JPRS ID: 8372 TRANSLATIONS ON JAPAN

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040008-8
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• Document Page Count: 32
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3 APRIL i979 CfOUO 1i179~ ~ i OF i
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JPRS L/8372
' 3 Apr~.1 ~979
TRANSLATIONS ON JAPAN
(FOUO ll/79)
CONTENTS PAGE `
POLYTIC,AL AND SOCIOtOGxCAL
_ 'CHUO KORON' Analyzes Ohira as New Prime Ministr.r
(Kenzo Uchida; CHUO KORON, ,;an 79) 1
I.UP Far:tionul Activities Geared to 1980 Presidential
Election
(ASAHI S1iINBUN, 18 Feb 79) 13
1J.S. Nuclear Umbrella in East Asia Claimed No Longer
E:Efective
~(SHUKAN ASAHI, 16 Feb 79) 17
SCIENCE AND TECHrIOLOGY
SST Agency 3-Year Pro~ect on Superconducting Electronics
(YOMIURI S~iINBUN, 17 Dec 78). 22
Ceramics R~p far Cas Turbinen Started at Kyuahu Institute
(NIKKAN KOCYO St1FNBUN, 27 llec 78) 24
' a ' (IIT - ASIA - 111 FOUO~
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POLITICAL AND SOCIULOGICAL
~ -
'GHUO KORON' ANALY2ES OHIRA AS NEW PRIME MINISTER
Tokyn CHUO KO1tON in Japaneee Jatt 79 pp 140-149 -
(Article by Kenzo Uchida, political analyaC) ~
[TextJ The producer 3n Che Ikeda cabinet, which coined
- Che catch phrase "tolerance and patience," has since
~ been known as the number two man. Now that he has
assumed the prime ministership, hia true potenCial is
in doubt.
The Reader Politici;.n ~
Among paliCicians tolay, Masayo~hi Ohira is a rare reader of baoka. I
point this out fi.ar in trying to profile the new prime minister. Ohira
himself has said "no matter how busy I am, I always try to stop at a
nearby bookstore at least once or twice a week, and usually T end up
buying two or three books to take home. The aroma of new books and their
softness to the touch give me great pleasure. This is the instant when I
appreciate the ~oy of living."
.
He hss not changed today. 0:1 29 November, Ohira slipped into a bookstore
and bought four or five books. What differs now is that Ohira, whose
electior~ to the prime minister's post is assured, now has an entourage
of "Ohica watcher" reporters following him around, causing him to
uncons~.iously sigh, "I guess I can no longer browse without care in a
bookstore."
Ohira has been extremely busy the past several years as foreign minister
in tl~e Tanaka cabinet, finance minister in the Miki cabinet, and secretary
general of the party in the Fukuda administration, but his passion to read
has not abated. After political reporters ceased their night beat, Ohira
would be enjoyable reading at his quiet private residence in Seta, Tokyo.
He would be relaxed in Japanese garb in hia Western style room, sitting on
the rug and immersed in reading, a scene which I have encountered many
times.
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Po13tiC3an~ today have compl~Cely given up on bonk r~ading. Their tim~
,la nccupied wi~h enCereaining peeie3oner~, Cravel to and fr~m eh~ir O~.~CCOrA~ _
_ di~Cr~.cta, evaning banqu~tis, and whgCet~er slight ~c~arning Ghey pick up by
~ttr. H~ve noC moaC of tihe pa~t succ~ssion of prime ministers been thie
w~y? Thig wa8n't the giru~tion iromedigtely gfter Wor1d War II. Teteu
KgCayama was a practicing lawyer, who aleo authored a book on appreciation
of Pai Lao-t'ien'~ poetry, while Hitoehi Aahida wge known fox his work on
ehe diplnmgeic higtory of Wor1d W~r. II. 5higeru Ynghida was known to ba
an ~rdenC aecr~t reader of Kodo Nomura's derectivp ~earie~, nnd hi~ w~aleh -
of anecdotea and ebundanC humox can only etem �rom such reading. The i
faCC that Ichiro Hatoyama was also a good book rQAder is clear from reading
hie memoire. As for Tanzan ~ehibashi, he left a monument~l 15-volume werk
_ on Japnn'g poliCicgl higtory.
Hdwev~r, wiCh the three-generation, bureaucratic political era represented
by S~hineuke Kishi, Hayato Ikeda, and Eisaku Sato, it aeems thaC we no
longer have any reader~, noC to mention writers. I remember a well-known
veteran ,journalist, who knew theae prime minisCers welt ground that time,
lamenting to me that prime miniatere nowadays only re~d the newsp~tpers and
guvernment docuroenCS."
Then how did so many book readers happ~en to come together under Prime
rtinister Ikeda, who himself was always atressing atatiatical data and
- figures? One might ment3on Shigesaburo Maeo, the senior member of the
Ikeda clan, who was known as the best book collector in political circlea
- and also renowned as an eseayist with a book on study of the eigna of the
zodiac, Shunji Shiomi dongted the Shiomi literary collection to hts home
prefecture, Kochi. Furthermore, the three musketeers under Ikeda, namply
Ohira, Yasuyoshi Kurogane, and Kiichi Miyazawa, are all well-known in
political circles as book readera.
Some peop~e may think it an odd Question to ask c~hether b~ing a book reader
is of any advantage to a politician. One would probably meeC wi~h a
cynical response Chat "culture ts an impediment" in present-day politics,
- where forceful Action is respe~ted. Or in an era of a headlong rush towards
a managed society, where data and figures are all-important, such play with
abstract concepts would be deemed un�~e~essary.
We note that the decades starting with 1955 and 1965~ from Kishi to Kakuei
Tanaka, were a period of high economic growth, when the ~~~anese pursue3
material goals and they could live with the dream of a great economfc empire.
However, Japan in the oil-shock decade sCarting in 1975 io in a period of -
confusion and searching. Ohira reportedly has recently read several of
Galbraith's books, and one can assume that the explosive boom generated by
the trsnslated words of '"~the Age of Uncertainty" reflect some of this
confusian and searching. It seems rhat for ~he same rea3ons, Takeo Miki
- and Fukuda, the political leaders following Tanaka, were compelled to make
some spiritual appeal to the people. As during the time of confusion =
fqllowing World War II, is it not again the time when some type of thinking
or histarical perspective is desired of our leaders? It is at such a time ,
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_ Chat w~ ~e~ Che "reader Ohira" mak~,ng hie gppearance on ~Cage. Ohirg
himeelf gdmit~s thae "Z find myself eCopp~.ng ir. fronC of rh~ book~helves
lab~led higCory, gocieCy, essay~, ~nd euch sub~ects rather than politice,
ecouomice, and law." Yf h~.g range of rending really covers eheae areas, -
it only proves ehat his rea9ing makeg him a etudene of this hietory of old
~nd new, and EasC and Wegt. In this eransiCion period of continued
' searching, w~ ehould have grea~ expectaCiona of a politician who ehinka
~n Che framework of hiatory. ~or this reaeon, r have elecCed to point out
- that thig is a rare appearance of a book-reading prime minisCer ott gtgge.
Famous Director of Ikeda Politics
_ A11 dur3ng the prime miniater election, Ohira became teasingly we11-known
, as the "ahs-and-~hs Ohira." Undoubtedly Ohira's uCterances are at times
tot~lly obsCUre, giving the impression thaC he is in~xplicit in worda and
action. However, if one troubles to read tranacripCs of his tglks, apeeches,
or responses to the Diet, one notices thae the text is surprisingly clear
and to Che ~oint. The "ahs" and "uhs" in oratory only seem to be the birth-
pains of a search for the right words.
The previous prime minisCer, Fukuda, lefC a repuCation ae a master of coined ~
words such as "Showa-Genroku" and "rampaging commodity prices," but Ohira
has the patent on his own coinage of "tolerance and patience" for the
annals of Japanese political hiatory.
According to Ki~tau Shiomi's book "Listening to Hayato Ikeda," Ikeda was
- advised during ?~is viait to the United States about "patience and tolerance"
by then Secretary of the Treasury Schneider. At a meeting at Ikeda's -
Shinanomachi residence wi~h Ohira, Miyazawa, ~nd others to discusa a motCo
for the new political party in office, Ohir~~ suggested the use of "kanyo"
(tolerance) and "shinbo" (perseverance), ated there Che matter ended. Ikeda
later approved th~ suggestion, but suggested that Ohira not be told so as
no;� to inflate his ego. :~~e word "shinbo" w~s also thought not to have
~ enough class and was changed to "nintai" (patience, perseveran~e).
This is an episode on the eve of the Ikeda cabinet in 1960. It is a `
historical scene, bringing back vividly the atmosphere of the Ikeda clan
at that time.
~ Ohira, who was originally a commo~ bureaucrat in the Ministry of Finance,
established his political ties beginning with the poat of secretary to -
_ Minister af Finance Juichi Tsushima on two occasions ~ust before and after
Che end of World War II. This was followed by the post of secretary to
Minister of Finance Ikeda in the third Yoshida cabinet in 1949. His
political connections, particularly that with Tkeda which led to his
_ election to the Lower House in October 1952, marked the beginning of his
political ca:eer.
What brought politician Ohira suddenly into the limelight was his appointment
es director of the prime minis~er's secretariat in the Ikeda cabinet in
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July 1960. Tn Che turmo~.l ~urround~.ng Chn Murual Secur~.ty Treaty ~.~sue
in 1960, Ikeda's politics, wh3ch were responaible ~or changing the
- dire^Cion of conservative polltics �rom power rule Co manegement, from
front~l attiack tio �lanking, from confron.CaC~.nn to consultaeion, and from
high Co 1ow posture, marked a ma~or Curning point in postwar po1lt~.ca1
history, wh~ch has been ~valuated and a consensus reached.
The stiift from a position of confrontaCion on Che securiCy pasti to a
policy of high growth, and the change from political to economic priorities~
allowed conservative rule to avoid a crisis, and this furthermore resulted -
in the long-Cerm prosperity during the 1960's and into the 1970's. Although
- the ship's captnin was undoubtedly Hayato Ikeda, the helm~men were the
secretnriaC trio of Ohira, Kurogane, and Miyazawa, 1ed by Maeo, and al~o
5hosuke Ito, bettez known by the'nickname "bu-chan:' Ohira, who was in the
middle of the low posture politica of "Colsrance and patience," was not -
simply a head clerk in Che cabinet, but actually a diatinguished direcCor
of Ikeda politica. ~ � "
How can we tell whether being director of tht secretariat of the prime
minister's office and an efficient aide were good for Ohira? The reputa-
tion thaC he is always the exemplary supporting actor, the depuCy, tine
chieE of staff, and at beat the nwnber two man aeema to follow his around.
For instance, foreign m3nister in the Ikeda cabinet, directet of political
~ coordination for the party and minister of international trade and inauetry
" during Che 5ato administration, foreign minister and finance mi~,~ister in the
Tanaka cabinet, finance minister in Miki's cabinet, and finally pb*ty
chairman in the Fukuda adminiatration.
One particularly remembera the strong impression left by the Tanaka-Ohira
duo, which accomplished normalization of Sino-Japanese relationa, further
establishing the image of Ohira as always following Tanaka around.
Friendship With Kakuei Tanaka
There is no stranger pair than that of Ohira and Tanaka. Ohira is known
to be a careful, deep thinker while TP~zka is impatient and decisive. One
can see Tanaka "th{nking on the run" while Ohira would be slow moving to
the point where he wouldn't "cross a bri~ige even after it was checked for
solidarity." One recalls a char.:sterizatioa by Tomomutsu Ono~ who wielded
power as party vice president ia the days o~ the Zkeda ~dministr~tson, that
"Maeo has superior talent and knowledge, Kiichi Aichi is well-leat:ed~
Kakuei Tanaka 3s an extraosdinary genius." Ohira likes to portray himself
as an ordin~ry man with honesty .as his motto. In an epitaph written for
a senior alumnus, Saburo Koda, 0'hira made use of the interesti~tg expression
"Koda was not an ordinary fellow, but I'm fust a simple man." Even if old
man Tomomutsu were to scold him "you have no talent," Ohira would probably
~ust barely amile.
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~o~ nr~rcint, us~ ortLY -
,
r~:'
Ohira and 'ranaka rep~rCedly became acquaineed soon after Ohir'g f~.rer ,
- election victory. Ohira recalls Tanaka as being "very high apiriCed, "
faet Chinking, and a faet worker." Hayato Ikeda and Eisaku Sato wexe
Shigeru Yosh~.da's Cwo lieutenanCa. Ohira became Ikeda's righe arm, while
Tanaka became SaCo'g vassal. Uuring tihe decade following 1955, in the
wor~d of a cooperat~on-opposition and love-hate relaCionship between Ikeda -
and SaCo, Che Cwo pillar~ in the history of Che LiberaT UemocraCic Party
(LDP), Che friendship berween Ohira and Tanaka grew d~eper. It seemg that
auch extreme opposites in poZitical dispoeition fbund atimulation in
comp?emenCing each other, and this evenCually Cied them toge~her. In the
personnel ~;huffle of Ju1y 1962, the on-etage appearance of the Ohira,
- forei~n miniater-Tanaka, finance minister combination, which replaced
= other stalwarCs in the cabinet, startled the public. FifCeen yeara have
- passed ~,ince then. Ohira has publically never wavered in his personal
friendship for Tanaka even during Che laeter's resignation in 1974 as a
result of a money and politics acandal or his arrest in the Lockheed case ~
in 1976. As an individual, this may repre~dnt honeaty and be a virtue,
but he is a public figure and currently prime minister. The Lockheed
Crial with Tanaka as the defendant is proceeding on schedule in the Ohira
administration, and this is where a major problem for Ohira may exisC.
All of Japan's mass media have been raising ~ries of warning and are closely
watching developments, while the public has also been showing extraordinary
interest in the isaue. DespiCe the fault of repetiCion, I can onl~�
reiterate the gravity of the matter, since public trusC in the Ohira
administration resta on this single poinC. Alrhough rhis may come ae a
surprise to Ohira, there is already the gossip and speculation being
circulated in political circles that "Ohira is too careful and lacking in
decisiveness. Aren't major national issues really being settled by a summary
telephone call fxom Ma~iro (Tanaka's residence)?" _
Repeatin~ again, Che future of the Ohira adminisCration depends on Ohira
, escaping Tanaka's shadow.
A convincing argument for the Tanaka administration theory ~s that the
capability for action and the vote-gathering operations of the so-called
Tanaka Army Groug played a determiniatic role in the prime minister primary
election. Is this tr~~e? Let us quote a few of ehe arguments.
One cannot deny that, not the general public, but the extraordinary capability
for action of the Tanaka Army Group, a type of professional collective with
a vote-getting operation turned on 1.5 million party members, had an
enormous effect. It can also be pointed out that the plurality of 110 points
and winning 550,000 votes far exceeded the strategy expectations of the
Ohira-Tanaka camp. This kind of landelide can only me~n that there was some
change in the consciousness of party members or the public beyond that
producible by vote-getting tactics, good or bad, which, howev happened
to work in Ohira' favor. ~
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~~ox or~~ci~, us~ oNt~Y `
Whgt was eh~.e changp? Strateg~.catly spenking, this was partly due Co poor .
thinking and tactical errora by the ~ukuda camp. ~ar1y in Che primariea,
ehe hawkiah poseure of Kakaeone promoting emnrgency legislation and his ~
- views on mod~fyin$ the conaC3turion eppealed eo the far righe-wing membera
of Che pnrty, and Chia led to p~.rsis~ent rumorg that his popularity was on
ehe rise. Hnping ro turn this mood to hia advantage, ~ukudn adopted a -
forcefu.l high profile posrure with repesea~d hollow attemptis at self-promotion
such as "support for Fukuda is rising fro~m a11 corners of the counCry," or
"who can haridle the Tokya aummiC? The w~~rld wants Fukuda:" WiChout paying
~ any attent~.on to Takeo Miki's caution a.bout "speaking Coo loudly," these
utterances must have not only broughC cesanrment but also muat have had
some influence on the voting by party members.
Compared to the shrill Fukuda, Ohira campaigned throughnut at his own pace. _
Ohira kept repeati.ng in subdued tones that "one reaorts to force as a last
measure. I believe in a politics of harmony, aeriving while humbly
reflecting, trying to reach an understand.3ng in goad faith." One prevalent
appraisal of the two candidaCes for the pr~me miniaCership was ''Che Fukuda
oF accomplisti~ments, the Ohire of personality," but this eventually changed
to "the arr.ogant Fukuda, the undependable Ohirb." Fukuda, with his high
posture boasting of his accompliehments, appeared arrogant and generated
anCagoniam, while Ohira, with his constant down-to-earth low posture, aeema
to have generated aupport and sympathy such as that normally accorded a
~udge.
There is also some harsh criticism such as "thaC's Ol~ira's style, but behind
the apparent low posture, there lies a crafty calculating mind." I
- previously mentioned the solidarity of the Ikeda clan some year~ ago.
The death of boss Ikeda in 1965 wa~ followed by a tumultuous coafrontation
of internal factions. The senior member Maeo inherited the Hiroike-kai
Ikeda faction, btit this resulted near the end of 1970 in a more serious
confrontation between a younger group within the faction demanding transfer
of pdwer to Onira and the ol~i-boy group desiring to protect Maeo.
Colleagues Kurogane and Miyazawa, known ae membera of the ~ecretariat ~
trio, sup~^orted Maeo, while Ito, with a journalism background, supported
Ohira. Eventually, in the spring ~f 1971, Maeo resigned the chairmanahip
of the Hiroike-kai in favor of Ohira, and this prevented a split of the
group left by ;Ckeda. The apasms from this experience have noz altogether
vanished, even after 7 or 8 years. The fact that Maeo, who later became
a distinguished leader of the Lower Houge and g party elder~ maintained
a bystander attitude throughout the present prime miniater election, even '
though it ~aas a campaign for Ohira, almost liice a younger brother, aeems
to show that hard feelings do not die easily. It cannot be honestly said
that Ohira can completely disregard the i~l-feelinAa aurrounding his
relationship with Maeo.
In retrospect, no paiitician, especialiy one who sima fur the prime minister's
post, ean survive by beong gentle, sincere, and likeable. Ohira's boldness
and tenacity, once he makes up his mind, can be observed f irst when he
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' inh~rieed Che Ikeda facCion from Maeo and latier in the current political
seruggle againPC Fukuda. From thie viewpoinC, perhapa he is too retiring,
while Fukuda is too outapoken and lacking in CenaciCy. Fukuda's announcemenC
on the eve of 17 November of drdpping out of the race is typically Fukuda. -
Enough ~~bout personallties and strategiea, and let ua return to the main ~
problem o� party member coneciouanees. Speaking of introduct~.on of the ~
_ primary ~iection syatem and iCs aceual adminiatrati3on, it could easily be
criticized as aCill being aimply backroom-faction-money politir.a now -
praceiced on a national azale, ox that parCy membe:~^ and sympathizera
conatitute a special profesaional collective. Neverthelesa, none can deny
thaC rhe general elecCion involving the LDP has been liberalized and ie one
etep closer to becoming thaC of tt~u pe~ple. There ia much more significance
- in an election involving 1.5 millian vo~era than in one involvin~ aom~ 400
party members in boCh houaes of Che Dieti. There still remain questions
and room f,or 3mprovement regarding parCy memberehip registratton r~nd Che
system of vote point allocation, bue one should nute thaC party inembera
are aC Che same time the public. Therefore, the party members and the
resulta of the public vote ge~m to reflecC to some deg:~ee the fine variations ~
in the naCional conac3ousness. This seeme tn be more soecifically reflected ~
in the response to the confrontation between Ohira and Nakasone on the tssue
of the principle of emergency legi:~lation.
Nakasone's vociferous advocacy of the theor~ of emer~ency legislaCion has the
theory of emergency le~islation has the appearance of an exciting preliminary
akirmish before the primary elecCion, and various surveys were uaed to ahow
that it was popular with the rank and f.ile of Che LDP. This was used to
prove that right-wing resiliency in the L~P was strongly rooted, a favorable
comparison to the strength of left-wing resiliency in the Socialist Party.
At about this time, Ohira deftly made known his own critical viewa on the
highly-touted emergency legislation theory. "The present Self-Defense Force
Act represents earefully enacted em~rgency legislation whereby the prime
minister can order self-defense force mobilization in case of imminent attack
and obtain Diet approval later. In other words, we already have the mechanism
_ to deal with .~n emergency (15 October speech). Also, "existing laws should
' be constantly reviewed, and, as necessary, the Diet can be a~ked for a
_ decision. I do not believe that Japan's security is at present fragile
as an eggshell, such that the issue of emergency legislation must be
considered immediately" (Kyodo News Service interview, 14 November).
. A statement such as this in the atmosphere of a prime minister election is
quite an act of courage. I am not simply saying that this emergency legislation
argument between Ohira and Nakasone was a powerful factor in Ohira's victory
over the Fukuda faction. I am simply pointing out that Ohira's down-to-earth,
sensiblE, and in scme ways courageous statements were more warmly received
by party members, such that Ohira lost no ground in the primary election.
It almost seems to me that the image of the "undependable Ohira" has nearly
been canceled by this quiet and courageous statement.
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= Perh~pg I have dwelt Coo much ou Ohira's vic~oriea. In nrder Co avoid this
accusatioci, I would like to introduce ~he fo11ow3ng comment, even though it
be repetitive. `"The results of thR prime m~.nistier election may have erased
, the image of a right-wing LDP, bu~ there still remains the strong image o�
the moneybage LDP." How can the new prime minister, Ohira, respond eo this
criticism? '
Although the political vie+wa of Ohira and Fukuda differ to some exeent
becaus~ of a difference in generaeion, iC could also be due ~o d3fferences
in age nnd upbringing. Fukuda was born i:� 1905, Ohira in 1910--a difference
of only 5 yeara. Tn contrast Co Fukuda's boasting of "Mei~i 38 years old,"
it wosld be unlikely for Ohira to say "Mei~i 43 years old" even in ~est.
In contrast, one recalls that Ohirc~ was reporCedly baptized in his youth
~!e~ a Christign, and followed Toyohiko Kagawa's teachings, and considering
his school days in rhe early Showa period, one feels an association with a
lingering image of democracy in the Taisho period. On the a~her hand, while
Fukuda, wiCh the same background in the bureaucracy of the Ministry of
_ Finance, too~: the sCraight elitist road from the ~irst H3gh School to Tokyo
- Univeraity to Calented bureaucraC. Ohira spent 8 years on a circuitous road
from the Takamatsu Higher Businesa School to the Tokyo Univeraity of Commerce.
This difference in background may account for some of the differences in
their personalities.
liope To Cope With the RighC-Wing Forces
It was said during the general election for the prime minstership thaC "there
~ shouldn't be much change in political direction, foreign diplomacy, or _
economic policy, whether Fukuda is reelected or Ohira becomes the new pri.me
minister. The problem is actually Ohira coming �after Fukuda." Let us see
~hat thia means.
It is difficult to believe Chat there will be much change in diplomatic or
economic policy because of Fukuda's retirement and Ohira's appearance on
stase. There should be a change in political style, however, if not ao
much in political direction. For instance, in contrast to Fukuda's e~rnest
desire for a return to abeolute ma~ority rule by the LDP, Ohira conceives
~f an age of relative rule by means of a flexible alliance with opposition .
parties.
In June 1977, Ohira coined the word "partial alliance." This indicated the
possibiliCy of a timely and opportune alliance with opposition parties
before the Uppex House election in which a r~versal of the balance in
conservative and reform seats was anticipated. Actually, the balance was
not reversed, but in view nf the almast matching strength of opposition
parties in both houses of tna Diet, Ohira as party chairman had been in _
reality for the past 2 years conducting Diet operationa on the basis of
partial alliances, such as on the issue of budget amendment. Prime
Minister Fukuda, who could har~lly ~isregard Chis reality, had to play a?~ng
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wirh DieC management on chairman Ohira's terms. On Che oCher haud,
Fukuda's earneat desire was early digaolution of the Diet followed by
general elections L�o regain an absoluC~ sCable ma~ority in the Lo~~,er House. -
This hape was never fulfilled because of defeaC in ehe prime miniaCer -
- elecCion snd aubsequent early retirementi. Fukuda also tragically became
the only prime minister who didr't experience a general election in the
23-year history of the LDP a~cer Tanzan Iehibashi, whose adminisCration ,
only lasCed 2 mnnths. One can easily understand Fukuda's d3sappointment.
The ~ob of dissolving the Diet and holding a general election was now passed
on to the new prime mini.ster, Ohira. Ohira is in no hurry to undertake '
lchis task, and it wi11 pronably be postponed until after ~he taii of 1979.
This can be parCly aCtributed to Ohira's nature to be discrete and no~ ro
force the iasue on any matter, but also Chere is nu urgency for Ohira to
plan forceful recovery of an absolute ma~ority by the LDP at thia time,
and national political ob~ectives can ue readily achieved by means of
collaboration and a partial alliance with the opposition parCies. At a -
~oint presa conference when he entered the prlmary election race, Ohira
stated "My way is to think together with the people, to avoid unproductive
confrontations, to avoid rigid thinking, and to conduct politics in an
effective manner. T would like to adopt the posture of confronting
difficult prc~blems by including opposition parties and, if posaible, `
togethsr with sIl of the people":(4 Novembet).
From the standpoint of the high posture fact3on, which aims for recovery -
of absoluCe ma~ority control by the LDP, this sounds of defeatism.
- Antagonism and resistance to the Ohira administration from right-wing
forces represented by the Seifu-kai is expe~ted to increase. How will -
Ohira cope with this? �
?i
` Behin.d this pol.itical posture lies what might be called Ohira's historical -
perspectives and political philosophy. The ~ra of the old and rigid
conceptual and ideological scheme of confrontation between the
conservaCives and the reformists has endecl. As the interests of the
= people become more complicated and multifaceCed, one needs to understand
that the only way is to develop a broad consensus. In this sense, Ohira
appears on stage at a turning point in Japanese politics.
Who Will Carry the Responsibilities Of cn~: 1980's?
The decades following 1955 and 19b5 were the golden days of conservativP
rule and fast economic growth in Japan. According to the Western calendar,
this was the "order of 1955," but to be more exact, this prcbably ende~d
with the fall of the Sato administration in 1972. These golden days were `
supported by three successive bureaucratic administrations-�-thp Kishi _
cabinet for 3 years and 5 months, the Ikeda cabinet for 4 years and 4
months, and the Sato cabinet f~r 7 years and 8 months, a total of 15 and
a half years.
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t~C~tt ~~~~I~tAfi. U5~ dN1,Y
`Thp r~e3.rpm~nt of ehe 5~ed ddmini�eraeian, whi~h wd~ tao lnng, ~;.g~~1~d ehe
~ ~una~e af LUf~ c~nCrn1, gnd th~ b~ginning df d~yg of Gnnfugion ~nd g~grCh.
~hh rhre~ ergn~itio~i ~dmini~er~tion~s~--thp ~8n~ka c~bin~e df 2 y~8r~ ~nd 5
manthg, Che M3ki cabinee of ju~G ov~r ~ yearg, gnd the ~'ukudn cab~.n~t ~f l~~g
th~n 2 y~~rg, tne~l~~ tta mor~ than 6 yegr~ ~nd 5 md~ths. The depth vf the
rurmoil end confu~io~ iq ~vid~nr when ~h~ 1~ngehg di th~ l~me ~ew gdminieerg-
t~dng nr~ eompnred te th~ 7 y~gr, ~ month ~ul~ of th~ Sato ~dminigCretion~
Th~ thr~~ er~n~itian adminidtr~tion~ w~r~ gtrongly nhergce~rized by rheir
critieglly d~f~n~ive ~teitude C~leulaC~d to gvoid gny d~ng~r td Che LL~p.
The T~n~k~ ~dmini~~ratian Cniked nf br~ekfng the fleadloek ic~ dotn~~Ci~
~nd intern~eion~~l affnirg by "det~rmingtidn ~nd ~cti~n." Although rhe
d~ndlock in foreign nffair~ wa~ reedlved by the r~alix~Ci~n df ndrmgl 5inn-
J~p~n~~~ r~l~tior~s, there wa~ 1~~g ~ucc~g~ in dome~tic politicg b~cause of
~n nff-b~~e i.d~g about "r~con~truetion of the Jepan~~e i~landg," not Co -
meneion th~ dig~etrdua ~ffect nf th~ ~i1 ghdck.
The Miki ~dminigCraCion f.nllowing Tan~kg, who w~g forced to retire a~ a
r~sult of mdney-politic~ ecandal~, ~tr~~~~d a cl~anup in politicg and ~
- return en con~~rvgeiv~ rul~ on a platfnrm nf moraliCy u?~d~r the banner of
the "~le~n Miki." nith~ugh g thornugh invegtigatidn of the tockheed scandal ~
wduld h~vp b~en nn aaproprigt~ miggion for thi,~ ad.mini~eration, it wss
limited because of a basic ~eakne~g in th~ party W1~ich rendezed th~
~droinigtration impdtent in carrying out its policies.
Tlie ~ukuda admintstration, ahich came ~n atage aft~r the Lockheed scandal
general elecCinn defea~, barely escaped defeat in th~ Upp~r Houge Election,
~nd While proclaiming a return to coneervative pn~rer rul~, it ~x~rcised
itg admini~trative capabilitieg in di~po~ing of p~nding problemg. However,
~ukudr~'g over-confid~nce and high posture, ngaingt ahich Miki had watned~
led to his resignation as g reeult of being tripped up by the primary
election system Which he had himeelf introduced. The days of both the Hiki ~
and Pukuda a~i~~istrations cen be said to have been apent in a eucceseion
of trials and errors.
The que~tian noW ig whether thp Ohira edministration cnn put an end to
thes~ ~riats end errora comraitted by the chree previoua administrationg
and r~t~y in power fnr any exteaded length of time. There are a number of
conditionn in his favor, but whether or not he can realix~ thts advantage
~ aill depend on the new prime minister's perg~nality.
Prime Minister Ohira'~ t~rm rung to the end of November 1980. Although
the problem of extending the prime ministership another 2 years is yet
unregolved, there is every poseibility thgt he can complete his first 2-
year term and then hope for g 4-y~~r tWO-tern atay in office. Yn other words,
Ohira aill be in a position to direct the events of che 1980's.
While the 1970's is about to end in a continuation of confusion and 8earch.
this s~l~so marks the end of the so-called "postvar" type of Japan Which
p~aked in the 1960's. This decade can also be considered a time of going
thro~gh thE birthpains of entering the 1980's.
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~dk ar~tc~nt~ U51~ nNLY
J~p~n up to n~w hg~ b~~n ~xep~gively 1ock~d inrn ~ C~xebndk ~nnfrane~eton
- b~ewp~~ ~nng~rv~~,i~m hoping ~or r~eurn td a pr~wer Jepgn gnd eh~ r~~drmigt~ -
d~~tr~ng ed re~p posCwar b~n~f3Cw, Howev~r, 30 y~~r~ ~fe~r th~ wgr, eh~ -
"w~rlc~n" c1~~~, whirh i~ noC int~regt~d in gny guCh ~chem~, now xlmngt
Cnn~tieue~~ th~ mg~ority. ~t ~eQm~ th~e eh~ n~w prim~ mini~Cc~r, Ohira,
i$ quite awsre of rti~ probl~m of whsr kind df polieieg i~ r~quir~d tn
regpdnd C~ thQ in~~r~~e~ ~nd dEgir~g of ehi~ "wgr1~~~" gener~tint~.
~ukud~ typicglly r~pr~genCg Ch~ eongervaCiv~ d~giring ~ reeurn eo th~ prewar
world. i ehink, hnwev~r, thge Nak~~on~ ig diff~r~nC. Hi~ ~~ri~g nf recent
opiniong ~nd po~eure ge~t~m~nC~ gp~m Cd envigion ~ polieic8l front ~d~pe~d
to n npw p~rg, afe~r bre~kin~ d~wn Che unprdductive eonfrdnCgtinn betwe~n
thp pr~war gnd ~n~Cw~r fact~on~. The rnntene of hig vi~wg differB
con~id~rnbly, howev~r, �rom tho~e df Ohirn, which geemg Cd be Ch~ h~grt of
th~ problem for th~ LDp.
In ~ny ~v~nt, Ch~re g~pmg to be no cl~ur winner cnndidgte fnr rh~ ~rime
mini~Cprghip tc~ follow Ohira~ 'T~n yenra~ ~go, during th~ 5~to ~dmini~eratinn,
on~ could engily ngme four pogt-S~ro aandid~e~g--namely ~ukudg, Tanaka, Miki,
gnd dhira. `~hey aceuglly succeeded en Che prim~ minigt~rghip in the order
nf T~nnkn, Miki, and I~ukuda, with Ohir~ rhe lnet Cn tgke the et~ge ag the
prime miniater. An honest opinion ig Chnt after Ohira, the LDP wi11 have
run out nf potenCigl leaderg. This cnuld easily provide a motiv~ fnr ~
long run by the Ohirg gdmini~rrgtion. Yasuhiro Nakagone und Toshio Kawamoto,
two candidat~s in the recent prime minist~r election, are congidered as
po~gible ~uccessorg eo Hira. Also, gs soon as Ohira becam~ prime minister,
the nam~ of Kiichi Miygzawa ghould gtart to attract more attention. Oth~r
po~sibilities are Tokugaburo Ko~akg, Shintttro Abe, and YoheiKgwaao, who ~
wa~ ingtrumental in reorganization nf the conaervaties. If Prime Mini~ter
Ohira's mission is to bridge and reconstruct congervative pulitics in
the 1980's, then the digcovery and training of succesgors, estgblish~d or
unknown, becomes a part of that job.
NoWever, Ohira, who has just ascended to the throne of political power,
would naturally have no time to devote to problems such ag the training of -
gucceseors. The more urgent and major problem ig whet the Ohira administra-
tion i~ ~upposed tn do from now on.
During the prime minister electioa, Ohira spoke frequently on political
philosophy and palitical techniques, aignificant words characteristicg
of Ohirn. ~or inatance, aith respect to political pneture, Ohira made
frequent use of the words "flexible but strong," and he also expounded on
"reaching en agreement through pereietent persuagion an3 understanding."
They closely resemble the expre~gion "tolerance and patience" or the "politics
of loW poeture" of 18 years ago.
~
HoWever, 1980 is no longer 1960. In 1960 Prime Minister Ikeda played the
star role and called the shotg, vhile director of the secretariat Ohira
played thc role of deputy and planner. Ikeda, While aided by the political
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L-
' ~'8it UI~~'ICfAL US~S dNI,Y
- CEICGfCtl nrnh~~ergcc~d by dhirg, led eh~ ~hnrge ~ttd g~hi~ved thp mg~or -
paliti~gl gog1~ nf incre~~ing in~nm~, rgpid ecnnomic ~rnweh, gnd Che
building of ~n acnnomic ~mpir~e. Now in 19y8-1979, dhira him~eif ie on
e~nCar ~e~ge gnd doing ~he p~rforming. pcr~everence i~ comm~ndable and
~o i~ ppr~u~~ion, bur it i~ nc~C alt~geCher cl~er whnt political ob~ective~
dhir~ hnp~G Cn achi~ve by the u~e af rhese political tacti.r~. Words ~uch
g~ "from qu~ntitativ~ ~xpansion Ca qualiCative 3mprovement" or "from
m~e~ri~1 eo ~pir3tugl" b~nCpred ebout during Che prime minieC~r ~1~eeion
r~pr~~~nt only conc~pte which agn hardly ~ubgeitute for h~rd political
go~l~ tn in~pire eh~2 publlc. ~or in~C~nce, at a pre~~ conf~rence wirh -
thp new prime mini~ter on 1 becember, Ohira wgg qu~stioned nbouC Che "one
strgtegy and rwo p1~n~~" nem~ly, eh~ compreh~n~iv~ security ~trat~gy, the
plnn to ~trengthen the foundgtion of Che fgmily, and the rural-urbgn
d~velopmenC p~.an. Ni~ r~plies were "3C does not repre~ent the egtabl3~hmenC
nf any new gonlg," "will reconeider th~ reordering of prinritiee of exi~ting
poliCi~~," or "C~ simply augm~nt and bring to compleCion wh~r~v~r r;.~re
h~g be~n g deficiency."
~ 5uch re~p~ngeg can hardly represent politic~l goals to inepire the will
~nd Che spiriC of Che people.
The most important political quality tn b~ ~xpected of Uhira, who hae now
become th~ atar and plgyer, ghould be ehe decisiveneg~ to be able to
determine whaC and when. The qualitie~ of Ohira, previou~ly known as a
superior aide, plgnner, and number t~o man, are now in question for a man
del~gated with the hiy,hegt authority. Cnn Uhirn respond deciRively enough
to problema to get a pasaing grade?
A superb politici~~ is said to act out hisCory. Ia Ohira, Who likeg to rend
history booke, prepared to act out his own pet phrase "the eternal present"
in Japanese hietory?
COPYRIGHT: Chuo Koronaha 1979
5516
C50: 4105
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- pdLl'r~CAL ANn SOCIOLOGICAL
LbP ~AC~~ONAL ACTIVITILS G~A1t~U 10 1g80 PRESID~NTIAL ~I.~CTION
_ Tokyo A5A1iI SHINBUN in Japaneea 18 ~'eb 79 p 2 ~
(ArCial~: "Signs of Growing Fukuda-Ngkgeone-Miki Cooperation; MuCual
Snunding~ il~hind Che Scen~~ Shr~kin~ Ohira Itule")
[TcxC] A i.itel~ over 2 monChe nfC~r Che l~unching of the Ohira rQgime,
Che ~ukudn, Ngk~ecme, nnd Miki facCions, which w~re defegted in the
Liber~l bemocratic ParCy pr~eidential e1~eCion~ hr~ve compleCed rebuilding
their org~niznCinng and have begun to dieplay an ~ttitude of inCensifying
nctiviCy sh~king Ohir~~e rule, which ia centered upon the ~niCed Tanaka
and Ohiru fc~ctiong. Houtever, upon probing into the inCernal affairs
of Che three f~ctione, iC can be eeen that there ia aleo a strong elemenC -
of continuing to eound one annther out with an eye tu next year's
presidential etectione. The Miki faction, in particular, h~a diepiayed
an aCtitude of dietancing itself~ ~nd aith the differences among them~
it app~are that for the ~r eeent their cooperation Will be on as ieeue
by ieaue basis.
Givin~ momentum to Che joint movea by Che Fukuda, Nakasone, and Miki
factione was the drama eurrounding the recent selection of a succeaeor
to Speaker of the Houee of RepreaenCatives Hori. Thie wae due to the
succese of the three factions in lining up behind a move to dump Kazuo
Fukudu~ said to be the "favorite,' and bring about the aelection of
5ppnker Naduc~. F1com the Fukuda faction Iaaders even camE the remark
thgt, "This is the buginning of n Fukuda-Nakasone-Miki alliance counter
to tl~e Ohira-Tanaka nlliance." Then, at the gxecutive Board meeting on
the 16th, membera close to the Nakaaone and Pukuda factiona fiercely
attacked the arguments caning frnm Ohira fgction leaders and othere
favoring the freezing of th~ budget for the B2C early Warning aircraft.
Cc~nrrcte moves auch as theee have surfaced to date.
lloaever, this is nnt ait. One thing eparking the inCra-party etruggle
is the etrong pogsibility rhat, With reepect to the problan of party
reform, the Fukuda~ Nakaeone~ and Miki factione aiil move in step on
the point that "the president and the chief oecretary ehould not belong
to the same faction," and Ohira's probl~ns in managing the party are
bound to increase. Ha+ever, even if We may speak of three faction unity,
their internal effairs are complicated.
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rukudu-Nalra~dne-Miki Al1i~nC~ t~uphori~
"AC fir~e wn were i.n c anpl~tia di~urxay ccmcc~rnin~ Che selacCion of Cha
ltouec ep~aknr, ~uC in ri~~ end we manag~d Cb ~eti in sCep. Tht~ ig Cli~
- C~a,~einn dt n~utcudu-N~~kusone-Miki ntlir~n~a to cnw~t~r th~ Ohirn-~ananr
ull~.n~~c~." A~t~r th~ ~m~rg~nca df N~dun n~ 1~ouge ~puak~r 1 rnbrugry th~
~ukuda fucCinn le~derehip ac~~med nver3oyed. A~ the time of lnsti year'g
preeid~nCi.~l ~lecCion the Fukudn camp vi~orously pursued a seratiegy of
coop~ratiion berween rha Fukudg, N~kaecme, and Miki f~ctione in the fingl
elecCian by Uiet members. However Chia fgded awny wiCh Che ~voidance
of a Finut elec~inn. ~'rnm the etnndpoint n~ Che Fukuda facCion leaderehip
wl~ich wr~s the cenrer of thie straCegy, even if balated, thie muet be like -
n dream cane true. With respect to the emergence of House 3peeker Nad~o,
prior Co Che falling itiCo lino of the Chree factione, prime Ministier Ohira
wne eaid to have d~cided ~o appoint N~dgo in order C~ gvoid Gurmoil in ~
ehe pnrCy. Kowever, ehe Chre~ facCions aeserC eheir effectivenees, egying,
"P~rhups ek~~ prime miniet~r's deciaion came earlier in ~ime, but tihe
prop~ect oE threu faction uniCy mus~ have put preaeure on him."
lsnees for niseent AbundnttC
At pr~aene~ Che bg~ee for unsettling Che Ohira regime are party refnrm
nnd treatm~nC of budger deliberationa. With reapect to the problem of
purty refoxm, d3acussions have begun in rhe Party Refonn Psaaotion
Heudquartere; however~ prns and cone of the poaitiona of preeidenC and ~
chief aecretary being taken by ti~e eame facCion are the grearest roadblock.
Alregdy the Miki faction hae argued for eeparation~ etating at the generul
m~eCing on r,~e iSth, "The poaitiona of preaident and chief secretary ahould
not be occupied by the eame faction." Both th~ Fukuda and Nakasone factions,
.~rguing for separ~tion, Gruehed the Ohira propo~al Co name Zenko Suzuki
chief ~ecretary at the Cime of the launching of Che Ohira regime, and
~ confrontation seems likely with both the Ohira and 2anaka facCione,
which believe etrongi.y that having both officers fram the eame faction
ie ali ri~ht.
In the cae~ oC the budget deliberationa, the problem ie the freezing or
climinaCion of the ~2C budget. The suspicivn wes atrong that the fact
thnt thp sofC line, that freezing Was unavoidable, became a target for
attack at the generai meeting on the 16th wa~ an indication of an aeeault
by the Fukuda and Nakagone factiona. Those receptive to the opposition
pnrty demand for freezic~g are relatively numeroue in the Ohira and Tanaka
factions, while oppoeition to freezing ia in the majority in the Pukuda
and Nakaecme faction8.
Next Preeidentiat Election the Targc:
Dehind the attempta by the three factions to intenaify their regia~ ahaking -
activity in the fact that they have recovered from the ahock of defeat in
the presid~ntial election and have completed for the present their
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' orgnnix~tion~l c~n~olidn~i,on. '~he Fukuda ~ncCi.on, which wae seen by
neh~r facCions us lik~l~ ro ~p1ie i~ Ch~ former pr~.me mi.nie~ar reCir~d~
hae revived under ~he n~cne~of Che C1e~r Harmony Ciub [Seiw~ Kgi~. IC
i~ uniCed with Fukud~ ~C iC~ head, a parCy reform headquartiere has even
been establiehed witihin Che facCion, and ~lready provieiongl org~nization
for policy and atrategy o amnieteee ~or Che criming presiden~i~l elention
~nd g g~neral eleceion comunittee hne been c anpl~C~d.
7.'he Nakaeone factiion h~s put Eorth a go~l of 24,000 party membere for
~~ch Diee membar, and hae launched a parCy reform commiCtiee. It hae
aleo eeti up ep~acial commiCreee on houeing and urban development~
ntiCempCing ~o create a"Naka~cme Plan" ~o countier Prime Ministier Ohira's
Garden Ci~y Pl~n. The Miki Faceion~ aiso, has est~biiehed a political
; e~hics cortnnittee, and along with creating an organi~ation tio argue
the baeic point of party reform, tihe Miki faction selling point~ it ie
full of wnbiCiona~ According to one faction ladere, "We wanti 500,000
~ffiliaCed parCy members who can bec ane our baeic vote."
Still Enemiee ,
All nf the three factione value highly the Fukuda-Nakamone-Miki cooperarion l
which eucceeded in the Houee Speaker Nadao designation. However, whei~
it comes to the queetion of the degree or couree of future joint ~ction,
for the moment viewa differ widely.
If Fukudg faction leadera aeeert Chat the Fukudg-Nakaeone-Miki veraus
Ohira-Tanaka ~amework will continue in Che future, Miki facCion leadere
atreee that, "Our baeic etance ia keeping equidietant fran ehe Ohira-
T~naka and Fukuda-Nakaeone groupinge." Each ie looking toward Che next
preaidential election, and calculatione concerning how to eei~e the role
of leader are at wprk.
The Fuw�uda faction ia attempting to Cie the energy of Fukuda's term as
prime miniaCer to the party presidentiai election. The Nakaeone faction
is aiming at a three faction syetem under its leadership. The Miki
faction does not wieh ro be buried within a three faction eetup.
Varioua types ~f conferences among the three fgctione. have been held
frequently even eince the pre8idential election, but the moaC foratard
looking have been the Pukuda-Nakaeone. Executive conferences of the Fukuda
and Nakaeone facrione have been held three Cimee eince last year'e
presidential ele~~~ion~ and middle level and younger members' meetinge
are also being held. Hoaever, reactions of participants have been
mixed, rangiag from the view that, "The~e are preliminary movea in
atrengthening cooperation betWeen the two factiona and a Fukuda-Nakasone-
Miki alliance," ta the aeaeesn~ent that~ "These are merely an exchange
of vieaa."
Nithin the Nakaeone faction there ie also the opinion that, "Rather
than i~ateneifying a eCance of vainly challenging the Ohira-Tanaka alliance,
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~enrching du~ ~ rouCg Co power witihin Che Ergmework oE rli~ p~rtiy ~e
s whole ie Ch~ beCCer ger~Cegy," ~nd ehere ar~ ~hoee who ineerpreC eh~
factehat fortner Executiive Bc~a~d Chairn~gn Ngkasone conferred wiCh Tnnak~
facCion lender Eorrt?e~ M~nieCer o~ Kealth and Welfare Torao Oxawg on
- tho 16th ae evidence oF Chie inCantion.
ConCecCe between both fac~iong gnd the Miki facCion nre et~ll a~ tihe level
of individuale, ~nd exchgngea between leada.rs h~v~ noC matari~lf~ed.
Within tihe Miki fgction the belief ie stirong thaC, "Itather tihan falling
inCo a Chree facCion eet~p, holding a caetiing vnCe in poli~ical
aff~ire will ahow the ~~rength of th~ faction," gnd iC appegre thaC
mutiugl soundings amang the Chree factione will conCinue in the fu~ure.
COPYRIGHT: Arahi Shittbun Tokyo Honeh~ 1979
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PdLI~TCAL ANll SOCIOLO(3ICAL
r
U.S. NUCLEAR UN~ItELLA IN ~ASm ASIA CLAIMED NO LONGER EFFECT7YE _
Tokya SHUKAN ABAIff in Japanese 16 Feb 79 pp 28-30
~Arti~cle: "More Th~xn a Dagger Thxust in J~pan's Ribs--Rea1. Me~.ning of
Convrrgion of ~torofu and Kunashiri Tslands as Bases by USSR.")
~Textj F1.i11-fled~ed military bases were under construction on ~torofu and
. Kunashiri Island~ by the Soviet Union. This was confirmed by the Je?pan '
Defense Agency. Some off3cials say agitatedly that, in addition to cre~ting
a new barrier to the return of the northern territories, it is tantamount to
~ dagger pointed fn Japan'~ ribs. What is the Soviet Union's real intention? '
How should this situation be interpreted?
On 3~ June when the news we~s flashed, the mayor and assembly chairman of the
city of Nemuro, Hokkaido, which is only a stone's throw from the islands of
~torofu and Kunashira, ~ointly sent several urgent telegrams to Tokyo. They
were eddressed to Prime Mtnister Ohira, Foreign Mtnister :onoda, and the
speakers and Foreign Relations Committee chairmen of the Upper and Lower
Houses of the Diet.
"We local cftizens are greatly shocked by the fact that the Soviet armed
forces have built permanent bases on the two islands which are oar rightful
territories. We request that you take strong measures to have the Soviet
forces depart from the islands and to have the four northern islands returned
as soon as posaible."
However, if one expected the residents to be caught up in a Wave of commotion,
it w~.3 to the contrary. Chairman Mitsuo Yanami of the Neu:uro City Council to
promote the rel:urn of the northern territo.ries stated, "We must absoluteiy
prevent the demand movement from losing momentum because of recent events,"
and adds, "E{owever, We should refrain from causing increased investigations
and seizure~ of Japanese fishing craft by the Soviet Union, and from hurting
our fishin~ industry by making too strong a demand." "The question is, a~ill
it henceforth cease to be a matter of inere violation of the fishing treaty
and become a cause of suspicion of violating military secrecy?"
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mhe eho~k and une~rt~inty of the 1oca1 3.nh~bi~antg, who depend on fishing
in the northern wat~z~s as their k~y induatry, hav~ doubl~d and tripled.
M~nr.uv~r3 Would Hr~v~ ~~en Prefer~ble
Accor~ing ~o iilv~stigationg by the Defense Agency, the Soviet mil3tary
instalLat,3ons construct~d on the ~slands are e?s follow. Mili~ary peraonne~ -
to+a]. aome 5,000 m~n, or rou~hl.y on~ batitia~.ion, of which 4,000 e~re stationed
on ~torofu ~nd 1,OOb on Kunashiri. Among the f~cil3.t3~s, the ~xisting a~r-
fie~d hc~g be~n repair~d and~expanded, and a new radur sit~ ha?s be~n added.
Al~o, technical componenta include a squadron of
anti-aircraft fight~r plgnes,
a pat;rol brigade, a communications brigode and a commissariat.
The Defen~~ Ag~ncy has known about the movem~n~s of tihe Sov3et forces on the
islandc~ aince th~ early half of last year. F3rst, at the enc~ of 1s~st May,
the radur in Wakkanai cuught the busy netivities of the Sov3et forces.~ ~o
YSTs hcaded ~ast on two occasi~ons, while a medfum-size Antonov transport _
plune heuded towards ~toroi'u on a total of 11 trips, accompanied by 3 or 4
larg~ helicopters.
, Meanwhile, according to Soviet communications caught by the radio monitor 3n
Hokkaidn, ft was learned th~t steel planks for temporary runways, cement and
construction machinery were br~ought ashore. Concurrently, a consideruble
number of new military personnel was being deployed. Since it was common
sense from n a~ilitary ~tandpoint that bases should not be built ad~acent to
border ar~as becausp they woul.d be vulnerable to attACk, the then ~oint chief
of staff Hiroomi Kurisu decide~d that "they must be conducting maneuvers."
Also, it is still fresh in our memory that Kurisu revealed his Judgment openly
and this became an issue in Lh,e Diet as a"dangero~, qnd careless statement."
In retro~pect, the view3 expressed by Defense Minist~;~ Shin Kanemaru were
correct when he explained it a,s "a mis~udgment by Joi;ct Chief of 3taff Kurisu"
~nd said, "The movements ~f the Soviet forces do not constitute maneuv~rs."
� Of course, the debate in the Diet was ended with a reprimand of Kurisu, but
it dicl not solve thc problem itself. In retrospect, one Defens~ official
pointed out the half-baked solution by the Diet, 3tuting, "Tf' they were not
maneuverr, it could onl,y mean the islands were being fortified as bases. If
they w~rc maneuvars, the troop~ should eventually returr~ home. However,
stren~thening the bases xould imply that they will not leave, which Would be
a much more seriou~ problem."
The Winters around ~:torofu and Kunashiri become severe in November. If they
aere conductin~ man~uvers, the pullout operations would be easily detected
around that time. Et~+ever, thcre has been no sign of such a pullout. 7here-
fore, thc Defen.^.e Agency has auade a Pinal ~udgmer~t, with the help of data
obtuined from the United States, Which boasts a strong data-gathering ~apacit,y
through the use of apy satelli~~es, that "they have become full-fledged bases."
What docs all this mean? Therr are apparently several answers. The Defense
A~ency source~ nnturally take the most critical outlook that "it is a da~;~er
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bhruat 3n Jap~n'~ wenlee~t apot," ~t ~n~~ye~g th~e 9ov3~~ intention ~s
followe.
Under the Japan-U.B. security p~c~, Japan was not such an important exis~ence -
in bh~ paat from the Sovi~t v3ewpoint. However, la~t August J~pan s3gned a
peace and fri~ndship ~reaty wi.th China, h~r former ener~y. Meanwhil.e, tihe
bondwi~.l and ~'riendship pact witih the Soviet Un3on still has not materi~lized.
Anti-Seviet feeli.ng is r~.mpant in Japan, At tihis point, there is the need to
deploy a sizeable number of troops and aprpLy political as well as military
pressure against Jap~n. �
A~m Is To Turn the Seu of Okhotsk Into an "Inland 3ea"
Tt?Q 3~1f Defense Forces stat3oned 1n Qbihiro in e~,stern Hokkaido consist of
only one d3vi~ion (about 5,000 men). ~he reason the Soviet forces dep~oyed
an equivalent number of troops on the two islands was surely not to d~fend
two tiny islands. It is an overd~ployment from the standpoint of their
defenae. The answer seems to lie rather in a"secret motive."
"If so, then should an emergency situ~tion ar3se, the existing Self Defense
Forces are far too in~dequate. It is necessary to drastically strengthen
our defense 3n this area. An airfield must be built in the Konsen (Nemuro-
Kushiro) plain. Hawk missiles must be brought in. Nfechanized troops woul.d
also be necessary. Otherwise, th~ securfty of 5 million people in Hokkaido
cannot be guarattteed."
Other v~fense Agency nfficials make frightening references to the abandonment ~
of eastern Hokkaido, albeit as ~ hypothetical case. It sounds as if tomorrow
Soviet landing cr~Tt might come swarming in on the beaches of Todohara around
Iake Otainuma, the famous tourist spat in eastern Hokkaido.
In order to strengthen the existing Self Defense Force, "the present defense
expEnditures of 1 percent of the GNP is far ~oo inadequate. We would need
exprnditures bctwec�n 1.5 and 2 percent," accdrding to Defense Agency sources.
However, military commentator Hideo Aoki has a different view. He says, "There
can bc no dagger polnt,in~ ut Japan, merely from the standpoint of ine:teriel
supply. Tt?ere are ~o harbor facilities on the islands ahich could unload
suppli.es to be used tor attacks. If they intended to attack Japan, they could
come from the Siberlan mainland and from 5akhalin. The landing points Nould
be Ishikari Bay and Wakkanai."
According to Mr Aoki, the Soviet forces have been mainly defense-oriented
force~, at least in the past.
The M-25 ~et which landed in Hakodate was also a defense fighter plsne equipped
xith ~ir-to-air missiles.
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"Un~~g,~ we nct~d ~~r~ful~y und~r thos~ conniderations, w~ wnuld bc~ m~king
- c? grav~ m~.stt~ke. Th~y would probably no~ ~ttack us in the n~tar fu~urE.
Abandon eaat~rn Hokk~ido? You must b~ k~dding.~' Th~n, why did the 3ovieti
- Union octi a~ 3t did? Fiis v~.~w i~ th~t i~ was "stixicbl,y from the st~ndpoint
of nuC].car c~trategy vi~-a-vi~ the Un~t~d StaL~s." On this pdi;?t, Tomdhisa
Sr~kan~ka, ~ditoria], writer of the ASAFIZ SHIN~UN, compl~tely agreeg.
"~3y controll~ng both ends of the Chish3ma 3sl.and Chain w3th ba~es on the two
isl~nds of Etorofu and Kun~sh3ra, and with th~ Petro KhabArov~k base on
Komchatka peninsul.a, th~ 3s].gnd chain could become a fo:m3.flable barricadp
protect.f~i~ the Sea of Okhotsk. Th~ S~a of Okhotsk would thus turn into a
3oviQt i.nland sea. In other words their a1m is to build an impregnable
sanetuary against for~i~n threats.t'
The Soviet; Pacifie fleet in Port Vladivostok includes 80iA1@ ~OO 9L1b~rS,hL3.
Ha~f of thpse are nuclear subs and about 30 are said to carry nuclear migsiles. -
In case of war, these gubs would pasg through the Soya Straita and apread out
in the Sea of Okhotsk. F~om tha~ position they would b~ abl~ ~o launch mis-
ai1e~ toward the U.S. mainland.
The U.S.-~oviet nuclear arms race in the 1960s was measured in terms of the
numb~r oi' their respective ICBMs, Ho~rev~r, with the increas~ in the explosive
power of nuclear missiles, their target-hitting pr~cision wss improved. As
a result, the ICBM land basea ~re now within range of destroying each other.
That would leave onl,y the subs, which wauld launch their missiles While moving
around. ~ '
At one time, the Soviet submarine missiles (SLBMs) had a ehort landing range.
Taking the Pacific Ocean as an example, they would h~ve landed midr?ay betxeen
Hawafi and San Francisco, ~nd would not have reached the U.B. mainland. Today, -
however, long-range SLEMs, such as the SSN-8 (8,5G0 Iw range) and the SSN-18
(9,000 km ran~c) have been developed. 7'hey xould reach from the Sea of Okhotsk
directly to the U.3. mainland. . _
- U.B. Umbrella Noir a"Torn Umbrella"
Of course there is also a~oviet submarine fleet on the xestern side. It is
poiscd to move from Murrtwnsk on the Aretic Ocean coast, pass through the north
side of Non+ny and strike ut the U.S. c?ainland from the Atlantic. Hoxever,
they xould be immediatel,y caught in the undersea anti-sub nettirork laid by the
Westcrn nations from Crecnla~d to Scotland.
On the other hand, the U.3. fleet aould find it difficult to penetratp the
"Chishima barricade" in the 3ea of Okhotsk.
_ Additionally, the straits betWeen Etorofu and Urup Island was heretofore
vlewed au the most easily penetratable spot in the "Chishima barricade."
Therefore, the purpoae of strengthening ~torofli as a base could be to increase
itg cu~ility as u vatchpoint for the straits. Our source in the Defense
Agency ~rees with thi~ interpretation.
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~ "ft~?1,f of the 9oya Straito, i,h~ ~ntr~ncc td bh~ 3nv3~t ~anctu~ry, iA Japan's
sna? t,c:rr~.tory. Japnn'n aLt;3tud~ would ~;r~atly inf~uence Sov~~t ~~r~t~gy,
7'~~are!'or~, th~ U~~[t rr,udn w~nknco~ in Jepun's t'or~3gn pol~icy and 3~ u~in~
thr~at; t~ pr~s~aur~ J;~pun with thc imp~~.Cat3on, 'bon't foo~ ~.round w3~h ue.'
A1,so, th~y are ~howina th~ir d~~Qrcnir.~tion to the ~ffec~ thab 'the ~wo _
islandc~ ~re now key m313.tary ba~e~ .~e ansur~d ~hat we w3.~1. r?ever return
. ~hem.'"
Fort3 ~
fySng the two is1~?nds and turning the 3ea of Okhotsl~ 3nto a Soviet
~ sanatuary has ~ausec~ n ma~or chang~ 3n the nuc~~ar bal.anc~ between th~
Un3t~d 3tates and the Sov3.~~ Union. ~'h~re 3.s a1.so the op:tnion (Mr Saks.naka)
that "~he U.B, nuc~e�~r umbr~ll~ 3n ~ast Asia is now ~bout to b~come a torn
- umbr~l~a."
How then w_11 J~pan react? I?:r Sakanaka anticipates that "there will be a
stronger demand from i;he rightwing to strength~n our defense power to cour?ter
Soviet mil.3tary pow~r. On th~ other hand, there cou].d be increasin~ contien-
tion from tih~ ~~ftwin~ that U.S. suprem~cy has alreac~y declined; that the
continuai,3on of' th~ Japan-U.S. security tre~ty er.tails the great danger of
Japan'~ being involved in a U.S,-Soviet nuclear war;. and th+~~ the on1,y
a.l.terna~tive is the abrogation of the treaty and the ~doption of a position
, of neutrality."
~'rom an international standpoint, China will probably noti accept such a
situatien in si'.cnc:a. Ch3na will probably use it as a reason for a Japan-
China alliance, say3ng, "The northern bear has resumed his sir?ister moves....
another case of hegemony." (befense Agency source)
The United 3tates might also pose a difficult proposition. For tnstance,
there 3s the d~mand for a stronger Se1f Defense Force so that "Japan would
hsve the power to block the Soya Straits." Whett~er or not that is the
reason, the I~iritime SU~ is already reportpd to be planning the capacity
for a mfne blockade with the use of C-130 transport planes for its midc::l.e
~ta~e defense plun, which begins next year. Of course, this will gravely
aggravate the Sovfet Union, which is sensitive to l~.S.-China-Japan collab-
orxtion. On 5 Februttry, the Japanese Government called Soviet Ambassador
to Japan Polyansky to the Foreign Office, where Councillor Takashima strongly
prote~ted that the Sovict moves aere "contrary to the spirit of an early and
pcuceful solutior? to the northern territorial problem," and he demanded the
withdrawul of
thc military fortifications on the two islands.
Nox much thi3 w~s based on a firm foreign policy and defense stance remains
to bc seen aithin the fremework of our future foreign policy vis-a-vis the
Soviet Union, the United States and China.
COPYRIGlPt: Asahi Shinbunsha 1979
58d~
cso: 4io5
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SCIENC~ ANU T~CHNGLOGY
- S&T AG~;NCY 3-Y~AIt PROJ~CT ON 5UPERCONDUCTING ELECTRONICS
Tokyo YOMxURI 3HINBUN in Japansoa 17 Dec ~8 p 11
[TexC] The ~cience and Technology Agency ha~ embarked on research on the ~
entirely new electronic elemenC "superconducting semiconducCor" which
posaegses superhigh properCies such as very high epeed switching, very low
noise, and very low power consumption, which are indispaneable attribuCea of
leading elentronic equipmene to be used in fuCure very large electronic com-
putere, space connnuniGaCione, electromagneCic a8tronomy, and remote seneing.
The reeearch will be conducted according to a 3-year plan, and 41 million
yen from the JFY 1978 Special Reeearch Promotional Fund assigned to this ~
fnatirute will be allocated to thie project.
Noise Ia Great~r the Higher the Temperature
The noise generaCed by electronic elemenr~~ ~s primarily the product of
elecCrong that are 3n randar movement wiChin the interior oi these ele~nenta,
and thie random motion is gCeater the higher the temperature. Thia ia why
part~ of certain apace communication equipment or electromagneCic tele:~copea
are cooled with liquid nitrogen Co facili~aCe the deCection of very we,ik
signals and their amplif ication and theraby minimize the contributian ~~f
noiae. On the other hand, when the uaual zypes of electronic elemente are
cooled Co too low temperature, their properCies deteriorate, and they no -
longer can maintain normal operaCion.
When superconducting bodieg are cooled to temperaturea of the order of -270oC
or lawer, their electrical resistancea drop Co ~ero. In addition, electrona _
tunnel through elecCrical insulatora to maintain their flow thereby
~ developing a characterietic unique to auperconducting bodiea. This
present reaearch is aimed at exploiting theae propertiea to produce semi-
conductor elements that can then be used as diodes or transistora.
When temperature is lowered to an extremely low level, noise ie also reduced
to a very low level. When noise is reduced to a very low level, then, for
example, a very weak aignal can be amplified greatly ae a reault of whi.ch
can resolve a problem thaC i.s preaently impeding electrontc equipment
development. This is why auperconducting semiconductora have been tabl~ed
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th~ "trump carde" ChnC wi.11 bpcana avail~ble Co FuCure alecCrnnic elements,
nnd apiritnd resn~rcl~ ia Ueing promored in tihe Weatern wnrld headed by
oompHn~.es euch as IB~1. Preaent researr.h is directed gti atudies involving the
exp~.oiCneion of Che J'osepheon effect, which ie the properCy in which current
flowa berween two euperconducCing thin pla~de even whett an ineulating membrane -
ie placed berween Chem. Now these Josephson elemenCa require superChin
insulaeing membranes of rhe order of 8evdral dozen AngaCroms (an AngsCran
ie 10'8 cm), and the ~echnology for fabricaCing auch thin ma~erials hae not
yet been developed. Consequently, anoCher wall is being f~tcod.
ProducCion Will De PossibY~ With Fu~ure Tschnology
This is why research in this country is beir~g directed at atterr.pt:e ~~1~
prepare theae auperconduc~ing semiconductora by the vapor depositivn of
aemiconductor wiCh good very high Irequency ctiarar.reriatica (eaperhigh
, apeed awitching properCy) on very ehin aemiconductors can be as much ~s
100 times grc~ater th~.r~ t:hc71se of thQ Joaephson elements, and it iu fel+~ that
_ nn undue dif�iculties wi].1 ariee even employing techno.logy available frcxn
_ the past. In addition, where the Joaephaon element is limi~od Co a diods
(one type of Cunnel diode), Chie auperconducting elemenC has Che posaibiliCy -
- of being developed into a tranaiCor Cype element with varigd proFertiee, which
givea it anot�her great advanCage. -
According to the reaearch execuCinn rlan of Chis agency, theoreCical reeearch
on superconducting aemiconductors and research on semiconductora will be
delesated to the Elecr.roCechnical Y,aboratory of the Miniatry of Internati~?nal
Trade and Induatry (MITI) aad research on Chis auperthin finiahing of auper-
conducting thin membranes to the InatituCe of Physical and Chemical r
Research. These will be followed by attempta to prepare super low noise
electromagnetic wave detectora than can receive elecCromagnetic wavea ranging
from microwavea Co the far infrared region in the form of a firat s~age ~
model aimed at making pracCical the fruits of the research deacribed ahove,
and this efforC will be centered aC Che Electromagnetic Wave Laboratory under
the Ministry of Postal Services.
This det�ector will have Che capability of deCecting even the very weak
clectromagneCic waves that come from astronomic apace (these were not
detectable by the astronomic inatruments of the past), and iC is planned to
conduct vurioue ~ypes of field Cesta at laboratories such as the
Electromagnetic Wave Laboratory.
Every Co~~ntry IA Turning Co Active Research Activity
Reaearch on auperconducting semiconductora can hit an impasae should research
on the Joaephacn element hit a dead end, and the different leading electronics
countries are quickly girding efforC ir? other directions. Research activitiea
are being acCivated in efforts to develop superconducing transiators, auper-
conducting inCegrated circuits (IC), and superconducting large-ecale
integrated circu~*.s (LSI) of the fuCure.
COPYRIGHT: Yomiuri Shinbunaha 1978
- 2267 23
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SCII:NC~ AN1) T~CltNOLC~Y
.
C~;KAMIC5 it&b ~OR GAS 'TURBINES STARTED AT KYUS1tU ~N5T~TU~~ ~
~nkyd NIKKAN KOGYO 3~IINBUN in Jap~nee~ 27 bet 78 p 11
(~~xtp (5ngg) The Kyu~hu Qovarronent Induetrial it8e~~rch Inetitute of the
Agency of Industrial Science and TaCt~nnlogy (Y~+do-machi, Torieu 9hi, T~iichi
Heyaehi director) h~e ~mbarked on the davelopment of cer~mic materiei for
uee in high efEiCiency gng Curbineg ~g g designae~d research eub,~ect.
~
7'his i~ nn imporCanC radeerch for devuloping high performance 3IARON family `
cernmic mnt~zial capable of withetgnding high tempernture nf tihe order
of :SOOoC to be uaed ae parte for high efficiency gas Curbinea, ~+hich ie
a res~arch and developmenk theme in the country'g Moonlight Plan. A 7-yuar
plgn i8 under way with the purpoae of attaining rhe objective of g practical
pronQSS by JFY 1984.
_ Uuring the pertod beCween 1974 and 1977, thie inel:ituta Wae engagpd in the
development of new auperhard and heat reeiatgne canpoaite material as a
gpecial reeearch as g reeult of which it succeedeci in developing Che eilicon
~ nitride-alumina family eintered product "SIARON" s~ith auperior high temperature
strengCh, and thia materinl ie being looked on wiCh great interest a8
warranting utilizaCion reaearch for applicatione puch ae bladee of ga8
turbine und jet engines. Already eome large induetriea auch as Ishikaaajia~g-
Nnrima Neavy Induetries~ rokuyama Soda~ and the Llectro�Chemical Induatrial
Co, Ltd have dispatched reeearch pereonnel to thie inetitute to eagage
in practicalization research, and the outlook for thia mat~rial as a nea
ceramic appeare pr~nieing.
This ie rhe background for the aesigrnnent of thie devela~xnental reaearch
involving the high performance SIAEtON family c~ram:tc as a designated
resenrch with very highly evaluated characterieticg. Yukio Higaehiyama,
head of the Materials bevslopnent Departrnent in charge of the project,
has said, "We would like to apply the basic data of SIARON to develop g
marerial Chat can withetand 1500~C and ateo incorporate impoct and
- corrosion resiatance to an order high enough Co giv~ us a practical prod~act."
This reeearch is pert of the reaearch and development ~f nea mgterials
neceseary to the conetruction of very high thetmal efficiency gas turbince~
which nre part of the energy conservation pr~gram under the Nooalight Plan.
24
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/48: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100044408-8
F8R OFPfC~At, ti9~ ONt.Y
~t ~?ill n~C b~ limieed eo ~u~~ eh~ d~v~l~pm~ne o~ ghie 9IAt~ON ~~mi1y
aer~nic, bue wi11 ~iao inelud~ d~v~icspmenC of bi~d~~ ~nd oth~r ~~p
Curbinr~ pnre~. A~ ~ re~ule, ehia may turn ~ut t~ b~ ~ pro~~et o~
ma~or prnportinn~, gre~e~r th~n enything thi~ iri~eitute h~g ~v~r
hnndled in Che pa~t.
COFYRYQHTt Nikit~~ Kvgyo SAfnbuneha 1~76
2267
CSO: 4105 ~
,
.
.
,
25
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j .
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t�j f
i
APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040008-8

APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02108: CIA-RDP82-00850R0001000400Q8-8
~
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APPROVED FOR RELEASE: 2007/02/08: CIA-RDP82-00850R000100040008-8