JPRS ID: 8626 SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA REPORT

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 42
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 27
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVE~ FOR RELEASE= 2007/02/08= CIA-R~P82-00850R000'100080027-3

2i i ~ ~ i ~ i OF i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
~OR OF~ICIAL US~ ONLY
JPRS L/8626
21 August 1979
.
Sub-Saharan Africa ~Re ort
p
FOUO No. 645. .
~BIS FOREIGN BROADCAST INFORMATION SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
NOTE
JPR5 publications conGain information primarily from forreign
newspapers, periodicals gnd books, bue also from news a~ency '
transmissiona and broadcasts. MaCerials from foreigtt-language
sources are translated; those from English-language sour~es
are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phr~sing and
other characteriaCics reCained.
Keadlines, ediCorial reports, and material enclosed tn brackets
are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text]
or (Excerpt? in the EirsC line of each item, or following the
lasC line of a brief, indicate how the original information was
processed. Where no processing indicator is given, rhe infor-
maCion was summarized or extracted.
Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated ar~
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied as appropriate in conCexC.
Other unatCributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
iCem originate with Che source. Times within ~.tems are as
given by source.
The conCents of this publication in no way represent the poli-
cies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.
For further information on reporC content
call (703) 351-3165.
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GOVERNING OWNERSHIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCEL HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF THIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE O~T.,Y.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OFFICSAL USE ONLY
~ JPRS L/8626
2~, August 1.979
SUB-SAIIARAN AFRICA REPORT
Fouo No. 645
CONTENTS PAGE
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIRS
Crisis in Central Africa Reported
(S3radiou Diallo; J~;UNE AFRI(~t1P., 4 Jul 19).......... 1
Revitalization of OCAM Attempted
(Abdelaziz Dahmani; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 11 Jul 79)....... 3
Difficulties of African Development Bank Described
(JEUNE AFRIQUE, 11 Jul 79) 5
~ Poorly Conducted Negotiation, by Samir Gharbi
Fordwor Cornered, by Mehdi Malek
Briefs
OAU Summit Expense g
Gabon-Rhodesia-SouCh Africa Link g
Congolesp-Z.airian Co:peration g
ANGOLA
Africanist Weighs Alternatives for Unity, Peace
(Norbert Courbey; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 1 Aug 79).......... 10
Gc~od Diplomatic Relat.luns With FRG
(AFRIQL1E-ASIE, 23 Jul 79) 12
Briefs
Neto sn Investment Code 13
CAPE VERDE
Pereira: Every Country Free T~ Ask External Support
(Aristides Per~ira Interview; AFRIQUE-ASIE,
23 Jul-5 Aug 79y 14
- a- [III - NE & A- 120 FOUO]
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CONTENTS (Continued) pa8~
CHAD
Briefa
Kamougue Demands French Troope' Withdrawal 17
CONGO
Draft Constitution Approved by Voters on 8 July
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 13 Jul 79)..... 18
MAUAGASCAR
~ Madagascar's Ratsiraka Discuases Tnternational Issuea -
(DidiPr Ratsiraka Interview; AFRIQUE ASIE,
9-22 Jul 79) 21
MALI
Briefs
Opposition to Def ense Pact 24
MOZArBIQUE
. Agricultural Situation Looking Some~:?~at Better
(Augusta Conchiglia; AFRIQUE-ASIE, 23 Jul 79)........ 25
Briefs
~ Guerrilla Activities Reportedly Increasing 28
RHODESIA
' Briefs
Israeli Intelligence Network 29
SENEGAL
Dyna.mism, Power o~ Mourides Stressed ~
(Sylviane Kamara; JEUNE AFRIQUE, 11 Jul 79).......... 30
Briefs
Senghor Concerned About Arab Countries'
Division 33
- b -
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY
CON'rCNTS (Continued) PaBe
zAIItE ~
Stringent Measurea Adopted Against Speculation in
Coffee
(MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERRANEENS, 13 Ju1779)... 34
Briefs
Containerized Transport . 36
- c -
FOR 01~'FICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
~OR O~~~C I AL 115H: ()NLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIItS
ChISIS TN CENTR(~LL AFRICA ItEPORTED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 4 Ju1 79 p 29
(ArCicle by Siradiou Diallo]
, [Text] CenCral Africa is on the move or rather on the way down. With Che
excepCion of Cameroon, all of Che countries in the region are going through
an especially difficult crisis.
The case of Chad is well known. In the absence of an upsurge of national
conscience from the cadres ar~d political leaders, this country is running
the risk of bursting apart beneath the burden of foreign appetites. In
the Central African Empire and in the Congo, the situation is not much
better. Political assassinations are an everyday occurrenc~. Functionarfes
occasionally wait months before being paid. Large urban agglomerations such
as Kinshasa and BrazzaviYle are short of foodstuffs, while factories are
working~at less than capacity due to the lack of spare parts, if not fuel.
Even formerly prosperous Gabon is not completely unscathed. The price of
foodstuffs has gone sky-high. Fortunately, Gnbon is en~oying solid political -
stability, which is far from being the case elsewhere. Political shockwaves
in Bangui in January are still causing ripples. In Brazzaville, thp trial
- of former PresidenC Yhombi Opango, who has b~en under house arrest in a
, villa in the parachutist camp, is still being awaited. In Kinshasa, authori-
ties have been obliged to raise salaries, against the advice of the Inter-
national Monetary Fund, but even this has not prevented wildcat strikes in
boCh the public and private sectors. People elsewhere are unhappy to see
their purchasing power decrease from month to month. Everywhere inflation,
with its customary retinue of scarcity and in~ustice, is rampant, with no
improvement in sigtit; on the contrary, things are getting worse by the day.
Paradoxically, leaders seem rather unconcerned. Some do not appreciate the
gravity of the situation, while others seem to be completely out of their
depth. However, none are reedy to toss in the towel. To cover up their
failures, not to say their incompetence, in the face of an unprecedented
crisis, some among them continue shouting slogans which no longer evoke and
echo among the people, or occasionally wear themselves out in pointless
wrangling, as in Brazzaville.
1
FOR OFFICIi,;. USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
~OR 0~'FICIAL U5L ONLY
Cenrreil Africa ia made up of small stnt~s (with the obvioua exception of ~
'La:ire) which, ~1as, do not ~ry hard enough to draw together and cooperate,
st least on the economic level, while none of them has ar their dispoaal
a gelf-sufficient domestic market. However, UDEAC (Customs and Economic
ltnion of Centrr~l Africa) has sufficiently prov,ed itself to serve as an
embryn for greater economic cooperation, as Che aCates of west Africa have
demonstr~ted, being ~oined ~ogether in the ECOWAS (Economic Community of Che
West African States). RelaCions between sCates are o�ten very low-key: the
Cenrral African ~mpire does not have good relations with the Congo. The
latter, in spite of the recent visit of President Sassou Nguesso to Kinshasa,
rem~ins very cold towards 2aire. Cameroon and the Gabon are taking Cheir
eime to resolve eheir secret rivalry.
Thus central Africa sinks every day a little deeper into economic depression, _
the liquifaction of state auChority and disunity. It is true that this
region has neither the leaven of eChnic and religious cohesion nor the
Eoundations inherited from the pre-colonial empires of west Africa. But
central Africa has going for itself iCs immense mining, agricultural and
forest potential. It ought to exploiC these in the best interests of its
people:
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
9330
CSO: 4400
~
2
FOR OFFICI~,L L'~E UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOK O~FICIAL 115~ ONLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAIItS
1tEVITALIZATION OF OCAM ATTEMPTED
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 11 Jul 79 p 33
[Article by Abdelaz3z Dahmani] ~
[Textj One of Che oldest institutions of independent, French-speaking
Africa, the Afro-Malagasy-Mauritian Common Organization (OCAM), which has
changed acronyms six Cimes in 18 years, keeps on stuttering, feeling its
'way, mixing together the greatest hopes with the bitCerest deceptions.
OCAM held its lOth summit meeting in Cotonou, Benin, the 26th and 27th of
.1une, pointing towards the nth reorganization of its secretaryship-general
(located in Bangui) and the hope of ridding itself of its contradictions.
At the eighth summit meeting (in Bangui, 1974) the nine member states (Benin,
Che Ivory Coast, the Central African Empire, Upper Volta, Mauritius, Niger,
Rwanda, Sengal and Togo) took an oath to no longer talk politics, this sub-
ject being consigned to other tribunes, in order to silence "useless (ideo-
logical) quarrels." But, barely 5 minutes after having been elected presi-
dent on 26 June 1979, the Benin head of state, Colonel MaCthieu Kerekou,
_ gave a speech in which he touched upon all the hot spots on the continent,
from the Sahara to southern Africa.
Shortly afterwards,~the five heads of state in attendance (from Benin, Upper
Volta, Niger, Rwanda and Togo), all of them in the military, shut themselves
up for a long closed session. The discussion, occasionally quite lively,
concerned the political situation in Ghana. It was indeed on 26 June that
the new masters of Accra sent before a firing squad, among other officers,
two former presidents, General Akuffo and General Afrifa. In Cotonou,
these executions were considered an affront, all the more serious in that,
less than a week earlier, ministers and jurists from the Ivory Coast, Upper
Vo1Ca and Togo had been assured that Akuffo and Afrifa would be spared.
The shock was so great that the summit meeting was almost reduced to the
single closed session discussions. Colonel Kerekou had to use all his
powers of persuasion to convince his colleagues to abide by the conference's ~
agenda. The annoyance felt by the hosting president was proportionate to
the trouble the Beninians had gone to to welcome the organization in a
3 ~
FOR OFFICII,:, USE UNLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
~ FOR OFF'ZCIAL USi; ONLY
dignified mAnner. One need only mention the conarrucCion, on a beautiful
beach lined with coconut trees, of an OCAM villc~ge (whi.ch cost 3 billion
Ernncs CFA), with a conference ha11, 11 luxurious villas for the heads of
sCate and various nnnexes. The 11 villas were inCended Co house, in
uddition to representativea of the 9 member states, observers from Burundi
~nd the Seychelles, who had been invited with an eye to Cheir evenCual
,joining. But the latter did not send any delegates, leaving to their
faCe welcoming banners and flags sCrewn Chroughout the city: the Seychelles
were in the midst of elecCions and Burundi stumbled againet a last minute
"nisunderstanding" with RwandA.
Ie is true that this invitation to Burundi and the Seychelles was considered
a--political--manceuvre intended to strengthen Che progressive wing of OCAM.
The absence of Ivory Coast President Felix Houphouet-Boigny and of Senegal
President Leopold Sedar Senghor did not go over any better. Insistent en-
treaCy was made to Houphouet-Boigny to wait until the last minute to make
his announcement so as not to definitively torpedo the meeting (c�. JEUNE
AFRIQUE No 965). In order to prove its "good faith" and its "Ocamian"
convictions the Ivory Coast, through its minister of foreign affairs,
Simeon Ake, has proposed to organize t:~z llth summit meeting at Abid~an
(in 1981).
- iiut it was not only a question of--politics--in this apolitical organiza-
tl.on. The outgoing president, Gen Juvenal Habyarimana, Rwanda head of
srate, drew up a far from complacent balance sheet on OCAM. An ad hoc
committee was set up to study a new reorganization which must take into
c3ccount the fact that some members are not paying their dues, foremost
among them the Central African Empire, which houses the head office. There
results from this a lack of funds which creates difficulties for OCAM with
~lie 16 "common undertakings" which were entered upon at its founding. ~ao
among ti~e better. known ones, which date from 1961, hencef.orth are completely
independent: Air Africa and the African Postal Telecommunications Union
(APTU).
Unless it catches its second wind, OCAM may find itself relegated to being '
a simple "think tank." It is, moreover, having some trouble ~ust now
getting two ambitious projects underway: a local agricultural machine in-
dustry and a snultinational navigation company formed by west African c:ountries.
'rhis fluctuation between ideas and acts has even had repercussions on the
election of the secretary general. Even though his second mandate had expired,
L'r Sydney Moutia (Mauritius) had not placed the question on the agenda, which
mission shocked the heads of states. Rwanda was asked to name a new secretary
general who would take up his duties on.l November. The great favorite is the
Rwandi Amri Saed, presidential adviser and the only Mussulman with important
duties in his country. In order to nip backstage runors in the bud, the _
Mauritians denied to the heads of state that they would leave OCAM if th~
secretary general was taken away from them. Some people were even doing their
best to come up with a seventh acronym for this Afro-Malagasy-Mauritian Common
Organization...
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
9330 FOR OFFICI~~L USE UNLY
CSO: 4400
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
;
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
TN7~'EI~AFRICAN AFFAIRS
DIFFTCULTIES OF AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT BANK DESCRIBED
Poorly Conducted Negotiation
Paris JEUNE AFRTQUE 11 Jul 79 p 36
[Article by Samir Gharbi]
(Text] The 48 member states of the African Development Bank (AD~3) are to
announce their decision c~~ the amenciment to the statutes adopted by their ~
finance ministers, comporsing the council of governors, who met at Abid~an ~
from May 14 to 18. Onc~ ratified by at least 75 percent of the total vofies
casC, the principal result of this change will be to permit the participa-
tion of non-A�rican sCates (the leading nations being the United States,
Japan, the German Federal Republic, Canada and France) in the caFital as- ~
. sets and the manage~ent of the ADB.
This opening was not a new idea. Several times s~.nce the founding of the
bank in 1964, the question was discussed without be3.ng supported by a ma~-
ority. However, the Western nations and even the World Bank exerted in-
creasing pressure and the world economic crisis changed certain facts.
Furthermoie, in 1976, the presidency of the Board of Directors escaped
from the hands of Ghana's Kwame Donkoh Fordwor who had worked durin~ 5
years for the International Manetary Fund, a branch of the World Bank and
who was personally in favor of the opening up of the capital.
Even in the opinion of Dr. Horst Moltrecht, West German coordinator of the -
non-Africa states which had been invited to participate in the capital of
the ADB, the operation was organized "in a very short time", thanks to
President Fordwor. The machinery had been put in motion af ter the resolu-
tion taken by the Council of Governors in May 1978 at Libreville. President
Fordwor immediately organized four multilateral conferences wiCh the in-
terested non-African states in Washington, (September 30, 1978), Rabat
(November 27-29 1978), Abid~an (January 11-12, 1979) and London (February
13-14, 1979). In all, there were nine days of negotiations in less than a
year. It should be pointed out, for purposes of comparison, that the neg-
otiations f~r the African Development fund (ADF), which has specially as-
signed to receive the contributions of the ri~ch non-African nations~ had
lasted for nearly 3 years.
� 5
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
Wtiat were the ~esul~s? The non-A~xalcan sta~e~ ~gxeed ~o Ghe cond~,C~on that -
the seat of the ADB be located w~.~hin a membex African a~ate and that i.ts -
president always be a naCional of a member Afr3.can s~ate. Neve~thelesa,
rhis agreement was sub~ecC to ~he proviso that the preaident be elected not
on~y by a ma3ority of the ~oCal vote but also by a ma~ority of the vote~ of
the non-African sta~es. Tt was also conceded that the operations of the
AbB be carried on by the member A~rcian states auChor~ze the non-Afr~can
states which con~r3bute to ~he African Development Fund (ADF) to become
meinbers of Che ADB, acqui.r~.ng a.portion of its capiCal. However, Che non-
African stares would 13.ke this ~'linking"~~w~.th :.~he contr~.but~.on to ADF be
revised in the future. '
On the other hand, the capital of the ADB (1.22 bi111on units of account
[UC], one UC being worth approximately $1.20), 100% of which ~s held hy
the Members of African States (MAS), should reach a value of 5~25 bill~,on
UC's by 1986 (75 pexcent for the MAS, ~,.e., 3.5 b~.llion UC~s and 25 percenC
for th~ Non-African States (NAS), i..e., 1.75 bi1l~.on UC~s). This capital,
which is called subscribed capi.tal, ~.s subd3,vi.ded ~,nto two parts .'Y'he
first portion (25 percent) must be ~,nvested by a11 the member states in
r.onvertible currency, the second port~.on (75 percent) cons~ituting the capital
which i~ sub~ect to call. This ~,s the guarantee which permits the ADB
to meet i.ts obligations :Cn case of difficult~.es.
In this case also~ the f uture members of Che NAS have issued two typ es of
reserves. On the one hand, the 25 percent-75 percent division must not �
create a precedent for future increases of capital. Such revision~ b y
lezding to an increase in 4~e portion payable in currency could only in-
crease Che financial burden of the MAS and would run counter to the goal
sought by~Che proponents of "opening", namely~ to relieve the MAS. On
the other hand, the NAS specify that the liberation of their capital which
is sub~ect to call shall be subordinated to thetr own legislative and budget-
ary practices. Thus, the ADB, in case of some unforeseen difficulty, will ~
- not be assured of being immediately protected by having recourse to the
NAS. This contradicts the widespread idea that entry of the NAS is intended
to improve the financial position that will facilitate recourse of the ADB
to the international capital market.
Another ma~or contradiction appears between the idea of departure (furnish-
ing of foreign resources to relieve the financial position of the MAS) and
the result upon arrival. With the increase in capital, the 48 member
~tates have to invest 570 million additional UC's between 1981 and 1986
LJ consCitute their portion of 25 percent. In contrast to this, the NAS
will only pay out 437 million UC's which represent their share of 25 per-
cent. But how can it be expected that the 48 MAS wi.11 he able to invest
within 5 years more than they have in 10 ar 15 years? What would the NAS
do in case the MAS were not able to pay their share? They would block the~,rs
or offer to make up the defici.t in exchange for an increase in their power.
6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~
The div~.s~,on of powex ~,s a�unc~~,on o� khe d~.v~.s~,on of cap~,tal, that ~.s,
two thirda and one-th~.rd of ~he voCing x~,ghts ~ Hota~ver, ~the NAS have dr:-
manded and obtained "specia~. ma~~ority votea~' ~.n order to pro~ect their
rights. Moreover, they are not sa~isfied to have obtained 3 seats out of
12 on the Board of Directors. They want to have 6 ouC of 18. They also
, want, in connection wl.th recru~,tment of the profesaiona~ staff, the ADB
to grant "appropriate cons3deration" to the candidatea who are na~ives of
the NAS. The aim of tihe managemenC of the ADB i~ to multiply ~he level of
activity by a factor of more than six, to go from 770 m3.111on dollars of
loans granted from 1967 ~0 1978 to 5 billion dollars from 1981 to 1986.
The World Bank, with a11 of ita means, has reached the volume of business ~
which it does i,n Africa ar the preeent time (one billion do?lars per year)
only af ter 30 years of activ3.t~? ~ _
One can wonder whether the open:ing up of capi.tal could not have been nego-
tia~ad more favorably. Iri the fortn that ~,C 3s now be~,ng presented for
ratificat~.on by the African States, the risk 3.s being run of creating an
additional sub~ect of discord aC ~he summ3,C meet3ng of the OAU in Monrov~.a.
Fordwor Cornered
Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE 11 Jul 79 p 37
[ArCicle by Mehdi Malek]
[Text] At the end of a stormy session, the Board of Directors of the ADB
decided on June 28 to remove President Kwame Donkoh Fordwor from office in
accordance with Article 36 of the bylaws, follow3ng a long struggle. The
board designated one of the four vice presidents, F.0.0. Sogunro of Nigeria,
to serve as acting president until the next annual governors' assembly in
1980, although it is possible for the matter Co be settled before that
date. In any case, in a dispatch made public on July 2 at Abid~an, home
office of the bank, Abdoulaye Kone, minister of economy, finance and pla~ing
of the Ivory Coast and presently president of the Council of Governors of
the AbB, recalled the principle of "dialog and persuasion" which has always
prevailed in the ADB. At the same time, he let it be known that he had
called for a special session of the Council of Governors to meet at.Abid~ an
on July 23, 24 and 25, to be preceded by a meeting of the committee of
this council (Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Morocco) beginning July 8. Meanwhile~
the Board of Directors has been requested to suspend its decision as being
too "hasCy."
It appears that the Board of Directors entertained certain grievances with
regard to President Fordwor which were not completely without foundation
(J.A. No 964). In particular, he was accused of exercising prerogaCives
which, according to the regulations of the bank, are within the province of
the Board of Directors. In this manner, the Washington office was established
- 7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR O~FICIAL US~ ONLY
~
and iC~ head ~ppointed w3thout a~king the board to pg~~ on thi.~ n~tit~r~
The ~~m~ Ching de~urred with regerd to the appo~ntm~nti of th~ r~pre~~ne~-
eive nf Sifid~ ro the board who~ conCrary to the trediCion prov3ding th~C
the~e dut~.ee should be performed by a vice president nf tihe ADB, wa~ ~n
un~mployed internation~l official. ~urthermore, i~ happena th~e the for-
tunac~ winners o� thege postg were c~.tizena o� Ghana, ee ~s the president.
The gagrd of Director~ of Chp ADB aleo be1l~v~d tiiat the charig~g ma~e to
- eh~ organization chart ahould have received ita prior approval as ie re-
quired by Ch~ consCitution~ -
~ven mor~ serious wa~ the acnue~Cion Chgt the pre~ident did n~t aubmit ~n
a~cnunt to the Board o� DirecCore of his nu~ny tripa abroad wh3ch cost an
- uverug~ of $1500 (plus 300,000 CFA franca) per dayl Moreover, the preaid~nC
~ubmite~d resolutiona to the Council of Governora which had not previously
been digcus~ed by the Board of Directors. Positiona thet were contrary
td thos~ adopted by the Board of Directors were takeri by the president be-
- fore the Council of Governors. Mr Fordwor was also accused of exhibiting
personal animoaity towardg certain membera of the Board of Directorg which
led him to go as far as requesting their being replaced by the Council of
Covernora.
All of ehe abovementioned points eppeared in the memorandum which the
Bdgrd of Directors had ~ent to the presid~nt on June 1 and ~rhich requeated
him tn furnish a frank explanation to the Board by June 16. The laCter
' wag never received. Preaident ~ordwor, after having informed the $oard
of Directors that he was reserving his response for delivery to the Council
of Covernors, finally (upon the advice of an African chief of state) sent
thig body a 20-page memorandum while refusing to discuss the matter at all.
It was alsmst necessary to drag him forcibly before the Board of Directors
which e~aily apotted the untruths contained in his memorandum.
In addition to the facts, Chere are two hasic principles which are involved
in thig crisis. The first is the necessary submission of the presi~ent to
the Board of Directors. Thia ia the rule in similar institutions, in-
cluding ttie World Bank. In fact, the Couucil of Governors is the equiva-
lent of the General Assembly of Stockholders and it is the~Board of
Dtrectora, and it alone, which in all public or private companies, be they
aatianal or international, is responsible to the general assemb ly. There-
fore the president must be appointed by the Board of Directors, to which he
must regul~rly account for execution of the policy deterntined by the board.
The second principle is the necessity for determination of the pciicy of a
multinationa7. instiCution by a body of inen. It is not possible to place
full responsibility for its management on the shoulders of 3ust one man.
k'hen, in 1969, Che ~ame crisis occurred in the same way to the ADB, the
Council of Governors decided to observe the regulations and President
Mamoun Behei ry of Sudan was obliged to resign.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
8
FOR OFFICIAI. USE ONLY
7b19
CSO: 4400
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
i
~
FOR O~FICIAL US~ ONLY
INTER-AFRICAN AFFAZ~3
;
BRIEFS
OAU StJ~II~tIT EXPENSE--The total coer for organizing tite 16th Swnmit of the
OAU is eetimated at more than 80 million dollare. The inirial ceiling o�
60 million planned �or ~he consrruceion o� ehe conference ha11, the 50
villga of the chiefe of sCate, and Che Africa Hotel wae exceeded because of `
Che long rainy season and many stirikee ae the workeitea. [Paria JEUNE
A~RIQUE in FrQnch 1 Aug 79 p 27)
3ABON-ItHODESIA-SOtTPFi AFRICA LINK--According eo diplomatic sources
ces 3n L3.brev311e~ Air Gabon has started a cargo shuttle opera-
~tion to handle traffic w3th Saliabury and Pretoria. Coopera-
bion between Omar Bongo~a government and the r~ciat regimes in
Soutihern Afr3ca is stiill. grow3ng ateadi].y. [Text] [Par3s AFRIQUE-
ASIE in French 23 Ju]. 79 p 78] b182
;
CONGOLESE-zAIRIAN COOPERATSON--On 11 June Colonel Denis Sasaou
Nguesso~ the president of the People~s Repubiic of Congo~ car-
ried out an "officiai v3sit of friendship" to Kinehasa that
las~ed for several hours. The Congoleae presirient, making his
first foreign visit since being appointed head of state~ spoke
priv~tely with President Mobutu Se~e Seko. A~oint communique
sanctioning this visit takes into account the wiilingness of
both nations to strengthen their economic cooperation in mat- `
ters of securi~y as well as in the sociocultural domain. Regu-
lar meetings between the two heads of state are also planned
wi~hin the framework of this cooperation. Thia meeting had~
moreover~ been prepared fnr by a~oint ~airian-Congolese Com-
mission which had met in Kinshasa toward the end of May. [Text]
[Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERItANEENS in French 15 Jun 79
p 1614] 8117
CSO: 4400
9
FOR OFFICII+L USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
AMaOLA
AFRICANSST WEIQHS AI11'ERNATIVES FOR UNITY, PEACE
Paria JEUNE AFRIQUE in Fren~h No 969 1 Aug 79 p 9
~Artiele by Norbert Courbey: "Which Ro~d for Angols?"]
- (TextJ In his esse~y, "8ucceas in Angols," Prolessor Inamnuel Weleratein
admits thst in 1975, Holden Aoberto'a FNLA and Jonas Savimbi'e UNI~A "were
~11 implsnted in certain parte o! the country." Thia ~s the conclusion
reached bpr OAU inveatigative commisaions nnd Dy the Ecumeniee~]. Couneil of
Churches. For an organization such es the MPI,~1, vhich vsa geeking, sbove
all, the good of the Angolari people, one queation ~?as peraenunt: "Would it
be better, in the interest o! the country, to ahare paver vith thrm--since
they repreaent part of the people--or ehould thryr b e elimindted and power
concentreted in the 1~'LA's handsY"
The queetion deaerved carehil. examinationt each e~lternetive should be
weighed in order to choose the leaser of the evils, obviously far Angoln,
and not for such or euch a psrty or group. The I~I~A decided to seize pover
�or itself. It opted thus for u prolonged civil. ~reur in place of n politicsl
sLruggle which ~ould almoat certainly have included drmed skirmiahes. I
believe that the course of the politicel struggle ~rould t~ave bew better
for Angola.
rn 19't5~ ~6ola xas emerging from a long period of political censorship,
Fach oi the three m~vements included numerous dedicated militmta, even
among the officie~7.s, despite the fect that eome of tbtm Were veritable �
criminals and agents provocateura. The fset that one o! theae movmente
~ras a bit more "quel3fied to govern" does not ~us~ity the elimination of
th = other t~ro, as elso doea the fact that this or that movement me~y be
penetrated by agents lrom the CIA, the Kt~B or South Africe.
It is ststed that the 1~'LA called on the Cuban troopa so that South APrica
would not occupy Luaada. But xho is to say vhether South Africa xould have
become bogged clo~rn into a vmr in MSola? Aavever, let us e~dmit that the
occupation of Luanda could have become renlity. True pntriots xould then
have banded together against the co~ton enmpr. Exemples ot lighters vho
abandoned the capital to continue the atruggle lrom the bush rather than
call in loreign forcea abound.
10
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
,
FOR OFFICIAL U8~ ONLY
Recowrse to the Cuban aoldiers, whoae generosity I do noti doubt, provoked
n dilferent kind oP w~?r~ in whieh the ~ounbry'e blood 3e being aimleeely
epiit in s fratrioideil atruggle. The?t ie t~ot to ae~y that natione~, unity
preciudee an sppeel to tbreign militdry e?eeietanae i! thie ie neceeeary
to repuisa sn ~nv~iou. Horrove~r.~ it ~hould be definitely oatls~ned i~ the
purpoae ia to 8quseh thoae pol3t~ca1 part3ee rrh3eh are "vell 3mplanted in
~erEain regione."
The t~LA is again faced by the ~ternatiive of either ~ontinuing the e~ruggle
ag~in~t the t1NITA snd the ~NLA until their totsl deetruction, or ooming to
terms with them, `+hieh vou].d enteil freedom of e~reseio~ tor e~ch pe~rty ae
vell as aharing 3n tbe poWer. Ie not Angoi~?'a intereat to be fouud in
peaee?
On an international scate, this choice tirou].d reinfor~e unity 3n Afriea ewd in
the non-alined movement; it tirould Pol1oW the path of unity in the Th3rd
World. One mqy ob~ect that su~h or sueh a m~veda~t became disrredited
through collaboration. Neverthelesa, the politiesi hietory o! hwnanity
abouncls vith inste~nces of excellent servante of the stete xho had, at one
time or another, collaborated rrith the enenpr.
In caae the I~LA d~ecidea to puraue the poliqr o! eliminating the other tvo
move~nents, it is optiing for a civil ~rar vhieh xill ~oatinue for s 1,ong ti'e.
It is aleo opting for the preaence of Cuban troops, as vell as for a rift
nmong the patr3ots, eince a fbrei~n arnqr o! 25,000 men could not bring about
n~tionel unity in Angola. On the other head, according to We~l,eratein, d
reconciled Mgola ~rould be d neo-coloniel Angola. Thie is not serious.
A country's independence derives mainly from its degree of eel!-sulfi~iency
in the production of foodstuffs, l~rom the tirolume and the diver8ity o! ita
income, trom the level of consc:ence schieved by its elite, etc. A peacefut
Angola a~ould certein~y be far less dependent thea en Mgola in a state o!
_ civil War.
Be thst as it me~y, I have attempted to esk so~e questions eseential to
Augols and vhich, I believe, have beea ov~erlooked, rather then bring eome
redc~jr ansxers. In politics, passion aud pre~udice o!'t.en lesd to results thst
are diametrically opposed to those that one deeired. The Mgolen ezperience
seems to be a caee in point.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
- cso: ~400
il
~OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OFFZCIAL V8E ONLY
ANGOLA
GOOD DZPLOMATZC RELATZONS WZTH ~RG
Par~.g AFRIQUE-ASZE 3n French N~ 19x 23 Jui 79 p 78
[ mox~ ~ A l~rge delega~3.on f rom the Federal Republ3.c of Germany
h~~ded by tihe chief of the African Sect3on o� the Foreign A~fairs
M3.ni~try was expected 3n Luanda to complete clraft3ng a joint de-
c~.~r~bion ctt113ng for establ3.shmen~ of diplomatic relat3.ona be-
tween Weat Germany and Angola.
Thc nego~iations lead3ng up t;o this decision were long and
difficult, becauae it was clear that ao long as OTRAG
m~~intained a satellite-spy base in Zaire, there could
be no question, for Luanda, of normalizing relat3.ons with Bonn,
d~spitie many efforts by German diplomats and emissaries and the
discreet intervention of their Western a113ea. But once Presi-
dent Mobutu asked that the base be dismantled and there were
rumors that his decision had been encouraged by the Gorman So-
cial Democrats who were in power the way for normalization of
relations between Bonn and Luanda was suddenly open.
=t was the Angolan ambassador to Paris~ Mr Luis d~Almeida, who
conducted the secret negotiationa with the German leaders. He _
s~,oke with the head of the German diplomatic corps~ Mr Gensher,
who ~pparently played an important r81e in meeting the Angolan
remands, notably on the OTRAG isaue. It is generally known that
the Schmidt governmPnt was getting heavy pressure on this score
from ma3or German corporations eager to get a share of the many
~ndustrial and economic pro~ects President Agostinho Neto~s go-
v~rnment had in mi.nd. The f act remai.ns, though, that f rom the
1ngolan point of view. no condition conflicting with the MPLA's
positions of principle was raised by the German government.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Asie
6182
Cso: 4400
12
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ANGOLA
BRIEFS
NETO ON INVESTMENT ~ODE--A new investment code wi.ll be publiahed in
Angola. Iti conaritiures the implementarion of the "economic orientarion"
law adopted ati the end of June by the MPLA's political bureau. Z'he code
authorizes the repatiriation of foreign companies' earninga, provides
indemnizaCion guaranCees in the evenC of naeionalization and even providea
�or certain Cax and castoms dutiea exemptiona. Preeident Neto had to puti
his full authority on the line tio have this code passed: his Cuban
economic counaellors did not approve of iC. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AF'RIQUE
in French No 968 25 Jul 79 p 41]
CSO: 4400
13
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CAPE VERDE
PEREIRA: EVERY COUNTRY FREE TO ASK EXTLRNAL SUPPORT
Paris AF.RIQUE-ASIE in French 23 Jul-5 Aug 79 PP 6T�69
_ ~Interviear With Aristidee Pereira by Simon Malley in Praig, date not given~
[Excerpts~ [QueationJ The question of the unification betaeen Quinea-Bieeeu
and Cape Yerde wi.th the PAIGC as leader is s~rakening the curioeity of
political and diplomstic ob8ervers in Weat ASrica. The aecrrtary ger~eral oP
the party is ~he chieF of atste of Cape Verde snd hie Guinean counterpert,
Preaident Luis Cabre~]., is his deputy in the PAIGC. But whe?t e~bout the
procesa of organic unification?
(Ms~rer] By opening to debate the queation of unity betti+een Guined-Biaeeu
and Cepe Yerde, one touahes o~? the very exietence of the PAIGC. ~le are
ceaselesa]y Working tioward this goal, which, to us, is eeeentinl. We dre
also very much aware of the e2'tbrts ve must eLill malce to achieve it, becauee
we do not wish to end up xith failure. We have scen too many auch sttrmpts
in Africa end their sorry results. This is x2~y we are proceeding vexy
gradual~y, at timea through our respectives countriea, at timee through our
party. We believe ti?e have achieved concrete reaulta.
Iio~.ever, one muet acknowledge geographical re~l.itiee and even human ones,
and account for them. If one undertakes a serioue atudy of the Mistory oP
Ccpe Verde ancl Guinea-Bissau, the methods used by Portuguese coloninliam
gave a specific chare~rter to each country. There are, of course, common
sources bringing us together. For instaace, there are e~lmoat no Guinee~ns
without relatives in Ce~pe Verde, and vice-veraa. There are also other
factors to be taken into account, auch as the degree of educntion etnd evolution
oi theae tWO peoples. We must plen very careit~lly, avoding uriclwe heete, the
cruse of so maY~}r failures.
[Question] You are coming f~om Luanda, ~rhere the firot su~it betveen the
chiefs of state of the former Portuguese colonies `ras held. What took place
there? Had this meeting a epecitic.g~al, or Wss it only aimed at opening n
nea page in the history of these five countriea?
~ (MaWer] We could nat expect too much Srom a firat meeting such aa thia
one. We had simp]~y thou~t that, in vie~r of our common past of struggle to
~ 14
_ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
~Ott OFFICIAL USE ONLY
ech3eve our independen~e, and in coneider~tion of the pereona~ tiee uni~3~g
the preeent 1.ee~dera o!' theee five Qountr3ee, the le~~t of ineet3ng, di~c~e~ing,
and exehanging vi~wre could on~y reinforce ue. We aleo emerged fran thie
conferen~e ~onvinced the?t together~ we ~ould eer3ouely contribute to the
support of Afri~~n liber~?tion movemente in the 4ehievement of indep~nden~e
and in the economi~ development of the cont3nent.
[Question~ Are you consider3ng the establiahment of organiz~?tional stru~tures,
ag, for inatQnce, a common aystem oP defense?
(Mawer] First of a1.1, I do not believe, g3ven each of our oWr? real3tiea,
the apecificity of our problems and the distances that eeparate us, that a
atructured organixation ~+ou1d be vi~ble, s~t least for ~he time being. Ho~+ever,
thanka to such conferencea, We a311 enhance our cooperation, part3cu1arly in
the economic and educational fields, as we11 u in others. We did not discusa
an organization of common defenae because the main ob~ective of this first
summit in Luanda was economic cooperation, even if problea~e of secur3ty and
War in 3outhern Africe Were caref1x11y revic~ed. Concerning Africa in general
and other international problems, there are obviously some slight difPerencea
in our reapect3ve poeitions, Whiah derive from conditiona pertaining to each
of us, but We did reech an agreement on e~sential questions.
[Question] What uould you do if Cape Verde Were threatened by aggreeeion?
What ahould those African countries do, such as Moz~mbique, Zambia, Angola,
Which are attacked daily? Western porrers became the racists'eccomplicee,
but az~y recourse to the socialiat ponrera'8seistance ie i~mnedistely thought
of as vassalage to the Soviet Union...
(Msxer) We hold one f~ndsmental principle. Any independent country has
the unequivocal right to appeal to the country of its choice to defend ita
sovereignty if threatened. Of course, We do believe in interndtionnl legality.
This legality is still, in our opinion, the best dePense. Hrn+ever, it does
not preclude recourse to military assistance by friends ar~d allies. My
country Which is attacked or threatened has the right to ask !or auch
assistance. And it would be both un~ust and false to accuse them of being
agents of MoscoW if they appeal to socialist countries.
(Ariatides Pereira thinks for a moment and then continues).
In the event Cepe Verde vtere threatened, we would firat arm our people to
make them conscious and proud of dePending themselves. This Would not
preclude recourse to assiatance from other countries, but we would rather
first count on our rnm resources. We xould of course ask for nssietance
from those countries which vtould readily provide it, but `re ~rould, above e11,
defend ourselves ~rithout help.
I4uestion] Ho~rever, at the time of the second war oP liberation in Angola,
you did send PAIGC military units to fight with the t~LA. This was a
manifestation of the PAIGC's international.ist policy.
15
FOR OFFICfAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
~OR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
(M,~WerJ Of courae... As for a atructured, org~nized African ~rr?~r, J:
believe that it is llposaible to estQbl3eh it. But allow me to be epecifict
e~?ch country is eovereign. It knoWS, it muet knox, khat to do. ~f it appeal~
to the so~ialiet countries, which helped us during our War of liberation, it
must PeQr being accuaed by this one or that of be3ng used as a base by the
Soviet Union or Cuba. Thie is neither the 3ntention nor the ob~ective of the
- country under attack. It aimply and wholeheartedly W3ahes to preserve the
independence and freedom ~cquired e~ such high cost. As for the avenue chosen
by tts people.for 3te development, it hae no accounta to give to ar~yone else
and has no uae for labels.
CUPYttIGHT: 1979 Afrique-Agie
C5U: 4400
16
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR QFFZC~AL US~ ONLY
CHAD
w
BRIEFS
KAMOUGUE DEMANDS FRENCH TROOPS' WITHDRAWAI~--Kamougue, chief of Che Chadian
Gendarmery, a~nt the Elysee a plain-apoken formal notiice: withdraw tih~~
French army or you wi11 be responsible for everything which may happen .r.o
. your nationals. [TexC] [Paria PARIS MATCH in French 3 Aug 79 p 81] -
CSO: 4400
17
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
CONG9 ~
DRAP'T CON9TITUTION APPROVED BY VOTERR ON 8;~IILY
Paria MARCHES TROPYCAUX ET MEDITffiRRANl~NS in Fs~nch 13 Jul 79 pp 1960, 1962
[Ekcerpta~ On 8 July~ th~ Comgoles~ votera naMd 63 d~puti~s to the P~opie~�
Assembly, aa aell ~s represent+~tiv~a to th~ r~gion~l u?d local cour?cil~~ fros
the siat~a ~pr~~enCed by the sin~le part~ that us~a tha naa~ of Macf~ntitic
aocieliam~~~ Che Congol~ao L~bor Part~? tPCT). Th~y x~r~ alao able !o approve
the dralt constitutiion worked out aa a resuit o! hoiding th~ PCT~s third
special conv~nCioa last March.
Conaidaring the nature ot tho election, tha only aurprise to be expect~d vas
the nusber ot votes in favor of . tha govarnsent. We rec~li that !n 1973~ at
the ti~ of a�ioil~r raf~rendwa~ 73.47 perwnt ot the voters approwd th~
constitution, Mith 21.13 perc~nC opposed. Today~ th~ pr~li~insry reaults
indlcsCo an ~~ov~rwh~lmlag aa~orityM(95 p~rc~t?t) !or the �red votaN ~~y~aM),
and a 99 p~rcent r~te ot particip~tion. This cheu~ge is not n~ce~aarily !or
th~ better.
A Socieliat Decentralized Coln~titution
The People~s Republic o! the Congo !s on its sixth constitution since it
grined independence ~a part of French Equ~?toriai Atrica.
Tt~a constitution of 8 July 1979 returna to oertain dQfiaitions o! the 1973
constitution; in pareicular~ it akea the Congo into a�Paople~s RopublicN
(Art. 1). Its Nprinciple~~ ia Lfncoln~s lam~u~ phras~s Ngovern~nt ot the
people~ by the people~ and !or th~ peopleM (At~. 6).
Tho chie! innovation o! this oonaCitution lies in the adminiatrative deo
centralizatlon it guarante~s. Outside the People~s National Asse,bly~ the
~l.uprem~ agency of governa~nt� authority~~(Art. 40)~phich is elect~d Dy pop-
ular v~ote tor S years~ and the Council o! Miaist~n~ the �supro~ ex~cutive
agency" (Art. 75)~ Nthe region~ and cosna?ea ar~ doc~ntralis~d local co~-
munities endoMed vith awr~l lndividuality and linsncial ind~p~ad~nc~~~ (Art.
(84). They are �ada~inistared by agencies r~pr~sonting the gov~rnment e~uthority
celied Peopie~.s Cowncila~~ (Art. 85). NThe organica~tion and operation" (Art.
g6) and the "by-laws, eethoda of elaction, and pr~rogativea o! the P~opi~~s
CouncllsM (Art. 87) ars not specitied in the constitution, but ar~ tho aub-
~ect o! Mspecial i~NiN (ArC. 87). 18
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
~OR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
'fhe preaident~ electied for S ysars by th� pCT convention, is alao chairaan
o~ tha patty~s centr~i comwltt~� and plays a auppoa~diy ieper~onai rolo= hr
"~aabodi~s national uni~y ~nd a~~s to the observanc~ o! +~h~ conatitutfon and
the norm~i op~r~Cion of the publio inatitiutionr" (Arr. 62). Ir is th~ pr~a�
mfniat~r, the ~~h~~d o! gov~~nt,~~ who ~~dit~cra, cooxdia~t~~, +u?d oontrola
th~ sotivl~y ot the oinirtera~~ (Art. 7y) rrithin th~ Councii o! Minir~~~rs~
Mhoao eeine~r poaiCion ~re h~v~ altyady MnCion~d.
Thaso ~~raaes~ far froo baing aopty.~ ,3wv~ ap~~irl rQaonanc~ in a country
ther haa experlenced aoverai presidet?ti~i rsgiwa and t~?o poriods of unas-
_ biguous Ailitaty dictatorahip. Th~ analysts Mho see in Congolose political
, life ai~ple ethnic confrontatoons betWe~n Ch~ North sad South aiil b~ heip-
ieaas aithough the prasent pretld~nr~ like hia pred~ce~aors~ can pa~a !or
a rapriaentative of the Mbochis, the soat dy~uulc atbnlc group o! th~ Con-
~ goleae North (but by no aeans the only on~)~ Mh~t ia to be done witih a priue
minister irtto is a nativ~ o! th~ South, and put at tih~ head oP the naupr~se
~xecutive a~ency~~? At th~ very leeu~t, a rrgion~l balanc~ ia co~s~siv~bi~. Th~
decisive parC playad by ~he Congolese youth ~nd intellectuala !s, ~or~over,
alMSya underea~lmaCad in a aup~rliaial study of thinga.
"The repreaentatives of th~ paople~~~ s~ys C!� con~titution (Art. 5), M~re
dir~cted to rely upon the p~ople,...to liaten to th~ir opinlons aad to sub-
mit to their control.� Oate of th~ plaguea o! Congol~a~ politics and sconomlcs
is en exceasively lerge civil a~rvice (including par+~-govsr~ntel co~apanies),
Mhose privileges are str~ngthened by th~ econoNic criaia~ ~hus ~ggrav~ting
the criaia itself. It is thia Nbureaucratic bourgeoiaieN that pas rec~nlly
denounced in ET!)MBA by a aie~bers o! the ceatral camittee of the Union o!
Congoles~ Socialist Youth (UJSC), pho �aids MQn 8 July~ ~ ahail not vot~
for aaney, tribe, or l+u~do~mers." The eatabliah~n~ o! "people~s auehoritiea"
� aureiq repreaants a hope of future controi Por tho qoung and lo~r-class
people who auffer from inflation~ tro~ the deterioration of the �conoa~, and
froa all kinds of bur~acracy. Their diasatisPaction largely expl~ins ttw
convening of the PCT~a third specisl convention l~at March. The gov~t~ant
remains aMSre of the importance ot thes� doanda.
The State and the Private Soctor
In order to meot th~m~ the oonstitution atetes thaC Mth~ ch~et moaru of pro�
duction are the prop~rty of tha people~~ (Art~ 30)~ ~The lamd" is also Ntho
prapertq of the people~ and ail deeds aad casto~ary rights are abolishodM
(Art. 31). Ho~?ever, Mprivate propes~ty aad th~ right o! the inh~ritanoe ot -
goods, except tor latid~ are guerant~edN (Art. 33).
Social relations i+nd the atatna of the privat~ sector, ohether daoestic or
foreign, are also m~ntioned by the lattm~kerst M... the govertu~nt directa
ecosiomic life and developsent according to a general plan (.;~d], relyiag on
the gavernmvnt and cooperative economic aectora~ [exercisea] ~ gen~ral con-
trol over th~ p~iva~~ sector....The gov~rtwnt reli~a on the union aad
ployee organizxtions, c~~n the cooperativ~s, and i! n~ces~~ry on other organiza-
tions of the Working ma~aes~~ (Art. 32),
19 ~
FOR OFFICIAT. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
~OR 0~'FICIAL U5E ONLY
These ap~ciEicetione r~m~in inco~apleCe and~ moraover~ the rec~nt ~trikea o!
the CFCO have eho~m thaC there could be ~ cottf 1 ict between the Congolese w~or-
kers and the Braczaviile authoritfeg.
Leet May, aC o meetiing aith represenCativ~a o~ the private secCor~ tihe prime
minister very succosstuily gave a long description of the Congolese author-
ities~ ldea oP the rela~ion beh?een the pnbllc u?d private aectora of th~
economy. Going back to the government~e tor~a r statemente~ Mr Gooa said that
he wea in lavor of a Mcontinuing diAlogueN between the suthorltfea ~u~?d the
leadera of the pr~vate aector.
~~Areas of lntervenCion" Will be reaerved !or the private secror~ he eaid~
specifyfng Chat privata acCivity in agriculture Wae atill poeaibie e~d even
very desirabie ~or the ~ntroduction of neW cropa or the valori~ntion ot
egricultural products.
Aside from the role of the ~oint state-priv~te en~terpriaes, the private sec-
tor still has a future !n the working oE rock sRlt and foro~t producta, or
in a~inerai proepectfng. Arrangements for prlva~e intervantion can be atudied
in industry, where the exiating companies are aot in danger. Trade and pub-
lic Worka also have a place lefC for prlvate entexprlses~ except !or con-
struction, n branch in ahich Sonaco [Narional Cons~ruction Company~ has a
monopoly.
Thus the Congolese authorities aeem from their atatemen~s~ their actions,
and the constitution they have ~ust sabmitted for the people~s approval
to be conscious of the con~radictory requirements i~plied by e situation of
political and economic crisis.
The constitution and its results are intended to settle the politicai crisis
by a marked return to legality and self-expreaaion by the people~ after tWo
and a half years of uncerteinty.
The oconomfc crisia casi be settled only by a raneWad struggle egainsC poor
~cenagement and privileges~ as in a frank dialogue wiCh the private aector~
for the irreplaceable dyna~nism. From this point of vieM, the decentralizetion
propoaed todaq may be an interesting experiesent~ and an originel as~d correct
one in any case~ for hoW can the problens ot the Congolese Cuvatte be com�
pared aith those o! Pointe�Noire4
~
C~~PYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie., 1979
8429
CSO : 4400
20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY '
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
MADAGASCAR
MADAGASCAR'S RATSIRAKA DISCUSSES INTERNATIdNAI~ ISSUES
Paris AFRIQUE ASIE i.n French 9-22 Jul 79 pp 25-2~ LD
'["Exclusive" interview with Madagaecan President Didier Itateiraka by Simon
Mall~t: "Maneuvera Aimed at Weakening Havana Summit Are Bound To Fail"--date
and place not specified]
[Excerpt] [Question] Two events of ma~or importance directly concern~.ng
Africa will soon take place--an OAU summit in Monrovia and a aummit of non-
alined countriea in Havana. What resulCa do you expect from the OAU aummit?
Didier Ratsiraka: At every OAU summit the same problem arises because mem-
ber states lack consisCency. They Iack the political will Co firsC achieve _
independence in order to evenCually be able to do someChing of primary im-
portance, namely liberate the continent politically and economically.
Th~refore, from compromise to compromise, they will find themselvea bound
hand and foot at the mercy of imperialist interests. They are no longer
able to either oppose or even criticize any activitiea on the part of im-
perialists or their allies on the continent, such as South Africa and -
Rhodesia, to mention only those two. Othera are not free of their movementa
an@ cannot oppose self-determinat.ion and independence for Weat 5ahara (as
publ3shed].
Last year, I stated at the Khartoum OAU summit that it is neceasary to first
achieve political and economic independence to acquire as a result means for
an independent policy and that it is necessary to to clearly distfnguish be-
tween imperialists, that is, our enemiea, on the one hand and our ob~ective
allies and friends on the other.
Once this is achieved, the course will be set and the task confronting us
clearly determined.
[Question] May I take this opportunity to ask you again about your views on
the creation of an intervention force by progressive countries, irrespective ~
of whether such a force would be controled by the OAU or not....
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
- FOR O~FIGIAI~ US~ ONLY ,
nidi~r itat~iraka: Unti~l tha ob~ectiivee wh~,ch I hgv~ ~ust mentioned ara
, nchi~vad ~.e would ba illu~ory eo ~ry to creaee ehie k~.nfl of ~orc~. ~or who
ie progreseive or eocialiet and who ie no~? I� ie were possibl~ to anewer
thie queeCion without r~,ek of error, the conference of African progre~eive
aountries~ which w~ wanted tio organixe lase year, wduld hav~ taken pl~~e a
inng time ago. In ~he presant siCua~ion only bilateral ~lZiances are pos-
~~b1~, or, at th~ very moaC, we oould create a progressive defens~ force
ag~�.nst imper3alism.
(Qu~~tion) sti~.ii on the sub~ect of thig intierven~ion forca, what are your
viaws on the int~rn~tional~et eid given by Vietnam to Cambodian libera~ion
forcea and by Tanzania to Ugandan liberation forces?
Didiar Rateiraka: This queetion ~.s connected with the previous one and I
hav~ alr~ady angwered it in part. However, I would like to add that we
hav~ alway~ militaeed in favor of negoCiatione and a peaceful solution to
ConflicCS ar3aing between eocialieC countries. When the Sino-Vietnamese
conflicC broke out I sent telegrams to Chairman Hua Guof~ng and Leonid
Brezhnev. I aeked the former to "reatore" peace eho~ring respect for the
sovereignty and integrity of Vietnamese national territory. And I aeked
the 1~teer not to intervene directly in this conflict because Chis could
lead to a Sino-Soviet war which would result in heavy loases for both coun-
Crieg. Now any weakening of the Soviet Union would be bound to benefit im-
perialiat powera and international reaction. It would certainly harm world
r~volution.
Nnving said thie, you will have realized that we did not condemn the aid
given by Vietnam to the Cambodian people's forcea. As for recognition of
the new Kampuchean regime, we believe that if it is eufficiently popular
it will be recognized in due course. I will not accept any criticisma on
�:his, for what could be said of all those countriea which claim to be so-
cialist and revolutionary but which refuse to recognize the Saharan Arab
Republic?
As for the Ugandan-Tanzanian conflict, at the time of his visit to Dar es
Salaam our foreign minister officially condemned Amin Dada's aggreasion
aga:nst Tanzania.
~verything is therefore clear. As for recognizing the Kampala regime, We
lack information which would enable ua to make a decision right now.
[Q,estion] You have concretely demonstrated your internationalist solidarity
w-.,.li the Seychelles people by s~nding troops there in order to thwart plota
hatched against them by mercenariea and their masters. Is this an indica-
tion of a chaage in your policy? Can it be aeen as a precedenC?
Didier Ratsiraka: World imperialist and reactionary forces are logical.
They help one another and coordinate their efforta and their policy. We
h~ve always striven for the unification and conaolidation of world socialist
and progreasive forces.
22
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FAR OFFICIAL U5~ ONLY _
Our ~n~id~r~,Cy w3eh ~h~ 9eyehe~,la~ i~ a reeul.t of eh~.~ m~nC~l ate~eude. Ir
con~CiCuCe~ neirher a ch~nge nor a n~w departure in our pol~cy bue an il-
1u~tr~eion nnd pr~eti~,cgl implpment~e~,on, amang oehere, of ~.te militiene and
rQVOlutionary natur~. If ehie ~epecC of our policy may seem new, iC i~ be-
cauae, firet of all, we had no opporeunity in tihe paet to make iti known~ ~
~urthermo~e, we lacked the nece~eary meane to do eo~ Howev~ , it ehou~d be
remembered that a~.d for and mueual a~,d among progreaeive and eoc~.alieti coun-
erie~ h~v~ giwayg been ~ cort~tant factor in our poiicy. We have n~ver
ceae~d Co g3ve concrete eupporC eo liberation movamen~~ ~.n th~ eh~rd world,
inciuding the popu].ar movemenC for the liberat;ton of Angola, th~ Mozambique
liberge~on �ront, the Zimbabwe Afxican Peop].e'g Union, the 2imb~bwe African
Nat~on~1 Union, Vie~n~n~ the PLO, the Polieario, the Southwest African Peo-
ple'e Organization and the African Natiiongl Congrese. In any case, the PLO~
the Polisario and ehe Zimbabwe African people'e Union either already have
or wi11 soon have officee or permanent repreaen~aCivee in Antananarive.
(Quest3on) Aa far as th~ ~ummie of nonalined countriea in Havana is con-
c~rned, you mueti be aware of maneuvere aimed at weakeni~g the movement and
neueralizin~ ite �uture Chairman Fidel Cas~ro. What attitude will Madagas-
cgr adopt in Cuba?
Uidier Itae~iraka: An aetitude gimilar to the attitude which we have always
adopted and which has been based on principles to which we have always
claimed as our own. We beli~ve that ~he mavement of nonalined countriea
should be a powerful instrument to be used in support of our struggle againat
imperialiem, colonialiem and racism. ~'he movement, to which mast UN members
belong and which poeaessee hug~ mineral and agricultural reaources, muat
sCrive to insure the complete liberation of the third world; it must wage
a struggle in support of peace, ~uatice and democracy throughout the world,
gnd it has the neceasary reaources to do so.
Therefore, Madagascar will do everything in its power to atrengthen it and
endow it with more authority. By indulging in maneuvers with a view to
dividing iC, delaying the Havana aummit or getting it cancelled, and exclud-
ing Vietnam from it, the imperialiats and their lackeya have proved "a
contrario" that nonalined countries conatitute a real force capable of
opposing their desire Co dominate gnd exploit. However~ we feel aure that
theae maneuvera are bound to fail.
COPYRIGHT: 1919 Afrique Asie
CSO: 4400
23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
r~n~t ub~r'l~IAL UJ~ UNLX
MALI '
BRIEFS
OPPOSITION TO DEFENSE PACT--rtaYi is the only country atill opposed to tihe
establishmenC of a defense pace within the CEDEAO [Economic Connnuniey of
West African 5rates]. It is beliaved tihar the proximity of Algeria may
be the cause of this reticent atitirude. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE in
French 1 Aug 79 p 28]
CSO: 4400
1
24
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
~ FOR OFFICIAL U9E ONLY
MOZAM~ZQU~
AGR~CULTURAL, S~TUATION LOOKSNG SOMEWNAT BE~TER
P~r~.~ AFR~QUE-ASZE 3n French N~ 192 23 Ju1 ~9 pp ~0~71
- [Excerpts from art3.cle ~~.tled ~~D~velopmenti Strategy~~ by Augu~ta
Conch3.gl3a]
[Tex~] Zn ~pi~e of systemnu3c st~acks from
~he rac3sts, ~he economic ~nd po1.3.t3ca1 situa-
tion is s~ead3.ly 3.mproving as the 5th year of
3ndependence dawns. (
For~y-five cooper~t3ves~ ~~machambas~~ (cooperat3ve fields)~ ~nd
18,000 fruit trees planted. That was the score when, on 25 June
,(the anniversary of independence)~ the first 6-month ~eason of
socialist rivalry came to an end in bhe northern Province oF
C~bo Delgado.
Led by FRELIMO among the peasants whom 3t sought to perauade to
adopt a collective labor organization, this campaign of course
was ultimately aimed at far grander targets than these con-
crete results achieved in the field.
Cabo Delgado Province, which shares a border with Tanzania (and
where the armed s~ruggle for liberation atarted) is going through
an attempt ~o transform it by giving new individual responsibi-
lity to each of its inhgbitants~ such as integration into a
"basic unit �or national planning~" in which the governmen~ 3s
looking for solutions to problems shared by all the people.
Change in Town
The idea is to do away with routine work and to call on the peo-
ple's own imagination and creativity. This way~ say FREI,IMp lea-
ders, the workers, who can see most clearly what their region
needs, and what it can make available to other regions of the
country, will understand that it is urgently necessary to in-
crease production and to intensify trade. ~
25 '
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OFFICZAL U9~ ONLY
A~h~.c~v~.n ba~.~na~ ~.n th~ very un~v~n d~v~~a~m~h~ o~ th~ n~t~.on
r~~~.c~n~ ~~.mb~~.~no~ 3.~ p~?rb~.cu1~~~.y m~?~k~d b~tiw~~n ~own~ ~nd tih~
rural br~~?k3ng out o� ~h~ ~ubc~~.~~encd ~~onomy p~~~~rn 3n
th~ cour~try d~.~~r3.e~~s ~nd d~ve~op~.n~ ~oiieoti~.~~ own~r~h~.p ~nd
w~rk pr~~~~.~~~ ~r~ go~~~ I~~LINIO ~~ti �or ~h~ na~~.on a~ tih~ b~-
p~i,nn:tn~ o~ i.ndep~nd~nce. They hav~ now b~~n pa~~~.~1~.y ~ch~.dv~d
and~ ln Juiiuury 1979a Pr~~s~.d~nt S~mer~ M~eh~~. ~ou~.ci g~~+ tha~ ~h~
~c~nomic b~?lan~e~ b~tw~~n ~own~ ~nd rur~?~. ~?r~s~ w~~ no ~.ong~r ~o
~~.a~r~?nti~.y ~~.~~~d ~ow~rd ~h~ town~s.
An ~u~omubi~~ ~?~r~~mb~.y pJ.~?n~ n~~r 9~~.ra h~?,~ bg~n r~madel~d ~.ntio
a t'~rm m~ch3n~ry fa~ctory, ~nd 3.ts ~3.~~ ~nd flex3b~.~~.ty a~re ~uch
~h~~ 3b h~~ be~n ~~?3.d thgt 3~~ cong~ruc~3o~ con~~~.~utied ~'th~ �~.r~~
he~vy ~.ndu~bry ati~~ck. ~h~.~ firsb achievemen~ 3s proo� ~ha~ ~h~
pol~.cy ~dopted h~re, wh3ch giv~a ~gr3.cultur~ ~op pr3.or~.ty, ha~
not rem~3nc~d ~ de~d ~.e~~~r. Zn ~p~.~e o� nabural catastroph~s~,
~.h spi~c~ of ~h~ de~~ructi~.on wrough~ by Rhod~~~.an air r~~.ds and
s~boteur~, ~~~m producti~.on (~nd industirial producti~.on a~~ we11) is
up ~h~rp~.y.
M~ch~n3.zati~.on o� f~?rming 3.s mov~.n~ r3.gh~ along, par~3cul.arly 3n
t}ie many atatie state-run farms ~hat h~?ve taken ov~r 1.and aban-
don~d by colonist~ or by ~he big Portiugue~c~ agr3bus3.nesses. Ev~n
so, la~t June 3~n the L3.mpopo Valley they had to mobil3xe 40~000
peop~e tio get in th~ r3.ce crop... by hand!
The li~rv~~ti, which was 32,000 tiona in i97~, this year hit $6,000
ton~. Thati means the country came very cl.ose to meeting th~ ~oa1
o~ 60,n00 ~onss which the Party had aet for ig8o. ~
Cur~r~nt es~imates indicate that a third of al]. peasants (or about
3 m311ion people) are working collectively. Ten percent of them
work on the s~ate machambas and in cooperatives. Others, hun-
dreds of thousands of them, work in comraunal villages.
pnlitical Progress
SincC August 19~$, when Joaquim de Carvalho, then Agriculture
Minister, was ousted �rom the Party and from his position, pri-
ority has gone to tihe state-run sec~or, to "solutions from the
people."
'the sum of 100 b311ion escudos has been earmarked for building
:ommunal villages~ which are destined to become the basic units
ut ~overnment by the people. Some will be built close to state
farms, and the farm workers who will move into them with their
families can also set up and run their own cooperatives.
When it comes to food supplies for the towns, as of now it is
tihe state-run machambas which provide the bulk of them.
26
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OI~FICIAL U8E ONLY
A~ ~'or m~rk~t~.ng �~rm produc~~, no e~~y m~~~~r b~cau~~ o~ bhc~
r~uci.by o~ ~.nfr~~bruc~ur~~~ ~ ~pec~.~~. ~~~ncy~ tihe GAPpO [dxp~n~
~~.on unknown~ h~?~ b~~n ~~t up bo hand~~ tha~.
Pres3.d~nb Mache~. ~.a op~~.m~.s~3.c a~ ~o ~he na~ion~ s eaonom~.c Fu-
tiurc~.
Poli~ie~lly~ boo~ bh~ ~3.~ua~3.on h~a 3.mproved. FR~LIMOi whioh de~
c~ar~d ~.~~~~f ~ par~y ~.~s ~h~.rd congress 3n 1977, completed
i.t;a r~~w or~~n~.z~~~.on on D~c~mber ~.9~8. N~w member~, car~-
f'ully cl~o~e~n, h~v~ ba~n ~dm~.~tQd ~o Party rank~, fo~.~ow3.n~ "C~o~e~
~xum~.n~ti~.on ot' tih~ir ~3.ve~ ~nd behav3.or on ~h~ ~ob and in avery-
d~y 1i~~. " Ce~.l~ ha~ve been es~abl.~.mhed 3n f actior3.~s, coopera-
~ t3v~s, schools, d~.~~r3.bu~ion centers, hoapiti~la, communal vi1.-
la~~s, ~he army, and th~ polic~.
COFYRIGNT : i979 Afr~.qu~-A~3~
618z
CSO: 44dd
27
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OFFICIAL U9E ONLY
M07.AMBIQU~
BRIEFS
Git~RRILLA ACTIVITIE3 REPORTEDLY INCRF'ASING--"We muat destroy the enemy
before he deetroya us FRELIMO leader Samora Machel, who hae held
power in Mozambique for 4 years, ie facing increased activities by the
guerrilla movement. 7'he epokesman for tihe rebeis is a Mozambican born
in PorCugal, Orlando Chriaeina [as publiehed], 51 years old, a former
member of the special Portiuguese servicea. The "Resiatencia Nacional
Mozambicana" [Narional Mox~mbican Resistance~ has been conducting numeroue
sabotiage activities during ehe past 6 months. Ita equipment, which ie
of Soviet manufacture, comee from FRELIMO etocke. Samora Machel is
accusing the Rhodeaians of providing "sanctuary" eo the movement. ~Text)
[Paria VALEURS ACTUELI~ES in French 23 Jul 79 p 20~
CSO: 4400
28
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
RHODE9~.A
HRZEFS
ISRAF?LZ ZNPELLI(~ENCE NErWORK--Serael hae ~us~ ee~abl3ehed a veritab~e in-
_ ~e11.3gence network in Salisbury under the direction of a former infan~ry
colonel. This branch of Moasad wae aet up wi~h the approval. of Siahop
Muzorewa who asked the Israell agents ~o he].p him track ddwn and eliminate
hig PF enemie~. Accord~.ng to Rhodesian sources, i~ is posaible thab 8~liebury
could become Mossad~s main s~a~ion for the Tndian Ocean and sou~hern Africa.
[extJ ["~r~.s ~tzQuE-as~ 3n ~rench 23 Jui ?9 p 7~
cso: 4400
~
.
29
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OFFICIAL U~~ ONLY
S~NEGAL
bYNAMISM, POWER OF MOURIDE3 STRES3ED
Paria JEUNE AFRIQUE in French 11 Jui 79 pp 60, 61
[Art3cle by Syiviane Kamara: "Powerful and Courtied"l
(Excerptis~ They are rich, power�ul, feared and reapec~ed. Regardless of
whethe~ they are �arn~era or distinguiehed citizena, socialists or dema-
arats, ~hey are brothere and Sheikh Bamba is their mastier. �
The very recent brotiherhood of the Mourides, established at the end of the
19th century by Ahamadu Bamba, is by far at the head of the Muslim movements
in Senegal at presenti, owinq to its tremendous dynamism. Tidjaniya and
Qadiriya, those brotherhoods ~hat came from the nort.h, have had to give
- way to it. The brotherhood, which forntierly was rural and peasanti, has
won the ci~ies and intellec~ual circles. T'he Mouride wAVe has awooped
down on schools anc] high schools where they join and federate among disci- .
ples of Sheikh Bamba. The success encountered by the Mouride movement
stems both from the personality of its founder and from the socioeconomic:
program, resulting from an orthodox religious thinki.ng, that~he was able to
p~~~ into practice. Because Sheikh Samba, a visionary and dogmatic, was also
and primarily a pragmatist. Although his life has become legendary, his
life is known very well, nevertheless, in its first reality.
The founder of the Mouride movement left his disciples a heritage whose full
fmportance is judged today. 2n the purely religious fielfl, Sheikh Bamba
endeavored primarily to be orthodox. His aim was to go back to the basic
truth of islam. His method was to apply the prophet's precepts to the let-
~er. And, first of all, the precept recommendinc~ that the believer, the
'touride (candidate), work. Small farmers, making up the bulk of his troops,
launch out into an attack on the bush. They clear ground, plant and har-
vest. Peanut production has quintupled under their drivfng force. The
Mourides have become merchants in those regions where Tidjanes at Qadires
monopolize agriculture. Disciples workinq on daara (production cells) pay
a tithe to the brotherhood and donate workdays to the fields belonqing to
the collectivity.
30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
� ,
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
.
I~Ott O~~~CYAL USL ONLY
mh~ Mourirles ar~ ~o riah tihat, ~.n 1919, ~he colon~.a1 admin~.a~;r~~ion borrow~d
500,000 C~'A ~A�r~.can ~3nancial Communi~y] ~rancs from ~hem tio raise the
franc. in 1924, they ass~mbled the sum o� 6 million francs ~or bu3lding
tih~ ],arge Touba mosque. 7'his wealth, resulting from the work of tihe tallbes
(di~ciples), has always stiirred up ~eelings~ Some p~rsons accu~e ~he Mouride
marabou~s of ~xploitiing ~heir bro~hars and of keeping money �or ~hem~elve~.
The f~ct remains that ~he achievemen~s of ~he bro~herhood ~re vQry v3.sible~
in 1945, iti financed the Diourbel-mouba railroad sec~ion. Iti built moaques,
schools, the A1-Azhar rnstitute at Touba, portis. The library in ~he holy
city cos~ 500 million CFA francs. The UNESCO Cultura~ Week a i~.ttie 1ess.
Z'he sheikhs and the caliphs suppor~ a horde of needy persons, assist mer-
chants and dis~ribu~e scholarships ~o students.
$ut, al~hough the call the work puti outi by Sheikh Bamba has been widely
heard, ~his is not ~rue of i~s corollary?in the mi.nd o� ~ha sheikh: man's
social equality. A progressive idea, especially 3n a country whose social
stiruc~ur~ is based on castiea.
When he proclaimed that every man must work with his hands, when he abolished
slavery and castes, Sheikh Bamba was a true revolutionary. From men divided
in castes, he made sheikhs, while noblemen, mere disciples, worked the land
and even iron and wood.
gut, in this field, the frame of mind did not follow and the caste spirit
is still especially deeply rooted in Senegal, even among the Mourides. A
more successful innovation by Sheikh Ahamadu Bamba pertains to stressing
national languages. Differently from the heads o� the other brotherhoods,
- a Mouride marabout addresses the faithful in their language and not in
Arabic.
beeprootedness in Senegalese culture, the keystone of "Bambian" thinking,
� is found even in clothing. The Mourides have created their fashion--Xar-
sanni at the beginning of the century, 3 Abdou recently. This Mouride
three-piece garment has enjoyed huge success in Senegal where young persons
have sacrificed their jeans to it.
This concern for not cutting the Muslim off from his traditional culture
finds its peak in the Baye Fall phenomenon. 2'he Baye Fall are semipagan
Mourides. In accordance with Ceddo tradition, they drink, wear their hair
long and a large number of amulets.
When he set up tY~is community, Sheikh Ibra Fall, a companion of Sheikh Bam-
ba, aimed at giving pagans a feeling for a single god without compelling
them to abandon their customs immediately. This tolerance, which seemed
to be an aberration in the: eyes of some, has enabled the Mouride community
to spread as far as India and Jamaica. On the occasion of a reggae [as
published) tournament in Senegal, Jimmy Cliff became a Baye Fall.
At present, the dynamism and the power of the Mourides are so great that
nothing can be done without them. Z'he refores~ation campaign was markinq
31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
~o~ o~rzcrnL us~ orrLY
tiime. Zn on~ single day, a~ ~he oaii o� ~heir caliph general, ~hQ Mouricles
plantied 600,000 treea. ~n 1968, h~.gh achonl and elementary sahool s~udents
refused to stop tihair strike. Th~ governmen~ app~aled ~o the ca].iph. Within
24 hours, tihe movemen~ stiopped, because discipline 3s one of the ess~n~ial
bases o� Mouridiam. Z� the aheikh decides, tihe community mus~ obey. The
presant caliph, Serigne Abdou Lahad Mbacke, ha~ re~rea~ed with regard to
~he pnwer maintia3ned vigorously by his predeceasor, E1 Had~ Falilou Mbacke.
Certiain polit~.cal demonstratiions formerly held on occasion of Mac~al (holiday
celebrating, annually, Sheikh gamb~'s departure �or Gabon) have been abol-
ished. This discree~ness is understandable when it 3.s realized ~hat, in
Touba, Abdou Diouf, ~he pr3me minister, maintains contact with Abdoulaye
Wade and Sheikh Anta Diop, bo~h at ~he head o� opposi~ion parties.
COPYRIGHT: Jeune Afrique GRUPJIA 1979
10,042
CSO: 4400
32
FOR OFFICIEw USE UNI.Y
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
~OIt OFFZCIAL US~ ONLY
S~NEGAL
BRIEFS
SCNGHOR CONCERNED ABOUT ARAB COUNTRIES' DIVISION--President Senghor is
concerned about the division of the Arab countriea regarding Che Middle
Easti and the Sahara~ That runs Che risk of delaying by ~t year the
e�~ecrive srart of the African Socialiat InCernational r,f which tihe
Senegalese chief of srate is the sponaor. [Text] [Paris JEUNE AFRIQUE
in French 1 Aug 79 p 27]
Cso: 4400 -
33
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
i
~A=RE
STRINGENT MEASURES ADOPTED AGATN5T SPECULATTON IN COFFEE
Par3s MARCHES TROPICAUX ET MEDITERR.ANEENS in French 13 Jui 79
p ~.992
[Unattribu~ed Article: "Str3ngent Measures Against Speculation
- in Coffee"
[Text] Sn Zaire a counter-thrust has been aimed at coffee spec-
ul.ation~ with the coming into effect of a new regulat3on con-
cerning the commerc3alization of this product, the AFP arinounced
in an off3cial letter dated 9 July.
Under the terms of five circulars made public on that day in
K3nshasa, reveal3ng the measures adopted by the Executive Coun-
cil (the Government~ within the framework of the reorgan3zation
o:f the national "green gold" market, only those Zairians, whe-
ther indiv3duals or corporate bodies currently posseseing or
, exploiting a coffee planta~ion or processing plant~ will be
qualif3ed to buy and to export this product. They will~ more-
over, have to receive the approbation of the Zairian Coffee Bu-
r~au.
TY,ese measures which were requested by the International Mone-
tary Fund (IMFj~ charged with setting up a"stabilization plan"
intended to revitalize the Zairian economy in connection with
the "Mobutu P1an~" will restrain fraudulent exportation of cof-
fee, of which the Zairian'~P,lcvernment ~ s dead loss amounted to
~bout $280 million in.1977, Whereas the exportation of this
88,500 tons of coffee should have brought some ~400 million into
:he public treasury.
This problem~ moreover~ was to be stud3ed 3ointly this week by
the Zairian Executive Council and by those officials responsible
for the sectors concerned in the coffee harvest season, in par-
ticular the banking~gector. In fact~ many business enterprises
and a good number of private individuals~ faced with the impos-
sibility of gett3ng their money out of the country (as the zaire
34
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02148: CIA-RDP82-44850R000100084427-3
FOR OF~'ICIAL USE ONLY
[un3.~ of currency~ is non-conver~ible) had fallen in~o ~he hab~.~
of bulanc3.ng ~heir books by wha~ ig modeg~ ~.y cal~.ed "mak~.ng cof-
�ea" here. Not ~o men~ion a~.~. thoae--fore~.gners or na~iona~.s--
who took advan~a~e of ~h~.s system in order ~o raund of� their
own p~y checks, or simp~.y to make ~hemae~.ves r~.ch a~ a small
cog~ ~o thnm.
The struggle against fraudu].ent exports~ that pecul3ar].y 'La3rian
ecourge~ is one of the goals of the IMF and ~he Hank of zaire~
moreover, a3med a~ revitallzin~ tYle Zairian economy. It is
known that a team of Belgian experts wi11 be established in
Zaire in ~he near future~ with a tas~k�of setting up better con-
~rols in the Cus~oms Office~ where efficiency hag been nearly
at the zero l.evel up to the present t3me.
Las~ly, the Zairian Coffee Bureau plans to furnish a solid corps
of 1.eaders for the farmers by putting at the3r disposal agricul-
tural experts who wi11 adv3se them. In support of this action,
the Bureau plans to install hotbeds and nurseries in the princi-
pal production regions, which in the order of importance are:
Upper Zaire~ Kivu~ Equator~ Bandundu~ Eastern Kaza3 and Lower
'Laire .
(In fact~ it is a question of the enforcement of ineasures adop-
ted as a result of the creation--through an ordinance passed on
7 March i979--of the Zair3an Coffee Bureau which~ shortly after
its creation, had established the conditions under which buyers
and exporters would receive official approbation. We publ.ished
the details of these measures in our issue of last 1 June~ pp
14gg-15o0
~
COPYRIGHT: Rene Moreux et Cie Paris 1979
8117
cso: 4400
35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102108: CIA-RDP82-00850R004100080027-3
FOR OFFICIAL US~ ONLY
~AZ~
g~tI~FS
CON'rA~NLtt~zED TRANSPORT--Th~ use of interna~ion~i con~ainers in
la~.ri~n foreign tr~de i~ growing~ both for impor~~ ~nd ~'or ex-
por~s, The following ~tatistios for the firat ~hird of ig79
g~.ve an ~.ndiaa~~on of the ceaseles~ progre~~ be~.ng mnde in thig
new mode of ehipment. Some 173o containers weighing 1~~270 ~on~
were registered ae imports a~ Matadi (and ~o ~hia must be added
i77 empty cont~inere to be I.oaded witr. our exports). 7'he month-
1y average thua moves up from 4l0 loaded aontainera weighing
5356 ton~ ~0 57? Qontainera weighing 6090 tons. Sc:~ne 593 con-
tainers weighing 7259 ton~ were logded at Kinshasa for shipment
to the interior~ chiefly to Shaba. Exports coming from the in-
terior were shipped in 226 container~ weighing 4283 tone~ wherea~
when the ships were bein~ loaded at Ma~ad3~ e total of 1258 con-
ta~ners was registered~ with a total weight oF 17,989 tona (plus
�?9 empty containers). Here~ too~ the monthZy average, which weg
z37 containers wei.ghing 39].1 t~ns, has now risen to 419 loaded
cont~ziners weighing 5996 tons. [Text] [Paris MARCHES TROPICAUX
~'i' MEDITERR.ANEENS in French 15 Jun ?9 p 1614 ] 8117
CS.:: 4400
END
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100080027-3