.
Ruinc~us War
Socialist leader Abderrahim Bouabib, however, in recent statements said with
alarm that Morocco perhaps would not be able to pay or withstand the price of
the rrar. Military expenses for 1979 are estimated at a billion dollars.
The Sahara conflict daily swallows 160 million pesetas of the public treasury.
The civilian morale is also beginning to suffer. The king's messa~e on the
nay of the Revolution of the FCin~ and People was followed with obvious
indifference on the streets of Rabat. Hassan, thus, is at a critical moment
in spite of never havin~ had in the history of his reign such unanimous
domestic public support.
Howev~r, the battle has to be won abroad, especially in Washin~ton which
maintains its policy of arms embargo against Morocco. In an int erview granted
t~o U. S. weekly NEWSWEII:, Hassan opened fire touching a sensitive spot,
especially in U.S. leading circles. �
The Alaquite monarch ,justified the annexation of Sahara, adducing that there ~
was real danger of Cuban intervention in the Mauritanian administration zone.
In the same interview, Hassan II insinuated that the possibility was not
bein@; discarded of a meetin~ with Algerian President Chadli Ben~edid, to
try to re~ch an agreement.
The sharp verbal artillery of Hassan was aimed now against T~ibya, indicatin~
that "millonaire" Colonel Q,adhdhafi "did not mind" the bloodlettin~ of the
war. Al~eria could not maintain a war with Morocco. According to experts,
a direct confrontation would necessarily be limited to bord.er skirmishes, for
economic reasons.
_ Therefore, now Hassan is trying to create a splii: among the Algerian forces
who support the Polisarios. As a sign of good will, the king has suggested
the possibility that Nbrocco ~ede a corridor in Sahara to ~ive Algeria an
outlet to the Atlantic.
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For his part, Carter is facing a seY�ious dilemma., comparable to the one he
was facin~, when the Shah was tottering, accordin~Z to a well-informed statement
by the infliiential U.S. newsman Arnaud de Aorchgrave. On the s~me pa,~;es of
NEWSWI;EK, Borcharave recalls that Morocco i~ the oldest ally of the ifiited
State~ and ~zaxns of a possib].e debacle that Hassan's downfall would mean for
the West, ati event that woulci inexorably follow a defeat in the war.
:tassan's support to the Shah in his most difficult days would now be rewarded.
Now Hassan is knocking at the doors of the White House.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Informacion y Revista, S.A. ~
11635 ~
CSO : 4410 ~
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