JPRS ID: 9320 KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT

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• Document Number (FOIA) /ESDN (CREST): CIA-RDP82-00850R000300030040-1
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• Content Type: REPORTS

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JPRS L/9320
30 September 1980
Korean Affai rs Re ort
p
CFODU 7/80)
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JPRS L/9320
3Q September 1980
KOREAN AFFAIRS REPORT
(,FOUO 7/80)
CONTENTS
SOUTH KOREA
POLITICS AND GOVERNMENT
Ex-minister Talks of KCIA Activities in Japan, Rim Tae-chung Case
(Akio Nomura; ASAHI EVENING NEWS, 18 Aug 80) 1
Japanese Scholars Discuss Kwang~u Incident, R~K's Future
(MAII~TICHI SHUl~IDUN, 28 May 80) 3
ECONOMY
Japan To Wait Until January for Final Approva~ of Loan to ROK
(MAINl'CHI SHIMBUN, 5 Aug 8Q) .....................n....... 10
ROK Threatens Japan's Steel Sales in Southeast Asia '
(MAINICHI DAILY NEWS, 31 Aug 80) 12
NORTH ROR~A
FOREIGN TRADE
DPRK, Japan To Revise General Trade Conditions
(NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN, 21 Aug 80) 14
Japanese Big Busineases Want Improved Trade Ties With DPRK
(THE JAPANESE ECONOMIC JOURNAL, 12 Aug 80) 16
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S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERIa4ENT
EX-MINISTER TALKS OF KCIA ACTNITIES IN JAPAN, KIM TAE-CHUNG CASE
OW191005 Tokyo ASAHI EVENING NEWS in English 18 Aug 80 p 1
[Article by ASAHI SHIMBUN correspondent Akio Nomura] '
[Text] Washington--The South Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA)
has numbers of informants planted in government off ices, priva~te enter-
prises and various organizat~!ons in Japan, according to Choe Se-kyn,
=ormer ~inister at the South Korea.n Embassy in Tokyo.
Choe, who directed KCIA operations in Japan until December last year,
when he sc~~ight political asylum in the United States, made the dieclosure
when he was ~ointly interviewed last week by the General American Bureau
of the ASAHI SHII~iBUN and Mun Myon.g-cha, a Korean 3ournalist living in
America.
He said that when he defected, the KCIA had no evidence that the former
presidential candidate Kim Tae-chung had connections with North Korea,
which is one of the things he has been charged with in his court-martial.
Choe said the allegation is most unlikely to be true.
Choe took up the Tokyo poet in February last year at the strong request
of hls brother-in-law, KCIA chief Kim Chae-kyu, who was executed for
assassinating President Pak Chong-hui.
Before traveling to Tokyo, he was calied to the KCIA headquarters and
briefed on the Kim Tae-chung's abduction fram Tokyo in 1973. He would not
- tell what he had learnt, but commented that abducting Kim was a stupid
thing to do. He said that Kim Chae-kyu was of the same view.
Choe's testimony suggests that the kidnaping was the work of the KCIA.
The finger-prints of Kim Tong-wun, f irst secretary at the South Korean
Embassy in Takyo and a KCIA operative, were found in the Tokyo hotel room
from which Kim Tae-chung was abd.ucted, a~ confidential U.S. State Depart-
ment cables, which attest to KCIA involvement, were made public in May
- last year. Nevertheless, Seoul has not a cknowledged that the KCIA was .
irnio lved .
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According to Choe, the most important objectives of KCIA operations in
Japan are to counter North Korea's subversive activities against South
Korea a~ to determine whether North Korea intends to invade the south.
The KCIA, he said, routinely collects information on the pro-Pyongyang
General Association of Korean residents in Japan and other anti-South
Korean organizations, tries to keep the pro-Seoul union of Korean residents
in Japan under control, lobbies in Japanese political circles, and gathers
- international information available in Tokyo.
Choe disclosed that the KCIA has personnel stationed in the South Korean
consulates general in Osaka, Nagoya, Fukucka, Sapporo in addition to
_ Tokyo, and has informants extensively planted in Japanese Government
offices, private enterprises and various organizations, as well as the
organizations of Koreans living in Japan.
But he said the agency's budget does not permit it to spend money lavishly.
He said he had made reports to Kim Chae-kyu about the extortion of money
by KCIA operatives fram companies run by Korzans in Japan.
Of the corrupt ties which are alleged to exist between South Korea and
Japanese political circles, Choe said there are aspects which are not so
constructive, with money involved, and are certainly unhealthy. But he
did not give details.
Choe, who exchanged information with officials of the Cabinet Research
Office while in Tokyo, said he began to prepare secretly for his defection
after Pak's assassination, since he felt that if he went back to Seoul,
it would be the end of him.
COPYRIGHT: Asahi Evening News 1980
CSO: 4120
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S. KOREA/POLITICS AND GOVERNMEN'T
JAPANESE SCHOLARS DISCUSS KWANGJ'U INCIDENT, ROK'S FUT[TRE
Tokyo MAINICHI SHIMBUN in Japanese 28 May 80 p 7
[Discussion participated in by Shizuo Mitani, a critic of Korean problems;
Masao Okonogi, assistant professor at Keio University; Teruo Komaki, head
of the Insti~ute of Asian Economic Affairs: "Undercurrent of Kwang~u
Incident, ROK's Path"]
[Excerpts] On the morni.ng of the 27th, martial law
forces rushed into Kwang~u in the ROK, and brought the
city under control by military force, the activities of
antigovernment forces came to a tragic end in 10 days.
Seven months have passed since the assassination of
President Pak Chong-hui on 26 October last year; it was
expected that democratiaation would advanee, but it has
retrogressEd again and the view has grown stronger that
the gover~ent will virtually become a military govern-
ment. It seema that this, in its turn, will greatly
influence U.S.-ROK and Japan-ROK relations and the
entire Asian state of affaira. I would like to ask each
of you experts your candid views on the Korean problems.
No Repercussions Will Spread to Other Cities
[Mitani] I agree with Mr Komaki an the point that.special circumstances
of the region affected the Kwang~u incident. The antagonism of Cholla and
Kyongsang has existed since the Three Kingdoms era, and that political
climate has remained to the present. Even when one looks at the era of
the Pak government, Chol~a was put in a back seat in terms of economic
development. Tak3.ng the construction of express highways as an example,
it began in Kyongsang, and Cholla was left until last. Industrial devel-
opment has been the same. Even when it came to personnel appointmenta,
the people of Cholla were kept at a distance and discriminated against.
Kim Tae-~hung, the political symbol of Cholla, was shackled and hauled
before the authorities. It is said that this ca+lsed a great sense of
crieis and was a ma~or crsuse for thts disturbance.
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- On this point, in the sloganr "Follow Kwangju," even though fnere is an
alinement of democratic forces centering around former President Yua
Po-son of Seoul, I don't think repercussions will spread to other regions.
[Okonogi] It is a fact that Kwangju occupies a special position, but
when the opposition party's Kim Yong-sam, president of the New T~mocra-
tic Party, was divested of his legislator's position last fall and his
presidential authority was suspended, riots broke out in Pusan and Masan
(hoth are in Kyongsang), and it is feared that the same thing will happen
in the future '=pending on what moves the mi1 itary makes.
[Question] The Kwang~u incident has come to an end for the present. The
"Special Committee for National Security Measures" was set up; the military,
in short, Chon Tu-hwan, commanding general of the Defense Security Command,
assumed real political power. I would like to ask you, first of all,
your forecast of whether this will proceed as it is to a"Pak system
without Pak," or, whether it will end after a short duration and go in
a different, new dir ection.
� [Komaki] General Chon Tu-hwan came to power by accident with the Pak
assassination incident. Ii~e to that, he was in a defensive and te~mporary
position of having to work out new measures. On 12 December of last year,
from the time Chong Sung-hwa, army chief ofistaff, was put under arrest,
he appeared at the front line of power and embarked on this present
course; but in doing that, he confronted the senior military officers.
He gave advance warning to Kim Tae-chung, but other than that, I think
he gained power without any prospect of 3t or preparation. Because of
that, f irst of all, he confronted both extremes of the old order and of
those against the goverrnnent, and in the Kwang~u incident, he was confronted
with a large number of dead unprecedented in recent years. It became an
extreme life-and-death situ~tion wherein the army "could not withdraw any
further," and antigovermnent forces "could not allow Chon Tu-hwan." I
don't think we can be definitive about a r~:appearance of the Pak order.
The ma~or trend was that the Pak order could not help but collapse poli-
tically, economically and socially, and that sit~uation has not changed
even now. Since General Chon does not understand that, a re-emergence of
the Yusin system will fail ~ven if it is possible ~to last] for a short
- duration of several months. However, since"it is dangerous,for General
Chon not to put forth a confr.on~ation posture, events stmilar to the
Kwangju incide~t can reoccur. There is a part of the military which
opposes General ~hon, and so I can't predict what will occur in the future.
[Okonogi] It is a great misfortune that there has been a transition
without any clear goverrnnent program. President Pak was supported not
only by.the military but also by the Democ~atic Republican Party. Kim
Chong-pil, president of the De~o�ratic K'epublican Party, was arrested, and
there is no base, even if a"Pak system wit'hout Pak" is promoted. It can
be said that the base supporting Chon Tu-'hwan system is exceedingly limited.
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[Mitani] P�aratroopers came into Kwang~u violently at the beginning.
However, later the military appeared to be under aelf-controY. The
military sorted out the extremists and the moderates, bided its t3me and
plunged in when it was clear. The miZitary was waiting for ~ustification
for the suppression to be created. As~for control hereafter, won't ~us-
tification be created to let aay one of the chief military offic~rs take
responsibility? The Chon Tu-hwan order seems to be running full speed to
a military gover~ent, but if a military goverrnnent comes about, the U.S.,
as well as ma.ny ~oreign nations, will be critical and may not bring ~.n
capital and technology. The ROK economy cannot maintain itself. I~think
President Choe Kyu-ha must compromise and, taking responsibility, promote
a democratization schedule.
[Okonogi] Th~t is so if the military is wise. President Pak',~ method was
to control by force and then loosen up. I am hoping the same method will
be used. At any rate, they have ao base. Will they do everything from
the top or ~will they compromiae? If they are wise, they will choose the
latter.
[KomakiJ Concerning the movea of the military, there has been some of
that since about the time President Pak was assassinated. The United
States sensed this. Th~re were those in the military who thought "Pak
is not good," and after this incident, General Chon Tu-hwan took the bold
course of arresting the army chief of staff. There was the possibility
the chief of staff would be the mainstream, and if so, General Chon would
have been eliminated. However, to what degree was it planned? It is
said that wihin the army, at present, the Korean Military Academy [KMA]
Class 11 stands firmly together, with General Chon Tu-hwan and No Tae-u,
Capitol Security commander at the center. But, the more they stand
firmly together, the more others are cut off. General Chon Tu-hwan is
a lieutenant general, and below that there are ma~or-generals and field t
officer classes; these may begin to stir. The United States has begun to
w~ork openly and secretly, and I think a group that moves with the mind and
inclination of :'~e U.S. may also appear.
[Question] The question is the power of General Chon Tu-hwan within such
a military. General Chon seems ta have gained power suddenly; will the
Chon system last long?
[Mitani] If that point were known, I could boldly state my opinion.
Seen from the outside, it can be said that General Chon's "six-man group"
or "eight-man group" is a key group. From the standpoint of rank,
General Chon is a lieutenant general, and being a part of KMA Class 11,
is young. Yu P'yong-hyon, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and
Yi Hui-song, martial law cammander, are both superiors. These men make
up the moderate faction. Chu Yong-pok, minister of National D efense, can
also be added to this group. Therefore, it is unthinkable that the army
will move at General Chon's beck and call. Within the military, there
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are both moderate and radical views. I often hear in my conversations
with Koreans that General Chon is a capable person, but he has no poli-
tical ambitions. Won't General Yu P'yong-hyon's moderate faction lead
the military? This is a conjecture; I cannot say with certainty.
[Okonogi] This is my impression. At General Chon's pressconference when
he assumed the position of acting director of the KCIA, he seemed to have
taken over former President Pak's mentality intact. These military men are
moved by the same paCriotic sentiment as the young officers of the former
- Japanese army. It is their mission, but not necessarily a desire f or
political power. In reality, however, there are times it is more d iffi-
cult to handle people who have a mission than people who are possessed
with a desire for political power.
Lack of Plan for Social Change
[Komaki] Former President Pak made an inspection tour of the entire coun-
try during his 18 years in office, and he understood relatively well the
national, political and economic aituation. Consequently, there was an
aspect of dealing flexibly with the situation. But didn't his und erstand-
ing of the existing situation disappear about a year before his assassina-
tion? I think, being military men, these military leaders have scant
understanding of economic development and social change.
[Mitani] It is difficult to discuss a comparison of President Pak who
was in office for 18 years and General Chon who has been in 7 months..
This is a period of confusion for the latter.
~ [Komaki] There is a great ditference between now and 1961 when the
Pak regime started. F irst of all., when President Pak appeared, there was
an international trend toward national independence. Secondly, from the
aconomic po int of view, the Pak era was an era in which it was said the -
economy would gradually improve, but now there is a gap in [thinking]
that the economy is deteriorating. A1so, the.U.S. ~upported President
Pak in order to stabilize the ROK; Japan also supported the Pak regime
- with the Japan-ROK normalization and technological assistance. However,
now Prime Minister Ohira has cooled. When the ~l~ange in this situation
is looked at, it can be said the state of affairs is severe.
[Question] Concerning this incident, there was a strong impression Lhat
the reaction of the U nited States was slow. Did or did not the Korean
military calculate that the U.S. could do nothing? Likewise, did ~ usti-
fication exist tha.t the north would take advantage if the confusion con- _
tinued? How is this incident viewed from the international enviro nment?
[Okonogi] The U.S. and China were for maintenance of the status quo,
and after the Pak rule, the USSRf..which had criticized the ROK mor e
strongly than the U.S. and Chin~, was not very critical of the Kwang~u
incident. The neighboring big powers, ar.taching great importance to
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the maintenance of the status quo, did not want the confusion to continue.
If there was any connection between the domestic state of affaire and the
international enviroryment, the focus of attention was on the attitude of
North Korea (Democratic People's R epubl3c of Korea). However, North-KorEa
has also been taking a flexible line toward the ROK and the U.S. and the
incident happened when North Korea was trying to take the offensive posture.
After the occurrence of the Kwang~u incident, there has been little criti-
cism of the U.S. arid President Cnoe; criticism has been mainly of the
military. I am hoping that these moderate countermeasures of the North
will continue in the future.
[Mitani] There is a great difference in the thinking of the Japanese and
the Koreans concerning the question of the North. We think that an advance
on the South means attack, but in the ROK, they don`t think only o~ an ad-
vance on the South with miaitary force. What they fear most is domestic
disturbances brought about in a peace offensive, such as propaganda through
leaflets and broadcasts, and guerrilla infiltrations. I think this differ-
ence should be recognized.
The U.S. response was extremely unclear. Since Dec~ber of last year,
the U.S. has only repeated the same words, ~'If anyone takes advantage of
the ROK situation, we will respond decisively." Perhaps the U,S. doesn't
know how Lo confront the situation. It seems there is much mutual dis-
trust between the U.S. and the ROK. By stationing troops in Korea,
and through economic a~sistance, the U.S. has intended to strive for
political stability. Bui: there is the feeling in the ROK that this was
part of the U.S.'s world ~trateg}~; it was not actually done for Korea.
It is almost like seeing right through thQ U.S. The same thing can be
said about Japan. Distrast of Japan has come forth because Japan has
held back. It is hoped that this mutual distrust between the U.S. and the
ROK and between Japan and the ROK will be eliminated and a new relationship
w~ll be established.
[Komaki] Certainly the U.S. must be displeased and dissatisfied. But,
contrary to the time when th~ [ROK] removed its army without notifying
the U.S. last D ecember, the U.S. this time has given approval to Korea to
move the army under the command of the U nited Nations forces commander.
The U.S. must have been distressed about this also. There was criticism
from certain antigovernment forces that the U.S. was terrible. The situa-
tion is such that an ant3-U.S. feeling 'has arisen out of a completely ~
pro ~J.S. situation.
The security of the Korean peninsula is the number one ob~ective of the
U.S. Because the NorLh and the SouCh will be stable if the ROK govern-
ment is stable, the Yusin system was valued. F rom such a viewpoint, the
question now is how to apply military and economic pressure against the
military, but it is difficult to apply pressure militarily. Although the
U.S. did not especially intend to apply pressure, it will appear that way
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because acrive econ~mic support from the U.S. will probably end in the
future. There is strong dissatisfaction with the U.S. State Department,
and perhaps this will be expressed in contacts witn the Koreans, and ~
perhaps pressure will gradually be applied. ~:owever, because there would
be national repulsion if the li.S. goes too far, the U.S. also ~rill make
allowances. But won't the tug-of-war between pro-U.S. ai:d anti-U.S.
forces in Korea continue?
[Mitani] Following pol_itical control, control of the economy will appear
as the major ~_~oject. However, this cannot be handled through the con-
cept of the mi'itary. The military follows commands, but management of
the economy must be a democratic concept. -
[Komaki] That is right. The miiitary cannot handle the economy. There-
fore, it is necessary to have an administrative cabinet which includes
civilians who are strong in the economy, and I think this new cabinet has
that kind of character. It is a matter of whether politics will be put
aside and eco nomic stability will be sought; but now, inopportunely, the
problem of wage increases has occurred. The economic situation is bad
and wage increases cannot be aff orded. However, the workers cannot be
patient. Given the suppression of politics and the suppression of the
economy, it is possibJ.e that these two dissatisfactions will be linked `
together. Nonetheless, if i:here is no political stability, will it not
be difficult to wrestl~ with economic problems?
~ [Mitani] During the first half of the Pak government, it was said that
economic stability cannot be expected if there is no political stability.
But now, it is said that political stability cannot be expec ted if there
is no economic stability. In short, if economic control fails, laborers
and smaller businesses will be antagonized. However, it can be hoped
that the present tremors are treu~ors headed for democracy.
[Question] Finally, I would like you to speak about what wilJ. happen
hereafter in Korea, focusing on the direction of democratization.
[Okono~i] (Concerning democratization), the hopes which are aspired by
a semideveloped country ended in wishful thinking and failed. Democrati-
zation will not s~icceed if tried hastily; it takes time. The foundation
of democratization is domestic unity. But I am optimi5tic about the
establishment of a European-style democracy.
[Mitani] Perhaps they will head toward democratization formally with
President Choe at the center. Perhaps it will be a substantially l.imited
democracy, bu t I hope that today's tremors are the "labor" pains of
democracy. I would like to appeal to the good sense of the Koreans.
[Komaki] I f eel the same way, Even the military cannot rep ress the trend
toward democratization. Concretely sp~alcing, definite political freedom
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is aecessary with the ccnstitutional amendments and presidential election
at hand. Under martial law, there can be nn presidential election. How-
ever, it is possible that s cry, questioning the responsibility of General
Chon, will be raised by the students. A vicious circle of opposition to
a 13mited.demociatization is thinkable.
COPYRIGHT : Mainichi Shimbunsha 1980
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- S . KOREA/ ECONOMY
JAPAN TO WAIT UNTIL JAN.UARY FOR FINAL APPROVAL OF LOAN'TO ROK
Tokyo MAINICHI SHIl~UN in Japanese 5 Aug 80 p 7
[Text] 20 Billion Yen Loan to ROK Agreed but Signing Delayed
Amid the upheavals of the ROK political situation, the Japanese Government
has recently b egun working-level consultations with RO& Government su~hori-
ties on providing a yen loan to the ROK this fiscal year. Government cir-
cles revealed on the 4th that tentative agreement had been reached that
(1) the amount of the yen loan would be bet�,~een 19 and 20 billion yen, and
(2) tsrms would be repayment ~n 25 years including 7 years grace, with in-
terest at 4 percent per annum. Aowever, a Foreign Ministry source indd-
cated the same day that signing Qf the exchange note for final settlement
of Che terms of the agreement will not take place right away, but wi 11 be
delayed for some time, "probably till next January." When asked if this
' attitude were related to recent moves by the ROK Government such as the �
prosecution of former presidential candidate Kim Tae-chun~, the source
carefully replied, "I will leave that:to your imagination."
This is related to the "great interest" in treatment of Kim Tae-chung which~�
Foreign Minister Ito expressed to the ROK Government, and is taken as an
indication of the "apprehension" in government circles regarding the ROK
situation.
Indicetion of "Apprehension" Over Kim Tae-chung Case?
' Consultations regarding this yeur's yen loan to the ROK were held last week
in Tokyo between working-level officials of~the two countries. The Koreans
requested a yen loan in excess of 20 b illion yen for the purposes of expand-
ing higher education facilities and modernizing medical and public health
research institutions. In reply Japan said the ROK has graduated from the '
developing country stage to that of a newly :Lndustr3.alized country and that
there has been no change from the principle that economic cooperation with
the ROK should be primarily on a nongovernmental basis, and ~ldvocated last
year's level of 19 billion yen, Ultimately both sides agreed to settle
an thp range of 19 to 20 billion yen.
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It therefore became necessary t~ quickly hold a second round of working-level
- negotiations to make the signiug of an exchange note posaible. Neverthe-
less, on the evening of the 4th a high F~r~ign Ministry official said, "We
allowed the first rotmd of working-level negotiationa to begin last week
with the idea of signing the exchange note about next January." He thua
suggested the signing wouid be left til nexC year.
There are economic reasons for this: ,the ROK economy is in an export slump
because of severe inflation, and the unemployed are growing in number. But -
_ another reason seems to be that there is still "apprehension" in regard to
that country's political situation, as see�.i in the matter of Kim Tae-chung's
arrest and prosecution.
~
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Shimbuneha 1980
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S . KOREP,/ECONOMy
ROK THRF.ATENS JAPAN'S STEEL SALES I1J SOUTHEAST ASIA
- Tokyo MAINICHI DAILY NEWS in English 31 Aug 80 p 5
[Text]
~ ihe risIng power South I{orea
~ I'n addition,~ a fourth furnace '
of in stee! exports is thrn,~tentng ~will be added tb the Pohang
Japan's position as No. ~ 1 ex-; steel plant. ~
_ porter to the Sovtheast Asian It is expected that the im- -
regioQ. : proved equipment will boost the
Otfkials are ~orrled that a~ capaclty of South Korea's crude ~
''st~e1 export war" between the steeI production to 8.5 mUllon
_ two nations may break out next~ tons a year, from the present 5.5
year, ~vhen Swth' Korea starts mlll~On. .
full�fledged opei~at3on of ~ the Ari exeCUtive of the gigapti~
modernized plants at Pohang. Nippon Steel Co. predicted that
Wnat also worries offlc~als is. Swth ~orea's upgraded ability
that. other Asian nations are, to make stee! would result in
increasingly interested in in= smaIler Japanese steel exports
dependent steel production. : to,that country tban hitherto.
' These factocs lead them to~ aJapan sold2.15~million tons uf
- fear that Japan's steel exjwrts steel. to South Korea last year.
to ttre region might sharply; Now there is a distinct~
plummet after ~ aext year,. possibility of We votume being
forcing Japan to, lose its best� ~~1y slashed , for. years to
clients. ~ . come. ~ -
.Iapan exported 31.39' ~itllion~ ~~re serIously, the nation's
tons of sfeel products worldwid~ steet industry is acutely aware
last year. Of the total. 12.48~ ~at the ~strengthening of South
miIlion tons wer~ destir~ed~ for. ~rea's steel p~udnetioa . is
Southeast Asian nations; the to encrnach on Ja an's
..largest buyers of the Item as a~ ~
'~,o~. . . . _ . . predominant market share In
Southeast Asian nations.
~
'Sonfh -I{orea is ~rapidly The ecNtpment investments
~~emerging as a powecful rival in for the Pohan steel lant ~ill
stee} exports to the regiop.. by ailo~ South Korea to P rt ~an
enhancing its steel pmdvction additialal one million~tons of
capaclty. . ~ steel; accordin to the N n
Last month, South Korea Steel executive~ ~
completed ~he s~cond heated- . -
metal rolling plant at Pohang to The growing tendency of
pave the way.for full oqetations Southeast Asian nations to
from next April,~;y, manufgcture their own steel is
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also ~clouding the tuture ot
Japan's steei exports to the
regioa
Taiaan ls taking the lead in
the tr~nd. China ~SteeY Co. of ~
that coimtry is in the course of
~building its second furnace, to
be operat~onal between late 1981
' ~ and 1982.
The new tacility will push up
Taiwan's abllity to make crude
steel to three mil~fon tons per
year, compared with 1.5 milllon
~ at present. - ~ .
Domestic steel production is .
_ also being plarmed in India and
Indonesia. ,
In reflection of fears con-
cerning this trend. voices
calling for a review of Japan's
technical aids in ste~el
pn~duction~ are being heard
from the nation's steel industry.
Some insist that technical
coaperation shauld be extended
from no~v on, by deliberately
calculating the boomerang
effect of the aids. '
This view appears to reftect
the sour lesson learned from the
experlence that South Korea's
_ Pohang steel plant, a growing
threat to Japan~ was built with .
the help of Japan's steel
makers... , . . , .
COPYRIGHT: Mainichi Daily News 1980 '
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N. KOREA/FOREIGN TRADE
~ ~
DPRK, JAPAN TO REVISE GENERAL TRADE CONDITIONS
Tokyo NIHON KEIZAI SHIMBUN in Japanese 21 Aug 80 p 8
[Tokyo U.S. Embassy Translation]
[TextJ Japan-Korea Trade Association Managing Director Riichiro Aikawa said
on the 20th that a delegation including trading firms affiliated with the
Japan-Korea Trade Association an~i shippin~ companiss will visit the DPmocratic
People's Republic of Korea (North Korea) for about 2 weeks from thE :h and
hold negotiations with the International Trade Promotion Com~ittee oi that
country (Chairman: Pang T'ae-yul) to revise the "General Conditions Con-
cerning Transactions in Goods Between Japanese and Korean Trading Firms."
lhese "General Conditions" stipulate procedures and rules for trade between
Japan and Korea. They were concluded in 1963 and revis?d in 1965, and are
to be reviewed this time because of the necessity of revising the basic rules
in order to respond to the expanded trade. The request has been made recent-
ly by both sides. The party was scheduled to leave Jpan on the 18th, but
its departure has been postponed for 1 week at tlie convenience of the North
Korean side.
- Japan-Korea trade is growing rapidly. As to the amount of transactions last
year, exports from Jap~n amounted to ~�61.9 billion and imports to ~�32.7 bil-
lion--~94.6 billion both ways. Thus, they showed an increase of 54 percent
over the preceding year. This year, too, the trend toward exvansion is _
continuing. During the January-June period, exports increased by about
~�10 billion, and imports--by about ~�20 billion. If transactions develop at
the present pace, it is certain that *hey will exceed the ~�105.2 billion
level of 1974, which was an all-time high.
However, there are n.o diplomatic relations between the two countries, and
- moreover, North Korea caused the problem of non-payment of trade bills.
Thus, there are many tasks tuward normalization of trade. On this point,
Japan-Korea Association Managing Director Aikawa says, "Expectations on
trade expnasion are mounting between the two nations, but exports and handling
of impc?rt claims, are posing an obstacle." Therefore a revision of the
"~eneral Conditions" is aimed mainly at consolidating the conditions for
expanding imports of rJorth Korean products to Japan.
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With regard to Japan-Korea economic relation~, the "East Asia Trade R~search
Council," under the leadership of Japan Trade Asaociation Chairman Tatsuzo
Mizukami, was established recently, and moves by large Japaneae enterprisea
to normalize economic relations between the two countries are coming to,the
fore. A delegation of the Japan-Korea Trade Aeaociatioa conaisting o~
Japanese and Korean friendly trading firms, will vi~it North Korea and
people will be watching what sort of concrete conaultations will be held.
But, Managing Director Aikawa went no farther than saying, "I am in no poai-
tion to speak on the moves of the East Asia Trade Research Council, etc.,
and I want to refrain ~rom making any co~ent." ~
COPYRIGHT: Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha 1980
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