JPRS ID: 9350 LATIN AMERICA REPORT

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JPRS L/9350
17 October 19~0
Latir~ ~~ereca Re ~rt -
p
c~ouo ~ 9iso~
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~ JPRS L/9350
17 October 1980
LATiN AMERICA REPORT
(FOUO 19/80)
CONTENTS `
- ARGENTINA
USSR, U.S. Policies Toward L.A. Termed Contradictory
(Sergio Ceron; LA OPINION, 21 Sep 80) 1
Columnist Defines Strategy of Reorganization Process
(Eduardo J. Paredes; LA OPINION, 14 Sep 80) 6
Magazine Reveals Shipment of 40 Antiaircraft Guns
(Karl Guenther Barth, Peter Hoebel; STERN,
14 Aug 80) ?.1
EL SALVADOR
Red Cross Recognizes Virtual State of War
~PRELA, 13 Se~ 80) 13
MEXICO
Briefs
PCM Leader Shot to Daath 15
PERU ~
YCP Changes Suggested by Conference Implemented
' (PRELA, 4 Sep 80) 16
' a- LZII - LA - 144 FOUO]
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ABGENTINA
IISSB, U.S. POLICIES TOWASD L,A, ~ CONTRADICT08Y
Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spani.sh 2i Sep St~ p 12
[Article by Sergio Cerons "II~S, I,ends Economic S~pport to Aicaragu$ and
USSR Approaahes .Bolivia"~
[Text] p(7f most importance for the security of the Weetern Hemisphere,
and therefore for the ftii$ura of the United Statee~ is II.S. foreign policy
with respect to Latfn America itselP," This sentenae comes from Dr Jean
P~i.rkpatrick~ Eonald Rea~gaa~s ad~viser on in~ternational affairs, and vae
uttered at a Cariference held at the office of the Arg+entin.e Council for
Internationa.l. Relations~
~erefore~ it is doubly important. First, beoauae it expresaea a line of ~~-L,
thought agreeing wi~z that of t~he Hepnblican candidate for the presidency~
Second, and more fa:r-reaching tbaa the snccea~ or fa3lure of 8er~n's at-
tempt to repl.aoe Ji~y Carter in the White House, becauee it represents a
atrategic and geopolitical view tba?t appears to be gaining ground in the
American intellectna~. world. Everything seeme to ind.icate that we are
canfronted with a situati~n similar ta the one existing in Europe, parti_
cu].az~ly in France, ahere aaa,].yst 8a3nnond ~ron symbolically persoaif3,es e
democratic�, intelligen~ and pragaia~ic Mgh~ wing.
%irkpatriak, a Columbia University political science graduate, pointed
out to her audience tha~t, as a result of the ~Pietnam ~trauma~" mar,y people
have focused their attention on the IInitecl St~tes~ undergo~slg minor crisea,
wbile of importancc for the ftiiture of the West is the aeourity of La,tin
America. -
No doubt thts new visitor to Buenos .~ires, r~hose pr~sence reveals f,he sig~-
nificaaee Argentina is assumix~g in the eyea of iffiportant ,A~neriaan represen-
tative sectors, a~rees with tr~e conaept of world strategy that assigna~
the "three~ .Amex3.cas" the fanciamental a,^ole of bastion of defense for the
West, assuming that an improbable bnt pasaible xar betwean the superpowers
should quickly put &~rope out of ac~fon, either thron~ military occupation
of the latter or although this wonld seem to be a fic~ional. poasibility -
~hrough its voluntary neutralizatiaan, Ia tliat event, the LTnf.ted States
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would ha.ve to fa7.1 back on the continent and sia~ul.taneously consolidate
the sphere of influence represented by a possible 53no-tiTapanese alliance~
In this way, I,a~in A~nerica and the F~ar East wculd become the trro arm~ of
a pincer movement that would attempt to limit the 3oviet IInion's ability
to expaad,
In this scenaxio, as we ha.ve repeatec?ly pointed out in this colu~, Argen-
tina would play a triple role: 1. On the s~rategic front, it w~uld pa~-
ticipate in controlling the Sou'~~h ~~laatic and the interoceaaic sea lanes
that pass by Cape Hnrn and the Cape of Good Hope, 2, Qn the ener~y front,
it wonld be a short-term supplier of gas and fhel oil to IIrugu$y and Brazil,
and possibly a mediaa-term supplier of oil to the West, a.ssu~i.ng that
Y~ydrocarbon deposits are fonnd in the Arg~entine Basin. 3~ On the food
front, a supplier of food to its Wes~ern allies. Concerning the first
point, we must not forget the importance of the transpo~.ar air rnute across
whiai. the union could supply ita Ea,stera allies with hi~.ly sophisticated
military equipment (missiles, electxonic equipm~ent, etc.), making uae of
its big tra.nsport planes over one of the few routes eafe from attack from
ene~ aircraft.
Ideology and Security
As did Roger Fontaine~ the profesaor whom many feel to be Heagan's chief
foreign policJ a.dviser, before her, ;iean Kirkpatrick mairr~tained that Jir~r
Carter is convinced that; "we are living in a new era of interdepeat~ence,
due to a technological development that fo~ces ua to adopt a new overall
approach to comnaiunist problems~" To a~eaq,~t extent, the thinking of the
,~merican representative is only a reflection of the trilateral doctrine
- that has replaced ~the doctrine of confrontation with that of eoonomic and ~
technolog3cal cooperation wit.'~ the socialist countries in the conviction
that ~his would, on the one haud, help mutua,l understanding and a sort of
union of interests while, on'the other, higb].i~ting the technological
supremacy of the West and the coa~anist natitms~ subordination to it.
This is an essenti~lly ideological appmach based on atiother the~retical
assumption: that the doctrine of hun~an rights has giv+en the Western demo-
cracies the first ideological weapon they have had since, following World
War II, the IISSR rai~ed fihe baaner of national liberation struggles in the
former ~hropean colonies of Africa and laia.
Up to no~r, t~he resnlt of this stxate~y, nourished by the laboriaus efforte
uf progressive intellectu.als, has raised no hopes in those sectors most
inclined to consider the world criais f~om the strategic point of view~
They believe it is apparent and 9n connection xith this we muat point
out that they often forget China'a bre~k [with the USS&] and ~nwar at-
Sa,clat's swi.tch to the West - that the Soviet IInion has rapidly a.dvaneed
on the international chec~cerboard at the expense of the IInited States,
Consequently, security reasons prevail over considerations of an ideolo-
gical na~tvre, Of course, this is the positi.on traditionally ma.intained
by the Pentag~on and by the powerful industrial-military group but~ ae
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time goes by, it is being a,dopted by an ever larger number of intellectuala,
both in university departments and a~nong those urrho devote their time to
strategic or geopolitical analysis~
So, we ha.ve recently seen that, whi1Q interpreter~s of the Carter doctrine
have emphaeized the need for making Latin America democrd,tic as soon as
- possible aad at any coet, Ronald $eagan~s advisers have shown their concern
fur establishing a sort of "cordon sanitaire,f0 starting with the Sourthern Cone,
- to separate their country~s "strategi~ backyara"~ from the Marxist virns~
. In t,he end, both are tzying~ to do battle with the increase in influence
Moscow has achieved since that fatef~l day in 1959 that saw tha.t unl~own,
' romantic arld contra~clictory lawyer, Fidel Ca,stro, come to power in Havaaa,~
Received with a hero~s laurels by ~he progressive sectors aad the liberal '
press of the United States, Castro did not trait too lcrag to proclaim to the
world his position as a n~.litaat Marxf,st. ~ren today, people axgue over
whether he was really a Marxist or ~rhether he felt himself :forced to aeaume
tha,t position because of the blindne8a with t~hieh the II. S. Government re-
acted to a goveznment of advanced ideas bnt basically representing a sort
of leftist n2~ionaligm that could be saQed for democraey,
Sterile Debate
In ar~y case~ this is a aterile debate. ~e reality is th,at Cuba became
a beachhead for Soviet penetration on the continent, the praiaoter of ultra-
_ leftist subversion in I.atin America, ~d starti~g wlt~h the 1970's t~e sup-
plier of military forces that made possible Moacow's strateg3c advaaee in
Africa thro~ugh an intermediary~ tirithout xiaking a head-on collision with
the United States.
In a world marked by para,doaes, we have come up with a reallq unnsua,], situ-
- ation~ While the Carter adminisi,.ration made efforts to get Congress to
approve a$75-million loaa destised to consolidate the Saadinist Liberation
Fxont'a Max~xist regime in DTi~r.gua~ the IISSR has been approaching Gea Luis
Garcia Meza's g~av~ernment, ieolated by ~he big Weste~ natione, for the pur-
pose of beefing up the Bolivian economQ~ and acqniring influence in a key
geopolitical. area, Wbile the Demoeratic Paxty bas in pr3x~ciple aacepted
Sen Edw~.rd Kernmedy�s recommendation to temporize with Caba and Nicaragua
and apply pressure on the military reg3mea of the 5outhern Cone~ Mc~acow is
negotiating a big grain contract Wi.th the Arg~entine Governiaent and of~ering
La Paz the chance to refine its ores aad count on having aa export market
for them~
What difference cau we see between the two positions? It is h,azd for
Wash3ngton to neutralize militant Maixi.sta in power or lying in wa,it to
seize power~ For them there can be no poseible deal with the "capitalist
bourgeoisie"; it is all or nothing and they will accept nothing less than
total power. On the other hand, the IIS~ has set its sighica on ezploiting
tho confrontation betweer~ the White Houae aad the militaxy g+ove~ments o~'
I+a4in .America, attempting to separate the latter from the g~c~vernment that
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ought to be their natural ally, It :nas two alternative ob~ectivest to
maintain rriendly relations with the United States and, in the avent o~
a collapse provoked b~ State Department pressure, to capitalize on the
chaos and excesses that usually follor~ the noisy downfall of a Castro
government. On the left or on the rf~t, like a11 grood alei~t-of-hand
artists, Moscow has an ace up each sleeve,
Thia crucial situation is coming to a head inasmuch as, through i~orance _
of the real situation in Latin America, Washington is pxessuring fox haety
democratization~ Elections are not an end in themselves, rather an i.nstru- -
ment to serve a nation's t~ill realization, one which in order to be really .
effective and usef~l must be applied when the suitably ob~ective conditions
exist, Any haste, any imprudent handling of the political timing, can
produce catastrophic results, such as what basically happened in Bolivia
where a political. and social situation was produced which went far beyond
what its protagonists wanted. To believe that everything can be reduced
to a unilateral decision made by a"reactionary" sector of m.i.litary leaders ,
is a simplietic and childish attitude. If Bolivian society had been pre-
pared to receive a democracy composed of cor~ventic~al features inherent in
those of the big Western nations, no military aectox would have ha.d enough
power to ornnipotently impose its will on it,
Prudence and F'lexibility
It is, therefore~ imperative for Washin~ton to learn to use prndence and
flexibility in its relations with the L~.ti.n-American countries, because
otherwise, as it applies pressure by "hammering away to democratize" the
cont~nent, it will run the risk of instead creating the conditions for a
rebirth of subversive activities.
Although it is a simplistic view, some obr~ervers feel that Luis Gaxcia
Meza's coup, intellectually inspired by the Republican right, is a sort
of couxiteroffensive of South A~nerican militariem against the Democratic
administration. And, enlisted in tha ranka of the "progressive movement,"
State Department advisers feas that Buenos Aires may mobilize an attempt '
to render the brand-new democra.-tic regimes ef Pern and Ecuad.or unstable~
The president of Bolivia and some of bi.s collaborators haxdly did llt�g~entina.
a favor in raising the red bullfighter's cloak of a I~ypothetioa.l "Southern
Cone pac~" to stir up the Andean Group. Althougi~ Garcia Meza's attempt
at applying presaure with the threat of withdraWi.ng from that ~roup of
countries and joining the one that ha.d presumablg been ski11t1xlly prepared ~
on the banka of the Plata for the purpose of forcing Venezuela, Colombia, _
Ecua.dor and Peru to recognize h3m waa tx~nsparent, there were some who
really believed in the ezistence of this southern specter. The Palacio
San Martin categrorically aet matters straigYit, but we all lnlow that on the
slippery turf of diplomacy no one fully believes e~yone else~ The doubts .
persist. During his stay in Nerr York, I?1ini.ster c~f Forei,gn Relatioas Ca.rlos
Washington Pastor will probably try to c;onvince people of the transparency
of A.rgentina's attitude in_ the ta.lks he has announced he will have with
other colleagues from the continent.
~t
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Meanwhile, it is necessary for us ta direct our attention to a resurgence
of subversi~e activity in South Amer.ica and its transnational effects~
The^e remains little doubt that the assassination of Sna,sta,sio Somoza was
a service performed by Argentine exi;remiat orgaziizations for the Sandinist
movement~ A few months ag~o~ the in~eraational presa published photos of
Firaenich and Vaca Narvaja strollin$ down the streets of Managua Ha,zdly
had he been killsd rrhen the Costa 8icau Government, traditionally neutral
and one which played an important role ~n the over~hruw of Somoza, did not
hesitate to affirm that it was the work of lrg~entine subversive elements,
Bolivian. sources, on the other hand, published an alleged correspondence
between Fixr~?enich an.d Heraan Siles Zuazo. While the real situa.tion demon-
strates how little we can trust theae sources, excessively biased and ele-
mentary in their tactical propoaals, there is no reason to i~ore the pos-
sibility, A few hours ago, retired M~j Gen Richaxd Glutterbuck of the
British Army maintained that "fihe ringleaders of the armed leftiat groups
that were operating in Argentina up until the end of 1978 are now active
in Ebrope and many of them are in Brazil, tryi.~g to set up a revolutionazy
Junta,~ n
There are too many voices raised in agreement with this, from other placea,
for Washington to ~turn a deaf ear to their r~arnings~ ~e fate of the con-
tinent and of the Western world is at stP:Re~
COPYRIGHT: LA OPINION, 19ao
.
11,466
cso: 3010
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ARGENTINA
COLUNINIST DEFINES STRATEGY 0~ REORGANIZATION nROCESS
Buenos Aires LA OPINION in Spanish 14 Sep 80 p 13
[Article by Eduardo J. Paredes in the column "The Political 5cene": "The
Strategy Is Not Based on the I}iscrediting of the Parties"]
[Text] The Chilean people have democratically said "no" to democracy. Gen
Luis Garcia Meza, president of Bclivia, told the Argentine magazine SOMOS
that there cannot be democracy in his country with 35 percent illiterate and
65 pzrcent of the population lacking in culture, steeped in.corruption and
ethnically divided. Colonel Gutierrez united the military commands of E1
Salvador with one slogan: It is impossible to maintain democratic systems if
an alliance with Marxism is necessary for so doing. In Colombia, President
Turbay Ayala is attempting to arrive at an agreement with the subversives -
confronted by haughty indifference from the militzry and labor, seemingly
related to the advent of ano ther "Colombian-style pact," this time without
Liberals and Conservatives, with populism.
There is a democratic fatigue in Latin America.
And what about at home?
There is fatigue, a general fatigue, both democratic and militar.y. The agree-
ments among politicians are as spent as the agreements between the military
and coxporations. The mathematics inevitably leads to a new equation: the
- accord between the military and the politicians, backed by sectorial influence.
It may be the only element without signs of fatigue.
The military have one advan tage: The fatigue has its days numbered in accor- _
dance with their continliance in military activity.. There is no personal
fatigue. However, they have a disad~vantage: The fatigue which does not in-
volve~ personality nevertheless affects the,institutional area. The opposite
holds true for the politicians. In the personal realm, there is fatigue
caused by waiting, but in the institutional realm the parties freeze and
thaw without much internal trauma. The miLitary engage in political action
quickly, and end up fatigued, but almost unharmed, while the institution on
the other hand runs the risk of suffering a collapse. The politician engages
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in activity with dreadful fatigue, ending up in intensive care; b ut the party
con tinues to be run by those who are waiting for the attrition of the upper
_ echelons.
This would lead one to believe that, if agreement is reached between the mili-
tary and the politicians,.it will have to be between military without signs
of fatigue and politicians ~without fatigued parties.
The minister of interior, Gen Albano Eduardo Harguindeguy, made the inciden-
tal remark that the term of oovernment to begin in 1984 would ~e led by the
military again unless the goals of the national reorganization process were
attained in 3 years (something that he considered difficult ta achieve),
allowing for traasition toward democratic stabilization of the institutions.
The fact is that some political leaders react to the vicissitudes of the pro-
- cess with a childishness c~�hich, as the saying goes, would be funny if it were
nat tragic. With innocent assurance, they say that the.term from 1981 to
1984 must be the last one wherein the president is elected by the Junta system.
It is something like the boy who lends his bicycle to a little friend and says
to him: "All right...one more ride around the block, and then return it to
me...won't you?" With a blend of impertinence and blindness,. they are some
who still believe that they are the owners of the bicycle, whereas they ought
~ to admit that it was never theirs, r.ot even outwardly, much less now, when
those who are p~daling have met with episodes such as the defeat of subversion. `
the checking of economic chaos and the social resolution of a mess, accompanied
by sign~ of civil war.
This is why Harguindeguy notes that what ~s said d~ring the dialog in the
office, facing the tape recorder, is onP thing, and what the par ticipants ~
usually tell the press is something quite different. In faet, there are
_ very few politicians who acknowledge their lack of �orcefulness. And if they
had access to the polls taken by the Ministry of In.terior, their hair would
stand on end. In one of the Iatest ones, 65 percent of those queried replied
thd t they by no means trust the politicians. That lack of trust may be unfair
in part, but it is real. Let the reader use his own family and social group,
and take the poll, without forgetting to add the various social s trata (ser-
vice personilel, the janitor, the somewhat deaf retired autit and the plumber)
and he will receive a shock that is no reason for rejoicing among those who
trust in democracy.
This column began with the example of Chile, which serves as a counterpart for
understanding the matter of the "ob~er.tives" of the process. Pinochet, faced
with the lack of force among his country's politicians, has legitimized his
d#.c tatorship with a plebisc:~te which has enabled him to expand his unlimited
exercise of political power. It is ridiculous tu depict the case of Chile as
an option between Pinochet and hell. No one calls a plebiscite without the -
assurance that he will win it, and bringing up the ~;ase of Be Gaulle is
rather valid, because the old French general s~t up i:he 3pparatus so as to
win if he was winning and win if he was losing; since, after his decline,
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there emerged Pompidou, Chirac, D'Estaing, Barre and the trick of "ballotage"
(second ballot], a means of dooming Francois Mitterrand to being the first
one to come in second....
The strategy of the process appears to indicate quite the opposite. ~he poli- .
tical "ob~ective" is unquestionably to give backing to the structure of an
integrated nation and a country organi zed in the c apitalist, liberal manner,
so as to build a bridge to a new poiitical leadershi~ that will not have on
its shoulders tne burden of lack of fo rce. The reader should take note that
the handling of government propaganda is based on guidelines of harmony and
unity, and not on systematic attack on the parties or politicians. Further-
more, in the audiovisual campaigns against s ubversion, there is taken from
Peron's highly controversial role only his repell ing of terrorism, deliberately
overlooking the many times when he encouraged it; in what I suspect is a cal-
culatei action not to upbraid Peronism in the ima ge o� its late leader. More- F
over, if certain proceedings were judicially activated, Maria.Estela Martinez
de Peron might be washing her clothes a~t the ~ood Shepherd, instead of
resting at the San Vicente estate; another way of respecting a questionable
but real former holder of the presidency and the understandable outbursts of
_ Peronist emotion, since Peron's widow is invalved. Moreover, the political
leaders who attended the dialog, such as T31bin, Manrique and Matera, are not
unknown youths elected by indication, nor did the~~go to express their opinions
to Harguindeguy concerning the political bases wi th a bouquet of flowers.
Furthermore, this journalistic profession, always suspected by sworn followers
of government policy of prior censorship and of a heap of nonsens~e, was what
enabled the public to become informed of the prob lems of Governor Saint Jean
over excessive illumination (not of him, of course, but of a section of the
route) in the railroad "affair," and the political or union protest revolving
about it.
~ The process is not based on the deterioration of the politicians, but rather
on their own aecomplishments, and on a patient trend toward assimila ting the
mistakes. And it is overly generous in allowing a political leader from a
party whose latest electoral performance brought results amounting to 8 per-
cent of the total vote to say that everything is a disas.ter, and us in the
newspapers to publish it in small prin t at the bo ttom of the page, not out
of fear of angering the military, but because of a hint of shame at the con-
stant appearance of genuine dimwits. However, the many unquestionably irre-
proachable political leaders who voice their criticism from a clearcut stand-
- point, regardless of whether they ar.e right or not, have in the newspapers
the space that they want to argue with Dr Alemann or to engage in any other
substitute sport. It may be claimed that th is policy does not prevail on
the television channels. Up until. now, it has been a problem for the state. -
We shall have to wait for the new law on the subject. But let us agree that
television is not generous in giving the politicians a platform, but it does
not systematically engsge in catapulting the military either. We may say _
that it is dreadfully bad and politically incompe tent as a whole. If Peron
were in Videla's place, and with the four channels, ~he March of the Soys
would even be sung by my daughter, Laurita, who is not yet a month old; and
instead of a baby's rattle, her gift would b e a bass drum....
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The politicians cannot complain about the ir.tentions of the process, much
less after comparing it with Pinochet's distasteful. trick. It is all right
for them to criticize the government's measures., because, regardless of how
worn out they are, it is their obligatfon. But if they want to regain the
people's con.:'idenc tfiey should begin all their diatribes with a brief
reflection of the mistakes that have been made, livin~ under the protection
of an elitist, oligarchical and gerontocratic system which left them without
' a people, without a citizenry. They should at least admit ~hat they often
filled a slate of deputies or councilmen with dol.ts, and that many of their
best members were never candidates because they did not kowtow to the leader,
or because they had to make way for the one w:~o collected the mo~t signatures.
Not long ago, I wrote that the trick in this process consists of the fact
that there is no trick, a comment which I noted to have been copied extensive-
ly by Minister Harguindeguy, who shoul,ci not be worr.ied, because I do mt
intend to assert economically my unquestionable rights as author. My grand-
father, who was a Galician, taught me that one should never bring suit again:~t
a Basque, because the trial would prove endless. But, to return to the comment,
I am now more convinced than ever of it.
Does the trick consist of their saying that they are going to stay, and then
their leaving some day? No. They will stay until the political accord has
been reached; and, once it has been reached, they will remain in$titutionally
and constitutionally present in the country's political.power, precisely by
virtue of the political accord that�has been reached.
Does the trick consist of making a threat of union democratization, so as to
confound the trade union movement, a~d later trap it in a populist col'lusion?
No. There will be union democracy until tMe Peronist trade union movement
rids itself of the partisan commitment and~the leaders become used to going -
to the union in the morning and to the committee in the afternoon.
Does the trick consist of causing a dispersion of Peronism and setting up a
government party to win in eleetiozs sub~ect to conditions? No. There will .
be a statute on the parties, to be implemente3 at all costs, and the internal
problem of Peronism will be solely that of Peronism. There will.be no govern-
ment party, although certain military sectors will not conceal their desire
for the formation of a great new moderate party, which could take.part in the
electoral contest with chances against Peronism and Radicalism.
Does the trick consist of running the economy outside.of the political con-
text, to create a plutocratic structure that would seal the country's fate,
over and above ideologies? No. The armed forces assigned.Dr Martinez de
Hoz to put his.arm in the dungheap up to the elbow, until he found that
- ruined country of 1975, to wash, perfume and put it on the table. He has
now done so. Applause. It is certainly not the economic country that Also-
garay, Frigerio, Pugliese, Gomez Morales or Alende.would, for different
reasons, like to see. But it is the country which is (let us say) sufficiently
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Presentable to enter anywhere by the main door, and not by the service
entrance, as was the case 5 years ago, when any country in the world would
have perferred to sign an agreement *aith Uganda rather than ~aith Argentina.
,Ievertheless, this so-called pragmatic structure, which ~.s not stringently
monetarist nor essentially austere nor decidedly developmentalist nor remote-
ly socializing, but which has traces of statism, is precisely what has enabled
the armed forces to maintain an economic philosophy for the future, but to
apply to it all the variab.ies that common sense would dictate to them. And '
it is in this respect that I suspect a rash blunder on the part of all the -
politicians blindly cZing.ing to the theory that Martinez dP Hoz, like a
kind of stylish, cultivated versien of Lopez ::ega, has bewitched the ff~ilitary
with an infallible, esoteric plaii of his own. Martinez de Hoz carried out
" a mission in the process, with a good percentage of success, and during
periods of very difficult international relationa. He revamped the market,
he liberated prices, he combated the speculative economy, he cut hyperinfla-
tion to a serious but manageable degree, he appeared in international er.onomic
forums and at least deleted us from the list of undesirables, he surmounted
recessive situations and he did not stop the public works essential to the
country's overall growth. All that has been enumerated might represent a poli-
tical commitment between the armed forces and the economic group. There is no
such thing. There is a sharing of ideas on various fundamental points in that
economic policy. But when mention is made of continuity, it does not mean a
necessary repetition of mistakes. In fact, it is unfair to c18im that Mar- -
tinez de Hoz is pragmatic. It ie the military who are pragmatic.
The politicians can be at ease, There is no campai$n to discredit them any
more than they are, nor are there any tricks for their self-destruction. Amid
successes and mistakes, there ts a serious program for organizing the nation,
with touches of conservatism that are as logical as they are tolerable. The
bridges will be built. If anyone traverses them backwards, it will not be the
fault of the armed forces.
Until Sunday. I am going to watch the races, influenced by the successful
incorporation of Carrasco, with the vague feeling that this is one of the 33
Orientales reincarnated. May God help us.
Copyright: LA OPINION, 1980 -
2909
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ARGErITID1A
MAGAZINE REV~ALS SHIPMENT OF 40 ANTIAIRCRAFT GUNS
~tamburg STERN in German 14 Aug SO pp 102-ZOS ~
[Excerpts from article by Karl Guenther Barth and Peter Hoebel: "~Iretched
Business Deals `~ade in Germany"]
[Text] The Federal GYiminal Police Bureau and the
Federal Prosecutor's Office are investigating the re-
spected German firca Rheinmetall ragarding illegal
exports. 'ihe arms manufacturer Heckler & Kock is also
' delivering to tension areas.
_ "I have never worked under such lousy conditions," swore Peter Lerschmacher.
In the drafty shop of the Fabrica de Armas near the Spanish town of Oviedo,
the fingers of the foreman of an eight-ma.n team of inechanics from the
Duesseldorf Rheinmetall weapons firra became so numb from cold that they
could not even hold tools on occasion. The men from Duesseldorf were
working on 40 German twin cannons of the Rh 202 type, priced at DN: 500,000
a copy.
.
It took the German mechanics 3 months before the antiaircraft guns were
mounted, calibrated and tested ~iy the end of December 1979. Always present
were officers of the Argentine military ~unta, using the testing of the
automatic weapons on the pier of Gijon harbor as a welcome training op-
portunity. They also went on board when the weapons were loaded on an
Argentine freighter in the Spanish port city. Rheinmetall called the
operation "top secret." For 2 nonths the Duesseldorf prosecutor has
been investigating Rheinmetall for a possible violation of para~raph 4a
of the Arms Control Law. The case has.been assigned file number Js 489/80.
"Because of the political explosiveness," the investigating agencies have
also classified the proceedings as secret, just as they have done with two
other investigations concerning the renowned arms firni in Duesseldorf :
Via NA:O me:nber Italy, the firm is said to have delivered 1,500 machine
guns to Saudi Arabia in 1977 and in the same year to have sent a complete
munitions plant to the South African apartheid regime via Paraguay.
Rheinmetall in Duesseldorf founded a"Rhein~?etall International S.A."
in Brussels in 1978. It occupied an entire suite ~n prestigious Boulevard
du Souverain. From there arms merchants such as Dieter Koehler, Lodewi~k
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r~ux ur~r'l~ lAL U 5~ UN LY
Stahl and Pieter Iluynda~ deliver military equipment to the whole world.
The merchants in Brussels have formally severed all relations in Duessel-
dorf. Secret additional agreements secure their pensions in Germany, how-
ever. Fictitious payrolls are maintained for this that even increase from
year to year.
In the Duesseldorf headquarters of Rheinmetall, the Burssels subsidiary
is denied. "That is the founding of a Dutch firm," the plant headquarters
claims.
But a look in the commercial register shows that of the 1,250 shares of
the Belgian firm, the Rheinmetall Duesseldorf GmbiI [limited liabiliCy
company] owns exactly 1,244. The othPr six shares are in the hands of
the Dutch ammunitions f irms ~ de Kruithooren, NWM Industries, and
:iollaendische Rheinmetall International (all three in turn are 100-percent
subsidiaries of Rheinmetall), and of top salesmen Duyndam, Stahl and
_ Xoehler. The latter was also the manager of the Argentine deal, the in-
vestigators believe.
The background for Rheinmetall's Spanish detour was the following: The
Federal Office for Industry (BATa) had approved the export of 28 anti-
aircraft cannon to Argentina. The optical sights for the dual cannon were
procured through the Bonn Defense Ministry from the Italian firai Galileo. _
It was noticed on the Hardthoehe that Rheinmetall had bought more sights
than necessary. The Duesseldorf armsma'.cer thereupon applied for per-
mission to export 40 antiaircraft guns to Spain. They ended up in Argentina.
L
, ~
'I~in antiaircraft gun Rh 202,
unit price DM 500,000. The
Italian optical sight alerted
the ministry
COPYRIGHT: STERN, 1980
9240
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EL SALVADOR
-
RED CROSS RECOGNIZES VIRTUAI, STATE OF WAR
PA132328 Havana PRELA in Spanish 2?.35 GMT 13 Sep 80
[Text~ Managua, 13 Sep--At least 40 persons have been killed in
E1 Salvador during the past few hours by the repressive forces of the
Christian Democratic Military Junta.
Reports from that Central American country indicate that 15 bullet-
riddled bodies of inen and women were found in the city of Apopa,
12 km north.of San Salvador, and 7 more were found in Santa Tecla.
Most of the bodies showed si.gns of torture.
It was also reported that four dPad youths were found inside a vehicle
in the vicinity of the Central American Technology Institute in the
Salvadoran capital.
The New Nicaragua News Agency (ANN) reported from San Salvador, mean-
while, that the International Red Cro~,s has recognized a vir~tual state
of war in that country with the signing of an agreement with the
Salvardoran Foreign Affairs Ministry which establishes that it will
act as a"neutral organization in the event of civil war of domestic
disturbances."
The agreement specifies, ANN adds, that the Red Cross will not be in a
position to grant political asylum to citizens of that country.
The decision of the Red Cross, it adds, confirms reports by Salvadoran
political-military organizations that the Christian Democratic Militar}*
Junta is waging fierce repression against the people with the
characteristics of a "silent genocide."
It was also repprted that the Catholic "YSAX" radio station, official
spokesman for the San Salvador archbishopric, was blown up by government
- agents this morning, interrupting its transmissions.
~
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The electricity company in Soyapango was burned by a bomb explosion
in an action to which the armed forces of national resistance claimed
credit. Meanwhile a command of the peoples revolutionary army attacked
the mayor`s office in Cuscatacingo, 5 km north of San Salvador, causing
heavy damage to the buildings and to nearby establishments.
The Farabundo Marti People's Liberation Forces (FPL) has claimed credit
for an attack which reduced to cinders a large commercial footwear
establis'hment in downtown San Salvador.
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