JPRS ID: 8377 TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE

• Document Type: CREST
• Collection: JPRS
• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2
• Release Decision: RIF
• Original Classification: U
• Document Page Count: 47
• Document Creation Date: November 1, 2016
• Sequence Number: 13
• Content Type: REPORTS

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000'1000400'13-2
CFOUO 28179)

S APRIL i979 , i OF i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007102/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
~ ; :
ti ~ ~ ~
ti~ /
ti / .
/
/
~o ,
~ ~
o ~,~�~;a~
. ~a . ~
. ~ ~ ~Cs
, ~ v~''~ ` 44 e~
b . d
` /
` ~ . , ~
\ ~
\ ~
b `s ~o
/ ~
~~i ,~r .
~ ~ ,
~
~6
IMAGE EVAI.UATI
ON
TES'~ '~ARGET (M?-3)
!.0 ~ 1~
- ~ ~ z.z
~ ~s
~
I1~ V
YYo
~
~~I~~I'25 ~i~~~ ~
6"
9.
~ _
~ " ~1'
i . . ~
~ ~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~ -
~ . s~ . . ~
z `~i '`'~q~ , w;.~,
~ ~ ~ ~ `
~ `
~ ~
, ~ ~
~ ~ ~
, ~ A %
I ~ / o F
~ ~
~ ~ ~ ~
. ~ ~ p
~ ,
Qr ~O~~i"dp~11C titi
, . 49 YVEST MAIN SIREET ~
/
/ ~ �
/ WEdSTER N.Y. 1~SP0
/ ,
( 716 ) !7l~4S03
~ ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
FOR dFFICIAL U~E ONLY
JPRS L/3377
5 Apri1 1979
T RANS LAT I ONS C?~I WESTERN EU ROPE
(FOUO 20/79) ~ ~ ~
U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESE~RCH SERVICE
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
NOT~
JPRS publicaCiong conC~in informaeion primarily from foreign
newspap~rs, periodicals gnd books, buC ~lso from newe agency
Cr~nsmissions and bro~dc~sta. M~Cerials from foreign-language
sourcea ~re trgnslgted; Chage from ~nglish-l~nguage sources
ar~ ergngcribed or reprineed, with the original phrasing and
- other ch~racCeristica retained.
H~adlines, editorigl reports, and material encloaed in brackera
ar~ supplied by JpRS, Proceasing indic~rorg such as ~TexCJ
or [~xcerpt] in the firsC line of e~ch item, or following the ~
last line of A brief, indicaCe how the original informaeion was
processed. Where no procesaing indicaCor is given, the infor-
mation was summarized or exCracted.
UnfAmiliar names rendered phoneCically or transliterated are
enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a ques-
tion mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the
original but have been supplied asappropriaCe in conCext.
Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an
item originate with Che source. Times within items.are as -
given by source.
The contents of this publicaCion in no way represent the poli- -
cies, views or aCtitudes of the U.S. Government.
~
COPYRIGHT LAWS AND REGULATIONS GO~VERNING OWNERS?~iIP OF
MATERIALS REPRODUCED HEREIN REQUIRE THAT DISSEMINATION
OF TFIIS PUBLICATION BE RESTRICTED FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY.
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
F~R OFFYCZAL USE ONLY
- JPRS L/8377
5 Apr~.~. ~.9 79
TRANSLATIONS ON WESTERN EUROPE
,
(FO110 20/79)
CONTENTS ~ PAGE
~ COUNTRY SECTION
FRANC~
' Nuclear Con~truction Workere Get Poet-Job Attention
(Gille� Gaetner; VALEIJRS ACTUE~,LES, 12 Mar 79) 1
Chirac IntervieMed on Plan~ for Economy _
(Jacque~ Chirac Intervie~; PARIS MAT~H, 16 Mar 79) 4
PCF Congre~� Propoeale Reflect Change� in Ccmmuniet Ideology
(Irene Allier~ L~ NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR, 19 Feb 79) 12 .
~
PCF Opponent� Seen Beginning To Organiae
(Editoriel, Bemard Guetta; LE NOUVEL OBSERVATEUR,
26 Feb 19) 16
Barra Replie� to Journeli~te~ Questione ~
(L~EXPRESS, 24 Feb 79) 18 `
Detail~ of PCF Internal Di~pute Prokided
(Alain Tete, M ichel $arek Interview; L~EXPRESS, 24 Feb 79) 21
Brief�
PCF Deputy Secretary-General 25
ITALY ~ .
A nned Force� Praaotionel LeM� Examined
(IL MONDO, 23 Feb 19) 26
~ a - (iSI - WE - i50 FOUOJ
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
FOR nFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUIYl'RY SECTION
NUCLEAR CONSTRUCTION WORKERS GET POST-JOB ATTENTION
Paris VALEURS ACiUELLL~S in French 12 Mar 79 pp 66-67 -
[Article by Gillea Gaetner: "Worker Redeployment in Chinon"]
. [Text] "Here in Chinon everything is fine or at least nothing is wrong."
Such atatementa~ unuaual to eay the ]eaet, at Che nuc:lear power planta' con-
struction eiCes~ may eeem provocative.
In 2 yeara, however~ the Chinon B(second eaction of the power plant begun
in 1977) work aite has had only 5 daye of atrikes. A record! In contraet,
conflicts laeting several weeks are common place at most of the other plants.
The social har.mony reigning in Chinon is no doubt related to the decision
taken in liaison with the EDF [French Electric Company]~ the Tours chamber
of commerce and the ANPE [National Employment Pact Asaociation] to set up
EMIN [New Induatriea Training School]. Its misaion is to prepare for the re-
treining of the power plant's worker8 (there are 1,400 of them at the present
time) so as to integrate them more success�ully with the region's enterprises.
There we have a ma~or innovation for aince the start of the nuclear program
no one has been concerned over that problem.
Was the bulk of the work finiahed? The workers ~?acked their bags and left.
Profeasional training? An economic 3mpact on local trade and induatry?
Hardly any attention was paid to that.
In the final analyais the only ones benefiting from those establiahmenta were
the communea which were more than pleased to locate a aubstantial source of
income thanka to the bu,sineae tax.
Thie lack of irtegration with the ec~nomic apherp produces a great many dis-
advantagee. The riaks of social cenflicts have increaspd among an upr~oted
population in which the ratio of workers from outside the area sub~ected to
harah living conditiona is usually high. Strikes are frequent~ sometimea de-
generating into violent a:t~on.
1
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
- ~ FOR OFFICIAL U5E ONLY
The Chinon arPa itaelf hAd eame d~fficult momenxs in 1966 and 1977.
Thr, locnl populetion. in ~nrtlcular the tradc+aman~ ganerally gnine,from the
preeencQ of theee humxn concenCrationa. I~ will be s~l the more ~receptive Co -
nuclear disaidence if its profits ~are doomed to disappesr as soon as the con-
struction work has~�be~n completed.
- On the other hand, the recently isauQd announcement of the pas:~ible con-
struction of a third section tn Chinon has not appeared to urset a population
- accustomed to living peaceably in Frattce's "nucleai garden." (In Che depart- .
ment of Indre-et-Loir~ Qtone there will be five power plants in 10 years.)
In that connection~ a cflmment by the aecretary general of the Tours chamber
of co~nerce, Didier Ma~au is aignificant.
_ "For ecologieta~" he said, "it ie the Ang~~a-T~~~rs superhighway that is the
main problem in the area." ~
When the construction of Chinon B was decided upon in 1975, they wiahed to
- avoid repeating the errors made 17 yeara ago. The reaorting by the principal
employer, the Grand Travaux of Mareeille to local manpower was more systematic.
'I'he lattEr now makes up 85 percent of the civil eagineering employees at the `
construction eite. The time limit aet for construction was better adhered to
because of that fac+t, A sizable advantage in that a single day's delay re- ~
presents a loae for EDF of 3 million francs in earnings.
In September 1978 a"post-~ob commisaion" was set up with the cooperation of
_ the,EDF, the Indre-et-Loire prefecture and some elected individuals. It was
given the task of studying thp problems of the reservoir of workers.
This commission madE it poasible a few months later to facilitate initiating
a more broader operation. Ite name: "Racines" ["Roots"--Initiatives to
Regionalize a Nuclear Plant's Construction Activities far Employment and Sub-
contracting].
The main artisan for the operation ia the chief of the power plant's planning~
Michel Guillot, 42 years of age, an EDF engineer. A expert (he has had ex- '
perience at several work aitea).. De$pite the prospect of regul~r transfers
in public service, he has been extremely intereated in the economic future
of an area which he ia neverthelees deatined to leave in the near future.
The Racines undertaking bringa together the various parties concerned over
Che fall out with respect to employment.
The construction site employers: Grouped within ADESIC [Asaociation of ~'ie
Chinon Site Employers], their ob~ective is to encourage local employment.
Aseured of ANPE's aupport, they are committed to hiring only trainees from
the trade school that has ~ust been established.
2
~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
FOtt OFFICIAL U5E ONLY
Local enCerpri~~s: Once they are organized into eubcontracting groupa~ EDF -
(the prime conCractor for ehe work aiCe) wi11 entrust to them the aecondary
addiCional work (sanitary installaCions~ hangare). Potentially, this involves
_ 80~000 to 100~000 work hours. ~
The school (EMIN) will thua serve as a prop to the RACINES undertaking. Built
in record time~ it ia operational (the first trainees are expected at the end `
of March). Ite financing is provided by the apprenticeship tax, 1.1 percent
of ongoing training and the fund of the employment pact.
- The school's promotera hope to extend their activity beyond the atrict frume- ~
work of Chinon.. The achool could become a national training center that
would take in trainees from other nuclear plants.
.
The pro~ect ia an ambitioue one. BuC it includes the riak of promoting dis-
idence over what may one day become one of the key places for adapting to the
nuclear era. Guillot is aware of that. But he nonetheleae believea Chat one
- muat accept the odde. !
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "Valeurs actuelles"
' 8094
CSO: 3100
F
~
~
3
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
- FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~ _
COUNTRY SECTI01~ F'1tANCE
CHIRAC INTERVIEWED ON PLANS FOa ECONOMY
Paris PARIS MATCH in French 16 Mar 79 pp 44-47, 66
[Interview with Jacques Chirac~ former prime ministe]
(Textj The president was on his way to Mexico. The deputies of the RPR ~
(Rally for the Re~ublic] parliamentary group were at a working session in ,
Guadeloupe along with two Gaulliat ministere. Alain Peyrefitte and Joel Le ~
� Theule, when Jacquea Chirac had a cormnunique having the impact of a polit-
ical bomb ieaued by his aecretariat. Basing his argumenta o~n the gravity
of the economic aituation and the lack of inforoiation, he auggested that
"movements and partiea ~oin in demanding the co:lvocation of an extraordi~nary
- sesaion of the National Asaembly." The purpclse of Chat seesion: The creation
_ of two committeee on employment and public iaformation. The opposition has-
tened to agree to it but at the same tiaae announced its intenticn to file
censure motiona by the PSF [French Socialist Party] and the PCF (French ~
Communi~t Party] uF to now separate and with different c:ontents. Jacques
Chirac's initiative came at a time when opinion polls were exposing a rather
clear-cut drop in the popularity of the president of the Republic and of his
prime minister, and when concern over the maintaining of public order in the -
face of stri.ke violence was spreading to the unions themselves. But to the
president of thQ.Republic it seemed, in his own worda~ to be an episode of :
"a politico's politica." Before his decision to endeav~r to bring about an
extraordinary seseion of parliament~ Jacques Chirac in the newapaper LE MONDE,
dated Thureday~ 1 March, stated that he "disagreed in no uncertain terms" ~
with the government not only on Europe~ but also on economic and social policy.
- On thie Iatter point, which worriee the French so much, Jacquea Chirac agreed
to go further for PARIS MATCH in explaining his plan fc: economic recovery.
Our interview with Jacques Chirac is published on the following pagea.
Jacquea Chirac Explaina His Economic Recovery Plan to PARIS MATCH
[QuestionJ Some people think, and the prime minister said so Monday evening
on television.,that France w~as facing a"question of survival."
~
~F
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
~
FOFi OFFICIAL U5E O~YLY
~Answer] 1 am a Gaullist and as such I have nev~er envfeaged my country's
future in tern~ of survival, but rather in terms of will; "Indeed~ we ahould
find out~ ae General de Gau13.e used to say, whether ecame gxeat national dream
isn't e~eent3al to a people so ae to aupport 3ts actions and preserve its
cohesivenesa."
[Question] On several occasions you have emphasized that one oF the most -
serioua i11s ~.s the lack of lnfarmation. Now, tY~e min3sters are talking all
the time. za it their techniqt?e that is bad? What should they gay? `
[Anewer] 'I'here ia in fact a public information problem. Public opinion's
confusion eteme to a large extent from th~ eudden diacovery of a aerious r
economic and soc~al situation whereae official atakements were expreasing
nothing but serene and ateady optimiem. Thia optimiam apecifically allowed
hardly any room in the media for divergent assesamentP. I do not have the
habit of complaining but atill here ie aa example: Because the situation
has become worse, the critic~.awa which tne RPR and I myself have been mak~tng
for 2 yeara have auddenly been diacovered. In recent weeks I have neither
emphasized nor softened thoae criticiems; they have merely been illuatrated
by reaults which could have been foreaeen only too well. But most of the
French people were only vexy vaguely informed of them.
(Queation] Do you think, a8 some deputies of the Left do (Crepeau~ for ex-
ample),~~that hewing to the present pol~.cy is pushing France towa~td a"revo-
lution?
Savings Have Been Diverted
" [AnawerJ I thought that those deputies "of the Left" as you call them had
opted for revolutionary Marxiam. along with the ~oint program. They ahoula
re~oice over the opportunities offered for revolution. For my part. I will
confine myaelf to noting that thE failure of the government's policy is
giving ri$e to a dangerous aituation from every standpoint. I would not
, prophecy a revolution, but this situation doea worry me.
[Question) If, as you reiterate, the policy must be changed, people have
to be changed. Is that exactly what we are to understand?
[Answerj There has to be a policy change, yes. People changed, perhaps~ to
the extent that this ia necessary in order to alter policy. In aay case, I
do not think it is merely a matter for the leaders. A true economic policy,
such as I conceive of it, in a democracy requires the underatanding, adherence ~
and cooperation of the country as a whole.
[Question] You suggest giving a new impetue to investm~ents. T1wo questions:
If in the public sector, in what immediately productive activity and with
whar funds? If in the private aector, with what means of inducement.
J
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
FOR 0~'FTCIAL US~ ONLY
(Anewerj Even without resorting to some budgetary deficit, it is poaeible
firar to reduce administrakive wastefulnesa~ wh3ch is quite considerable,
then improducti~e expenditurea so as to develop productive 3nvestmenta that
are facCore in reducing unemployment. For example~ one hears that there are
too many beds in numeroua hoepitals~ that medical actions gre multiplied with-
out any good reason and even to the point of harming patients, that the French
are risking their health by taking too many remedies, that Social Secur3ty
at everyone's expense ie finencing an ab~eneeeism cosCing the economy the -
_ equivalent of a sizable pgrt of its petroleum bil1.
On Che oCher hand and in particular~ private inveatmenC representa a vast ~
- potential that has up to now been discouraged. The French l~ke to save. Now, r
everything goes on 8s though one caanLed to divert theae savings from productive
investmenta, and especially from industrial venCures. They have sought refuge
in real estate whoee costs they have caused to rise exceasively~ fn the owner-
ship of gold~ ~ewels, works of art, etc... They have also sought refuge in
' Switzerland or elsewhere. In a senae they we:rE not mistaken since any in-
veatment of this kind has proven as a general rule to be �ar more profitable
_ than purchasing shares in French enterprisea. If this disastrous courae
were reversed, we would have an enormous amount of capital for renewing our
production apparatus.
- [Questionj But according Co Barre any impetus ta th~ economy is necessarily
inflationary. -
Paralyzing Petty Annoyancea
(Answer] The economy's growth rate ia not related to the inflation rate. ~
Some countriea~ auch as Great Britain~ have experienced slight growth but
a heavy raCe of inflation. That ia France's aituation today. Other countries
have experi~nced a greater growth rate with reduced inflation. At the pre-
sent time, the problem is that of exporting enough and to have adequate pro-
duction in order to do so. It is not possible to improve the productivity
of French enterpriaea without a parallel promotion of investments and real
_ growth. So everytt~ing must be done in order, that France may have increased
growth. So inveatmente and the creation of enterpriaea must be encouraged.
[Questionj You said specifica~.ly--on the subject of the economyr--that a
atand contrary to that of the government must be taken. What does that mean?
[An,swer] I said that it would be "almost" enough to take a course thxt was
the opposite of the present orientation in order to get onto the right path.
I will try to explsin this more clearl~. Everyone is agreed in recognizing.
that the French economy must be trans~ormed~ be readapted~ so as to remain
competitive and to survive. On the baeis of that general established fact,
it ie evident that:
1. The governa~ent fias only very slightly looaened the yoke of the regulations
hampering enterprises.
6
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
2. Tt counts on the virtuee of comp~titiven8as to condemn il'1-adaptNd activ-
3ties.
it tH counting on t1~At eam~ compotitivonu~e to inepire enterpriae� epon-
~ taneously with a general etraCegy for our future. ~
~ One can in fact begin with ehose three points to establiah the neceseiCy of
freedom and planning. -
- Firat, the need for freedom. Queati~n any head of an enterpriae, whether
small, medium or large, and ask him if he feels he is rid of the obatacles~
formalities and paper work that are not ~uat uselesa but also poaitively -
damaging to economic efficiency. The conatruction industry recently,pointed
out--one example among 1,000--that these regulationa, formalitiea.and delays~
which are totally uselesa, add up to 10 to 1S percent of housing coata. Ask
- the artisans of our towne and of our countryside, as I have often done~ why
they do not hire an extra worker or two since work is available. They wi11
tell you that they want to avoid additional aocia.l inaurance and ffscal costs,
the petty annoyances of labor inepection and varioue othex kinds of diffi-
cultiea. .
If one adds that the framework :or credit atill continuea to exiet, I think
_ that on this point the cause has been determined. Official liberalism, to -
star.t with, has not even reatored any real freedom to enterprises.tu re-
ad~ ua t .
Second point. These atill paralyzed enterpriaea are told: Well, if you are
incapable of adapting yourselves--even to brutal competition from which the
Common Market does not protect you--you fall into the category we wittily
call the "lame ducks." You can just perish. Tt!e reault will be a more ~
heslthy economy.
Nonetheless, enterprises naturally endeavor not to periah. Their peraonnel
hang on desperately~ occupy work sites ir necessary, aecure the aupport of
public opinion, and the government itself often ends up being moved and
grante aome aupport which more or less amounts to emergency temporary as-
sistance. So improvemente are not achieved or else poorly or very slowly.
Finally, third point~ the positive strategy of transformation~ in~ovation and
development is not formulated either or in any event is only being done very
- slowly, �+ery incotapletely~ without the country's adherence or participation, `
hQnce w~thout any mobilizing effect and without any enthuaiasm.
, That is the way it is because no industrial group is sufficiently large to -
devise it on its own to the fullest extent and becauae in any event too many
factors depend on the state (orientation of public inveatments and on those -
of the national sector, taxation~ aid grants, credit, e~c.). Hente we are
going into the battle withost a battle plan. A great deal of luck would be
needed to win under thoae circ~stances.
_ 7
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
~
F'OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
jQuept3onj You wRnt to go back to planning~ Co a volunt'arist policy. To a
more energeCic nu~nnqem~nt of thc economy by the admin iAtration'e Cechnicians.
It is the oppoeite of the economista' prQSent tendencies. To which school
exactly do you belong?
[Anawer] But I do noC want "a more energetic management of the economy by the
adminstration'8 technicians." Not aC all. The plan I want is a political de-
ciaion which in a democracy ahould derive from the nation itself and from its
representativea. A deciaion which muat be established through concerted
planning by the economic and social officials who will also be involved in ~
its implementation.
= The paralyzing bureaucracy, which I have ~ust condemned, in recent years had
specifi~:ally fed on the abandoning of all democratic plannin~, on any plan
guiding our economy. So we have come to the point of having neither economic
freedom nor planning,whereas I am a partisan of both. I am not concerned over ~
knowing whether this thinking is in style among ec~nomists. Intellectual
styles disappear juat as othera dq. Profesaors who would go only by Keynes
repudiate him probably before rediscovering him. I leave their disputea to
the schools and do not claim kinahip with any of them. But we have tested
our theses in discussions with profeseors of political economy who are very
knowledgeable and they did not emerge from them weakened. On the contrary,
we have had the benefit of tehcnical assiatance whose value I would be un-
grateful not to mention.
[Que3tion] Some think that your program was quite largely 3napired by Debre's
- theses. Is that right?
[Answer] Let us understand each other. Sometimes I say "my criticiam,"
"my ideas," for conv~nience in talking. They are mine hut also to a very
lar~e extent it amounts to a~ollective doctrine. Innumerable people have
participated in working it out. In particular Michel Debre who with his own
eloquence and seneitivity has also often been the interpreter of what we were
_ all more or less thinking and he has often been among the first to denounce
the ills we are noting today.
_ [Question] Barre has ~ust denounced what he termed "false ideas" (by impli-
cation, those of the RPR). According to the prime minist�er (it was on the
occaeion of the 150th anniversary of the REWE AES DEU}C MONDES), the idea
according to which "the economy muet not be sacrificed for the currency" is ~
a mistaken idea. According ta him, of the countriea which have overcome
their economic difficulties, the best are the nations with a"good currency",
Federal Gerriany for example.
[Anawerj Geratany's situation is the opposite of what Barre claims. In
reality, Germany has a good currency because it has a good economy. The
proof of that ia that every time Germany has re~evaluated the mark it has
been obliged and forced to do so because of the "excessively good" results of
its economic policy. The prime minister is miataken when he considers that
8 ~
FOR OFF=CIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- by muintaining the franc at an artificially high level, the French economy wi11'
w ill be more healthy. It ie the reverse that is true. T� within the frame-
work of thH European moneCary eyatem France pe.gged the franc to the evolution
_ nf the mark, it would megn deflation~ unemployment and a~oreign trade deficit.
It is the German ecunomy which makea it poasible for the mark to be sCrong.
_ IC is not by aligning the franc on the mark that the French econonry will be
strong. If the French economy becomes modernized so as to be competitive,
and if consequently it invests acfficiently, it will in the end have a healthy
currency. In other words, a stringent monetary policy will not be sufficient
to resolve France's economic problems. Th~re must be a good economic policy
making a strong growth rate and full employment poasible; a good currency .
will emerge into the bargaia.
[Queation] According to the prime minister, another false idea is to say
that protectioniem guarantees employment. .
A Vitiated Game
[Anewer] To protect its employment France muat stop playing the vitiated
8ame of savage competitivenees. -
France is in a atate of legitimate economic defense in at least two situations:
1. In the industrial manpower sectors outvied by countries oitly slightly ~
developed where wages and social inaurance contributions are abnormally low.
- In this case, protective measures must be applied at the European level and
, these countriea would not have any reprisals to take against us for they en-
joy an exceptiAnal situation: Only the Europear. countries, among them France,
are playing rhe game of totally free trade.
2. Some developed countries are not playing the competitive game. These are
the United Statea and Japan. When the United States retains the mechanisms
for protecting its chemical industry, such as the "Am~rican Selling Price,"
it is the one committing agression against free international trade. If
France and ita European partners were to set up similar practices, i~` would
be a completely normal counterpart to the Ameriean protective mechar.i::m.
[Questionj You say "the atruggle agr~inet unemployment... would undergo cer-
tain bold tax reducticns. Can you be more explicit?
[Answer] Let ue talk of the current aituation. What ahould not be done is
seen clearly and~ in contraet, what muat be done.
Let us talk of the most usual, unproductive investment without any risks:
You become the owner of your home. The collectivity helps you with it by
deducting the interest on the loan, ~:ut let us skip over that advantage.
What is more significant is that your capital supplies you with what amounts
9
FG~ OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
_
- h'Ult (llrl~"1(,IAI, tttil; c1Nt,Y
ea revenue in the form of the rent you da n~t hgve en p~y. And thge thig _
rev~nu~~ r~pre~ented by the r~ntal value of yaur hou~in~~ ig not ~ubjact~d
tc~ Ch~ indiv3,dug1 incame t~x.
'If ingtddd df buying gn apnrtment you baught ~hare~, your inCnme would be
t~xed ~n the ba~i~ of the tgx on bu~ineeg profite; Ch~n~ b~ck 3n your hgnd~,
tn in~re~ging tgx~g in accord~nce with tihe w~11 known ~tep~. In ehort, in
_ the fir~t ca~p (otan~r of your hom~) the rev~nu~ from your cgpiCel ig noti taxed.
In the ~econd case (as a tenant bue a eharc?,oldpr)~ three-quarter~ of the ~
correspdnding revenue from the eame capit.~l ie chopped off. The pr~cCical
conclugion: You have no interest in~being e ghareholder. '
M~ny correcitve m~~gureg could be envisaged and ~ince t~x lgwg ~r~ rapidly
becoming very complicgted, t will not gn into detail. i h~v~ nev~rth~l~gg
propo~ed a very ~ifirie mea~ur~ which would be exCremely eff~ctive and which
would not ~ven greotly reduce the etgt~'s regource~: Putttng the proprietor
a~d the tcngnt of the above example on the same footing, reducing the taxeg
on both un~til they are equivalent to a moderate rQnt, and beyond that, tax
- them both eimilarly. In other words~ up to 1 and one-half million or 2 mil-
~ lion centimes a year, th~ revenue represented either by the rental value of
your hom~ if you own it, or by the dividends from your Aharea if you opt to
invesC your savings in induatry~ that revenue will be tax free in both caseg.
In addiCion to the economic advantage, it is obviously fair.
(QuestionJ You say in your LE MONDE interview that the ~overnment is a vic-
tim of its infaruation (from the Latin "faCuus," meaning foolish), you allude
to a qua~i monarchical state of the government~ the eour reply you get talks
of a"politico's policy." Don't these exchanges of dramatic retorts distress
the French who would prefer to see everyone united so as to get away from
the atorm?
[Answer~ You are correct in referrir,~g to a storm. Even eo we have only
talked here of the economic and aocial situation. of our internal difficul-
ties. But the increaeing dangers ehould also be apparent in the international
sphere. ~
As Co what you denounce as an "exchange of dramatic retorts" between poli-
ticians~ I call your attention to the responsibility incumbent upon you too,
upon you journalists and commentators. It is natural that you should aeek
co spiee up your accounts, hence to give a personal touch to the discussions
and perhaps make the Aialogue more dramatic than i[ actually is. Nonetheless,
you muat help the French to develop for themselves sertous views on problems
that are serious--and the qualifier "serious" is doubtless no longer strong
enough.
Whatever the etymology of the word infatuation may be~ it is nevertheless an
error to isolate oneself in self-satiafaction for it engenders blind optimism.
10 -
FOR OFFICIAL USE (1NLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
FOR O~~ICIAL US~ ONLY
I did not ~eek a polemical effect 3n tireleesly d8nouncing Chie error pub- `
licly with othere for 2 yeare becguse all of the ~rench ~ar8 3ntereeted in ie.
but also 3n numerous pr3vate communicatione eeeking a dramat3c.~ffect a11 the
1p~~ eince they have rema3ned known ~olely to those they w~r~ addree~ed to.~
Who ig dramaeizing by epe~king of eudden crit3ciem or again by etigmatizing
ag aggr~geion the request Co convoke parl3amenC? As though a m~eting of
pgrliemenC within rhe f ramework of ite constititutiong], ateributee and with
a vipw Co becoming more thoroughly informed congiete nf aggreeeion again~t
anyone at all. Ae though the begt contribution parl3ament could make to the
govprnmEnt coneisted in remaining on vacation.
Contradictorily~ I am aleo reproached for not backing a motion of censure
which would'cauee a political crieie whose ouCcome no one knowe. We have to -
be more serious.
, Let everyone ~oin together in facing the storm~ you eay. It would of courae
be deeirable, but what would auch a unlon be worth in an atmoephere of inertia
or of e falee maneuver.
Peoples do not hgve as their firet duty leaving everything up to their leadera
and allowing themselves to be led.
In a democracy at leaet the principal deciaione are up to them. r
The French muet ref~ect. put aside illuaione and ideologies~ ~udge for them-
selves and then apply their will.
Otherwise salvation will not come to them from the politicane, I regret to
say eo~ nor fro~a any individuale united or dieunited. The firet taek of
politiciene la to tell the truth, always, aven if it evokes unpleasant re-
actions and even too eoon: Eapecially in the face of the dengere vhich will
not wait forever for a national will to be created~ oae capable of etanding
up to them.
COPYRI(3~: 1979 par Cogedip~esse 3,A. ,
8094
CSO: 3100
].1.
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
s.
FOR OF~ICIAL US~ ONLY
COUNI'RY 9ECTION FItAANC~
PC~ CONGRESS PROPOSALS REFLECT CHANGES IN COMMUNIST IDEOLUGY �
Paris LE Ni~WEL OBSERVATEUR in French 19 Feb 79 p 33
(Article by Irene Allier: "The PCF: A Report on Deficiencie~"j ~ '
[Text~ Up to now Marx and Engels~ Lenin and Jaures had aufficed it. The
PC~ (~rench Co~uniet Party~ did not claim to descend from ~ large family
even if it boaeted of a euperior lineage. Now the 23rd congreea ie going
to change all that. All of a audden~ the PCF ie multiplying its grafta dn
its genealogical tree and !a putting ita roota down into a past to which
hitherto it took exception. Not only ie it claiming to be the heir of all
"popular etrugglea," "lay and democratic ideale" from the 1789 revolution
to the Paris Commune~ "the firat proletarian state in ehe world," but~ get
ready for e ahock, it is aleo "integrating~" if only "in a c:itical way,"
- "the Utopian and libertarian" themes, even anarchic trade unioniam and "the
aspirations of Ct~riatiana for ~uetice and solidarity." In ot4er worde, are
Robespierre and Cebet*~ Proudhon and Bakunin (Marx's eneadea), Varlin,**
and Pelloutier,*** Marc Sangnier and Georgeg Marchais, part of the etruggle?
Well, yee, if one ia to go by the preamble to the plan for reforming the
statutes which~ together With the other preparatory documents for this
_ congresg (of next 9 to 13 May)~ the PCF ia aubmitting for its 700,000 mem-
bera to diacuge. The ehift does not atop there: Not only ie the dictator- ~
ship of the proletariat totally dieappearing ae wae anticipated~ replaced
by a"peaceful, democratic~ ma~ority and plur~list" path to socialism~ but
the traditional reference to Marxiam-Leniniem is in turn b~ing Who.lly en-
gulfed. The idea of "scientific socialiem" ie being substituted for it,
*Etienne Cabet (1788-1336), aur.hor of "Voyage en Icarie," which strongly
endoraea a pacifist and utopian cou~uniam.
**Eugene Varin, a bookbinder, aecretary of the Firet InCernational. a hero
of the Paria Commiune~ ahot by those of Versailles.
***Fcrnand Pelloutier (1867-1901)~ s trade unioniat Who came around to li-
beratarian ideae. He contributed to a rapprochement betWeen the anarchical
and trade union movements.
1.2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
FOR O~F2CIAL USE ONLY
doubeleds reg~rd~d 8g more "open~" in th~t tihough Mgrx ~nd ~ngele wer~e itie
fnundar~~ th~ PCfi poinr~ out that 3C w~e devaloped not only by I.enin~ which
goe~ withoue sgying~ bue ~iso "by other l~ader~ end theoretician~ of ehe
l~bor movement." No det~3ls.
_ A Laughable SgtiefacCion
Other doctrinal rev3giong in th~ forefronts Adherence to materi~li~m ie nn
longer e required condition for admigeion to th~ PC~' (eo one may be good 3n
pr~ctice without conforming ideologically,which takes the wind out of Marx-
ism's seile) and finally "the expreseion of the divergences" w3th the social-
igt counCriee is officiatly includ~d in the PC~'s etaCute~s henceforth it
is gn integrel part of the supporr it provid~e the international communiet
movementl if one sdde to thet thaC ~elf-m~nagement ig making a~p~ctacular -
eppearance among thp etatutory ob~ectives, one will concede that eomething
eeemg to be going on in the PCF.
Unfnrtunetely, what ie going on in it atteste far more to a ai11 to take up
the Left'e whole political epace and the ongoing identity crisie of a party
that wante at one and the same time to be "avant-garde" end "of the maeee~~"
"revolutionary" end "governnmetal~" than favoring a real renewal~ a clear-
cut choice of atrategy and true democratizaCion. After the breakup of tha
Left, the eleceoral ~iefeat~ the PCF crisis ahich last epring Wae bringing
back into questic~n the tactic followed aad democratic centraliem~ one ex-
pected of the 23rd congreao concrete anewere and the epellieg out of po~it-
ical proepecte. They cames It was a refueai and politically an official
report on def!cieacies.
Concerning democratic centralism, the disaidents aill have only meager eat- -
iafaction. What about the ongoing public debate? Outeide times congreeaea
are held it will only be opened in the party'e tribunee at the diecretion
of the central c~mmittee. Are individual candidacies for the party~A leader-
ehip bodies authorized from no~? on? No doubt. But in the final analyeie~
it ia epecifically a leaderehip body--or the coagrees--ahich aill determine
their validity. A laughable satiefaction for those Who claimad to k~ more
about the way in ahich their leedera are electedt From naw on they will be
told by how many votee! Md it ie not becauee the party'e eecretariat--
whieh often paeeed for the PCF's real leadership--eeee ita role reduced to
"current mattere" (doubtera to the advantage of the political bureau) that
_ the PCF'e decieion-making procesa will become ar~re democratic or toora easy
to underetand.
- A~tually, harever. that Wae not the goal being eought. Md the proposed
political eolution that the PCF leadership will aubmit to the congresa re-
veals all too clearly ahy: Obviously there was no agreement at the aummit
either ae to the neture of the party vho~e development was deeired nor ae to
ite etrategy, nor ae to tha outlook for its futur4. For lack of a Byntheeis,
or evea of a compromise. everything ie going on ae though everyone's
~
FOR OPFICIAL OSE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
~0[t b~FICIAL USL ONLY �
~rgument~ hgd been 9trung together aC the riek of thereby revealing tihae th~
_ PCF, which no long~r knowe ~u~t whati iC ie doee not know ~ither what it wante
nnr where iC i~ going. The range of ite doctringl Col~rgnce i~ a poor cov~r -
for the ghrinking of ~lrs pro~pect~~ the cati~ful broadening of i.C~ vocabulgry
dnee noC conceal the vaguene~g of itg ob~ectiveg.
Shot Bolte
Two px~mplpe: Union of the Left and Che attitud~ wiCh reepect to the gocial-
= iet rountries. In the firet inatance, tt~c~y decl~re fir~t that they are loyal
to union of rh~ Left, gn "irrevocable choic~," b~cauge thexe ie no alternate
atr~tegy containing the hope of power and becau~e they haven't aaid they wet~e
renouncing power. But Chen they deny themnelvee th~ meane fnr union: They
ere rediecnvering--for the firat time in 10 ypare--that the very "nature of
the Socieliat Pgrty, and not ~aat the present atate of affairs, coneign~d it
to collaborating with the Right. Among the socieliet counCries, the same
~uxtaposition of contzadictory ingrediant~: They are not firing one ehot
"at the crimes of horror" of Stalinism. But eince the evolution of the ratio
of inCernational forces "is a m~eter card for France'e democratic road to
~ocialiem~" there is no queetion of breaking with the USSR. let alone making
a few thruete. The aocialiat countries' balance eheet, whatever "the di-
vergencea" may be~ will thua be positive from the over-all standpoint. The
' discuaeion previously envieeged by the PCF leaderehip itself~ on the occasion
of tha publication of the book "We and the USSR~i' as to the nature of the
~aecern European regimes. ie therefore cloaed.
In other words~ uneble to provide a alternate etrategy other than that of -
union of the Left (Which tihey do not want as long as the Left has not re-
_ covered ita balance to their ~dvantage)~ the communieta are shooting the
bolt~ as a precaution. Obviously~ and until the day they are able to make
reasonable calculatione as to themselvea~ they will have no other concern
than taking care of the patrimony and ettempting to have their capital in
militants and voters bear fruit by struggling. For that matter~ in the
finel enalyais, the political situetion is not ru~hing them. Without auf-
fering from it~may more than from the union ahich was gradually eroding
their ~ubatance they can take up rheir old table-thumping f~~nction and de-
vote themeelvea to the workere' intereete ee an oppoeition Without proapecte
~ but relexed.
The diasidente? They Will have the recourae of epeaking for a different
party and for another policy. But where? In the open trituaes of the
party's preae? That remaine to be seen. They aill try. SomeWhere elee.�
in any event. Plans for meetingB~ colloquies are in the air. This aeek~ a
book including 12 eddreesea made at the Vitry seminar aet up on 9 and
10 Decmeber 1978 by the PCP leaderehip~ ahich at that time Wae eeeking to
14
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
FOR O~pYCtAL U5~ ONLY
~ br3ng iCe intellectuels back inCo line, ie to ba publiehed by Mgepero. They
did ~or obey. But they have no 111ue1ons ae to their influence avar a parey
t~hich could not lieten ro them without ~uddenly rQSlizing that they are
% nperet3ng in a void. _
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "le Nouve,l Obeervateur"
8094
CSO: 3100
[
15
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
l
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
r~uk Ur'!~'1~tAL U~~ ONLY
,
COUIP~tY 3ECTION Fe~ANCE
pCF OPpONENTS SEEN BEGINNING TO ORGANIZE
Peris LE NOWEL OBSERVA'TEUR in French 26 Feb 79 p 33
(Editorial by Rernard Guetta: "PCp': The DiasidenCs.are Organizing")
[Text] Georgee Marchaie is apparently unworried. Haen't he ~ust carried
off a great euccees by winning over to PC ranks for ~khe European electiori
the recognized defender of the Languedociafl communista, E~anuel Maf�re-
Bau~~~~ the praeident of the Regional Department of Agriculture for Langue- -
doc-Rouaeil~on and a sworn opponent of Common Market expaneion? Let us _
be exact. The succeea ~ill reatore eome votes to the communist party as
long as the former preaident of the Federation of Table Wine Producera
_ does not pereonally take part in di~cuseions of the party's poliCical
options.
However, with the 23rd congresa tWO months away, dievention ie riei~g
again in the PCF ranka. In fact~ the intellectuale vfio revolved last
aprtng are organizing and planning regular meetingg. The best known
among thea?, historiaa Jean Elleiaetein, ia preparing to drop a bombshell
aith a cauetic film abouC Troteky'e leat atrugglea against riaing Staliu-
ie~r. It will be ehown on "Doseiars de 1'ecran" (Televiaion Documentgriesj
on 6 March (unless aftRr the etrilce).
Until now the dieeidenta Were aatisfied to either make their complainta
kn�wn in the bourgeole preee or to draa up futile petitione addresaed
to their pgrty. Thie Saturday, 24 February, they will take a further
etep. 'They are inviting their friends~ thoae who have already epoken,
and thoee who are etill ailent~ to compare in a room reserved for 100
people, their refl~ctions and criticisma of their party's positions on
foreign policy. Thia ie the agenda: the "poaitive overall balance aheet"
that PC attributes to the regimea in the East; and disaidence in the USSR,
Czechoslovakia~ and GDR~ with taro eample cases as illustration. The
firet ie that of Rudoph Bahrs~ E~at German Cammunist, out and out
Merxiat~ in pr~ieon for having advocated in his book "The Alternative"
the "true" communiem as opposed to "actual" comuunism. The aecond case
~6 ~
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
` FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
is ehat o~ Jaroelav Sabatg~ former director of the Cxech PC~ ei$ner of
"Charter 77," and arree~ed for hav3ng partic3pated 3n a meet3ng with
Po11eh KOR (Workere Defen~e Committeej diseidenta~ Nie eon, remember~ , ~
came laet Nov~nber to eollcit the aupport of a11 the~parri~e in favor of
his father. PCF refused to receive him. But rhere ar~ many other eub-
~ecte on the menu of the chgllenging intellect~als: Vietnam, Caa~bodia,
and the Chinese affair. This meane rhat within Che "fremework of work
_ and reflecCion" which they are trying to create, ther8 wi11 be a great
deal to do. There ehould aleo be regular meetings and at rhe close of
their first aes~nbly~ the intellectuals ehoula launch an appeal for those
who ehare their poaitiona to ~oin them.
H1sCoric Reality -
Diviaive ~fforCe? Tending away from the constitution? Doubtleea, PC wf11
accuse them of it. But for the challengere, this time, the hour of devo-
tion to party diacipline geems to have come. To be convinced, it suf- -
fices to read the laet eeries of articles published by Jean.Elleinstein `
in LE MONDE. -
Rarely even by a noncommuniet~ hae Gaorges Marchaie' pclicy been so
harahly attacked. The propoeed resolutions for the 23rd congrese?
"1~wo eteps backward" compared to the 22nd congreea. The "positive over-
all balance eheet" of the communiat countriee? "A completely falee pic-
ture of eoviet reality." The defeat of the Left? "The truth ie that PCF
leaderehip believed the 'common program' aae going to allo~w it to de~�elop
its influence; but~ contrary to ite predictione, it was the socialiat
party that profited from unioniet currente." The economic crieis? "We
muat have the caurage to tell the Workera the truth and to take the necea-
eary eteps to economic recovery." The relationa between PCF and USSR?
"PCF ie not dieentangled from the bonde of privilege With USSR." The .
auppreeeion of the Leniniet reference? "There ehould be an explanation
of what ie changing, why it ie being changed, and ~hat ie going to replace
it. Pinally~ the internal democracy? "Most of todey'e party rules are
inherited from the Stalin era."
Who can say it better? Elleinetein again, with the film he made with
Yves Ciampi for "Dieeiera de 1'ecran" based on his lsteat book "Stalin
and Trotaky." The work is fiction, but hietorical fact is ecrupulously
followed and the televiaion viewera, communiet or not~ are going to dis-
cover, thanke to PCF member and one of the most popular television pro-
grame~ that there aas a time when the claeh of id~ae was the r~le in the
bolshevik party, that the riee of monolithiam finallq rang the knell for
_ the hopee that had reated on the Russian revolution, and that from 1925
the original bolahevika eaw with horror the groWth of the poieoned fruits
of theii~ heroiem and idealiem. This debate on "Dosaiprs de 1'ecran" Will
- poseibly make more noiae than the debatea of the 23rd congreae.
COPYRIGHT: 1979 "le Nouvel Obeervateur"
9374 17 -
CSO: 3100
FOR OPFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
FOR OF~ICIAL U3L bNLY ~
= COUIVTAY SEGTION FRANCE
BARRE RE~L~~$ TO JOUttNALISTS' QU~STIONS
Par~.e L'EXPItE3S in Fr~nch 24 Feb 79~ pp 94-95 '
,~Text/ On Tuesday 20 February~ Raymond Barre was the guest
a~' honor at a breakfaet given by L'F,RPRESS at the ~
InCe=~continental Hotel in Parie. Addresaing 320 company
managere~ ~ournaliete, union leaders, writers, politiciane~
and palitical ecientista, the head of government for 2 hours
anewered queetione from the audience. We would like ko
present here the moet ealient pointa in his remarke.
Following this summary of the eseential topice of hie
economic policy by the premier, L'EXPRESS decided to open
a debate in ite columne on this policy. It ie often attacked
but thoee who attack it generally do not anewer thc: follow-
, ing two questione: 1. Ie there~ under current national and
international circumstances~ a poe~ibility f~r a policq tha~
would be baeically different from the one puraued by Raymond
Barre--and, if yes, what ie it? 2. If not, what mea~s do
we have, within the framework of the present policq, to re-
duce unemployment in ehort-range terms and in a laeting
manner? Raymond Aron will open the debate next week by
anewering the firet of theee tw~o queatione.
~ . Economic Policy
"I have no intention of either hardening or eoftening the economic policq
which ie now being carried out. The main outlines have been determined:
defend France's foreign trade balance and its currency; through the eupport
of all~ achieve moderation in wage increases; aupport economic activity;
finally~ take all measuree neces~ary in order to adapt the French economy -
to new worldwide conditione and do so with the aupport of everyone;.moreover,
do thia through a social po2icy and a regional policy aimed at reducing the
cost of changea and permitting a more haz~monioua distribution of activitiea
throughout national territory.
Joba
"This ie not an independent variable. 1'his is an economic and social !
variable which.depends a lot on other factors. In other words, it depends
- on the atrength of the enterprieee which in turn dependa on the capacity of ~
the enterprises to pay wages, to produce, to aell. and to make profita so
as to be able to inveat. If not, what are we going to do? iJe create
artificial ~obe. In order~ in the future~ to have a satiefr,ctory ~ob
situation, to have sound ~obs and laeting jobs, we muet first cf a11
reatore the economq; we muet then make eure that our industrq will be
adapted to the modern conditi~ne of the world and that it Will be
competitive.
18
POR OFFICIAL USE ONLY .
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
. NOR OF~'YCIAL U5E ONLY
Monetary and Agricultural Europe .
, "The bae~.e of eCability ie a convergene effore by varioua countriea in-
volved in order to maeter the divergencee of evolution gnd especially to
make evolutione lese dieparatia in tex~m~ of price. But we need one reetric-
t~.on here and moneCary conetraint is such a reetriction wb.ich we cannot
do withoUt. We muet not fall into tha trap of deification of money~ but w~-
mueC admit that it ie nacaesary nut to consider money g~ a~sre means, as
a pure 3hstrumeat ahich oae can manipulate.
"When we accepted the Induetrial Comoan Market, we opened our markete to ~
German it~duetry which wae more powerful than ours. Our French induetrq
benefited from compeeition but ae paid the bill from that viewpoint. Since
we have an agriculture which is in the midst of tranaformat~on, common
agricultwral policq wa~ ona form of eharing the burden. `rith3n the Commuaity,
betwa~n Germanq and Franca. ~od~q we come back to moneCarq ~tability and we~.
for our part~ support.a little bit of the burden reetiug on the mark eiace
~the upward praeauree, baing eaarted upon the mark~ will be spread out over
a larger number of currenciea~ including the French currencq. We accept it
because it ie in our intareet and in that of the Ceamunity; but we ask ~
Germany to take into acco~mt~the fact that the e:ietance of compensatory
amo�mte ie an axcaeeive advantaga--~not to eay aa improper advantage--which
German farmar~ are benefiting from.
Aid for Investmeate in Crisie Regione
"Regarding the establiahment of these enterprioes~ are taill ~ee to it that
theee will be enterprieee that parmit us to hope for laating employmeat. We
do not want artificial operationa. Wn do not aant a eprinkling of loans,
making it poaeible to create Activities~ for 3 or 4 yeare ~hich then euddenly
fail. We Waat the industrial fabric of North, of Lorraine~ of the areas
along the Loire or the region of Marseille-La Ciotat to be able to have
busineasee vieh a future.
InvesCmeats in Praace
"We muet aek oureelvee Whether the conditions for realietic investment~ for
effective inveetment have reallq beea ~t. It wae hardlq conceivable, over
the paet 2 yeare~ that inveatmenta in France could be particularly livelq.
We had to begin by reatoring a general econonic eituation and a particular
economic eituatioa involving the enterprieee so that invettmenta could
develop on a solid fouadatioa. W'hat good art all the inceativea ~te provide
for inveetmente if thoee inveetmente are artificial? That may look good but
the end result often is ehe importing of capital goods~ and inability of our
_ domestic indw~rq to respond to the incentivas givan and, fiaally, a very
modest improvement in the eituation compared to the considerable reaources
committed. I am convinced that the enterprise8 that `rere $ble to do eo did
inveet in France aad abroad. I believe that their investoents ~e~ere, to a
great extent~ rationalization and productivity inveatmemts. And they ~rere
19 .
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
~OR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
~ ' perfectly correct--because ir is their future whici~ tihey ~are safeguard~ng.
A~zd~ along with their future~ they are algo protecting ths future of ~obe
in the branchee ~.n question. We may hope that~ once the finencial eituation
of the enterprieea hae been restored, once the rational3zation of the activ-
~.ty o� the~e enteYprises hae been aseured, the time will be ripe for a
resumption of ma~or investmente and~ consequently, a reaumption of the up-
ewing.
Enterpriee Competitiveneee ~
"t do not believe that everything Cha~ has been said about the low level oF
comp~+.titiveness of French industry is true. There are branchee which are
in bad ehape on that ecore bur there is a ma~or portion of French induatry,
at least EOX.in my opinion, which ia capable of coping with intgrnational
, competition. How can it handle that? Firet of all, by gaining control of
production coete. We find that~ in countries euch as Switzerland or Germany,
production coet control can be achieved all the more easily if one hae a
- etrong currency with which to pay for indiepeneable imports of energy and
raw materiale. The governmenC, for ita part, hae launched a policy which
wt~l be further stepped up and which involvee the development of innovatio~t
and technology. Pinally, the entsrprieea must make a ma~or effort in order
to find and improve their placee on the big export markets and they muet
- pureue an effecCive coffiaercial and induatrial inveetment policy abroad.
International Competition
"We muat safeguard competition within an overall concept: the ordarly
growth of trade. Right now, there is competition between developed ~
countries but there is aleo competition coming from a certain number of
developing countries. Md the category of developing countries muat be
differentiated. I believe that it would be ecandaloue to close the market
to countriea which are beginning to become industrialized and I similarly
believe that there are countries which have already achieved their economic
takeoff, which are already induetrialized, and which benefit from advantagea
which Chey no longer need. Besides, we cannot--even in dealing with
developing cowntries that deserve our aid--accept ~ust any kind of product
influx.
"It is true that the government's policy has been pictured as a polizy of
abandoning the country to the multinational, Eurocratic forcee which
threaten the country's activity. If we begin by putting our o~n affairs
in order and by properly managing the enterprisee, many of these negative
aspe:te would disappear."
COPYRIGHT: 1979, S.A. Groupe Express
5058
CS0:3100
20
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
COUNrRY BECTION PRANCE
DETAILS f~F PCF INTERNAY. bISPUTE PROVIDED
Parie L'EXPR~SS ie French 24 ~'eb 79~ pp 92-93
llnterview with Alain T@te end Michel Barak by Jacquea Roure and Jean-
Louia Eyaeartel: "Challenge resumed in Connauniet Party: 'Gap Between
Leaderehip'e Worde and Deede . .
LTexe/ Just 2-1/2 monthe away from the 23rd Congress~
the challenge within the Communiet Party ia resuming its
gpring-time vigor. On Tuesday, 20 F'ebruary, one week after
ti~~ publication of Che preparatory texts in L'HUMANITE, Jean -
E1leinetein, in LE MONDE, launched a egvere criticiam of the
policy conducted for the paeC 10 yeare by the party's leader-
~ ehip. Never before had a member of the PC %Communiat PartY/
gone as far~ especially in hurling a pereonal challenge at
Georgee Marchaie. Why all thie haste aince~ officially, a
diecuseion forum ie to be etarted on 1 March in L'HUMANITE?
Becauee the dieputants are convinced that thn PC leadership
wae quiCe determined to prevent the moet virulent onea among
them to exprees themeelves. And that applies eepecially to
Jean Elleinetein, the beet-knawn among them. "It would even
be better~" he eays~ "abruptly to bring about a faceoff
rather than to allow the debate to wind down into banalitiea."
Thie deeire to bear witneee i8 ahared by a ma~ority of the
challengere. They know that the epace reserved to them in -
_ the L'HUMANITE forum will be meaeured in half-linea. "This
is going to be a ronp, a lark." commented a Communiat jour-
naliet who was peraonally affected by the partq's press be-
ing brought to heel. The challengere thus decided to go
public in prder to make their contribution to the Congresa--
with Seuil ~ublishere/~ under the management of Antoine 5pire,
a aupporter of Elleinetein~ the former managing editor of the -
PC'e Editione eocialee ~ubliehere/; With Maspero, where Gerard
Molina and Yves Vargae, dieciples
of Althuaeer, have ~ust
recently put out a collection with a first group of militant
witneee etatemente: "Watch out, one party can hide another."
The new weekly publication MAINTENANT, likewiae inspired by
Elleinstein and representatives of other left-wing tendencies,
will be a vehicle for challenge as of 12 March. Michel Barak~
a militant in the Jacques-Duclos cell in Aix-en-Provence, '
wae one of the pioneera of diesidence. He was the eparkplug
behind the "Appeal of the 300~" which later on became the
appeal of the 1,500 and, on 29 May, in L'El~RESS, he re-
plied to charges of "fractioniem" made against him by the
party in mid-January, he analqzea the documenta of the
23rd Congress for L'E7~RESS.
21
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
~
. FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
- Queation: What ie your ~udgment of the preparatory texts for the 23rd
CommuniaC Perty Congrees?
Michel Barak: I find them misleading. Here ia the first decep~ion: I find
no self-criticiam there, no aerious analysia as to the underlying reasona for
the failure of the Union of the Left in March 191A. The only one blamed b~
the PC leaderehip is the PS %Socialiet Party7. It is true ehat our partner
has reeponeibilities but these are not exclueive. The prospecta for union
which the party recommended--without apparently putting much stock 3n them--
firet of all are not credible anyway. How can on~ then put together an
alliance with "Social Democz~.ts" who are likened to "reactionary forces?" -
, After getting too much unity at the.top, wiChout worrying about the grass-
r~~ta, the party's leaderahip ewung around the o~her way; it now wanCe unity
. at the base without having anything to do with the top., I do not believe -
that this is the beet way to give the country a political perspective.
Eapecially eo since we did not properly reapond Co the following iesue:
becauee the PC wae not strong enough to mainta3,a unity, we could not get
anywhere with the rest of the effort either. Now, the party leaderahip re- _
- fuaes to go into this debate.
The second dieappointment involves the generally poaitive ~udgment about the
socialist countries. Thie bringe us to the very limit of the acceptable. ~
Talking about the e~uperiority of the soviet "new aysteaq" when everybody
knows only toa well whst goea on in the USSR or in Cssechlosovakia--
well, that ie ~ot serious talk. Regarding the kind of socialism c~e want,
that socialism over there ia absolutely repulaive. It is shocking to
realize that the Central Committee adopted thia position unanimously.
Alain T~tet I would go even further than Michel. I believe tha~ this text
reveals a hardening on the part of the leaderehip. It abandons the freedom
af tonz which it had diaplayed to-~aard the USSR. How could one propoae, for
France, a aocialism that defende libertiea and, at the same time, how could
one aeaert that the Soviet ayatem is "generally poaitive?" The attacke on
liberties in the USSR are mentioned as simple accidenta. This bad faith is
entirely ineupportable.
M. Barak: Eapecial~y so eince our party's Staliniat practices experienced
a stupefying reeurgence laet apring during the canpaign unleashed againat
the diseidente--and our pgrty ce.rtainly was not affected to the 8ame degree
as the communiet partiea that are in power.
Question: Were you satisfied with the text regarding democra~y within the
party? _
M. Barak: We will aee how thie worka out in practice. But the amendments
seemed very limited to me. Here are two examples: the texts say that,
henceforth, we can have more candidatee than poaitions for which people can
run in the elections to the party's leaderahip bodies. And, after a secret
vote, the reault would be released to the delegates. These are measures
.
22
~ FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
I
_ FOR OFF'LCIAL USE ONLY
of elemen~ary democracy which will make all democrata emile. Nevertheless, -
this is eome progre~s; Last autumA,.GasCon Pliseonnier, without emiling,
explained that the high point of democracy reaided precisely 3n the fact
_ that there ehould be no more candidatea thsn we have offices to run for.
And X remember that, at Aix-en-Prov~nce, during a"towr meeting," aboue a
- yea~ and a half ago, they refueed to announce Che resulta of th~ vot~tng
after one hour of diacuseion.
But, basically, nothing hae changed. lnternal democracy is etill hobbled;
leC me talk now abouC the cooptation of the le~dera. Of course, this pro-
cedure does not ahow up anywhere in the charter but it remaina a reality
in the eystem. The ~ongresa obviously votea by aecret ballot. But it only
reveals the decisions worked out at the top. Thi.a is a kind of democratic
tinkering with a procedure Chat ie not democratic at all. When, in the
course of what Congres~, did the rank and file ever propoae any candidates?
- Never, never. To be really democratic, you do not ~uat write the word
"democratic" in every line of every apeech. I am a~Mar~tfat. I do not be- -
lieve in the Cou~ method.
Queation: Georges Marchais asserte that his party, in certain areas, is
experiencing t0some delaye."
M. Barak: ~Yes, he is talking about the delay brought about in 1956 by
Maurice Thorez but he never tries to analqze this 8ort of thing. Now, eince
1952, how many party leaders and militaata have been slandered before being
kicked out or barred after full-fledged trials? And did not the party
leaderehip promise Charlea Tillon that theae trials would be reviewed before
March 1978? That wae nnt done: Why? It would aeem.to be high time to aee
that ~uatice is done to him without waiting any longer. I say that, so long
as this ia not dane, the French road of socialiam to liberty will not be
credible.
Queation: But that m~ves us further away from the 23rd Congress.
M. Barak: On the contrary. It ia our l.eaders who, today, invoke "reason
of atate" in order to etop any diecuseion. And they commit the party upon
roade that take ua far afield from Marxi~m. When I read all thoae nationalist
referencea ia the preparatory texts of the Congress, I fear that thia will
only reawaken in public opinion a~ingoist apirit, in other words,
chauviniem. I know that Euroge ia dominated by the trusts and that social
democracy loyally maaages capitaliem. But the thing that worries me is our
convergencea with the authoritarian right, represented by the RER /Rally "
for the Republic/. It would be better tp have constructive diacuasions
with our Italian and Sganish comrades who include the European factor in
their strategy while being fully familiar with the dangera springing frow
that Europe.
Question: Does not the aeverity of your criticism constitute a direct
challerge to the party leadership?
23
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
FOIt bFFICIAL USE ONLY
M. 13~rgk: L'~XP1tE55 ~~k~d me th~C qu~stion la~e M~y. And I r~plied:
"prnb~bly." Thgti cgueed much ink to fl~w. Afeer thinking gbnut it d~~ply,
I regree nothing. Md i find tihat Che,re ie alway~ a wid~ ggp between th~
worde and the deede of our lsedere. Juut look ~C what ig h~pp~ning in the
pgrty'e publiehing houses and book ~tor~e. Thp 1a~yoffe were decided
aeeording to practicea worthy of big bueine~s, withoue gny coordinat~on and
~gainsC th~ adv~~~ of the CGT %Generel ConfederaC34n of T.~bor~ uniong ~ti ehnee
enterprises. Labor union libert3ee are not even r~~pected by th~ 1e~dere of
a p~rey that pr~achee eelf-managemenC. And it ie the pereonnel who euffere
the coneequencee of management mietak~~ by off3cial~ who ke~p holding on tn
their ~obe. I declar~ that thi~ confrottts me w3th a problem of confidenc~e~
A. T~te: I do not think that chaaging the men at the hegd of the party
would bring about any ma~or modifications. The higher you get in the
h~erarchy, the more r3goroue is cooptation. The CenCrgl Committee constitut~~
an extraotidinary breeding ground for of�iciale who know how eo t~ke the place
of one person or another withouC party policy being changed one iota.
Queation: What remaine of the critique movement which you launched in the
epring with the Appeal of the 300?
M. Barak: I am going Co give you my opinion~ which meana that I am only
apeaking for n;y~elf, because I am only a epokesman or a leader of a ft,3ction~
~ust ae I was last April and Mey. I believe thaC the appeal brought doWn a
number of taboog. Hereafter~ the communists will expresa th~selvea freely--
something which we are now doing in ralking to you. Not to attack their
party but becauee the affaira of the PC concern all Frenctmen. This ie a
new~ irrevereible fact of tife. �
A. T~te: I am more peeeimiatic. I believe that the leadership has mangg~d
to ieolate the challenge movement. Thie ie expressed today by a tremendous
diacouragement among the militante and not only among tho8e Who, like ~re,
c~ne out with a challenge in the spring. Some people remain in the party
although their epirit ie dead. Many are waiting for the Congreee before
they make their decisione. Othere have already left it.
Queetian: Like you.
A. T~te: Yee, in mid-January. I no longer had any hope. Reading the
preparatory texta proved to me that I Was right.
Queseion: Michel Barak~ your criticieme leave little room for hope. Nhy
, did you etick with the party?
M. Barak: Uadoubtedly becaueE I atill feel that I am a co~nmist~ com-
pletely. .
~ COPYRIGHT: 1979~ S.A. Groupe Expresa
5058
1 CS0:3100
1 24
POR OPFICIAT. USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
_ I
FO~t OFFICYAL U38 ONLY
COt1NTRY 8~C1'ION
FRANC~
BRIg1~8
PCF DEPUTY 9fiCRETARY-aENBRAI,--The pCg plenr to appoiat, aC ite upcoming
congrere~ a deputy ~e~retaryganeral of tfie party. Cheriee Fieerm~n is
reportedly moet likel,y Lo be choeen. (~~xt] [Parie PARI3 MATCEI in i~r~nch
23 Mar 79 p 55]
C30: 3100
25
FOR OFPICIAL U5E ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
~OR OFFIC2At, U9~ ONLY
COt1`MMtY S~CT~ON i'~ALY
ARM~b ~ORCES P1tOM0'TIONAL LAW3 ~XAMIN~U
Mi1~n iL MANDO in Italian 23 ~eb ~9 pp 2~-29
tT~x~j Billions in ~$ivoeg--~rmy~ n~vy and air forep
~re ~p~~dic?g 7 tri111on ~ir~ to buy nea apapnn~. {i'hat
ar~ th~y buying? tiho decides on the purch~~e~? And
e~pecially, wi11 thay h~lp tv defend the co~nt~y b~tter?
rh~ political ecen~ ha~ gtnnk for ye~r~, end ita lat~At eructatione afflict
alen th~ crisi~ of governmen~ in progrees. Yet th~ Lockhe~d scandal con~
c~rn~ only the purcha~e of 15 Herculpg C-130's--that is, a minimal pgrt of
Italian armament. NoW e~any other Lockhaed caeee ar~ hidd~n in th~ huge
defenae purchaees? Md even trithout 8uspecting corruptioe and bad faith,
vho decidas, and on the bagig of vhat crit~ria, ~?hethar italian defanse
- neede more miseileg or cannone~ and vhat mir~il~~ and vh$t c~~nnona?
According ta Palco Accama, aho ie responsibl~ for defeng~ prnbl~me #or the
Sacig~~Ae Party, severel of the decieiona taken !n recent yeare to incr~a~e
thp poaer of the Italian armed forces are, in this re8pect. dieputable and
disturbing: "Equipping oureelvee vith Tornado-Mrca airplaaee. irith a large `
number of Leopard tanks, aith the thraugh-deck cruiser or e helicopter-
earrier, revealA the admitted ambition to make italy a gmall military pc~wr
with offeneive capacity la che Hediterranean ~rea." Nho haa takea these
decisione? "t have littlt faith in parliaa~ent'8 capacity for control in the
defQnge eector," Accsme sayr furthar, "because the politiciang are afraid
to concern themselveo with these problema. Thus the military do as they
like~ buy vhat they want, vithout thare baiag any caordination among thp
tfiree anaod fercee: army~ n~vy and a~r force.
It is c~rtainly t+rue that politicgl intar~st ia the problems of eecurity in
Italy ie acarce. From the parliamdntary records it ~ergas that almoat none
of che d~putiee a~!d �enators vho are on the defense coamittee--except for a
fea axceptions~ su^h ae the socialiat Accame, foroerly a high navy official~
or the left-wing inde;:znd~nt Nino Pasti, a former general--takes much
interest in analysio of the strategic choicee which ere a pre8upposition
for purchasaa of waapons. Yet ~ust to maintain its armed forcee. Italy Ktll
26
POR OFP2CIAL USB ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
~~lt O~~tCtAL US1~ ONLY
~pend 5,119.15 biilian lira in 19~~ (~?tl6 p~~r~~nt o~ eh~ f~d~~~i budg~e, mnre
th~n 14 biilidn p~r d~y). And theg~ ~ra ~xp~nditur~~ iimie~d t~ c~nv~neion~~
w~~pdnry, b~~~u~~ It~1y dd~~ nne have ~n ~utunomou~ nuci~gr gt~~~ngl, ~v~n
thou~h nu~ie8~ w~Apon~ ~re ,n~e~il~d in Ir~1y. C3e+~ ~eceian ~ntiel~d "Wi.th
th~ Trigger in W~~hington"j.
ig thi~ n gm~li gm~unt, m~~nt~in~d by Mini~t~r nf D~afpn~~ Attili~ ttuffi~i,
who, ~p~~king in eh~ ~h$mb~r in the ~I@b~Cl on th~ budg~t for hig mini~ery,
d~~Crib~d the drafe bud~~t f~r 1979 one for "m~r~ ~urviv~i7" nr i~ ehe
pDt)~ Cp~d~~~~ri~n Uniey P~rty) dpputy ~1i~en Mil~ni righe wh~n h~ ~~yi~ th~t
th~ dpf~ar~~ budg~t--c~l~ul~t~d an th~ b~gi~ ~f t~~ ~rd~~ n~~io~~~ ~raduet
~nd nnt on th~ h~~i,~ of th~ federg~ budget--ia, rgeh~r, incr~~~ing ~v~ry
y~ar, in ~ompliance ai~h the aiaheg of NA'~0~ ahi~h in 1g77 agkpd ~t~ partner~
co incr~~e~ th~ir def~nee ~xpsndi~ur~a by ~ perc~nt each y~~r? Or, ind~~d,
i~ th~ uriter Carlo Caa~olg right wh~n h~ gays that it i~ not nacee~~ry t~
gpend ~v~n on~ i~ra for we~pone, in view of th~ fact th~t in e~~~ df aar,
ftaly aould hev~ a r~ducpd aarmaking cepacity enyrvay?
With~ue d~ubt~ ie emerge~ from ~am~ data r.hat the ~tat~ nE hp~lth nf th~
It~li~n grmed forcea i~ not of the be~t. On~ ~xempl~ out nf many p~~~ible
on~g: th~ ihvel of tr~ining of thp troopg. in his 12 menths of draEt
~~tw ic~, e eoldiQr manage~ to fire only 120 ~ciflp rnun~ae, if hp b~langa
, to a combat unit. Oth~ruis~, nniy 48. N,~ itali~n cannon fires on,y
25 tr~ining ehotg in a year, ae ag~inet che 90 firpd by a French or Weet
G~rman cannon, 120 by an Englioh cgnnon, or 112 by ~~delgian on~. Finally--
~ti11 in annual terme--a tank fir~a 36 training roundg in Italy, as againat
95 in France, 110 in West GQtmany~ 114 in ~ngland ~nd 60 in Belgium. In
order for soldiers, cannons and tanks to ehoot, in ord~r for planeg to fly
and ghip~ to ~Ail--for military training, in a~?ord--131 billion 1ire, equ~l
to 2.5b p~rcent of the military budg~t, ~ri11 be apent in it~ly in 1979. A
figur~ ahich the experte conefder very low--certainly far beloa vh~t other
countries ~pend: "Ara~ed forcee which d~ not train," Defenae Minister Rufftni
acknouledged in parliament, "do not have e reason for being end canetitut~ -
only A MA8[@ of re~ources." Add to thie the eggravation that keeping soldiers
ineuffici~ntly occupipd ie aleo coneideced one of ttw cauee~ of the epread
c: dr~g dLuee: 258 caseA verified in 19~7 ae aga~nst 69 in 1973.
7e g~t c~ut of thie situation, to moderntze thp armed forceg and mak~ thpm
more eEficienc ia 1979, the Italien parliament has decided to l~unch a multi-
year plan vith a tocal exp~nditure~ at 1978 priceB, oP more than 7 trillion
lire earmarked for purchaeea of nev ~apons: neW a~rplanee~ new ahipe, new
tank~, nea cannone and nex helicoptera.
NdW Will thie money b~ epent? Will it really help? To ansver Chese ques-
Cion~~ IL M0:1D0 weac co [he Inatitute of International Affsir~ (I1?:,1~ the
only independent research center which folloaa in depth the prablems of
defense in Italy. Chairad 6y Altiero Spinelli, who for yeare was a commis-
gioner in the EEC and ~+ho ia nou an independent left-aing deputy, and
directed by Ceaare Kerlini, one of the Italigns on the Trilateral Commiesion~
27
POR OPFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
FOR 01~FIC~At, U~~ ONLY
~
eh~ IAI ~nil~b~r~e~~ ~in~~1y with th~ In~efeuee ~f ~tr~e~~iG ~eudt~~ in ~
L~nd~c~~ ~nd ie i~ thi~ It~11~n corr~~pond~n~ of 3IPRi, ~n intarnaei~fl~l ingti-
eu~~ ih Sea~khnim whieh 1g th~ aarid'~ md~t ~uth~riteeiv~ voi~~ nn ~t~
pr~bi~m~ of W~apong c~neroi. Thi,~ ie ehe iA~ anaiy~is.
Miiit~ry Spending
Th~ ~~eim~e~i nppropri~tion~ ~e~ign~ad to the Mini~t~ry of D~f~nae in 197s e~e~i
4,314 biiiion 1ir~, as ag~in~t 3,531 billion ~n 197~, fdr ~n increg~~ of
Z2.2 p~raant, con,~ider~bly high~r eh~n the rat~ of infi~tioe. ~accluding
th~ @xp~andl~ure~ for pubitc e~fety (carabit~i~ri) gnd oth~r minor ~xpen~~~,
the ~ppropriae~on~ eff~ctiv~ly ~p~nt for naE~on~l d~f~n~e cnn b~ congl,der~dt
~,920 billion in 197~ and 3,S78 biilion in 1978, for an iacr~a~~ of
22.5 perc~nt.
Nithin thee~ figur~r, the most maa~iv~ incre~e~~ ~r~ uncl~r th8 h~adin~ of
pureh~ge of good~ and ~~rvice~, ahich ~nt froei 1,678 bii~ion ~ire in 1977
to 2,1~4 billion in the folloaing y~gr; tha p~rcentage diff~~r~nc~ i~
29.5 p~re~nt~ if th~e~ data ar~ further en~ly~ed to d~fin~ ehe fin~nci~l
l~~d for purehgg~ of ~epone~ the re~ulta ar~ as foiloW~s 999 billion in
1977 and 1,347 billion itt 1978--an increase of 34.8 perc~nc. Thie rel~te~
, to the fact that in 1978 c8me the first sub~t~ntiai appropri~tinne connected
aith the three promotional laa~ for modernizatioa of th~ armed forces.
Hith ~h~ approval~ in rha firet half of 1977, of tha promotionul laa~ for
the ~ir force and the army, tha legielativ8 framewark which r~ill r~agulate
the expendituree for modernisation of thg araed forcao until 1986 vae com-
pieted. In contrast wi~h tha navy laW, vhich estebl~eh~~ the amaunte of
expenditure yQar by yaer, tha two na~? lave ar~a flexible: aft~ar an initial
e~ount of 35 billion for 1977, annual appropriacions of 100 billion for
the nir force end 120 billio~ for the are~y are planaad in th~ period
1978-1986; tt~ ee appropristions may be increaeed in relation to the atate
of fulfilLnent of the programe~ aventual coet increaeea due to inflationary _
effecte, and increaeee for raa roaeeriale and the coet of labor.
The ~ffects of this legislated flexibility hav~ already been felt: nn the
basis of the estimated budgete~ the air force expendituree cinanced by the
promocioaal law should be 168 billion and 293 billion (ingtead of 100 bil-
lion) in 19~8 and 1979; for 1979, the expenditures for the atmy a~f the
navy ahould riee~ reapectiv~ly~ to 200 billion and 295 billion (from the
initial baee of 120 and 1SS billion). At 1978 prices~ the totgl load for -
- the three lavs together (initi~lly, ~,070 billion) has already arrived at
5,450 billion ~ec 7,000 billion if, as ia very probable, the navy laa
is rQEinanced).
In fact, all thie posee e eerioua problem of political conerol. The mddern-
izacion laae~ ae coacrived~ guaranteed the integral fulfillment of the pro-
gcams eatabli~hed~ indepaadently of the coete. This appears ecceptable if
28
FOR OPFICIAL USB ONL1'
_ .
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
FOR O~~ICIAL t1S~ dNLY
gdv~rnm~ttt ~nd p~t~ii~mene t~k~ ~ dir~~e p~re in eh~ prc~gre~~iv~ ~~~rrying-dut
~f eh~ progr~m~ npprov~d and ~r~ in ~ pngieion td h~v~ ~ m~~ar vdic~ in Ch~
- b~~l.s d~~iginn~. On th~a deh~r hand, whi1~ Che "milie~ry-indu~trial"
gpp~~`~Cug h~~ b~an ser~ngth~ning ~nd nr~ani~ing it~plf in r~c~nt ye~r~~ rh~
in~trun?~nt~, eapacity and will for control by th~ pnlitiegl p~aer ~pp~~r
tn~ufff~i~ne; p~rgddxicnlly, ~hi~ i~ due ~1go to ~reh~i~ r~~idu~l f~gtur~~
~f th~ militar~? ~truCture, ~nd in p~rtiCUigr, to eh~ inW er~ngpgr~ncy of ~
frgm~aro rk tredition~lly divlded by ~~ncorg, ~ fr~n~aork in ahich ie i~
difEieuit to bring tog~th~r ~l~mentg of unitary m~n~gemene ~nd int~rbr~nCh
vigian.
Armyt The progr~m~ cov~r~d by th~ prom~tinnal 1~w for~a~~t g eot~l nuel~y
of 1,9~5 billion lirP. tn th~ eector of "whe~lpd, erg~k~d and grmor~d
tran~port, combat and auxiliary equipmpnt," Ch~ prngram~ fingnced ~y thp
lau ~r~ ehe fo118uing: (1) purchaee of 120 Leopard t~nk~; (2) purch~~~ of
~uxili~ry e~nk~ wieh th~ ~~me body ~g the Leopard (68 r~~i~f t~ntc~,
64 bridge-1~yere and 29 ~appar~); (3) purcha~e of 300 armdred trdop '
tr~n~porC v~hicleg of the Vvc-1 typ~; (4) purchage of ~,g00 2-tdn truCkg;
(5) dev~lopment of th~ Vcc-80~ g neW track~d ~nd armor~d transport and
combat vehicle; (6) p~rchaee of deviceg for night vi~ion and firing. All
thie equipment W111 be deliverad in the p~riod betW~en 1979 and 1984.
A~ r~garde "artillery, artillery support, munitione and equipment," the la~
Will permit purchaae of 164 155-mm ~oved cannon8 oi the Fh-70 type, ~ointly
m~n~f~ctured by Hest Germany, Great Britain and Italy. The cannon~ Wi11
have a rnng~ of about 24 kilometere, greater then that of the pre~ent
grtillery of the eame calib~r. Thia also involvee replacesnent of the
battlefield acquieition~ target and surveillance radare; 30 Will be
purchased.
~or brilding up antiaircraPt defenae, ahich for yeare has been conaidered g
priority need, 40 mobile mieaile nyatems of the "Mei" type will be purchased,
to be ~eed againat plnnea penetrating at low altitude, and portable migeiles
not yet sp~cified. In addition, modernization of 120 40/70 antiaircraft
cannona i~ eaid to be planned; howpver, thie program ia not definite and
could be replaced.
Conaiderable uncertainty aubalate in another eapecially important sector,
antitank defenee, ahich in future could be centered on aysteme of short
range (up to 1 kilometer)~ medium range (up to 2 k~lometere), long range
(up to 3 kilometere)~ and very long range (up to 4-S kilometera; ncrmally,
these are mieeiles leunched by helicoptera). Actually, there are doubts
about the readinees aad availability in the early 1980's of two aystems
of Italian manufacture: the FOLGORE [Thunderbolt~~ a recoilless cannon
= designed for distancea of leee than 700 meters~ and the SPARVIERO (Sparrow-
haakj~ a caieaile Which hae a range of about 3 kilometers. For this renaon,
the choice could go to foraign miasilee, such ae the Franco-Cen?an MILAN
(for the medium diate~cee) and the American DRACON (for the shortex
distences). It eeeme certain~ though~ that antitank helicoptera armed
29
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
t~OR O~FICIAt, U9g ONLY
wieh~Am~ri~~n TdW mi~gile~ ~which eh~ ~rmy gir~~dy h~~) w31~ b~ pur~h~~~ds
in eh~ comi~g y~a~r~, ~om~ 60 h~licopt~r~ of ehi~ typ~ (Agu~eg A-109 ~nd
_ ~fe~r 198~, Agu~t~ A-129) ghould b~ bought.
Th~ promotionel i~w for th~ army aov~re a1~o "~upplying of radio eC~tiong
and tel~communic~tion~ ~quipment." in th~ 2-y~ar p~riod 1977-1978, 2,900
n~w r~dio gtations~ vehie~l~~ ~nd portabl~, he?ve already been bought.
St~rtin~ !n 1980~ ~pproprigtiona fnr purche~~ of high-fr~quency gnd long-
r~ng~ radio rt~tion~ ~nd n~t~ tel~comanunication~ ~quipment arg planned. Th~
praduct~ are of variou~ typest rgdio link~, eplephnnic multipiex +~quipmant~
gutomatic telephon~ exchangee, electronlc teletyp~writera, remote-contro~
~nd direct-dialing equipment, etc. Th~ l~et heading ie "equ3pment fnr -
manegc~ment opar~tion gutomation." In thie fleld, deliv~riee of mini-d~tg
proceseore h~ve alre~dy begun.
On th~ whoi~, it i~ a modarnization program which goaa 1n the direction both
of purchaeing equipm~nt tn integrata and compleCe the exigting aquipment
(~uch as the L~op~rd tanke); to prnvide the army wtth w~apone and aquipment
in l~ne wirh technologic~l progre~e and the nea uee concepte (in ell the
modern armi~e~ increa~ingly intansiv~ mechanization of i~nfantry~ providing
speed, protection nnd flexibility of ue~, ie taking plac~); and to fi11 in
gapa (anticrsft and antitank weapon~) Which are increasingly obvious with
the improvement in airplane characteristics and the improvem~nt in eh~
tech~icel charactarigtics of armored equipment. -
Neturally, euch moderaiza~ion Would mak~ no eenee if it aere not accompani~d
by the poeeibility of achieving an effective military inetrument through
adequate craining and equally adequate levele of eupport. Otharaise~ it
would be mora euitable to create an instrument of smaller dimeneione,
correeponding b~tter to the countrq's econoiaic and finaacial reality but
posaeeeing high efficiancq and operational capacitq--capable, that is, of
representing an effective deterrent.
Air Force: The programa linancod by the air force laa are four. The most
important ie the ona for the multipurpoae Panevia-Tornado airplane (manu-
factured ~ointly with Weat Garmany and Great Britain)~ which ie progreasing
normally. The firat airplanea vill go into eervice in 1980, replacing the
~-104C'~~ The 100 Tornadoe coa~ing to Italy by the time the program ie
completed (1988) will be ueed ar folloae: 12 for training, in a t~?o-eeater
vereion; 54 in the "firet line" group; and 34 as reserves, to replece loaees -
and to permit overhaul cyclee.
~
The ofiher three supply programa are the following: (1) 100 Mb-339 training
~ets~ built by Mncchi; (2) antiaircrnft miasile systeme of the SPADA (Sword~
type~ for defense of the moat iiaportant basea; (3) 30 sighting, altitude
and identification radars, ahich Will become operative by 1986.
The air force laW is perhape the one Which hea caused the most argument in
the past, mainly because the Tornado airplane aas conaidered en oftensive
30
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
FOR OFFICIAt, US~ ONLY
~ pinnt~. In vi~w d~ eh~ ~tne~ of cdmpleCidtt of Ch~a pro~~~t~ whi~h by nnw i~
~111H1. t1~~~ ~~~lne uC nu rn~urn, ~b~~~einn~ n~ ehi~ kind g~e now rnre~ BuC thc~
cnn~~rng ~bnut the cn~C incre~~~~ (owing in pgrt, in Che cas~ of Che Torn~do,
rn rh~ devn],uatiion of th~ lir~ in r~l~tion to th~ Germ~n mark) ~r~ eti11
~urr~ne.
At eh~ b~ginning of 19~5, the total eosC for carrying outi eh~ pro~r~m~ pro-
vid~d for by Ch~ 1aw w~~ 1,265 billion iir~; ehis co~t rd~~ to ~,745 bi111on
by Ch~ middle of 1976, to 2,170 billion ~t the beginning of 19~7 gnd 2,533
billic~n ~ yegr 1~ter.
A~~re~in number of ~ir force programs, ~1d and n~w ~ne~, prove Co be cov~r-
ed by funde outsid~ the promotional 1~w. Among the~e ~re the furnishing of
44 G-222 traneporC planes and 20 Hh-3F reecue helicoptere, improv~ment of
th~ ~vionic8 of the F-104S~ purchasa of SIDEWINDER air-to-a3r migeileg of
th~ n~w generetion~ and th~ expe~dituree for Ch~ AWACS girborne warning and
~ontrdl ey~tpm. The mogt eignifi~ant pro~ect which wi11 be d~veloped with
ordinary financing h~~ the abbreviation Am-x. Thig is a n~w tactical gupport
p1~ne wh~ch will repla~c~ the G-91R's ~nd the G-91Y'e in the 1980'g. It aill
in all probability be an entirely Italian product (but with Che enginea
built under foreign 11e~nee). In any case~ any idea of ~oint production with
West C~rmnny and Great BriCain, per the exempl~ of the Tornado ~nd the
Fh-70 cannon, eeeme out of the picture. Inetead, there hae been talk of a
possible agreement with Sweden.
The same commentary as made for the army ae a military inatrument is valid
for the air force also. Plenea which reacfi the limits of their technical
and operational life are replnc~d. Civen the increase in air defenee
capacitiee, the missione of attack planea have become more difficult and
exacting; it ie attempted to obviate this with, on the one hand, greater
sophistication permitting high speed at the los~eat altitudes and all-weather
operationa, and on the other hand, with more complex equipment aysteme, -
especially for electronic aarfare. This is a tendency which raisea the
total costa well beyond the alraady high price of an airplane pure end
. eimple. The purchage of the Tornado would make no aense if one wers
constrained to use it as an attack plane of the 1960's--that is, aithout
equipping it with syatema~ and aspecially armament, auitable for ite ~
mission (area bombe~ antirunaay bomba, laser-guided, electro-optically
guided, or infrared-guided bombe). �
Navy: It ie very probable that the navy law will be amended in such a way
as to make itfinancially flexible. This Would make it possible not only to '
re�inance the "reduced" program (1 helicopter-carrying cruiaer, 6 anti-
aubmarine frigates, 2 eubmarinea~ 6 misaile-launching hydrofoils, 1 fleet
supply ship~ 1 reacue-ealvage ehip, 4 mineaweepere and 27 Ab-212 anti-
aubmarine helicoptere)~ for which 1,000 billion lire is no longer sufficient~
but also to coneider again the poesibility of building all the ahips
origtnally planned.
31
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
FOR OFFICIAL USL ONLY
In ~unh n e~~e~ ewo mieeil~-1~unching chu~er~~ two more frigatee of the
~~M~~~C~'~1~" (Northw~~t Windj cla~~~ ~ix mineeweeper~~ one traneport ehip
for r~mphibldu~ operatione end nine Ab-21x hel3coptere would ~oin the fieee
~round rhe mid-198U'~.
The ~dded coet, including the "technical�op~rational imprdvementa" and
completion of the equipment on board," would totel 1,158 bi113on lire.
at 1979 price~. With the 386 b311ion in price revieione, the navy law.
thus refinanced would come to coet 2~544 billion.
M~~nwhi5.e, the del~vary tim~e are be;tng ouClined with greatier precie:Lon.
Ag regarde the plgn for conatructinn financed by the ordinary budgete, the
frig~Ce "Lupo" ~Wolf) became operaCional in the autumn nf 1977~ and a year
later, the frigate "SagiCLario" (Sagittarius] and the eubmarine "Sauro"
~RoanJ; in 1978~ tha ~ubmaritte "~ecia di Coesato" end the.frigate "Perseo"
(Per~~ua) were launched. Among th~ ehipe pianned by~ the pr~motionai 1aw~
the k~el of the frigate "Maeetrale" we~ laid at the beginning of 1978 (ehe
- eix unite of ehie claes will be delivered between 1980 and 1983)~ whil~
the eix hydrofoil~ wiZl go inro eervice in Che 3-yeer perind 1979-1981.
Neverthelese~ reasona for indecision are not lacking~ both ae regarde the
. decieion to build the helicopter-carrier cruiser and because Che ngvy law
and the ordinary budgete ds not sRem to give the neceseary emphasis to the
auxil~ary shipe. In lact. construction of only one equedron supply ehip~
the "Veeuvio~" is echeduled; it Will join the "Stromboli," vhich ~rent into
gervice in 1975. A factor euc!~ ae this could have a negative influence on
the fleet's operational capacity.
Interbranch Strategy
The dizzying pace of technological pt�ogresa which brings weapons syatems
rapidly to technical-operational obeo:.escence, and equally, the dizzying ~
riae in their coeta, ans! the proper limits placed on the financial re-
gources which 3t is posaible to devote to defenee pro~ecta~ in the face of
more urgent aocial necessities, impoee difficult choices.
But it ie difficult~ from analyeis of the three promotional lgae, to under-
etand what unitary etrategic deeign governed the 3mportant decisions Caken
in past years. Thus it ie difficult to eatablieh whether the mr:ans chosen
are the right ones or not. Por sure, there hae been no deciaion taken in
the politicel arena to whic~ to refer and to uae as a standard for checking
- the choices made.
It ia indeed the responsibility of the politicians to establish the frame-
_ work of political reference which the military ehould abide by for defining
the military inatrument. Only if such a clear lrame of reference existe
ia it poeaible to evaluate the cost and effectivenesa of the individual
technical propoeals. to make choices, to reduce or expand the budget~ in a
32
FOR OFPICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
~
~'OEt 01~'~ICIAL US~: ONLY
r~a~on~d w~y, with ~wareneg~ of tha ri~kg run ~nd c~1,culgtion of th8 b~nefi~~
which ~nn be d~riv~d frnm them. In the ~bsenca of ~uch ~ framework, th~
- entir~ proc~~~ fedeg into ehe ~.ndefinite. The more g~n~rg1 the on~~ctives of
- delense policy are, tha more iC becomes imposeible eo evaluata the correct-
n~es of expenditur~. There are no eolely "rachni.c~l" criCer~~: wug it
neca~~ary eo buy the famoue Nercules planes which are be~ng grgued about in
- eh~ congtitueional courC Cod~y7 Ig it nece~agry to build Che nAw Itialian
"thrnugh-deck cruiger? ig it advisable to mgintein ehe pr~asent budget
divi~ton which fevor~ th~ expenditures for the army? It i~ impoeeible Co
reply 1n g complete way: one cgn dgtermine whether a ep~c~fie p1gn~ nr
ehip or c~nnon or eomething els~ is ter.hnically valid, wheCher ir carrieg
out properly the taeke for which it w~e designed; but no one Coday outeide
tha defenee apparatue is in a po~ition to evaluaCe whether it ie right for
thQ Itali~n armed forcee to have epeet a11 that money tn carry out that task
in thnt manner. The only way to know, and hence to hav~a a proper debate on
def~nee expenditures, ie by preciee determingtion of what it is degired to
defend, how, why and within whaC limite, with what prioritie~. But unfor-
eunaC~ly~ the Italian political clase h~e ~o far hidden behind th~ convenient
gcreen of NATO denieion, general and imprecise~ refueing to debaCe thge which ~
3t wae iCe taek Co decide.
Itdly has thua become eseentially a"forw~rd base" of NATO (and in particular, ,
of the American forces), limit~ng its interest (and hence the m~jor portion
o� ite budget) to defense of tt~e northeast sector--that is, Friuli and the
Veneto,.where more than one-third of Italian war poaer ie conceetrated. As
the etraregic aituation in the Mediterranean changed and Che necesaity of a
more active European role in the alliance became mope presging~ Italy did
not conduct any debate on these decieions and tried to continue as in the
good old times. Thus wae created a void~ which had necesearily been filled
directly by the military adminiatration~ but lacking eufficient political
cover, lacking a�rame of reference and thus actually prevented from making
more courageoue choicee. In the abeence of political decieions, bureau-
crntic routine naturally preveils. Theretore, the predominant etrategic
posture eeems in fact to remain for the future too the one hinged on defense
of the borders with the east. The military eatabliahment~ tahich has little
_ propensity to baeic diacusaion of military qnestions and ie diseatisfied at
not receiving precise political directivea which might have sided it in ita
choices, hae in any case coatented iteelf with managing the funds aeaigned
to defenae in a form eubstanCially free of parliamentary control.
Therc are at leaet two negative resulta. The firat ie that we are still
witnessing a distribution of the defense budget in accordance with a priority
(�irat the army, then the air :orce, then the navy) which is no longer con-
sonIInt with the altered geoatrategic importance of the Mediterranean area.
The second ie that a unitaty~ interbranch vision of military programing is
stilt lacking~ and one hae the impression that each armed force is proceeding
Along ite oxn line of evolution and modernization, without any coordination
with the othere. But it is no longer poasible for the three brnnchea to
33
FOR OFFICIAL USF, ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
I
FOEt O~t+ICIAL U5~ ONLY
pr;~cnnd cilc~ng thi~ rnnd without th~ir progrema b~ing ~v~luated and approved
in ;:unr.eian u~ ehe nverall militery in~trumenC which it ia de~ired Co achiav~
and wi~hout ~dopeion of strict criteri~ for verifying coet-affacCivenaae.
The ~eform of the armed forceg iniC~a~ed hgs certainly etreamlined ~everal
eerv~ces, but ~t has noe changad the bas3c criteria of subd~.vigion of tha
budget and of etrategic orlentation. It ~s g"technic~l" reform, with a11
the limite of political deficiency already pointed out. The new means which
ICaly ie acquiring are thersfore making technic~lly mor~ modern an instrument
which is "old" in its politicai-~Cr~Cagic principl~e. Once again~ ther~ ie ~
conc~ntraCion ott ~ffectiveneae by sector, without finding the over~ll effec-
tivene~s of Italian defene~ as ~ whole. It is therefore necessary to re-
think, in new terme~ the military instrumente which Italy naede, considering
the profound changes in the geopolitical and geoetrategic conCext of the
Maditerranean erea~ fitring the distribut3on of defense reeources to th~m.
According to the IAi, it would be advi~able to concentrete in the futnre on
~ a military inetrument of rgduced dimeneione but fully eff~ctive and~capab~le
of. pursuinR the eeaentinl ob~~ctivee of the coun~ry'e military policy. Yn
ttiie context, the political claee ehould act to give direction~ to coordi-
nnCe and control~ and the finel decieion ie up to it. While reeponeibility
for finding answere~ on tha technical level~ goes to the military--no
longer anewere to the 3ndividual requi,rements of each armed force, but to
the more articulated requiremerte of the military inatrument ae a whole, -
~ith unitary programing for army, navy and air force.
With the Trigger in Washington
In Italy there are about 1~000 nuclear warheada. Some of them are assignad
to use by the Italian armed forces, according to the NATO agreementa. Some
of them are atationed on Italian territory, but controlled exclusively by
the American troope. Finally, eome of them equip the American Sixth Fleet
stationed in the Mediterranean. But here, in detail~ is the eituation.
Nuclear Weapona Aesigned to the Italian Armed Forcea
According to a etudy by the Stockholm International Inetitute for Peace
(SIPRI)~ the nuclear weapone aesigned to the Italian armed forces as of mid-
1976 were; 126 155-rmillimeter howitzers; 12 203-~nm howitzers; 18 Honeat John
ground,to-ground mie~ilea; 6 Lence ground-to-ground mieailes; and 72
F~104 fighter-bombere. From 1916 to today, according to the International
Institute of Strategic Studiea of London, the Honest Johna have been with-
drawn~ while according to SIPRI~ there are eight Lance missiles today, not
five. As for the fighter-bombera~ in reality only two groups of the F'-104
type are deaignated in Italy !or uaing nuclear bombs, and thus their number
is more realiatically about 30-36. If one takea into account the fact that
in general, the nuclear warheade atored in Italy for theae weapons are one
for each mieaile~ two f~r each fighter-bomber, and three for each howitzer~
one arrivee at about 500. ICeeping aleo in mind the fact that other Italian
34
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
~'Ott O~~ICIAL U3~ ONLY
- ~arri~r~ of ~ing1~ Cacrica], nuc~~ar warhead~ are cereainly ehe 96 Nike
Hnrcule~ anCi~iticraft miaei~~e, and probably Che aneieubmarine p1an~~ (25),
one ~rrives at g toCal of more than 600 nuclear warhead~~ which tihe Itialiane
would hgv~ ~o u~e with Che "double key" eyatem; for the usa of euch weapong,
author3x~eion by tihe preeid~nr of the United States and approval by the
It~~11nn Government are neceesary eimulCaneous~y.
~in~lly, ~gain according Co SII'ItI~ there are algo in Ie~1y, ag we11 as in ~
West ~ermany, Greece and Turkey~ nuclear demolition minE.., Che eoCel numbar
nf which--gr~11 according to SIPRI--ehould be about 300.
Am~rican Nuclear Weapone ir~ Italy
Th~re is lese information about the nuclear weapons controlled directly by
the Am~ricane ~ut stationad in Italy. The numbar of Americ~n airplanes ~
based in TCaly and equippad with nuclear weapong ia known (including those
belnnging to the Sixth Fleet)s about 20 fighter-bombers based at Aviano,
in Friuli~ whieh belong to Che 40Ch Tactical Group of the U.S..Air Force;
- about 60 attack planes on board two aircraft caxriera and abaut 30 anti-
submarine planee on board the eame aircraft carriers etationad at Siganella,
near Catania. Lese well-known, though, ie how many nuclear weapons are at
the diaposal of the eurface ships G,f the Sixth Fleet, which hae its logisti-
cal base at Naples~ and the hunter-killer submarines, a auppart ship for which ~
is stationed at Maddalena. ;
;
According to an estimate by an American source, the tactical nuclaar warheada
on board the American tleets in the Atlantic (the Second) and in the Med iter-
ranean (Che Sixth) total about a thousand. Knowing the aizee of the fleets
(5 aircraft carriers and 60 surlace ahipe in the Secoad; 2 aircraft carriers
, and 15 surface ahips in the Sixth), ona can deduce that there are about
- 300 tactical nuclear weapona available to the Sixth Fleet in the Mediterranean.
35
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
FOR OFFICYAL USE ONLY
,
The Coet of Def~nse
X of NaGion~l ~ of Pub13c X of Grose
Y~ _Budg~tY ~xp~nditure4 Nar,ion~1 ProducC
A4 g5
1974 9.17 ~ `
19~5 8.07 2~9 2.9 -
1976 7.77 9�7 2.6 2.8
1977 7.49 8�6 2�5 2.6
1978 7.06 8�91 2.4 _
1979 7.033 7.9
Key: .
1. The figurea furniehed refer to the ordinary defenae budget. It
ehould be kept in mind~ for exa~~pie, that the promotional lawa
for Lhe armed forces~ launched in 1977, provide fcr expenditures
(which hav~ already etarted, from 1978) not conaidered in the
ordinary budget.
2. The increaee in public expenditure of a current nature in recent
yeara shoas defenee expenditures conatantly decreasing, even in
the presence of conetant appropriations. In addition~ from 1975
on, tha expenditures for military peneiona have been removed from
the defeese budget.
3. Forecast.
4. 5ource: MILITARY BALANCE.
5. Source: SIPRI, Stockholm.
36
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
,
~ FOR O~FICIAL USE ONLY ~
The Italian Armed Forcea Today
~ ~SGRCITO'~: ~ 2 ~nivi 2b0 m1U I~Ki~~i a~~einarq '
..........r. ~ti~.~N..~h~l~'!'..~'NS~~~."~~.'``rl~~~.M
1 dwl/lom oor~un~
~ dlvhloM m~eanltuu
t Wlq~u m~tbnlinu
S brlq~a molorlttn~
~3~ea~aa.ian~ ;
1 by~u pn~aduttul ,
9 btt~q~bnl ~nllbl o
Q~�,~~`~
Obkl ~ aenom nmov~nU r ~
bilp~u coe n+NNli u~n-tari ~l~nn. d~ 165,116 ~ 9tl7 mm. ~ 6
1 W~INtbM ~nuNrN eon mirNl ~N~wk~ pp~el ~ annonl d. f0l,164 ~ ZO] mm,
CN~I ~rrMllt , Mirlll ~ntip~ro ~Tow~ '
100 M-~f ~ 700 M-60 '
~ 1.000 ar,~ ard~ d I,qHeitO~ 7~�~.
i _
hp00rt0 tfYpO~ v..~ M ~
WI Ilpo M-11~
llloottNl: 60 AO-,f;140 AB 70/1206 ~
8 }~o ~e-tOE; t0 CM-~7
- ~so.�.i ~.~~i ~
. ( Qkanblelui (~t(~ttiv190 mi1~1
~ ~ rppinwneo oa~u~~o
~ eon M-~1 ~ M-11~
~ ...r . U1~~~~ p~nplbr~proodutMl 1
i
' MARINA (11 ' ~ ~ (1~~ eN~ttivi~a2 mila ,
_ .e:i.k_.~.~:: i::..,iit!?ia (+;f~�t
s. ~
~13 6 wmrMrpiblll d'~ttaco ~
~14 wmm~rpiDili ~hunt~l-klll~n
(~nNwmrtwrplbili) ~ Mw rHomitrln
. ~ nwl tn~po?to truPp~ ~ nut~tiNl ~
, ~ C'tI q~ ~~i a~ ~e.~~o
(IS ~~roel~tall~nebmintn '
, S16 eo~.n~o~e.~~ ~
4 taeel~ lanet~miatll
~l~ ~ C~eti~ (dl tul 1 ~diblt0 �
; n~w ~euo~~ ~ Md~ eo ndo) ~ 2 ~ ~tu' dl t b0 n~vl ~wlllui~ ~ mino?i
, ~18 ip frp~t~ ~ ' (mototr~~portl eo~tt~rf; muei
~19 1Z COMIt~ d~ Ib~~CO; hONt-N11t; fROtO
, olliein~ coid~n: n~vi tip~ri~ni~,
' ~ Id~opnfleh~, olu~m~. pour~tl,
~ nlv~tp9lo, feuob, Hmorehi~torl.) '
, ~0 1~fle~fo ~~nctimbdll 2~Z b~tuplioni dl fintui~ m~rin~
1 ~ motoannonl~n
22 6 na~o~nur~nttl~ ~2 ) Avl~zion~ dtll~ Muin~ ,
23 ~ drp~min~ tdl eul 4 d1 ~Iwr~ Elteotnrl:
?0 coiU~rl ~ 10 IltannN) ~ 3 ~ 24 SM-~0; 70 AB-2C1/212 ' ~
~
(Table and key continued on following page]
37
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY ~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
FOA 0~~'2CIA1, U5B Ot~iLY
[T~bi~ e~ntir~~s~.j
( A~/1 ONt De(31) etletttvt~omt~~ .
~ It~r~a ~OO.enl d~ con tdmento
- ~.~.,L.t..~���:�,3~i6a~~ _y. . w.~._w..,:_8r,l~r..
, Ih~1~p0 d) tlttilbOfDbNUiNI ! i ~ _
!'df) ~~1~4 Q 7r~+7~r-~
~ M~PP~ dt aeci~Een?bMNMI ..s:. ~ ~ _ '0 .z n
eon F-1 ~1 S
S~t n~vai ei aeetieen+e~ro~+~ ( 4 ~ rwooe et ~nt e. �.roerro
eon o-Ot r cen O-t~0 ?1
Gle a~oo~ ei i~~~?a~~~~o+i ~ C4 i owao+ �.k.~ w ri.~oo,+e
e~~F-~au ~4 a~+o-~~o
a~oa nW~n.m1~t1
~NIA~=NMtvpM~
.
�
~ ' -s3'
~~P ~oa~ m aeN.esn+eNe1M1 N~t Mrd w~ddwtnnwme: �
�?Iee4MtaleenG-OtN !/�:i0;?~1N:M~-3?~;
Q pupp~ d~ ?lee4r?IroN een Ilf-1010 Tf-t0i0 ~�!Ifi
_ � f_~aa
Q 2a~oM d~,?co4M~oH nu,Nnn,t ea+
/nOwt ~Alwntk. Gg~
t a~voo dt ?keqnqoN nwinlenl Eiflrett�I: '
~ ton ~-I.T~KRa� 6S A8-l1 d1J; i0 AS-S0~ 9
Key: -
1. Army.~a~
2. Pereonnel: 240,000 (not including car~binieri).
3. 1 armored divieion
3 mechanized divisions
1 mechanized brigade
5 motorized brigades
- S Alpine briggdea
- 1 parachute brigade
2 amphibious battalione
4. 1 brigade ~+ith Lance ground-to-ground mieeiles
4 entiaircraft battalione with Hawk miasilee
5. Tanka: 700 M-47's~ 200 M-60's and 500 Leoparde
4~000 troop-tranaport trucks of the M-113 type
6. Self-propelled hoaitzere and cennona of 155~ 1~5 and 203 mm
Nowitzers and cannone of 105~ 1S5 and 203 mm
TOW antitank miseilea
[Key continued on following page~
38
FOR OFPICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
~~R O~~iC~N. U9fi ONLY
C~py ~dntinu~d~
7~ Army ~ir for~e
_ H~1i~ope~r~s 6~ N3~-4~'~; 140 A~-704/205'~;
140 A$-206~~; CN-4~~~
iSU 1igt~t p1~n~~
9. C~rgbini~ri ~p~r~onnel: 90,000)
10. i~rtn~r~d r~~iment With M-47'~ ~nd M-113'~
1 p8r~chue~ b~ttgli~n
_ 11. Ngvy
1~. P~r~onn~i: 4~,000
i~. 5 attack suba~~rinag
14. .4 hunter-killer gubmarine~ ~antteubmarin~) ~
15. 1 mi~si~~-launching crui~~rs With he~icopt~rg
16. 4 m~eeiie-launching chager~
17. 4 eh~e~r~ (in~~udiag 1 for uee tr~ining ghip and h~adquart~r~)
1$. 10 frigatea
19. 1~ corv~tte~
20. ~ ~ieeile-launching hydrofoil
21. 4 gunboate
~2. 5 torpedo boa~g ~d)
23. 34 t~in~saeepere (includiag 4 for high eeae, 20 nffghora and
10 coaetal)
24. 1 supply ehip
25. 2 troop and materia~ traneport ehipe
26. 2 landing ehipe
2~. More than 150 ~uxiliary and minor shipe (coastel tranaport shipe;
landing cre~t; hovercreft; coaetgl ~hop ~hipe; teet ~hipe;
hydrographic shipe, tankerg~ netlayera, salvege ehips~ training
ehipe, toaboata)
2~. 2 battalione of marinee
29. Navy air force
30. Nelicoptere: 24 Sh-3D's; 30 AB-204/212'e
31. Air Force ~b~ c)
32. Pereonnels 70~000 (about 300 coa~bat planes)
33. 1 fighter-bomber group aith F-104C's -
- 34. 3 f ightar-bomber groupe With P-104S'e
35. 2 fighter-bomber graup~ with C-91Y's
36. 6 interceptor groupe aith F-104S's
37. 3 light fighter-bomber and reconnaiseance plaze groupe With G-91R's
38. 3 reconnaiesance plene groupe With RF-104G's and F-104G's
39. 2 maritime raconnaieeance groupe srith Ereguet Atlantics
40. 1 maritime reconnaiesance group with S-2 Trackera
41. 1 tranaport plane group With ~-100H's
42. 2 transport plane groupe ~rith C-119's
43. 8 Kike-Herculea antiaircraft missile groups
44. Training planee: SF-260; P-166; MB-326; G-91T; TF-104G
45. Nelicopteres 65 AB-47G/J'e; 40 AB-204B's
(Key continued on folloaing page~
39
FOR OFPICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
~'Olt 0~'FIC~At, U9~ ONLY
[K~y c~ntinu~d)
(a) Ail th~ fnrc~~ ~re "a~gign~d" en NA`~0, px~~p~ ~h~ bri~~de~ d~pl~y~ed
in r~ntr~1 ~outhe~n ~taly.
Cb) 'Th~ ~ir d~f~n~~ fo~re~~ (it~t~rGaptor~, ~nei~ir~~~f~ t~~~~ii~~ ~nd ~
~~d~t~' tt~e~~rork~) "unde~ NATO conanand"; aii the och~r forcee
~r~ "~g~i~n~d" ta NA~, ~~c~ep~ ~ne ii-91R grdup, the tr~nspar~
pl~n~~ ~nd ch~ trainit~g p~~n~~.
~hp eomb~t groupe ~r~ compog~d n~ i~-ig girpi~n~~, ~nd eh~
Eran~port group~, of 14-16 pi~n~~. G~ch group ha~ ~~v~r~1
~ddition~l pi~ne~ (~boue 2b p~r~~flt, i~ r~~~rve fdr ov~rh~ul adrk),
ahi+~h a~ke poa~ibie a continuou~ pra~~~g of ch~ng~~ver. rh~ figur~
~f 300 eomb~t p1an8~ includ~~ m~ritim~ r~eonn~i~g~ne~ p~~npu b~t
not these additionel plane~.
(d) 'Chr~~ of them er~a aquipp+ad for incurgion ~nd frngman ~ction~. -
COPYttIGH~: IL MONDO 1479
11267
CSOs 3104
~0
FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
~
l
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044413-2
,
~
i
~
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040013-2